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ABSTRACT 
The prime aim of this thesis is to examine the link between fiscal decentralization and local 
financial governance in fiscally empowered woreda administrations (districts) of the Amhara 
region in Ethiopia. Local financial governance has been one of the reasons and arguably the 
crucial one that drives many countries to subscribe to fiscal decentralization. The 
presumption is that public finance mobilization and spending can be implemented in a more 
efficient, responsive, transparent and accountable manner at the local government level than 
at the centre. Nonetheless, empirical studies show that the linkage between fiscal 
decentralization and these local financial governance benefits is not automatic. Several 
developing countries that have tried to implement fiscal decentralization have failed to realise 
the promised financial governance gains largely due to design and implementation flaws.  
A review of the various theoretical perspectives suggest that local financial governance is not 
a factor of just devolution of fiscal power but also other intervening forces such as financial 
management system, citizen voicing mechanisms and the social and political context. It is 
within the framework of this theoretical argument that this study sought to investigate how 
the mixed and incomplete efforts of the district level fiscal decentralization program in the 
Amhara region has impacted on financial governance of woreda administrations. The study 
assesses the efficacy and role of various initiatives of the district level decentralization 
program of the Amhara region, such as the fiscal empowerment of woredas; financial 
management system reforms; citizen voicing mechanisms and political party structures and 
system in influencing woreda financial governance. 
To this end, the investigation process largely took the form of an interpretative approach 
employing a combination of various methods of gathering the required qualitative and 
quantitative data from respondents and documents in the selected four case woredas or 
districts. 
Findings on the assessment of the intergovernmental relations to measure the adequacy of 
devolution of fiscal power indicate that, despite the constitutional provision that affords the 
woredas the power to mobilize and spend public finance for the provision of various local 
public services, several design and implementation shortcomings have constrained woreda 
administrations from exercising such power effectively. As a result, the district level fiscal 
decentralization framework of the Amhara region appears to have features of decentralization 
by de-concentration rather than by devolution. 
Despite the extensive financial management reforms that have been undertaken, the research 
findings indicate that the financial management system in woreda administrations faces a 
range of challenges triggered largely by important design and implementation shortcomings. 
It is observed that the ‘getting the basics right first’ reforms in various financial management 
processes of woreda administrations are not only incomplete but also found to be inconsistent 
with each other and therefore could not serve their purpose. Furthermore, there has not been 
any other change in the last two decades since the initial implementation of these reforms 
despite such serious shortcomings. Most importantly, woreda administrations could not 
properly implement the techniques, methods, procedures and rules that constituted the reform 
process due to serious implementation problems such as the lack of manpower competency 
and problems associated with the lack of administrative accountability. 
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The results of the study’s assessment regarding the practice of social accountability show that 
currently there is no arrangement for citizens to participate in public financial decisions and 
controls. In general, people have little interest in participating in the meetings organised by 
woreda government. Formal and informal community based organizations suffer from 
important capcity constraints, and the lack of strong civil society organizations to support 
these community based organizations makes such problems more difficult to resolve. 
However, local communities did indicate that they would be interested in participating in 
financial and budgeting processes if a number of conditions were satisfied. These included 
the availability of adequate and relevant information; the introduction of genuine forms of 
participation in which citizens were empowered; and evidence that popular participation was 
making a visible impact on financial decisions related to service delivery in their 
surroundings.  
The assessment of the ruling party structure and system suggests that the centralized system 
of the regional ruling party has created a dominant relationship between party organs at 
various levels so much sothat it has undermined the fiscal discretionary power of woreda 
administrations; blurred relationship between party and woreda financial management 
systems; and undermined direct voicing. Consequently, the genuine devolution of fiscal 
power, the effective implementation of the decentralised financial management systems, and 
direct participation of citizens are unlikely to be realised within the current ruling party 
system and structure. 
Moreover, the study shows that the intergovernmental relations, the implementation of 
financial management reforms and direct involvement of people influence each other. The 
evidence suggests that the effective implementation of the financial management reforms is 
not possible without genuine devolution of fiscal power and arrangements for the active 
involvement of citizens.  
Despite these limitations and shortcomings, the research nevertheless reveals that the 
decentralization process has achieved some positive results, such as the expansion of access 
to basic services; the economic use of resources for such expansion; the mobilization of 
resources from local communities; and the streamlining of a number of bureaucratic 
processes. However, the prevalence of various financial governance challenges such as 
excessive budget transfers; low budget execution; uneconomical procurement; illicit 
spending; budget pressure; inadequate revenue collection; poor financial transparency; and 
compromised accountability in fiscally decentralized woreda administrations means the 
promised local financial governance benefits of fiscal decentralization are remain largely  
unrealized. The evidences in the study strongly suggest that the shortcomings in the design 
and implementation of intergovernmental relations, financial management system reforms, 
and direct voicing mechanisms areresponsible in combination with each other for these local 
financial governance challenges. 
Thus, the study concludes that local financial governance is a result of a complex network of 
interactions of intergovernmental relations, public financial management arrangements and 
social accountability mechanisms. The success of initiatives to improve local financial 
governance is dependent on contextual factors such as the capacity of civil society 
organizations and the ruling party system and structure. Therefore, while recommending 
further efforts of genuine devolution of power, in particular through the continuation of the 
financial management reform processes towards full-fledged reforms, the study contends that 
opening enough space for the proliferation of civil society organizations and alternative 
political parties will be the main priority. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
Ethiopia has had a long tradition of centralist government structures. However, the 
situation changed, at least in theory, when the current government
1
 assumed power in 
1991, proclaiming a decentralized form of government in its 1995 constitution and 
making the country a federal democratic republic. The constitution called for the 
establishment of a government structure that has four tiers: federal, regional, woreda 
(district) and kebele
2
. The first wave of decentralization was centered on creating and 
empowering regional governments. Accordingly, regional states were empowered, 
among other things, to issue regional constitutions and other laws, and plan and execute 
social and economic development programs (Tegegn, 1998; Yigremew, 2001). The 
federal constitution does not state the powers and functions to be devolved to woreda 
governments. Instead, it puts an obligation on regional governments to establish woreda 
administrations and to provide them with adequate powers. In practice, however, 
regional governments had often been reluctant to devolve power, thus denying woredas 
the opportunity to exercise such devolved powers (Worku, 2005; Tegegn and Kassahun, 
2007). 
 
However, realizing the importance of devolving power to woreda governments as the 
only means to promote genuine forms of democratic decentralization and to bring 
government closer to the people, the Amhara Regional Government along with three 
other larger regional governments
3
 (including Oromia; Southern Nations, Nationalities 
and People’s Region; and Tigray) has put in place a series of measures to push decision 
making authority and public service delivery to the woreda level. This is known as the 
second wave of decentralization (Worku, 2005).  
 
                                                          
1
 The Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power in 1991overthrowing 
the communist Derge regime after 17 years of guerrilla fighting. After a number of elections the EPRDF 
is still in power. 
2
 Kebeles are formed in a geographical area which is inhabited by 5,000 or more people. So far kebeles do 
not have their own functions and budget. Rather they work as delegated branches of their woreda 
administration 
3
 The Ethiopian Federal Government has 9 regional states and 2 city administrations 
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Proclamation No.59/2001 of the revised constitution of the Amhara Region provides for 
district level decentralization. Accordingly, although woreda administrations are 
recognized as hierarchically subordinate to the regional government in a number of 
respects, they also now have the power to prepare and decide on economic development 
and social service plans within their own territorial area. This proclamation not only 
separates the three organs of government at woreda level (Woreda Council, Woreda 
Executive and Judiciary) but also clearly defines their respective responsibility as well 
as authority. This woreda level decentralization is not limited to the political and 
administrative dimensions of decentralization, but also includes fiscal decentralization 
which provides woreda administrations with the power and responsibility to raise, 
allocate and spend public resources according to the needs of the local community 
(Amhara National Regional State (ANRS), 2001; Worku, 2005; Muhammed, 2007).  
 
The district level fiscal decentralization framework of the region has shifted the 
responsibility and power of providing services to woreda administrations in areas such 
as agriculture, rural water supply, rural road, primary education and health, natural 
resource and rural energy to woreda administrations. To undertake such functions 
wordas are also empowered to collect and utilize local taxes and levies (including rental 
income tax, rural land use fees, agricultural income tax and licenses, and fees and 
charges rendered by woreda offices) when approved by the regional government 
(Worku, 2005; Garcia & Rajkumar, 2008). 
 
As part of this effort, the government of Amhara National Regional State (ANRS)
4
 
started allocating grants directly to woreda governments by using the block grant 
formula. The first block grant formula (the replica of the federal government) took in to 
account population size, the development disparity index
5
, and own revenue 
performance to allocate the grant to woredas. This became operational in 2002. To 
improve the problems of some woredas that suffered from budget deficits, the formula 
                                                          
4
Refers to the official name of the region. 
5
  Computing the development disparity index was a complex process that took into account five factors 
including health index (made up of six components such as number of clinics, number of doctors, number 
of nurses, number of health assistants, number of hospital beds, and mortality rate of children under five); 
road length per KM square; electric power measured as KWH per thousand people; telephone lines per 
thousand people; and percentage of people with safe drinking water. 
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was revised
6
 in 2005 (Mohammed, 2007). Finally, the complexity of the formula and 
the difficulty of getting data forced the region to switch to a unit cost approach. A unit 
cost approach is a needs based approach which can help to provide well-developed 
woredas with the needed high recurrent fund and woredas with low level of public 
services with the needed high investment fund (Garcia & Rajkumar, 2008). 
 
However, many scholars have expressed concerns about the capacity of woreda 
administrations to utilize and spend public finance in an effective, efficient, transparent 
and accountable manner for the socio-economic improvement of their constituents. 
Hence, this research sought to provide an in-depth analysis of the local financial 
governance situation of fiscally empowered woreda administrations in the Amhara 
region to unpack the possible gaps in the financial management and accountability 
systems. Local financial governance here refers to the fiscal aspect of local governance 
whereby local public finance is spent in an efficient, effective, responsive and 
accountable manner with greater citizen participation. It is not just a technical process 
that takes place in the office of the concerned local government executives, but it is a 
political and social process in which not only bureaucrats and their employees but also 
electoral bodies, higher level authorities, civil society and constituents are involved. It is 
a process in which outcomes are affected not only by formal behaviors but also by 
informal behaviors and interactions of those stakeholders (Yilmaz et al. 2008). 
Therefore, this study is an inter-disciplinary study which employs concepts and theories 
of governance that are often used in public finance, political science, sociology and 
public administration in examining the financial management systems and practices of 
fiscally decentralized woreda administrations. The study will not address all the debates 
on the concepts of decentralization in general. Rather it attempts to probe the key 
implementation challenges related to fiscal decentralization in developing countries 
with specific reference to local financial governance.  
 
  
                                                          
6
 To take into account population size, own revenue performance, development disparity index and 
recurrent expenditure need with weights of 50%, 20%, 15% and 15% respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
4 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Central control of government spending and taxation has often been blamed for many of 
the financial governance problems experienced by developing countries. The argument 
is since central government is distant from citizens and does not possess detailed 
information about localities, financial decisions made at the centre cannot address 
diverse preferences and priorities of several local areas in a nation. The World Bank 
(2000) argues that under such circumstances citizens have little say in central 
government decisions and cannot effectively hold public officials accountable for the 
consequence of such decisions. Therefore, fiscal decentralization is often seen as a 
panacea for addressing such challenges. The view that fiscal decentralization is an 
effective tool for improving effective and efficient utilization of public finance in line 
with the desire of the people has been widely accepted. The presumption is that local 
public officials are closer to the people and have better information than their 
counterparts in the central government about the desire of people. Thus they are not just 
able to match their constituents’ preferences and mobilize local resources but also to use 
local knowledge to utilize public resource more effectively and efficiently (Oates 1999; 
Oates 2005; Garzarelli 2004). Moreover, it is argued that fiscal decentralization 
positively reinforces financial governance by bringing government closer to the people 
and by providing people the chance to genuinely participate in public finance decisions 
that affect their daily lives (Crook and Manor 1998; Blair 2000). The 1995 federal 
constitution of Ethiopia as well as the Amhara regional constitutions’ endorsement for 
the decentralized government system implies that financial governance is one of the 
reasons for their decentralization program (FDRE, 1995; Zikre Hig, 2001).  
Nonetheless, the assumption that fiscal decentralization leads to local financial 
governance is not without critics. A review of fiscal decentralization efforts indicates 
that local governments in many developing countries continue to suffer from weak 
financial management and accountability systems that include high indebtedness, 
wastages and misuse of public fund, irregularities and malpractice in procurement, 
inappropriate allocation of resources, inefficient revenue systems, and consequently 
weak delivery of public services. The rush to decentralize taxation and spending power 
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has not often been matched by efforts to improve financial governance at the local level 
(Baltic and Yilma 2007; Fgeldstad 2001; Ott and Bajo 2001).  
This means further efforts are required in order for fiscal decentralization to deliver its 
promised benefits. While fiscal decentralization provides the means, it does not 
guarantee sound financial governance. Nor does it guarantee in particular that the 
money collected and spent by local government would be directed towards addressing 
the desires of the people (Schaefer and Yilmaz 2008). There is no reason to believe that 
local governments always act in a more socially desirable manner than their central 
government counterparts do when they decide on the collection, allocation and spending 
of government finance (Shah 2006). Hence, fiscal decentralization needs to be 
accompanied by efforts to improve the manner in which decisions on the collection and 
spending of public finance are made, and to make local officials accountable for such 
decisions. Financial governance at local levels requires designing and practicing 
effective financial management and accountability system in addition to decentralizing 
collecting and spending responsibilities. Having a system that makes local governments 
accountable to higher level government and an administrative system that ensures 
public finance is protected from misuse, wastage, abuse, and embezzlement by officials 
and bureaucrats is important. But it is also equally important to find ways that guarantee 
that local authorities are responsive to local needs and accountable to their constituents 
for their decisions and their consequence (Schaefer and Yilmaz, 2008).  
In view of this fact, the question in the case of district level fiscal decentralization in the 
Amhara region is whether the necessary arrangements have been put in place for 
woreda governments to capture the promised benefits of decentralization, or whether 
they will continue to suffer from the consequence of weak financial governance. Several 
studies have indicated that the Amhara regional government has been aware of the 
challenges and dangers inherent in the decentralization of powers and responsibilities to 
lower levels of government, and has introduced a number of reforms designed to 
address them. Through its Decentralization Support Activities Project, the regional 
government, for example, has introduced reforms in the areas of planning, budgeting, 
disbursement, procurement, accounting, and cash management and auditing, in line with 
the ‘getting the basics right first’ approach. Worth mentioning is the introduction of new 
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charts of accounts, new budget classifications, double entry book keeping system, 
modified cash accounting system, open bid and bulk procurement methods, single pool 
finance systems and sample based post-audit systems in woreda finance systems 
(Muhammed, 2007; Peterson, 2011).  
A number of in-service training programs have also been offered to woreda 
administration officials and staff members, as well as employees deployed from 
regional and zonal offices to woreda administration offices. Furthermore, guidelines 
and manuals have been prepared and distributed to guide their works (Muhammed 
2007; Worku 2005). Moreover, the then Ministry of Capacity Building through its 
District Level Decentralization Program (DLDP)
7
 has been coordinating and supporting 
the reforms across all regions to minimize the possible challenges of implementing 
fiscal decentralization (Worku 2005). Some of the roles played by the ministry in the 
district level decentralization process include the drafting of legal and policy 
frameworks; designing the governance structure of woredas, preparing manuals for 
reforms; formulating block grant transfer formula; and scaling up of decentralization 
implementation achievements from one region to another (Ministry of Capacity 
Building 2007). 
While the adequacy, appropriateness and sustainability of such reforms is yet to be 
studied, other essential elements of local financial governance advocated in the 
international literature appear to be seriously lacking. For example, the district level 
decentralization reform process does not have any legal instrument that clearly specifies 
the functional competencies devolved to woreda administrations. The legal framework 
proposed by DLDP has not been ratified by regional government council as legally 
binding. Although the constitution requires public officials to be transparent and 
accountable, to date there is no adequate arrangement or legal framework to enforce it. 
Elements of democratic governance, such as multiparty election systems and check and 
balance systems which are generally regarded as a fertile grounds for financial 
governance are weak at woreda level and do not properly function as local 
accountability instruments in Ethiopia in general (Dickovic and Tegegn 2010; Meheret 
                                                          
7
DLDP is a program under the broad Public Sectors Capacity Building Program (PSCBP) supported primarily by the 
World Bank established forcoordinating all decentralization implementation processes in the country 
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2007; Vaugan and Tronvoll 2003; Yilmaz and Vonugopal, 2008). Direct voicing by 
citizens is literally nonexistent in local financial decision making process due to weak 
civil society and media even at national level (Dessalegn, 2002; Pausewang, et.al, 2002; 
Dickovic and Tegegn, 2010). Moreover, the ruling party that has ruled the country for 
more than two decades maintains tight control through a highly centralized party 
structure which is often believed to be inconsistent with the essence of decentralization 
(Paulos, 2007).  
 
To date there have been few studies to assess how such mixed and yet incomplete 
efforts have impacted on local financial governance. Little work has been undertaken in 
the Amhara region or the country as a whole to empirically examine how these different 
initiatives and forces have intermingled to influence woreda financial governance. In 
particular, there have been few studies of the impact of the political environment on the 
extent and effectiveness of the devolution of fiscal powers and the effective functioning 
of financial management systems in the woreda administrations. The majority of the 
studies on district level decentralization of Ethiopia have focused on the adequate 
devolution of fiscal power and the subsequent intergovernmental fiscal relations 
between regional governments and their respective woreda administrations. But this has 
not been sufficient to fully understand the challenges of decentralization, in particular 
because the intended socioeconomic changes for the people will not occur just by 
devolution of resources and powers to woreda administrations without ensuring that 
there are systems to ensure that resources are directed to provide an effective and 
efficient public service. This thesis attempts to fill this gap through a more 
comprehensive empirical investigation and analysis of all the relevant factors involved 
in the district level fiscal decentralization process in the Amhara region. 
 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
The general objective of this study is to investigate the link between fiscal 
decentralization and local financial governance as well as intervening factors in fiscally 
decentralized woreda administrations of the Amhara region. Thus, the specific 
objectives of the study are: 
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 To explain the degree of fiscal decentralization and the resulting nature of fiscal 
relationship between the regional government and woreda administrations, and 
the impact on woreda financial governance 
 To examine the local financial governance consequences of the financial 
management and political reforms put in place in woreda administrations as part 
of the decentralization processes in the Amhara region.  
 To assess the arrangements those have been put in place to involve local citizens 
and civil society, as well as the impact of these on woreda administrations 
financial governance. 
 To unpack how political factors, in particular the intra-party relation of the 
ruling party, have influenced the devolution of fiscal power, the working of 
woreda financial systems, and the involvement of citizens and civil society, 
together with the consequences for woreda financial governance. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
There are two key research questions that this empirical study of the Amhara region 
seeks to address. These are: 
 Have fiscal decentralization and financial management reforms of the Amhara 
region worked to promote or hinder sound and effective financial governance in 
woreda administrations, particularly in the absence of other needed reforms that 
are currently lacking?    
 How factors such as the intergovernmental relations system, the public 
arrangements of governance, the social arrangements of governance, and intra-
party relations of the ruling party influenced and shaped the financial 
governance situation of fiscally decentralized woredas in the Amhara region?  
 
1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
There are four important perspectives that can help to explain the relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and local financial governance. These are presented in more 
detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis). One approach is the fiscal federalism model which 
advocates fiscal decentralization based on a linear link between devolution of fiscal 
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power to local governments and local financial governance (Shah, 2006; Oates, 2004). 
Another approach is public choice theory which argues against such linear linkage 
assumption and suggests that interventions such as elections and checks and balance 
systems can have an important impact on the outcome of the decentralization process 
(Dollery and Wallis, 2001). A third approach is New Institutional Economics theories 
which emphasize the importance of institutions and suggest that in addition to formal 
institutions such as election rules and separation of power the inclusion of informal 
institutions that allow direct involvement of people in the local government financial 
allocation and utilization decisions (Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Shah, 2006; Putnam 
1993; Dollery and Wallis, 2001). A fourth approach is New Public Financial 
Management (NPFM) which proposes ways of improving efficiency and financial 
transparency within local government bureaucracy (Pretorius and Pretorius, 2009).   
 
Although highlighting different elements involved in the decentralization process, these 
four approaches are not necessarily mutually incompatible or in conflict with each 
other. This suggests that financial governance at the local government level can be best 
understood by using a combination of such approaches. This is true especially in 
developing countries where the relevance and efficacy of conventional approaches 
appear not to be effective. Therefore, the theoretical framework employed in this study 
brings the various approaches suggested by those theories together in an effort to 
develop an integrated financial governance approach. 
The diagnostic framework developed by Yilmaz et al (2008) for assessing local 
governance in decentralized countries adopts a similar approach and will be drawn upon 
to guide the theoretical framework for this thesis. As the Yilmaz et al framework was 
formulated to assess local governance in general, modification will be made in this 
study to make it specifically useful for analyzing local financial governance. It is also 
important to note that the Yilmaz et al framework provides a useful but incomplete 
assessment of the local governance situation based on formal policies, structures and 
institutions at country level. A more detailed and sophisticated understanding will also 
require a detailed and critical investigation of additional factors such as the impact of 
formal and informal structures, behaviors and power interactions which may be specific 
to a country, region or local context.    
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Thus, the theoretical framework for evaluating local financial governance study starts 
by examining the theoretical propositions on the devolution of power and the resulting 
intergovernmental relations as well as its impact on financial management and 
accountability of local governments. Generally, when responsibility and power to 
decide on raising and spending public resources are devolved to levels of government 
closer to the people, the more information is available to government about the 
preference and needs of people (Oates, 1972). The more clearly such devolved powers 
are stated, the lesser central government is likely to interfere in local government affairs 
and make unilateral decisions. Consequently, local officials are more likely to take full 
responsibility for their decision on the allocation and use of resources. The clearer that 
intergovernmental relations become, the more likely it is that citizens will become more 
aware of whom is responsible for which public service provision, and will be more 
likely to take action to hold their local officials accountable (Usui, 2007; Bahl, 1999; 
Shah 1998).  
At the same time, the more free and fair local elections are, the less likely politicians 
and officials will be to indulge in opportunistic behaviour, resulting in financial and 
budget decision which are more reflective of citizens’ interest (Crook and Manor, 1998; 
Blair, 2000). Furthermore, the more clearer the separation and balance of power and 
capacity between legislative and executive bodies of local government become, the 
more likely it will be that financial resource allocations will be made efficiently and 
responsively in line with citizen preferences (Lankina, 2008). In addition, the impact of 
various arrangements such as the right of people to recall representatives for re-election, 
reserving seats for minority groups in the local council and allowing non-partisan 
candidate to run for election should also be examined. The more such arrangements are 
exercised, the less the tendency will be for local councillors to be captured by elite 
groups and vested interests (Packel, 2008).  
Direct citizen participation and involvement of civil societies in financial activities as 
well as the impact on financial governance will be examined in detail in this thesis. It is 
argued that the more civil society organizations exist, the more social capital of citizens 
will be developed, leading potentially to stronger forms of accountability and the more 
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responsive and efficient allocation and use of resources ((Yilmaz, et.al; 2008 Putnam, 
1993). 
Nevertheless, all these efforts will not be able to guarantee sound local financial 
governance without appropriate financial management and accountability systems 
within local government. This means the reforms in planning, budgeting, accounting, 
controlling, reporting and auditing systems undertaken in the local government must be 
assessed in terms of their capacity to help managers in the bureaucracy to spend public 
money in an economic and prudent manner, as well as to provide adequate financial 
information to local government councillors and officials, as well as civil society and 
community organizations (PEFA, 2008).  
Hence, the framework suggests that the more the financial management reforms allow 
meaningful linkage between preferred policies and medium term expenditure plans; 
between planned activities and budget; and between financial performance and physical 
performance, the more likely spending will be responsive to the need of the citizens. 
Furthermore, financial information reported to citizens, local council and civil society 
will be more understandable, reliable and complete, thus facilitating improved financial 
management and accountability at the local government level (PEFA, 2008; Pretorius 
and Pretorius,2005). 
Furthermore, the more local political parties are independent from central political 
party, the less likely it will be that client-patron relationships will exist, and that the   
fiscal autonomy of local governments will not be rhetorical. At the same time, the more 
likely it will also be that local government officials (both elected and appointed) will 
take full responsibility for and be disciplined in their financial decisions, and are likely 
to be more accountable to their citizens than to their central political party masters 
(Packel, 2008) 
 
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The lack of adequate local financial management and accountability systems is one of 
the implementation weaknesses of fiscal decentralization in many developing countries. 
District level decentralization in the Amhara Region commenced a decade ago. Despite 
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the fact that this period provides an adequate time span to discern achievements and 
limitations of the reforms, to date little has been done to study the impact of financial 
management reforms in fiscally decentralized woreda administrations. It is hoped, 
therefore, that the findings of this study provide information that can help different 
actors in the decentralization process in Ethiopia and Amhara Region to understand 
achievements and setbacks, and determine what additional interventions are needed. 
The study is of particular relevance to international development partners that are 
supporting the district level decentralization process in Ethiopia.  
 
Recent studies conducted by the World Bank (2008) in ten decentralized developing 
countries have employed the World Bank diagnostic framework to examine the link 
between discretionary power and accountability using mainly national data and 
legislations. Their findings show that in none of these countries have decentralization 
reforms conformed to the prescribed framework and the promised benefits have not 
been realized. However, the reason for these failures has not been fully answered. A 
detailed case study like this one that uses local data may help to fill this knowledge gap.  
 
In addition, in developing countries most fiscal decentralization designs and 
implementation processes are criticized for simply imitating the experience of 
developed countries instead of innovating their own. The finding of this research will 
help to address this issue by indicating accountability and financial management 
systems and practices of the implementation of fiscal decentralization appropriate to the 
context of developing countries. Furthermore, the findings of this study could provide 
clear and comprehensive insights about the intricacies that exist between different 
forces involved in local financial governance based on empirical evidence, thereby 
contributing to current theoretical debates surrounding fiscal decentralization. 
 
1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
 
This thesis is designed primarily to assess the link between fiscal decentralization and 
local financial governance. Fiscal decentralization and various public and social 
arrangements of financial governance are at the centre of the study. But it has to be 
noted also that, in addition to fiscal decentralization, administrative and political 
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decentralization will also be discussed, as the issue of fiscal decentralization is in many 
ways inseparable from that of administrative and political decentralization.  
 
Moreover, this study covers both the expenditure and revenue sides of woreda public 
finance; although not all issues related to revenue collection will be addressed. The 
problem of adequate revenue generating, particularly in the developing world, is a wider 
issue than those covered by this thesis. 
 
Subsequent to the implementation of various financial management reforms, woredas 
also have also undergone another reform known as Business Process Reengineering 
(BPR) through which woredas have reorganized their organizational structure, working 
units, work techniques, operational processes, and roles of staff members aiming at 
leveraging efficiency and generating cost saving. Such reforms will also be referred to 
in this thesis, though not in extensive detail. 
 
The study also focuses on some elements of service delivery performances of woreda 
administrations to specifically analyse budget allocation responsiveness and utilization. 
However, this does not mean that the study will cover the whole issues of service 
delivery in woreda administrations. Neither the scope of this study nor the collected 
data would allow a full coverage of the service delivery performance issue. Hence, it 
has to be noted that the purpose and coverage of service delivery issues of woreda 
administrations by this study does not go beyond showing the allocation responsiveness 
and utilization of public finance 
 
1.8 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis is organized in nine chapters. 
Chapter One provides introductory background information for the study that includes 
the rationale of the study, the statement of the problem; objectives of the study; research 
questions; the theoretical framework of the study; the significance of the study; and the 
scope & limitations of the study. 
Chapter Two (“Review of Literature”) is devoted to a critical review of the theoretical 
and conceptual literature with regard to decentralization, as well as to the establishment 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
14 
 
of a theoretical framework for the study. In particular, a critical analysis is provided of 
the strengths and weaknesses of different local financial governance approaches, as well 
as the implications for the design and implementation of successful fiscal 
decentralization programs. 
Chapter Three (“Decentralization in Ethiopia”) presents background information about 
the country and decentralization process, including a historical, political and socio-
economic profile of the country. The nature of the country’s federal government system 
and overall governance system is also presented. Furthermore, the nature of district 
level decentralization that has been introduced across all the regions and its local 
governance implication is provided in this chapter. 
Chapter Four (“Research Methodology”) provides a detailed explanation of the research 
design, sources of data, types of data, data collection instruments, reflections of field 
research and presentation of data and data analysis techniques. 
Chapter Five (“Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationship and Woreda Financial 
Governance”) focuses on analysing the impacts of fiscal decentralization design and 
practice on local financial governance practices of district administrations. Hence, in 
this chapter, functional competencies, autonomy, financial resources devolved to district 
governments are evaluated. The complications or inconveniences that the current fiscal 
decentralization present on financial management processes such as planning, 
budgeting, budget implementation, reporting, evaluation and auditing are analysed. It 
also analyses the impact of decentralization on the autonomy of woreda administrations, 
as well as the extent of public involvement in financial management process.  
Chapter Six (“Budgeting Reforms and Woreda Administrations Financial Governance”) 
addresses the link between public arrangements of budgeting in the woreda financial 
management process and the financial governance of woreda administrations. The 
budgeting reforms introduced as part of the district level decentralization initiative in 
the areas of woreda socio-economic planning, budget formulation, budget estimation, 
budget calendar, budget classifications and codes, budget appropriations and allocations 
and the impact on woredas financial governance are presented in this chapter. 
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Chapter Seven (“Reforms in Budget Implementation, Controlling and External Scrutiny 
and Local Financial Governance”) is a continuation of the issues discussed in Chapter 6, 
and covers reforms in the areas of revenue assessment and collection, procurement, cash 
management, accounting and auditing. It also focuses on the impact of the political 
environment on the efficiency, effectiveness and popular accountability of the financial 
governance systems introduced. A particular focus will be on the capacity of such 
financial management and political reforms to preserve financial discipline and 
safeguard public finances from wastage, corruption and other forms of abuse. 
Chapter Eight (“Determinants of Local Financial Governance beyond State Realm”) 
addresses factors outside the domain and immediate control of woreda administrations 
that can nevertheless impact on the success of the effort to improve woreda financial 
governance. The chapter consists of two broad parts. The first part is about the 
assessment of social accountability practices and their impact on the financial 
governance of woreda administrations. It presents an assessment of the practice of 
different social accountability arrangements and their impact on local financial 
governance. First it assesses if the existing gaps in the public arrangements of financial 
management demand social accountability methods. Examination of existing social 
accountability practices and the impact on local financial government is presented. The 
challenges and opportunities of using both formal and traditional associations for 
strengthening the financial accountability of woreda administrations are also discussed.   
 The second part is about the impact of the regional ruling party system and structures 
on intergovernmental relations, the working of financial management systems and the 
effectiveness of initiatives to directly involve citizens in financial matters. A particular 
focus is on the impact of the link between intra political party relations and the local 
financial autonomy of woreda administrations. An assessment is also presented of how 
intra party relations of the ruling party obstruct or facilitates the role of various 
traditional and formal community associations to work as an alternative means of 
ensuring financial accountability in woreda administrations. 
Chapter Nine (”Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations”) brings together both the 
theoretical literature and empirical findings to synthesize, summarize, draw conclusions 
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and make recommendations with respect to the fiscal decentralization process in the 
Amhara region.  
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
2. 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is designed to provide a conceptual and theoretical back ground for the 
study and consists of two broad parts. The first addresses the conceptual clarification of 
fiscal decentralization and local financial governance. The second discusses different 
perspectives regarding the link between fiscal decentralization and local financial 
governance. 
 
2.2 FISCAL DECENTRALISATION AND LOCAL FINANCIAL 
GOVERNANCE 
2.2.1  Defining Decentralization 
The last two decades have witnessed an unprecedented move in the developing world 
towards transferring power and resources from central government to sub-national and 
local governments (OECD, 2004; World Bank 2005). Many developing countries have 
embarked upon decentralization for its supposed potential in promoting economic 
growth and good governance by improving the levels of public participation, 
accountability, administrative and allocative efficiency, and responsiveness to local 
needs (Litvack et al, 1998). Decentralization has therefore occupied an important 
position within the development discourse. Decentralization has been given different 
meaning in different countries. But, generally, it can be conceived as the transfer of 
powers and responsibilities for decision making, planning, management and resource 
allocation from the central government to administrative units, sub-national and local 
governments, semi-autonomous public authorities and parastatal organizations 
(Rondinelli et al, 1983; Litvack et. al, 1998). Recently, the meaning of decentralization 
has been extended by some authors to include privatization and transfer of power to 
civil society organizations (Oyugi, 2000). 
The nature and scope of decentralization may vary from country to country depending 
on the objectives driving the reform. At one extreme, some countries have limited the 
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reforms to the least extensive form of decentralization, known as de-concentration, 
whereby selective administrative functions with very limited decision powers are passed 
down to geographically dispersed branches of central government ministries. Others 
have opted for delegated forms of decentralization through the transfer of specific 
authorities and decision making powers to indirectly central government controlled 
organizations, such as parastatals and semi-autonomous agencies. This power can be 
taken back by the central government at any time. Conversely, many countries have 
come to realize that strengthening local government through the devolution of 
discretionary power to elected forms of representative local government is an important 
element of advancing economic growth and governance at local level. This is 
decentralization by devolution whereby local governments are provided with clear 
discretionary power to decide independently over resources and to design and execute 
development plans and programs within broad national policy guidelines (Cheema and 
Rondinelli, 1983; Litvack et. al, 1998). Devolution involves a number of dimensions, 
such as political, administrative or fiscal decentralization. This study will focus 
primarily on the latter dimension, namely fiscal decentralization, although it is 
recognized that for effective forms of fiscal decentralization to be established they will 
need to be accompanied by appropriate forms of political and administrative 
decentralization. 
2.2.2 Fiscal Decentralization 
Fiscal decentralization in many ways constitutes the core of decentralization and is 
considered by some scholars as the true measure of local autonomy (Bahl, 2000; 
Smoke, 2001). For instance, Conforti et al. (cited in Dererese, 2003) argue that local 
governments often lose their enthusiasm and interest in decentralization if they are not 
given command over some degree of resources and are frustrated if their role is limited 
to execute policies that are decided elsewhere. Litvack et al (1998) also point out that it 
is fiscal decentralization that can link local financing and fiscal power to the service 
provision responsibilities and functions of local government so that local politicians can 
bear the costs of their decision and deliver on their promises.  
Fiscal decentralization is justified by its economic and governance gains. Economic 
efficiency and equity gains can be achieved in fiscally decentralized countries through 
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allocation efficiency due to informational advantages at the local level and a closer 
match between public services and the preferences of people (Shah, 1998; Tiebouts, 
1956; Oates, 1972; McClure, 1995). Public administration scholars, such as Wolman 
(1995; cited in Kee, 2002) point out that fiscal decentralization, by bringing decision 
making closer to the people, can promote improved governance and democracy through 
the greater participation of citizens in government expenditure and revenue decisions as 
well as transparent, accountable and responsible forms of local government. 
Fiscal decentralization is an integral subset of decentralization defining how and in what 
ways expenditures and revenues are organized between and across different levels of 
government (Smoke, 2001). It can also lead to the empowerment of communities by 
involving them in financial decision making and holding local government officials to 
account (Bahl, 2005).  
Fiscal decentralization involves the effective devolution of four key functions or powers 
to lower levels of government. These are the assignment of expenditure responsibility; 
revenue assignment (taxing powers); intergovernmental fiscal transfers; and 
responsibility for local government borrowing (Smoke, 2001; Bahl, 1999). 
Fiscal decentralization is not without dangers or critics. Among the many cautionary 
notes, it is important to mention Prud’homme’s (1994) “dangers of decentralization” 
and Tanzi’s (2001)“pitfalls of decentralization”. Such critics have highlighted a number 
of conditions of developing countries which might lead to the failure of fiscal 
decentralization. They summarize these conditions as insufficient information and 
political power on the part of the people to influence local officials, the tendency for 
local officials to be more corruptible than national officials, and weaker bureaucratic 
and financial management system at local government levels compared to the national 
government level. Prud’homme (1995) further points out a number of additional 
possible dangers of fiscal decentralization. These include the worsening of inter-local 
and inter-regional fiscal inequality, destructive inter-local competition to attract 
investors, and the limits placed on the ability of central government to influence 
national policy at the local level. The reports of recent empirical studies on fiscal 
decentralization, in the same way, contain many cases where decentralization has not 
led to efficient allocation and spending of public resources and greater accountability. 
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McLure (1995) asserts that some of the criticisms arise from wrong assumptions 
concerning the ‘pure decentralization of fiscal federalism’. Pure decentralization is a 
‘straw man’ that hardly ever exists in reality in any country. Instead, fiscal 
decentralization almost inevitably involves striking the right balance between 
decentralization and centralization according to the reality and needs of the country 
(McLure, 1995; Shah, 2006; Sharma, 2005). On the other hand, the cautionary notes 
highlighted above have led scholars to focus more attention on the design and possible 
implementation failures of fiscal decentralization processes in developing countries. 
McLure (1995:221) himself concedes the limitations in the implementation and 
designing of fiscal decentralization stating “decentralization, done badly, can cause 
problems”. Smoke (2001) argues similarly that disappointing results in fiscal 
decentralization reforms are not the result of inherent characteristics of fiscal 
decentralization. Instead they typically result from failures in design and 
implementation of the reform process due to weakness in or the absence of the 
necessary institutional arrangements, such as an appropriate legal framework, effective 
political and administrative institutions, and civil society involvement (Litvack et al., 
1998). One of these design and implementation problems, which will be probed 
specifically by this study, concerns the local financial governance gap that developing 
countries can well face when they devolve fiscal power to their local governments.  
2.3 MEANING AND DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS IN FINANCIAL 
GOVERNANCE 
2.3.1 Local Governance 
It is important to clarify the meaning of local governance in general, before taking a 
look at its specific version that is financial governance. Local governance is defined 
differently by different authors. For instance, Stoker (1998) defines local governance in 
terms of the interaction and interdependence between various actors at the local level, 
and the role of government in guiding and regulating these relationships. According to 
Stoker, local governance is the complex and autonomous network of interaction, guided 
by set of institutions, between interdependent actors, such as government, private sector, 
civil society, in which government takes the leadership in guiding and steering this 
partnership in the most innovative way to tackle social and economic problems. 
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Likewise, Leach and Percy-Smith (2001) place emphasis on the role of government and 
other actors in service provision process at the local level. Andrews (2006) refers to 
effective government and defines it in terms of the desired outcome expected from 
governance: responsive, efficient and effective provision of public service. Popular 
participation of the people, accountability and the means by which public officials and 
politicians come to power are also considered in other writings. Shah (2006:2) refers to 
governance as:  
The norms, traditions and institutions by which power and authority in a 
country is exercised—including the institutions of participation and 
accountability in governance and mechanisms of citizens’ voice and exit and 
norms and networks of civic engagement; the constitutional-legal framework 
and the nature of accountability relationships among citizens and governments; 
the process by which governments are selected, monitored, held accountable 
and renewed or replaced; and the legitimacy, credibility and efficacy of the 
institutions that govern political, economic, cultural and social interactions 
among citizens themselves and their governments.  
Governance is often used interchangeably with accountability (Mulgan, 2000). For 
example O’Connell (2005) seems to use accountability as akin to governance by stating 
that accountability is present when public services have a high quality, at a low cost and 
are performed in a courteous manner. Koppell (2005) also associates accountability 
with governance by broadening the meaning of accountability to include other elements 
of governance, such as transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility, 
responsiveness. However, other authors such as Bovens (2007:450) tries to show the 
distinction between governance and accountability by narrowing down the meaning of 
accountability as “a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has 
an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions 
and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences”. One can say, therefore, that 
governance is a broader concept in which accountability is is just one element, albeit a 
very important one.  
Andrews (2008) argues that the use of one best way of governance that works 
effectively in some developing countries may be inappropriate in others. Governance, 
according to him is largely associated with the processes through which local 
government officials come to power and exercise it responsibly, as well as the role of 
other local institutions, civil society and citizen in strengthening accountability. 
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However the role of the private sector and civil society institutions in service provision 
processes is not highlighted as much in developing countries when compared to their 
more developed counterparts, due to the relatively limited capacity of such institutions 
at the local level. 
2.3.2  Local Financial Governance 
Applying the concept of local governance specific to local public finance, local 
financial governance in this thesis is used to refer to the fiscal aspect of local 
governance whereby local public finance is raised and spent in an efficient, effective, 
responsive and accountable manner with greater citizen participation (World Bank, 
2008). It is not just a technical process that takes place in the office of the concerned 
local government executives, but it is a political and social process in which not only 
bureaucrats and their employees but also electoral bodies, higher level authorities, civil 
society and constituents are involved. It is a process in which its outcomes are affected 
by formal and informal behaviors as well as the interactions of those stakeholders. 
Thus, this study probes the local financial governance gap in woreda administrations of 
the Amhara region. The gap in local financial governance in fiscally decentralized local 
governments is witnessed when the central government’s financial management 
standards, procedures and rules are weak or not enforceable; when the financial 
management tools in the local government fail or are not effectively implemented to 
ensure collection and spending of public finance is towards the attainment of local 
government policy objectives; when the legislative body fails to countercheck the 
financial decision of the executive; and when citizens are unable to ensure that the  
financial decisions of local government are reflective of their collective interest. This 
results in a situation where, amongst other things:  
 The use of public finance does not comply with central or local government 
financial management standards, procedures and rules; 
 The use of public finance reflects individual, group or political interests at the 
expense of public interest;  
 Public services are not adequately, timely and sustainably financed;  
 Inadequate revenue is collected from limited sections of society;  
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 Collection and use of finance is not effectively accounted for and reported; and 
 The use public finance is wasteful and uneconomical.  
In short, the existing public and social arrangements in the locality are incapable of 
helping the local government to mobilize adequate resources and prevent misallocation, 
wastage and corruption of devolved public resources. 
 
Hence, the examination of the presence and extent of the gap in local financial 
governance involves analysis of not only the financial management process that takes 
place internally in local government administrations but also of the accountability 
relationship that exists between the different actors that are involved directly or 
indirectly in the local financial management process. That is to say the study on local 
financial governance should look into not only the financial management tools used in 
the local government administration but also the financial accountability mechanisms 
used in the interaction between different actors such as higher level government bodies, 
local executives, local legislators and citizens. Therefore, despite the difficulty of 
making clear demarcation, as financial management tools also serve accountability, 
local financial governance arrangements can be categorized into local financial 
management and local financial accountability. 
2.3.3 Local Government Financial Management 
Local government financial management can be conceived as a process that takes place 
in the local government administration involving several activities, including budgeting, 
accounting, revenue raising, cash management, debt management, internal controlling, 
reporting and auditing, to ensure that local government funds are collected, allocated 
and disbursed in an effective, responsive, efficient, transparent and accountable manner 
(Schaeffer, 2003).  
2.3.3.1 Budgeting   
Budgets represent the core element of any integrated local government financial system. 
Local governments plan, implement and evaluate local government policies through 
their budget (Gianakis and Mc Cuem, 1999).  
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Writers have defined the word budgeting differently. Schaeffer (2003) defines 
budgeting as the quantification of activity plans or strategic plans in monetary terms. 
Bland et al, (1997) define it as a projection of future revenues and expenditures. Jones 
(2007) focuses on the budget as a request by the executive of a government for authority 
from the legislature to impose taxes and spend them. Thus, in the context of local 
governments, budgets may be seen as a one year financial plan proposed and approved 
by local executive and legislative authorities respectively that includes planned 
expenditures and revenues derived from medium term expenditure plans and needed for 
undertaking planned activities of the same fiscal year to accomplish local policy. 
Budgeting is the principal instrument by which government translates into action the 
policies and programs set out in its development plans, and it plays a pivotal role in the 
financial management of the economy (Schaefer, 2005). At a minimum, a budget is 
used to control financial transactions. However, Pandy (1979) explains that besides 
controlling financial transactions, a budget should also be used as a management and 
planning tool. Budgets are needed to plan and control the receipts and expenditures of 
monies to provide allocated services to the people. Traditionally, there are two types of 
budgets: recurrent budget and capital budget. 
The recurrent budget is concerned with the regular operation of services, including 
salaries, pension contributions, the purchase of short life equipment, the costs of routine 
repair and maintenance, and the servicing of long-term debt (principal and interest). On 
the revenue side, revenues, including own source taxes and fees are credited to the 
recurrent budget whereas the capital budget is largely concerned with the creation of 
long term assets (such as roads, pipes, schools, water treatment plants). The only 
revenues credited to the capital budget are loans or grants specifically targeted for the 
developments of capital projects or receipts from the sale of capital assets (for example 
land, buildings). However, there are some unclear areas between capital and recurrent 
expenditure. Debt service is sometimes shown as capital expenditure as opposed to 
recurrent operating expenses. Debt service should be included in the recurrent budget if 
it is a charge against a recurrent tax or grant revenues. Vehicles and equipment with 
medium-term useful life can appear in either the capital or operating budget (Schaeffer, 
2003). 
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There are different budgeting approaches used to allocate public finance: line-item 
budgeting, performance budgeting and program budgeting. Each of these differs in the 
way in which funds are allocated for expenditures, and in the orientation of the budget: 
control, management efficiency or planning. Line-item budgeting is the easiest to 
prepare and is a traditional type of budgeting that lists how much the local government 
will spend on every item that it uses. Cost categories include personal services, 
operating expenses and capital out lay which are often further detailed in object codes. 
Its primary orientation is that of input or expenditure control. It shows how much 
money is appropriated to specific cost categories but does not tell how much is spent to 
provide service (Schaeffer, 2003). 
Performance budgeting and program budgeting are new paradigms suggested by the 
New Public Management or NPM (Hood, 1991). Performance budgeting allocates 
money to various programs within an organization but also details the performance 
targets on which the budget is predicated. Executives and managers are given more 
autonomy over how they manage their budgets, but have to agree performance targets 
for which they are accountable for achieving with the resources provided. The 
performance target is identified by the use of performance measures. In addition to 
controlling costs its primary orientation is that of improving the internal management of 
the program. It can provide information in assessing the quantity, quality, and 
productivity of the budget.  
Furthermore programme budgeting, in order to align budgets with public needs and 
policies, allocates money to major program areas, focusing on the expected results of 
services and activities to be carried out. The emphasis is on the attainment of long term 
local level community goals. Medium-term expenditure planning is a tool used to link 
policy and the annual budget. In this case revenues and expenditures are linked to multi-
year community goals and objectives. The anticipated results and output of the 
investments are identified in program budget. The distinction between the two is while 
performance budget emphasizes management efficiency, program budget emphasizes 
the benefits that the local community gains from government expenditures (PEFA, 
2008; Schaefer, 2003).  
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In addition, the process of preparing budgets may take one of two methods: incremental 
budgeting or zero-based budgeting. Incremental budgeting is the traditional budgeting 
method where by the budget is prepared by taking the current period’s budget or actual 
performance as a base, with incremental amounts are then being added for the new 
budget period. This incremental amount will include adjustment for things such as 
inflation, volume of tasks or planned increase in revenues. It has been argued that a 
process which concentrates on an increment is preferable to one that attempts to review 
the whole budget because it moderates conflict, reduces search costs, stabilizes 
budgetary roles and expectations, and reduces the amount of time that officials must 
invest in budgeting, thus increasing the likelihood that important political values will be 
taken into account. However, there had been a criticism that incremental method offers 
little explanation as to how decisions are made or how the increment is divided (Schick, 
1983). 
 
With a zero-based budgeting, however the budgeting process starts from a base of zero, 
with no reference being made to the prior period’s budget. All of the budget heads, 
therefore, literally start with a balance of zero, unlike incremental budgeting that starts 
with at least a balance equal to last year’s budget or spend. Every department function is 
then reevaluated comprehensively with all expenditures requiring approval. Zero-based 
budgeting tries to achieve an optimal allocation of resources to the programs of the 
organization where they are most needed. Managers are required to justify every 
activity in their department. Theoretically, no unjustified activities are allocated 
resources. Therefore, Zero-based budgeting involves three steps. It starts with from the 
identification of all possible activities to meet the objectives of the organization; 
followed by ranking alternative activities on a cost/benefit basis; and lastly allocating 
resources to activities according to their order of priority up to the spending level.   
2.3.3.2 Accounting and Cash Management 
Traditionally, accounting has been seen as relatively straight forward- document the 
cash come in and record the cash going out. Nonetheless, accounting involves the 
systematic gathering, recording and reporting of complex financial transactions in a 
meaningful and consistent manner. This helps various stakeholders as well as local 
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government decision makers to measure progress towards service targets and missions 
goals established in the budget, estimate resources required to accomplish these 
services; cost each of public services and effectively allocate public resource across 
competing goals and objectives (PEFA, 2008; Jones,2007; Scheafer, 2003). 
Several accounting methods are recognized by the International Federation of 
Accountants: cash, modified cash, modified accrual and accrual (Schaefer, 2003; Jones, 
2007). The simplest of all accounting procedures is cash accounting in which revenues 
and transfers are not recorded in accounts until cash is received, and expenditures and 
transfer are recorded only when cash is disbursed. But this system is not recommended 
by GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles), primarily because it fails to 
adequately control local government transactions as it does not record liabilities or 
future obligations and receivables or future benefits (Jones, 2007). Cash basis 
accounting can be modified to recognize short term receivables and commitments which 
will be received or due in the same period. But its limitation is that it ignores long term 
receivables or commitments that extend to the next year (Schaeffer, 2003). 
However, in order to get a complete and clear picture concerning local government 
accounts, the costs of services and resources used for a particular service target, 
revenues and expenditures of local government must be recorded not at a point in the 
time the cash is received or the disbursement made, but in the period in which benefit of 
the transaction occurs. As such accrual accounting records transactions according to the 
benefit period, instead of the period in which cash moves (Jones, 2007). A problem in 
many developing countries, however, is that the anticipated revenues may not in actual 
fact be collected. For instance, tax payers may dispute the amount owed, and the terms 
of grants and other transfer payments may be changed after the local government has 
already budgeted and spent the money. Hence, local government may adopt modified 
accrual accounting in which expenses are accrued but income from taxes, fees and other 
resources are recorded only when collected. The objective is to protect against possible 
cash deficiency that may occur when the recorded revenue is not actually available for 
disbursement (Jones, 2007). 
A related issue is cash management. Today the purpose of cash management is not 
limited to buying bills and collecting taxes, fees, fines, and other revenues, but has been 
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expanded to include other responsibilities such as availing the required amount of cash 
at the required time, mobilizing idle fund in banking accounts and minimizing the cost 
of borrowing. Such activities are carried out through careful cash flow projections so 
that shortfalls and surpluses can be determined with their possible remedies. Of course, 
the options available for cash managers vary depending on the legal framework in 
which the local government operates and its ability to generate its own resources 
(Larson, 2007). 
After all these activities, what matters for accountability is how it is reported to 
stakeholders: executives, councilors, civil society and citizens. To be useful, financial 
information reported to them must be relevant, comparable, reliable and understandable. 
Relevant information meets the needs of users. Information is relevant if it is substantial 
and provided in time to influence decisions the user must make. Financial information 
should be comparable across reporting periods and between different organization units. 
Reliable information must be accurate, complete, unbiased and free from errors or 
mistakes. People who prepare internal financial reports must keep in mind the capability 
of councilors, civil society and citizens in particular (PEFA, 2008).  
2.3.3.2 Auditing 
Local government auditing, like traditional corporate auditing, is intended to reduce 
asymmetry of information and to reinforce trust between the principal and agent. In 
other words, audit findings and opinions help constituents and local councillors 
(principals) to have confidence on the financial information presented by the local 
executive body (the agent) in the process of performance review or evaluation. In this 
sense, the audit can be considered a signal of any wrongdoing by agent to the principal 
in the principal-agent relationship (Yandell, 1988). By definition an audit is an 
examination of systems, procedures, programs and financial data (Kishnadwala et. al., 
1998). Auditing involves the responsibilities of analyzing the financial position of the 
local government, including financial trends; the quality of receipts and expenditures; 
evaluating the performance of the government on various financial managements and 
accounting issues; the observance of financial activities in line with rules and 
regulations; and the identification of wasteful expenditures, inefficiencies and delays     
(Baltaci and Yilmaz, 2007). However, in many countries the audit functions have been 
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expanded to include investigating the government agency’s performance against the 
resource used, in order to judge if it has succeeded in achieving its service targets, 
objectives and missions with respect to budget implemented. This is to say that not only 
compliance auditing but also performance auditing is needed to tackle the information 
asymmetry problem.  
Local governments typically make use of both internal and external auditing. Internal 
auditing is instituted within a particular government organization but should not be 
confused with internal controlling activities. Internal controls are the systems put in 
place to ensure sound financial management and service delivery. They emphasize the 
establishment of systems which contain rules, regulations, procedures and routines. 
These are intended to make sure that adequate levels of funding are available for public 
service; that all transactions comply with legal frameworks; and that spending is 
consistent with stated policies, organizational objectives, and performance criteria. The 
purpose of auditing, on the other hand, is to check the appropriate working of those 
systems (Hughes, 2007). The feature that most distinguishes audit from internal control 
is that the audit operates independently from the entity’s administration and internal 
control structure (Baltaci and Yilmaz, 2007). 
In general, there are two standards of the International Organization of Supreme Audit 
Institutions (INTOSAI) proposed for all organizations to adopt: independence and 
professional skills. Independence is essential to auditing to ensure that its investigation 
and report not be biased by a relationship it might have. Besides, auditing is a 
profession that requires a wide range of technical skills. Audit function should be 
assigned to a skilled local accounting auditing practitioner (A.B.C, 2007). 
2.3.4 Local Financial Accountability 
The financial management activities discussed so far focus on the financial processes 
that take place within the internal organization of government agencies. But as 
mentioned earlier, financial governance is about much more than such technical 
processes. It also includes the accountability relationship between different actors 
outside of the organization process. Accountability relationships in local government, in 
general, can be conceived as the exercise of countervailing power by one actor to 
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balance the arbitrary action of the empowered actor (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). 
Although authors have defined accountability differently (for example, Agrawal and 
Ribot, 1999; Mulgan, 2000; Mashaw, 2006; Bovens, 2007), most definitions share some 
important elements. Firstly, accountability exists only when there is a power 
relationship between actors. These actors in the local government context are the three 
organs of local government (local councils, executives and courts), constituents and 
civil society organizations. Secondly, accountability places an obligation on the 
empowered actor to provide information and explanation for their actions and their 
result. Thirdly, it provides the power to apply sanctions on the empowered actors when 
their action is deemed unsatisfactory. Hence, local financial accountability can be 
conceived as the arrangement whereby local governments can be held accountable by 
their constituents, as well as from above (by higher levels of government), for their 
decision on the raising, allocation and disbursement of local finance.  
Financial accountability arrangements can take a number of forms, including legislative 
budget scrutiny and social accountability arrangements. In democratic and devolved 
forms of local governance, the local government council as the highest political body in 
the locality plays a vital role of holding the local administration management 
accountable for the allocation and utilization of local public finance in line with the 
socioeconomic needs of the people. This is done through its process of regular approval 
of budget plans, as well as through the monitoring and evaluation of budget 
performance (PEFA, 2008).  
In addition, there are also social accountability arrangements which allow the direct 
engagement of citizens in the financial management process. In the developing world, 
the formal local government financial management systems have often not proved  
strong enough to provide timely and reliable information for people and ensure 
accountability. Thus social accountability approaches have emerged in response to these 
weaknesses of public financial accountability systems. Such mechanisms allow civil 
society and ordinary citizen to be involved throughout the financial management 
process starting from planning and budgeting to budget execution and auditing.  
Recent experiences have revealed that social financial accountability can enhance 
accountability through making local government financial information accessible to the 
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public; allowing strong public involvement in budgetary process through participatory 
budgeting practices; and initiating independent budget analysis and participatory 
expenditure tracking program that monitor budget execution (World Bank, 2008).  
Participatory budgeting is an innovative mechanism which aims to involve citizens in 
the decision-making process of public budgeting. It allows citizens to voice their 
priorities and is instrumental in making the allocation of public resources more 
inclusive and equitable. 
Independent budget review and analysis is another process in which a wide range of 
stakeholders research, unpack, monitor and disseminate information about public 
expenditure and investments, to assess whether allocations match the governments 
announced social commitments. This may involve analyzing the impact and 
implications of budget allocations, demystifying the technical content of the budget, 
raising awareness about budget-related issues and undertaking public education 
campaigns to improve budget literacy. 
Public expenditure tracking is another process which involves citizen groups tracking 
how the government actually spends funds, with the aim of identifying leakages and/or 
bottlenecks in the flow of financial resources or inputs. Typically, these groups employ 
the actual users or beneficiaries of government services (assisted by Civil Society 
Organizations) to collect and publicly disseminate data on inputs and expenditures. This 
approach often involves the triangulation of information received from disbursement 
records of finance ministries, accounts submitted by line agencies and information 
obtained from independent enquiry (using, for example, tools like expenditure tracking 
surveys or social audits). Information is disseminated through the use of media, 
publications and public meetings.  
Social auditing or accountability approaches are not an alternative but rather a 
complementary arrangement to formal forms of external auditing that requires close 
forms of partnership between the external audit agency and civil society organizations 
involved in social auditing processes. 
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2.4 THEORIES ON THE LINK BETWEEN FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
AND LOCAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE 
 
This section reviews various perspectives on fiscal decentralization and discusses their 
implication for the link between fiscal decentralization and local financial governance. 
Large bodies of theories explain the causality relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and local financial governance. Perspectives range from conventional 
fiscal federalism theories, to public choice theories, new institutional economic theories 
(NIE) and public organizational theories such as New Public Management (NPM). 
Whilst earlier and conventional approaches relied primarily on economic theories, more 
recent approaches have highlighted the important role played by political and 
institutional factors in understanding the ways in which the devolution of fiscal power 
can advance or hinder local financial governance.  
2.4.1 The Fiscal Federalism Model 
The fiscal federalism model of fiscal decentralization is much influenced by traditional 
public finance theories, such as the prominent works of Kennet Arrow (1977), Richard 
Musgrave (1959) and Paul Samuelson (1954, 1955) which focus on addressing the 
failure of the market to deliver public goods in a socially efficient manner (Garzarelli, 
2004). The non-rivalry and non-excludability character of public goods leaves the 
market system unable to deliver them in a Pareto-efficient manner (Dollery and Wallis, 
2001). In order to tackle this problem, it will therefore be necessary for government to 
play an active and positive role particularly in macroeconomic stabilization, income 
distribution and allocation of public goods.  
Therefore, the fiscal federalism model assigns the roles of macro-economic stabilization 
and redistribution to the national government while a significant role in allocating 
resources is given to subnational governments (Musgrave and Musgrave 1980). The 
role of macro-economic stabilization through the instruments of fiscal policy and 
monetary policy is assigned to the central government because (i) sub-national 
authorities have very few or no incentives to undertake economic stabilization policies, 
and (ii) lower levels of government often lack the necessary capacity and instruments to 
carry out such policies. The income distribution role is also given to central government 
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as it is in a position to redistribute resources from the wealthier to poorer local regions. 
If a particular jurisdiction adopts policies to redistribute income by imposing high taxes 
on the wealthy residents and businesses and giving high benefits to the poor, the rich 
would tend to move out and enter areas where taxes are less while poor individuals will 
move in from areas that tend to offer lower benefits.  
However, fiscal federalism assigns the role of resource allocation to local governments 
(fiscal decentralization). Being closer to people, local authorities can more readily 
identify local people’s needs, and hence supply the appropriate levels and mix of public 
services. Fiscal decentralization also provides detailed guiding principles on how 
powers and responsibilities should be devolved through effective systems of 
intergovernmental relations (Shah, 2006; Smoke, 2001).  
The nexus between fiscal decentralization and local financial governance is widely 
accepted in the theories of fiscal federalism. It assumes an automatic linkage between 
the devolution of fiscal power and responsibility and local financial governance.  The 
issue of information asymmetry is at the center of the argument in fiscal federalism 
theories. The argument is that local governments are closer to their constituencies. They 
have knowledge of local preferences that the center cannot easily access to. It is hard for 
a central government to know the diverse preferences of numerous jurisdictions that 
constitute the country as a whole (Oates, 2004; Shah, 2006). Oates (1972:54) puts this 
clearly in his decentralization theorem: 
in the absence of cost-savings from the centralized provision of a local public 
good and of inter jurisdictional externalities, the level of welfare will always 
be at least as high (and typically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of 
consumption are provided in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level 
of consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions.  
In short, local governments have informational advantage over their counterparts at the 
center about the desires and priorities of local people (Shah, 2006; Garzarelli, 2004; 
Oates, 2005). 
Therefore, the implication of the fiscal federalism argument for local financial 
governance is that as local governments are closer to the people and have informational 
advantage over central government they can make a more efficient allocation and 
spending of public finance according to the preference of the citizen and production 
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function of the locality. This is based on the presumption that if politicians in local 
governments know inter-jurisdictional heterogeneity, they are more likely to act in the 
public interest to deliver public services in line with such diverse preferences. 
The general assumption of fiscal federalism is that government agencies at different 
levels are custodians of public interest who seek to maximize the social welfare of 
citizens. But it is this public interest assumption that exposes this perspective to severe 
criticism by recently emerging theories. They reveal that there exist possibilities that 
governing agencies may indulge in opportunistic behaviours that seriously question the 
public interest presumption. For example the critique by Campos and Hellman (2005) of 
the 2004 World Development Report indicates that the linear relationship between 
decentralization and local governance is an ‘untested assumption’ and mentions factors 
such as local capture, clientelism, capacity constraints and intergovernmental frictions 
as factors that may limit positive gains of governance through decentralization. 
The fiscal federalism model places considerable emphasis on determining appropriate 
intergovernmental relationships between the different spheres of government. 
Therefore, the following section of the thesis presents a discussion about the 
intergovernmental relations and their impact on local financial governance. 
2.4.1.1 Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Local Financial Governance 
One of the issues that needs due care in fiscal decentralization reform is designing 
financial relationships between different tiers or spheres of government. The main 
concern is about deciding on the extent of expenditure and revenue power and 
responsibilities to be devolved to the next tier of government. Generally, if 
intergovernmental relationships regarding the assignment of expenditures, revenues, 
grants and borrowing in the fiscal decentralization framework are not designed carefully 
with adequate consideration to the context of different regions and localities, the 
consequences of fiscal decentralization may well be different to those intended (Usui, 
2007; Smoke, 2001; Shah, 1998). 
In order to strengthen accountability and ensure prudent financial management, the 
financial relationship between levels of government should be specified by clear rules. 
Blurred relationships undermine accountability. Expenditure responsibilities at each 
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level of government should be defined as clearly as possible to improve accountability 
and avoid duplication. In many countries, however, expenditure responsibilities are 
often not clearly defined. Local responsibilities must be defined by function, not by 
sector. Vague expenditure responsibilities leave people unsure of who is responsible for 
what, and weaken local accountability (Usui, 2007; Smoke, 2001). 
If national governments assign expenditures and functions without providing adequate 
revenues, this can also undermine local accountability. Local governments can blame 
poor services on the shortage of funds.  At the same time, it may also help to make the 
control of local spending difficult because local governments can easily justify 
overspending and press for more grants and loans. Citizens who pay taxes directly to the 
local government are more likely to hold local politicians and bureaucrats accountable. 
Thus, even if revenue potential might be limited, local government should have their 
own tax base and the right to adjust rates in line with the needs and demands of local 
citizens. Voters will hold their elected officials more accountable if their local 
government has the autonomy to levy the tax, a tax which should be large enough to 
impose a noticeable burden on the residents and one which cannot be easily exported to 
residents outside the jurisdiction.  
On what basis should regional and local governments tax? In general, four required 
considerations are identified in assigning taxing powers to local governments. The first 
relates to economic efficiency and dictates that taxes on mobile factors and tradable 
goods that have a bearing to a common market should not be assigned to local 
governments as they are untraceable to a particular local government. The second 
relates to national equity considerations, and argues that progressive redistributive taxes 
should be assigned to the centre to enable central governments to play a redistributive 
role and to prevent local governments from using the tax regime to attract high-income 
people and organizations from other regions. Administrative feasibility is the third 
consideration, which suggests that taxes should be assigned according to the ability or 
capacity of local governments to collect taxes in an efficient and effective way, thereby  
minimizing the opportunities for tax evasion and other forms of corrupt activities and 
maladministration.  
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The fourth consideration relates to revenue adequacy and suggests that revenue means 
should correspond as closely as possible with expenditure needs (Bahl, 1999; Shah, 
2006). However, if revenues exceed expenditures, local revenue collection efforts may 
decline. To deal with this problem, expenditure assignments should come first, followed 
by revenue assignments (the finance follows function principle). It is also important to 
assign economically efficient revenues based on the nature of expenditures assigned to 
local governments. For example, services that may be priced (public utilities, buses) 
should be largely financed by user charges. General services with a local area benefit 
zone (roads, parks) should be financed with local taxes. And goods characterized by 
significant externalities should be financed from region-wide taxes and 
intergovernmental transfers (Usui, 2007; Bahl, 1999; Shah, 1998).  
If local government revenue is dominated by central government grants, this can easily 
erode accountability. This is because citizens will hold their elected officials more 
accountable if local public services are financed to a significant extent from locally 
imposed taxes, as opposed to the case where financing is primarily by central 
government transfers. However, the own revenue of local governments in developing 
countries is rarely adequate to cover their expenditures. Such gaps are invariably 
covered by national government grants. Two important decisions need to be made in the 
distribution of grants: the size of the grant and how it is to be distributed between 
eligible local governments. Most countries use one or a combination of three 
approaches to determine the size of the total amount of grant to be transferred to local 
governments in a given year: a specified share of national (or state) government tax 
revenues; an ad hoc decision (such as an annual appropriation voted by legislative body 
of the centre); or reimbursement of approved expenditures. Allocations of the grant 
among local governments are also made in one or a combination of four ways: (i) by 
returning a share to the jurisdictions from which the taxes were collected; (ii) by 
formula; (iii) on an ad hoc basis; or (iv) by reimbursing costs. 
However, grants allocated to local governments are often released to local treasuries 
with significant delays. The under-funding and delayed disbursement of grants 
undermines local accountability and makes effective local planning, budgeting, and 
fiscal management difficult. Thus, it is important to set up an accurate and timely 
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disbursement system. Having a simple and transparent formula can also ensure 
accountability to the citizen since local governments and their citizen are aware of the 
amount to be transferred from the center (Usui, 2007, Smoke, 2001; Shah, 1998). 
The revenue collected by levying tax might not be sufficient to finance long term 
investments in particular, thus local governments also need the autonomy to borrow for 
the financing of their investments. The argument is that long-lived assets which need 
large funds should be financed by raising debt, so as to ensure equitable burden sharing 
across generations rather than putting the burden just on the current generation. That is 
to say such large investments cannot be financed by current revenues (Shah, 2006). 
Thus, local governments should be provided with limited power to borrow but also with 
careful monitoring from the center. If they are not limited by constraints, this may well 
lead to over borrowing, with adverse consequences not only for the long-term financial 
situation of local government but also for the macro-economic stability of the nation. A 
hard budget constraint motivates responsible behavior by local governments and 
eliminates bailout conditions (Usui, 2007; Bahl, 1999). Hard budget constraints refer to 
an arrangement that requires local governments to make their budget decision in such a 
way that the expenditures come into balance with the revenue, and liabilities can never 
be transferred to central government. 
Bahl (1999) describes practices such as deficit grants to cover revenue shortfalls; 
bailouts on delinquent debt; and direct central government coverage of year-end 
shortfalls on certain items of expenditure as enemies of hard budget constraints. 
Generally, in order to constraint irresponsible borrowing practices, strong central ability 
is needed. This is also required to monitor and control the imposition of a uniform 
system of financial accounts, audit rules, disclosure requirements for borrowing, and 
determination of when to relax spending mandates, and how to adjust grant distribution 
formulae. There is also the need for technical assistance to local governments, in several 
areas. Smaller and rural local governments in particular require assistance in areas such 
as accounting, treasury, tax administration, data processing and project evaluation. 
In general, such considerations in the design of fiscal decentralization, as well as the 
regulatory frameworks for intergovernmental fiscal relations, can help (albeit not 
sufficiently by themselves) to avoid irresponsible allocation and spending; as well as to 
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enhance downward accountability. But they are too mechanical to explain many of the 
intricacies and problems that exist in the political and administrative interactions 
between different tiers of government. For example, several central governments in 
developing countries prefer to hold a paternalistic approach rather than being strict to 
their rules in their fiscal relations with local governments. Of course, the reasons for the 
bailout of delinquent debt or grants to cover deficits by central government may be 
compelling. The central government is expected to play its role of providing insurance 
if local governments face such problems caused by factors beyond their control rather 
than bad financial investment decision. However, central government officials may opt 
for soft budget constraints either to ensure loyalty or their dominance over local 
government. Commonly, political party structures and relationship between the central 
political party and local ones, as well as path dependency, are factors which determine 
centre versus local fiscal relationships (Oates, 2005). 
2.4.2 Public Choice Theories 
Public choice theory concerns the infusion of economics and political science that uses 
economic methodology to explain the political behaviour of government officials in a 
political market. It is about explaining the theory of state, voting behaviour, voting 
rules, party politics and bureaucrats using economics techniques. Unlike the fiscal 
federalism model, it tries to address primarily government failures in the provision of 
public goods. The argument suggests that the fact that local politicians and bureaucrats 
are individuals with their own individual interest. In situations where there is conflict 
between public interest and their individual interest, they are likely to privilege their 
own interests rather than the public interest. Therefore, it proposes market like solutions 
where the behaviour of politicians can be redirected towards public interest by situating 
them under pressure of political competition (Boyne, 1997). 
Public choice theory suggests that decentralization reform processes should be 
accompanied by competition in the political market powered by exit and voice 
mechanisms. It requires local governments to act as an industry in which citizens are 
buyers of local services and politicians are sellers in an exchange for citizens’ vote and 
tax. Local government officials and politicians compete for their office as well as for 
tax. Citizens can choose among different combination of public services through 
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‘choice by vote and feet’ principle. Therefore, representative local government 
accountability to citizens is maintained through transparent and accountable election 
systems, the separation of power between legislative, executive and judicial bodies, and 
a genuinely competitive political party system. In this situation, constituents can force 
their representatives to provide efficient public service.  
Public choice theory advocates for fiscal decentralization due to its ability to foster 
competition through exit mechanisms. The argument is that a:  
…fragmented government system provides citizens with information 
concerning taxes and services in neighbouring areas thereby raising the 
competitive pressure on decision makers. This presents citizen with the option 
to vote with their feet, i.e.  to move to another jurisdiction if they believe that 
costs of moving are lower than the costs of staying (Tiebout, 1956). 
This means that local governments that set taxes too high and produce public goods 
inefficiently risk the exit of many of their constituents. Moreover, it allows information 
visible to citizens about the relative cost of different services provided by different tiers 
of government. They can therefore make separate judgments on the performance of 
different tiers of government and allocate their political support and tax payments 
accordingly.  
Public choice also is not free from limitations to promote local financial governance 
(Dollery, and Wallis, 2001). Periodical elections occur only in an interval of four or five 
years in most countries, making them crude accountability mechanisms. But decisions 
on the allocation and use of budget and resources are made between elections often 
behind closed doors with no or minimal chance for citizens to voice their needs and 
priorities. Empirical studies also show a mixed impact of local election on financial 
governance. In states where land and labour markets do not function well, and 
responsibilities of local governments are not subject to competition, the private sector is 
often extremely weak (Hills Jr, 2009). Democracy is often at an infant stage; violence, 
money and corruption dominate both local and national elections; and local government 
financial administrative machinery is too weak to ensure financial transparency. Under 
such circumstances, the assumption that people can move easily between jurisdictions 
or make their voices heard through political process is unrealistic (Olowu, 2003).  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
 
40 
 
But the major limitation of elections as a perfect accountability mechanism is their 
inherently indirect voicing characteristics. Even under “perfect” conditions of free and 
fair elections and a stable democratic national context, local elections often fail to 
ensure that elected representatives will exercise power on behalf of all segments of the 
communities. Structural bias by elected officials against marginalized and non-elite 
groups when they are captured by the elite group is not uncommon. Elected officials 
may be influenced by their political party or may collude with the executive as well as 
bureaucracy. Hence New Institutional Economics and New Public Management models 
have been developed to explain these issues and provide institutional and administrative 
designs to tackle those problems.  
2.4.3 New Institutional Economics 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) represents a collection of ideas, including rent 
seeking and collusions, agency theory, transaction cost economics, and game theory 
aimed at bringing institutional characteristics back to the core of economic analysis. 
This theory is different from conventional economic analysis in that it tries to address 
the failures of market mechanism by identifying the institutional characteristics required 
to gauge economic efficiency in governance (Dollery and Wallis, 2001).   
It begins by explaining that in the real world, individuals possess an inherently limited 
capacity to process information and accordingly are subject to ‘bounded rationality’ in 
the sense that their calculations include only immediate and readily accessible 
information. Bounded rationality necessarily implies that the complexities of actual 
economic exchange cannot be fully captured by hierarchical or market mechanism. This 
is to say that bounded rationality prevents the construction of complete contracts 
between agents and principals. Scope therefore exists for opportunistic behaviour by 
economic agents, who can conceal their preferences and actions from contractual 
partners. Indeed, it is precisely because of real world phenomena, like bounded 
rationality and incomplete contracts, that economic activities have to be conducted in an 
environment characterized by asymmetric information and costly transactions, and it is 
this feature which lends crucial importance to institutions (Shelanski and Klein, 1995; 
Shah, 2006; Dollery and Wallis, 2001).  
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Hence NIE can play an important part in explaining the link between fiscal 
decentralization and local financial governance. It can explain why the market 
mechanism in the political arena doesn’t work to ensure that the local agency (local 
politicians or officials) promote common benefits rather than their own individual 
interests. It addresses why elections and other formal arrangements serve as imperfect 
mechanism of accountability. It also provides institutional designs for 
intergovernmental and citizen-local government relations where the intended financial 
governance gains of fiscal decentralization cannot be diverted by powerful and 
informed bodies in the relationship (Oates, 2004). 
Accordingly, various levels of governments are agents created to serve the interest of 
citizen. Citizens are principals who delegate the responsibility to oversee the 
performance of their local government (agents). The institutional design in the local 
government must ensure that these agents serve the public interest while minimizing 
transaction costs for the principals. However, the existing institutional frameworks do 
not permit such optimization, because the principals have bounded rationality. That is to 
say they make the best choice on the basis of the information but are ill informed about 
government operations. Enlarging the sphere of their knowledge entails high transaction 
cost which the principals would not like to incur. These costs include participation and 
monitoring costs, legislative costs, executive costs, and executive decision-making costs 
associated with unstable political situations. However, agents are better informed about 
government operation than principals, but they have an incentive to withhold 
information and to indulge in opportunistic behaviour or self-interest seeking activities 
(Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Shah, 2006; Dollery and Wallis, 2001).  
Hence, there are several formal institutional arrangements to mitigate the information 
asymmetry and high transaction costs in the political transaction between citizens and 
electoral body, so that complete contracts between citizen and politician can be 
constructed and enforced. Among others, these include allowing independent candidates 
to run in local elections, reserving seats for women and other vulnerable groups, 
allowing for the recall of elected officials from public office, strengthening 
countervailing institutions and limiting the length of the term these elected officials. 
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However, as the interaction between citizens and politician is characterized by 
uncertainties and future events are unpredictable, it is very difficult to establish a 
contract which can fully address all these uncertainties and future events. Whatever the 
formal institutional arrangements used, these are not likely to be sufficient conditions to 
strengthen local government accountability. The problem is associated with the indirect 
voicing characteristics of election. There should exist a direct voicing mechanism that 
allows people to have complete information and a say in the decisions of local 
government on the allocation and use of resources in general and financial resources in 
particular.  
Therefore, New Institutional Economics suggests that financial accountability in local 
government can be strengthened through the use of a proper combination of the above-
mentioned formal accountability mechanisms with informal institutions that are 
established based on social capital such as trust, cooperation and reciprocity in the 
society to increase the availability of financial information with minimal transaction 
cost and help mobilize citizens to hold local politicians accountable (Putnam, 1993). 
These informal arrangements are often known as social accountability mechanisms. 
Such financial accountability mechanisms include, amongst other things, participatory 
planning, budgeting and monitoring; participatory expenditure tracking; social auditing, 
and citizen access to information and their feedback for services (Yilmaz, et.al, 2008). 
This entails the active involvement of civil society. Civil society organizations can 
strengthen accountability by bridging the power and information asymmetry between 
local government and citizens. They aggregate preferences and represent community 
needs, mediate community participation in government decisions to allocate and use 
resources, increase awareness of people on their rights and responsibilities, provide 
clear and understandable information about government performance to citizens and 
enforce political accountability of the institutions of government through the 
mobilization of citizens. They provide social organizations for citizens that generate 
their own norms of behaviour and responsibility organically, and over time may develop 
stores of trust and credibility that enhance capacity (Putnam 1993, 2000).  
Local governments also can depend on the relationships with civil society to elicit 
information necessary to the policy making process, judging the efficacy of previous 
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interventions, and plan for the future (Bardhan 1996). Politicians also depend on these 
relationships to gauge public satisfaction with their performance between elections. But 
this in turn requires commitment from the side of government in creating an enabling 
legal, political and institutional environment that allows and stimulates direct voicing of 
citizens and active involvement of civil society organizations. 
2.4.4 New Public Management Model 
The theories discussed so far are concerned mainly about improving accountability 
relationship between citizens and politicians. However, having strong mechanisms of 
accountability between local citizens and local officials will not by itself guarantee the 
efficient and effective use of local government finance. This is to say that no matter 
how effective the mechanisms used to strengthen the accountability of local government 
officials to constituents are, it cannot be effective unless the financial management 
systems in local government are strong enough to ensure effective hierarchical 
accountability and make complete information available to citizens about the financial 
performance of the government. Opinions and debates by the citizen, civil society and 
electoral body on how the budget is utilized can be made only if reliable, 
understandable and timely financial information is provided by the internal financial 
system. Furthermore, local executives can effectively discharge their responsibility of 
spending public resource efficiently and effectively entrusted by local citizens if they 
have sound financial management system in their local government organizations. 
Financial management and accountability systems in local government organisations 
strengthen local financial governance by helping local executives to manage and control 
the use of public finance as well as by making reliable financial information available to 
the public 
Therefore, another issue of discussion in local financial governance is about theories or 
models that deal with improving internal financial management and accountability in 
the local government organization. The New Public Management (NPM) model 
provides a paradigm that advocates private management practices for public offices 
aiming at improving administrative efficiency in the government office through changes 
in management system, practices and structures. Emanating, at least in part, from the 
neo-liberal ideology that gained growing currency under the influence of Margaret 
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Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the USA, NPM ideas and public sector 
reform programmes have increasingly spread to other countries in both the developed 
and developing worlds. In the developing world, this process has often been supported 
and encouraged by the influence of multi-lateral (in particular the World Bank, IMF and 
UNDP) and bilateral agencies and donors. 
The theoretical foundations of NPM have been informed to some extent by both public 
choice theory and new institutional theories. Public choice theory provokes reforms in 
the public sector arguing that public servants and politicians do not attempt to improve 
efficiency and minimize cost in the Weberian bureaucracy as there is no incentive for 
them to do so (Buchanan; 1986). Therefore, they should be subjected to healthy 
competition. Moreover, the two theories of new institutional approaches: Agency cost 
theory and Transaction cost theory, argue that there should be complete and easily 
enforceable contracts (Williamson, 1990) between politicians and bureaucrats as well as 
between managers and employees. 
The aim of NPM is primarily to replace the old rule, procedure and input control based 
style of public administration by a new one that emphasises outputs; measurable 
standards of performance; visible and ‘free to manage’ management; efficiency and 
economic use of resources; contractual relationships with management and employees 
based on expected outputs (Hood, 1991). NPM is not just a new way of managing 
public services, but also introduced different financial management tools and 
techniques. Before discussing the implications of NPM for financial management 
techniques, it is important to note the changes that NPM suggests to improve 
government administrative system efficiency. 
The very purpose of NPM models is to improve public service efficiency by removing 
or at least mitigating the ‘nonmarket attributes’ of government organizations.  Wolf 
(1989) has identified four nonmarket attributes in the public sector. These include the 
difficulty of monitoring and evaluating the outputs of public service; ambiguous 
relationship between input and output of services; non-contestable characteristics of 
public service; and non-contestable and irreplaceable management.  
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Dollery and Wallis (2001) argue that NPM suggests that the difficulties associated with 
defining, evaluating and monitoring the range of outputs provided by a local authority 
can be addressed by breaking up the bureaucratic structure into manageable smaller 
units. If the organization is divided in to separate smaller units, it is not difficult to 
determine clearly defined objectives and output targets for each unit. These single, 
manageable and traceable objectives, in turn, help to match resources to defined tasks 
and to shift from controlling inputs to monitoring outputs. This restructuring, then, 
enables local governments to assign clear output based responsibility to manage single 
units and gives managers greater discretion to decide on alternative allocation and 
utilization of inputs to cut wastages and overstaffing.  But such restructuring has to be 
accompanied by output based accounting and reporting.  
The New Public Management model also suggests that the subcontracting of public 
services or the separation of purchasing from the provision of public services are key 
approaches that can help to mitigate the non-contestable characteristic of public 
services. The aim is to increase efficiency through the introduction of competition in the 
public service provision process.  
To deal with uncertain and ambiguous relationship between input, output and outcome 
in public service process, NPM focuses on clarifying the distinction between input, 
output and outcome. This can help managers to exercise discretion in looking for 
alternative combinations of inputs to achieve defined goals, while simultaneously 
having a clear understanding about what outputs are expected from agencies to achieve 
the desired social outcomes. In this way the failures and successes in the provision of 
public services can be traced whether it is from the problem associated with the policy 
itself or its implementation.  
Finally, the non-contestable management problem is addressed by establishing a clear 
relationship between organizational performance and management expertise. One way 
in which this can be accomplished is by placing local government managers on fixed-
term contracts with specified outcomes to be achieved, and making the renewal of such 
contracts subject to the successful achievement of such outcomes.  
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Despite its emphasis on efficiency and accountability, NPM is often criticised for being 
insulated from the ordinary citizen as well as civil society. It does not include an 
arrangement that allows citizens to exercise collective accountability over bureaucrats.  
What then are the implications of NPM for local financial governance? The financial 
management reforms associated with the introduction of the NPM model are often 
referred to as New Public Financial Management (NPFM). New Public Financial 
Management is an integral part of the broader NPM reform in the public sector. Guthrie 
et al (2005) identify five key dimensions of NPFM. These include (i) changes to 
financial reporting systems (cash to accrual); (ii) the devolution of budgets to work units 
and programs; (iii) market based costing and pricing systems; (iv) integration of 
financial and physical performance measurement approaches; and (v) performance 
based (internal and external) auditing. But some authors argue that these techniques and 
approaches are too complex and sophisticated for many local governments in the 
developing world, where the necessary capacity and expertise is often lacking. Instead 
they recommend a “getting the basics right first” approach for developing countries. 
This approach is regarded as a transition towards NPFM approach. But it doesn’t 
suggest specifically which aspects of financial management are regarded as basic. A 
possible solution, recommended by the World Bank (1998), is to make reforms in the 
areas where performances are found to be problematic. Finally, it is important to note 
that there are authors such as Andrews (2006) who are sceptical of the “getting the 
basics right first” approach arguing that such an approach might hinder deeper public 
financial management reforms. 
2.5 SUMMARY 
The discussions about the concept of both fiscal decentralization and local financial 
governance in this chapter suggest that the focus of the studies in the fiscal 
decentralization of developing countries should be on implementation problems rather 
than on the concept itself. It suggests that the criticisms on the concept of fiscal 
decentralization point to weaknesses of absolute decentralization which does not  
happen in reality in any country. In addition, an attempt was made to unpack the 
meaning of local financial governance by applying the concept of local governance 
specific to public finance. Consequently, it was suggested that the study on local 
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financial governance should analyze not only the process and output but also the 
interaction of various stakeholders in local public financial affairs. It also suggested that 
the study should analyze not only the internal administrative tools in local financial 
management process such as budgeting, accounting, procurement, accounting, cash 
management, reporting and auditing but also the accountability relationship amongst 
stakeholders such as local executive, legislative, citizens and civil society, and political 
parties.  
In addition to conceptual clarifications, the chapter also focused on insights concerning 
the link between fiscal decentralization and local financial governance provided by four 
major theoretical approaches (Fiscal Federalism, Public Choice theory and NIE and 
NPM). Although such theoretical approaches are based in a number of ways on 
different assumption about fiscal decentralization and its impact on local financial 
governance, it is suggested that they are by no means mutually exclusive. In fact it is 
argued they could help to understand and strengthen local financial governance if 
applied in combination. That is why the theoretical framework (presented in chapter 
one) to be used for this study brings all of the approaches suggested by the four 
perspectives together to develop an integrated theoretical framework.   
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CHAPTER THREE: DECENTRALIZATION IN ETHIOPIA 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents background information concerning the decentralization process 
in Ethiopia with particular reference to district level decentralization and local 
governance. An adequate discussion about district level fiscal decentralization and 
woreda administrations financial governance of the Amhara region cannot be provided 
without contextualizing it within the historical development and current operation of the 
general decentralization process and governance situation of the country. Before 
embarking on such background detail, the first part of the Chapter is devoted to a brief 
presentation of Ethiopia’s political, socio-economic, demographic and historical profile. 
 
3.2 COUNTRY BACKGROUND 
 
Ethiopia is the oldest independent country in Africa and one of the most ancient in the 
world.  The country is the second most populous nation in Africa and has a diverse mix 
of ethnic, cultural and linguistic backgrounds. Despite its ancient civilization and long 
independence, the country’s record in socio-economic development, democracy, peace 
and stability remains unimpressive. The following sections provide a brief presentation 
of the country’s background. 
3.2.1 Demographic Background 
Ethiopia is the third largest country in Africa in terms of area, and the largest land 
locked country in the world in terms of population size. The 2007 national census (CSA 
2007) shows that its population size was 73,918,505 with an annual growth rate of 
2.7%. Ethiopia is a country of high cultural and ethnic diversity consisting of more than 
80 ethnic groups that vary in population size from 289 to about 25 million persons. 
Oromo (34.4%), Amhara (27%), Somalie (6.2%) and Tigrie (6.1%) are the largest 
ethnic groups in the country. Ethiopia is one of the least urbanized countries in Africa, 
as the majority of the population (83.9%) resides in the rural areas. The country is a 
home to diverse religions, with Orthodox (43.5%), Islam (33.94%) and Protestant 
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(18.5%) being the principal religions. A large section of the population (45%) is below 
the age of 15.  
 
Ethiopia is situated in the horn of Africa between 3 and 5 degrees north latitude and 33 
and 48 degrees east longitude. The total area of the country is about 1.1 million sq. km. 
Ethiopia shares borders with Sudan and Somalia in the West and East respectively. 
Kenya is its southern neighbor. Eritrea borders Ethiopia in the North and North East, 
and it also shares a border with Djibouti in the East. The topographic features range 
from the highest peak, Ras Dashen, (4,550 meters above sea level) in the north east to 
the Afar Depression at 110 meters below sea level in the east. The climate also varies 
considerably. The central highlands where most Ethiopians live enjoy a temperate 
climate, though with seasonal variations. The low lands, however, are much hotter. 
Throughout most of the country the dry season prevails from October until May, while 
the wet season runs from June until the end of September. The largest city is the federal 
capital: Addis Ababa. The country has, however, several principal towns such as 
Bahirdar, Hawassa, Mekelle, Nazreth, Jimma, Dire Dewa, Harrar and Dessie. 
3.2.2 Socio-Economic Background 
Ethiopia’s economy is predominantly subsistence and based on rain fed agricultural. 
Agriculture production accounts for half of the country’s GDP and 60% of its exports, 
and an estimated 85% of the population gains their livelihood directly or indirectly from 
agriculture. Industry is at infant stage, contributing only 11% of GDP and 5% of formal 
employment. The mining sector is quite small and Ethiopia is not well endowed with 
energy sources aside from the potential for hydroelectric power.    
 
Ethiopia is one of the world highly underdevelopment countries.  The country ranked 
174
th
 out of 187 countries on the UN’s Human Development Index in 2011, with 
average per capita income (US$400) equivalent to one-third of the sub-Saharan average 
(US$1225). Mismanagement of the economy on the part of successive governments and 
the three decades of civil war have greatly contributed to the present poor state of the 
country. Despite the high potential for agriculture development, only 15% of the arable 
land has so far been developed. The small proportion of land cultivated by small scale 
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farmers is characterized by low productivity due to the backward technology and often 
subject to recurrent drought. The low private sector capacity in the country halts 
industrial sector progress. Industrial production is far below what is needed to promote 
employment creation, and is heavily dependent on imported semi-processed goods, raw 
materials and spare-parts. Consequently, Ethiopia’s per capita income is amongst the 
lowest in the world and poverty is widespread. The country is also among those with the 
least access to education, health and water supply. 
 
In recent years, however, the country has shown an impressive development in terms of 
both social and economic dimensions. The economy has been growing rapidly with an 
average growth rate of 11 percent (MoFED, 2010) since 2003/2004. Consequently the 
number of people living under poverty dropped from 29 million to 25 million between 
2004 and 2011. Through massive donors support, the government has been able to 
devote increasing levels of public finance to the social and health sectors. Between 1996 
and 2006 this has helped to lead, amongst other things, to an increase in per capita visits 
to health facilities from 0.3 to 0.4%; in child immunization rates from 46% to 60%; in 
access to sanitation from 13% to 30.6%; and in access to safe drinking water rose from 
19.1% to 35.9%.  The infant mortality rate dropped from 124 to 67 between 1990 and 
2009 (MoFED, 2010). In 2010 87.9 percent of children were enrolled in primary 
schools, the result of an impressive 9 percent annual growth in enrolment since 1993 
((MoFED, 2010). As a result, the illiteracy rate has dropped from 60% in 1990 to 36% 
in 2009/10. 
 
Ethiopia has shifted from a state run economy to mixed economy in the period since 
1991. Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) is the long term 
development strategy which has been put in place by the EPRDF led government since 
1994. The objective is to bring development through the improvement of agricultural 
productivity which in turn would bring about a structural transformation of the economy 
in which the current overwhelming dominance of agriculture sector would be replaced 
by industry and service sectors. To this end, the government has implemented two 
development programs so far and introduced a new one in 2010/11. 
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The first is the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) 
implemented in the period of 2002/03-2004/05 and its successor is the Plan for 
Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) covering the period 
2005/06-2009/10 designed in line with the requirements of meeting the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The new Growth and Transformation Plan 
(GTP) has been implemented since 2010/2011. Decentralization and public sector 
capacity building were among the building blocks of these development programs, 
clearly stated in the first two development programs in particular. 
 
Despite the recent impressive economic growth, the nation‘s development process is 
challenged by macroeconomic imbalances that include high inflation and low foreign 
exchange reserves. Moreover, because more than 85% of the population resides in rural 
areas and works mainly in agriculture, the economy remains susceptible to climate 
shocks. There still exists a huge gap in health, education and rural water supply to meet 
the targets set by Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (MoFED, 2010). 
3.2.3 Political Background 
The country follows a parliamentary government system in which the House of People's 
Representatives (parliament) is the highest authority of the Federal Government. Its 
members are elected by the people for a term of five years. The federal state has a 
bicameral parliamentary system in which in addition to the House of People’s 
Representatives, there is also the House of the Federation in which each of the nations, 
nationalities and peoples has at least one representative elected from regional state 
council members (FDRE, 1995).  
 
Constitutionally, the country follows a multiparty system with national democratic 
elections held every five years. Elections are organized by a National Election Board 
whose members are appointed by the Prime Minister with the approval of the House of 
People’s Representatives. The political party or a coalition of political parties which can 
form the majority in the House of People’s Representatives forms the Government 
(FDRE, 1995).  
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The Prime Minister being the Chief Executive Officer and the Commander-in-Chief of 
the national armed forces is elected by the House of People’s Representatives and forms 
the Government by appointing cabinet members/ministers and the president of the 
judiciary body upon approval of the House of People’s Representatives. The federal 
state is headed by a constitutional president whose role is essentially ceremonial and is 
elected by a joint meeting of the House of Peoples Representatives and the House of 
Federation (FDRE, 1995). 
 
The country has embarked on ethnic federalism in which the federal state comprises the 
federal government and autonomous ethnic regional states. Currently, there are nine 
autonomous regional states, based on the geographic settlement of majority ethnic 
groups, as well as two city administrations. At present, Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, 
Somale, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP), Benishangul-Gumuz, 
Gambella and Harrari national regional states; and Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa city 
administrations comprise the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). There 
are also 671 rural local governments or districts (known as woreda administrations with 
an average population of about 100,000, 99 urban city administrations (equivalent to 
districts but in urban areas), as well as 863 municipalities or towns within the 
jurisdiction of woredas. There are more than 1,500 community centers, known as 
kebeles, with an estimated average population size of 10,000. These figures may change 
as continuous subdivisions do exist (Berhanu, 2009). 
3.2.4 Historical Background 
The early history of state and state formation in ancient Ethiopia
8
 dates back to at least 
three thousand years. According to the popular legend, the Ethiopian kingdom was 
founded in 10 B.C when the Queen of Ethiopia (Queen Sheba) paid a visit to the king of 
Israel (King Solomon) and came back to Ethiopia conceiving a baby who later became 
the King of Ethiopia. This legend has in fact served as a powerful source of 
legitimization by subsequent Ethiopian monarchs.  Most of the emperors who came in 
to power in the history of country (except those during the period of Zagwe Dynasty) 
                                                          
8
 The then Abyssinia which is the northern highland of the new Ethiopia 
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claim to be descended from King Solomon. The monopoly of power by the Solomonic 
root continued until the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie I came to its end in 1974.  
 
Nevertheless, the formation of a modern state in Ethiopia came about during the reign 
of Haile Selassie I. Haile Selassie was crowned Emperor of Ethiopia in 1930 following 
the death of the Empress. He reigned until 1974 except for a brief period of interruption 
when Italians occupied the country from 1936 to 1941 during Second World War. 
During his reign, he introduced a more modern state by creating a structured and central 
bureaucracy, a judicial system with codified laws, and a constitution (Bahiru, 2002).  
 
Despite such reforms, the Emperor’s inability or unwillingness to respond to the 
economic and political needs of the people ultimately led to the downfall of the regime 
in 1974. Following popular protests, demonstrations and strikes by students, 
intellectuals, military units and labor unions, power was seized by a group of junior 
military officers naming themselves the Derg.
9
 The Derg abolished the Monarchy and 
Parliament, suspended the Constitution, and ruled by decree until 1987 when a new 
Constitution was adopted. This formally established a single party system. It also 
brought about a number of administrative structural changes, including the division of 
the country into 29 administrative regions (Bahiru, 2002). 
 
Inspired by a rigid Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Derg’s rule was a turbulent and brutal 
one, marked by internal power struggles and popular resistance. Many ethnic groups 
and political organizations were discontent when the Derg took over the power claiming 
that the Derge was not legitimate body to rule. Consequently several groups including 
secessionists launched guerilla campaigns against the Derg. In response, tens of 
thousands of Ethiopians were arrested, tortured, and summarily executed. This 
provoked massive resistance from the people and criticism from international 
community. Financial and material support from the regime’s former backers, the 
Soviet Union, dwindled. Therefore, several ethnic based and secessionist fighting 
groups took the opportunity to consolidate their forces and defeated the Derg in 1991. 
                                                          
9
 Amharic name for committee which was formed by junior military officers from Armed Forces, Police 
and Territorial Army 
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The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Movement Front (EPRDF10) replaced the Derg 
and moved Ethiopia towards a new constitution and democratic elections. Eritrea, which 
was one of the provinces of Ethiopia, became an independent country. Since 1991, and 
following a number of elections, the EPRDF has remained as the ruling party at the 
national level (Meheret, 2002; and Minassie, 1996).  
 
3.3 FEDERALISM IN ETHIOPIA 
The practice of federalism in Ethiopia, though not in its current or modern form, dates 
back to the imperial regime. Early Ethiopian emperors were not able to have centralized 
government due to the difficult topography of the country coupled with the absence of 
advanced communication means. Instead, regional and local lords, princes, even kings 
who had been exercising autonomous power were not subject to close control by the 
emperor, providing they recognized and pledged overall loyalty to the Emperor (Bahiru, 
2002). But this trend changed with the coming into power of Haile Selassie I who 
consolidated and centralized power to the central government.  
 
Generally, the reigns of Haile Selassie I and its successor the Derg were marked by their 
strong centralized political and administrative system in the history of Ethiopian modern 
government. But this does not mean there were no efforts at decentralization. Indeed, the 
first move towards institutional decentralization in Ethiopia was when the Haile Selassie 
I Government submitted to the then parliament, the Awraja,
11
Local Self-Administration 
Order in 1966. The draft bill proposed to grant administrative autonomy to 50 awraja 
governments drawn from the majority of the country’s 14 provinces. Since the bill was 
faced with strong resistance from parliament, the program was implemented in only 17 
selected awrajas on an experimental basis. But the policy could be considered a typical 
                                                          
10 The Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) is an alliance of four ethnic based 
movements, including the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), Oromo People’s 
Democratic Organisation (OPDO), Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Movement (SEPDM), and 
the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Each of these is now ruling their respective regional states. 
But many believe that the TPLF has a dominant role in EPRDF as it is the pioneer of ethnic movement 
and behind the formation of EPRDF. Militant Tigrayan students, who fought the Derg through an 
ethnically based movement, established the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in 1975. Based 
amongst the peasantry, the TPLF maintained an armed struggle for 14 years, and took control of the 
Tigray region in 1989. 
11
Awraja is an administrative level between province and district (typically containing four to five 
separate districts) that was used during the regimes of both Haile Selassie I and the Derge. 
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administrative measure aimed at easing bureaucratic congestion at the centre rather than 
a serious decentralization experiment to bring about effective self-government. Because 
the imperial parliament failed to pass the local government finance bill, the authority of 
the awraja government to raise revenue and utilize it for development was limited. 
Moreover, a chief administrator for each awraja was appointed by the central 
government. Given these major shortcomings, the policy did not have much impact on 
decentralization and did little to promote genuine local self-government in Ethiopia 
(Kassahun and Tegegn, 2004; Miheret, 2007; Tegegn, 1985). 
 
The Derg had more penetrating central government than its predecessor. Along with the 
abolishment of feudal system under the slogan of ‘land to the tiller’ and the introduction 
of radical socialist policies in the mid-1970s, the government used mass organizations, 
such as peasant and urban dwellers associations, to mobilize local people, at least in the 
early days of military rule. But it subsequently changed them into state bureaucratic 
accessories geared towards implementing central directives (Miheret, 2002).  
 
The Derg instituted an authoritarian single party state based on Leninist principle of 
‘democratic centralism’ that did not lend itself to participatory governance and 
development. The system pursued a policy of forced collectivization and coercive 
resettlement of the drought-hit rural peasantry. But towards the end of its reign, in the 
early 1980s, the regime was forced, mainly due to the intensification of ethnic/civil wars 
in the country and increasing resistance, to consider some form of decentralization. This 
resulted in the second constitution in the history of the country, which was promulgated 
in 1984. This established the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE), and 
granted autonomy to a number of provinces which had been characterised by strong 
ethnic and nationalist movements. As a result, Tigray, Afar and the Ogaden became 
autonomous administrate regions. Eritrea was given a special autonomous status. Even 
though this was adopted as a matter of expediency to deal with the problems of ethnic 
insurgency and political instability, it did not save the Derg from being toppled by 
ethnic based fighting groups in 1991. Rather, this was a clear demonstration of the fact 
that decentralization was not a policy to which the Derge was fully committed 
(Meheret, 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: DECENTRALIZATION IN ETHIOPIA 
 
56 
 
 
Federalism in Ethiopia in its present form is the result of the coming in to power of the 
TPLF12/EPRDF in 1991.  When the then ethnic based guerilla fighters of the TPLF/EPRDF 
took control of power and replaced the Derg, their slogan was the right of nations, 
nationalities and people for self-government. This coupled with the proliferation of several 
ethnic movements in different corners of the country gave rise to ethnic based 
decentralization. Hence, the transitional charter drafted and approved by TPLF/EPRDF 
not only announced TPLF/EPRDF’s led five year transitional government but also puts 
decentralized government system and ethnic federalism at its forefront. As a result it 
established four tiers of government including the federal state, regional states, woreda 
and kebele administrations (Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), 1992; 
Yigremew, 2001; Paulos, 2007; Miheret 2007).  
 
At the end of five years term of transitional period, the 1995 Constitution was 
introduced. This made the country a federal democracy, reaffirming ethnic federalism 
and recognizing the right to self-government and even secession of ethnic group from 
the federal state. To that effect it provided that a government institution would be 
established for each nation, nationality and people of the country (FDRE, 1995). 
 
3.4 REGIONAL LEVEL DECENTRALIZATION IN ETHIOPIA 
 
Following the introduction of the 1995 Constitution, the decentralization process in 
Ethiopian has taken place in two waves. The first wave was from the center to regions 
and the second was from regions to woredas. Hence it started with the formation of 
autonomous ethnic regional states along with the transfer of power and functions. Nine 
regional states based on the settlement pattern of the major ethnic groups and two 
federal controlled city administrations were established. In this decentralization process 
stability and national reconstruction through ethnic federalism were the prime issues 
under consideration. Each region has ‘semi-sovereign’ status as it has its constitution, 
                                                          
12
Militant Tigrayan students, who fought the Derg through an ethnically based movement, established the 
TPLF in 1975. Based in the peasantry, the TPLF maintained an armed struggle for 14 years, gaining 
control of the Tigray region in 1989. Since then, with a dominant role within the EPRDF, it is ruling the 
Tigray regional state. 
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flag and a regional language to be used in schools, courts and public administration. 
Regional states establish their own government institutions such as legislative, 
executive and judiciary bodies. The regional state council is the legislative body and the 
highest organ of each state authority. Consistent with the provisions of the constitution, 
the state council has the power to draft, adopt and amend the state constitution 
(Meheret, 2007; Paulos, 2007). The regional cabinet under a regional president is the 
executive body in each region. Administrative functions are executed by regional 
bureaus, structured on a sector basis headed by members of the regional cabinet 
(Worku, 2005). 
 
The constitution makes a distinction between federal and regional functions. National 
defence, foreign policy, currency, inter-regional and international trade, high-way 
construction, civil aviation and citizenship are major functions which belong to the 
central government, whereas regional governments are made responsible for executing 
economic and social development policies, strategies and plans of the region; levying 
and collecting taxes and duties; and establishing and administering a regional police 
force and maintaining public order. The constitution (Article 52:1) further stipulates that 
“all powers not given expressly to the Federal Government alone or concurrently to the 
Federal Government and the States are reserved to the States” (FDRE, 1995). To this 
end they have taken the responsibility for formulating and implementing their respective 
socio-economic development policies, strategies and plans; establishing state 
administrations that best advance self-government; and independently bearing the 
responsibility for all financial expenditures necessary to carry out their responsibilities 
(Meheret, 2002). 
 
Regional governments also have significant fiscal authority, both in expenditure 
responsibility and revenue collection powers. The revenue authority of regions is 
defined in terms of regional and shared revenue, with shared revenues used jointly by 
the federal and regional government. The fiscal gap between own revenue and needed 
expenditure is covered by fiscal transfers from the federal government. To this end, a 
block grant formula has been introduced that takes account of regional variations has 
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been introduced and is modified on a regular basis (Paulos, 2007; Dickovick and 
Tegegne, 2010; Eshetu, 1994). 
 
The intermediate tier of government between regional and district level is the Zonal 
administration. Generally, Zonal administrations are not recognized by the constitution 
and do not have autonomous administrative functions and powers.  They are essentially 
a branch of the regional governments established to coordinate the works of woreda 
administrations and provide them with technical assistance. To this end, they have been 
provided with certain powers and functions from the regional government by way of de-
concentration rather than devolution. There are, however, a number of autonomous 
zonal administrations known as Nationality Zonal Administrations established by 
minority ethnic groups. Since regional governments are established based on settlement 
pattern of major ethnic groups, the self-government right of minority ethnic groups in 
the regions is respected by letting them establish their own nationality zonal 
administrations. These administrations have their own elected representative council, 
executive and judicial organ. They are the highest political organ of these minority 
ethnic groups (FDRE, 1995). 
 
3.5 DISTRICT LEVEL DECENTRALIZATION IN ETHIOPIA 
 
The 1995 federal constitution recognizes only the federal government and regional state 
governments but does not specifically mention woreda governments. However, an 
earlier proclamation makes reference to the woredas and assigns functions and duties to 
them. This was Proclamation No. 7/92 which was introduced before the final 
constitution was promulgated. Accordingly, an obligation is, therefore, imposed on the 
regional states to establish woreda administrations and to provide them with adequate 
powers. Crafting the structure of the woreda administrations and the exact powers and 
functions to be devolved to them were left for the regions to determine. But regional 
governments were often found to be unwilling to do so in practice. A study conducted 
in the second half of 1990s indicated that woreda governments had very limited 
administrative and fiscal power to respond to the needs of their citizens (Garcia and 
Rajkumar, 2008).  
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Therefore, a second wave of decentralization was introduced in 2002/2003 by the 
federal government. This granted self–administering power to woredas beginning with 
four of the largest regions (Amhara, Oromiya, SNNPR, and Tigray), which together 
account for 87% of Ethiopia’s population (Garcia and Rajkumar, 2008; Dickovick and 
Tegegn, 2010). Similar processes were rolled out in the remaining regions of the 
country two years later. 
 
Woreda (district) decentralization in the second wave, unlike in the first, was  motivated 
less by questions of ethnic identity and more by the motivation to extend governing 
authority down to local levels. As contrasted with the stability and governability aims of 
the regional decentralization, the stated aims of woreda decentralization included 
improved service delivery, deeper and more participatory governance, and the 
promotion of economic development (Dickovick and Tegegn, 2010). 
 
At present, woreda administrations, the lowest level of elected and full time government 
structure are considered to be the key local units of government established in all 
regional states in a geographical area containing approximately 100,000 people. Below 
woredas, communities further organize themselves in smaller electoral units known as 
kebeles. Kebele administrations are formed in geographical areas containing 
approximately 5,000 people. So far kebeles do not have their own function and budget. 
Rather they undertake work as delegated by their woreda administration (Tegegn, 2007; 
Worku, 2005).  
 
Woreda administrations refer largely to local administrations in rural areas. But there 
are also local administrations for urban areas known to have the same status as woredas. 
In the initial stages of decentralization to woredas, most urban administrations did not 
exist as separate administrative entities. They were a part of larger woredas that 
incorporated the urban areas (towns) as well as surrounding rural areas. In 2004, 
however, large towns were separated from their parent woredas and given the status of 
urban administrations with separate administrative boundaries and with woreda status. 
They are often subject to different rules than the rural woredas. For instance, 
Proclamation no. 42/2000 of the Amhara region which is according to Garcia and 
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Rajkumar (2008) similar to that of other major regions provides that urban 
administrations perform municipal functions in addition to state functions. State 
functions include health, education, and agricultural services. Municipal functions 
include the preparation, approval and implementation of development plans; assessment 
and collection of allowable municipal revenues; provision of internal roads and bridges; 
provision of markets, slaughter houses, terminals, public gardens, recreational areas, 
and other public facilities; regulation of cleanliness and provision of solid waste, water, 
sewerage, and drainage services; management of urban land and provision of urban land 
services; and delivery of miscellaneous services, including fire protection, libraries, 
public toilets, street lighting, nursery schools, and ambulance services (ANRS, 2000). 
 
It should be noted also that there are smaller municipalities/towns under the jurisdiction 
of the woredas which carry out municipal functions in small towns of rural woredas. 
They do not have woreda status and do not carry out state functions. They typically do 
not receive transfers from the regional or other governments, relying on own sources of 
revenue. It is expected that an increasing number of municipalities will seek to become 
urban administrations with woreda status in the future (Garcia and Rajkumar, 2008). 
 
Hence, the function and power of woreda administrations emanate essentially from the 
constitution of the respective regions. Even though each regional state has the power to 
design its own decentralization framework, practically, there has not been much 
difference between regional governments in the devolution of such power. The 
definition of powers and responsibilities to woreda governments is still evolving and all 
regions are still involved in the process of formulating precise legal frameworks for 
district level decentralization. At the moment, therefore, there is one framework 
developed by the federal government followed in all regions. Accordingly, the 
devolution of power to woreda administrations involves political, administrative and 
fiscal aspects as discussed below. 
3.5.1 Political Decentralization 
The system of political power devolution at woreda level is made possible through the 
establishment of the necessary institutions. Legislative, judicial, and executive branches 
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of government are created at woreda level. Members of Woreda Councils, the 
legislative body of woreda, are directly elected by the citizens from each kebele in the 
woreda. The Woreda Councils are accountable downward to the electorate but also 
upward to regional government. These councils select their Executive Cabinets. Woreda 
Councils are assemblies that meet once every three months. The council has the 
authority of approving the woreda’s budget, and of reviewing the work progress of the 
different sectors and executive members. The judicial system is represented by the 
woreda first instance court and the executive branch is represented by the Woreda 
Administrative Council or Cabinet (Yilmaz and Venugopal, 2008; Dickovick and 
Tegegn, 2010). 
3.5.2 Administrative Decentralization 
Dickovick and Tegegne (2010) assess the extent of administrative decentralization in 
terms of the extent of power woreda governments provided to develop their plans and 
budget, initiate regulatory legislation, undertake procurement, run the civil service and 
undertake employment policies. 
 
Therefore, currently woreda governments are formulating and implementing their own 
development plans and budgets without interference from the regional government. 
However, such plans have to be consistent with regional policy frameworks. The 
Finance and Economic Development offices of woredas have the responsibility to 
prepare woreda plans and budgets based on sectoral plans and budgets at woreda level 
(Kassahun and Tegegne, 2004). Thus, this preparation involves the prioritizing of sector 
plans according to the available resources as well as ensuring consistency with regional 
policy (Dickovick and Tegegne, 2010). 
 
The report of Yilmaz and Venugopal (2008) that closely reviewed the level of 
administrative decentralization also reveals that woreda governments can regulate land 
use, co-operatives and community activities, while municipal local government can 
regulate markets, sanitary services, and other municipal services. They have the 
autonomy to enforce regulation by sanctioning and punishing citizens in elected social 
courts and woreda courts. Moreover, woreda governments have discretionary power 
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over tendering and administrations of small projects, usually less than 100,000 birr. For 
larger projects, however, the woredas defer to zonal and regional governments. Civil 
servants such as teachers, sector office employees, health workers, and development 
agents are hired by woreda governments. Though the actual human resource policies 
and practices vary from region to region, in Amhara and Oromia, woredas play a central 
role in recruiting and hiring civil servants. But in Afar, the woredas send their 
manpower needs to the regional government. However, the right to determine civil 
service salary scales is not left to woreda governments but are determined by the 
regional governments. In practice, similar salary scale applies in all woredas across the 
country (Berhanu, 2009).  
3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization 
The primary issue that needs to be addressed in the design of fiscal decentralization is 
the definition of functions and responsibilities devolved to woreda governments. The 
definition of functions to woreda governments in Ethiopia is evolving. There is not a 
legal framework in all regions that clearly defines the functions devolved to woreda 
governments. But the trend across regions is toward decentralizing basic service 
delivery functions to the woredas while assigning higher order functions to regional 
governments. National policies and standards as well as tertiary services remain the 
responsibility of federal government (Worku, 2005 and Garcia and Rajkumar, 2008). 
 
Therefore, establishing and administering basic education services, including primary 
schools (Grades 1–8), the first cycle of secondary school (Grades 9–10), and adult 
education belongs to woreda governments. Their responsibilities include supervising 
these schools; printing and distributing primary school textbooks; and establishing and 
administering primary boarding schools. But the responsibility of printing and 
distributing books for secondary schools, formulating regional education policy and 
strategy, and preparing the curriculum for primary schools goes to regional 
governments (Worku, 2005; Garcia and Rajkumar, 2008). 
 
With respect to health, the woredas are responsible for coordinating primary preventive 
and curative health care and implementing health extension; constructing and 
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administering health stations and health posts; administering clinics; and preventing and 
controlling HIV/AIDS and malaria. Their responsibilities include the hiring of health 
staff assigned to health stations, health posts, and clinics. Moreover, in the area of water 
supply, the woredas are tasked with providing support to communities to administer 
water schemes; develop springs; build hand-dug wells; handle minor and moderate 
maintenance of water schemes; and promote indigenous irrigation schemes (Garcia and 
Rajkumar, 2008).  
 
Woredas also have the responsibility for maintaining lower-grade rural roads, as well as 
direct agricultural development activities which include extension packages; the  
planning and implementation of small scale and indigenous irrigation projects; and the 
administration and protection of natural resources such as land use and other natural 
resource belong to woreda governments (Worku, 2005; Garcia and Rajkumar, 2008). 
 
According to Dickovick and Tegegne (2010:11) district level fiscal decentralization in 
Ethiopia is “substantial by African standards, if one takes into account 
intergovernmental transfers”.  With the decentralization to local governments in 2002, a 
transparent formula based general purpose grant that gives autonomy to local 
governments was introduced in four regions: Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR, and Tigray. 
This has replaced the incremental budget allocation method. Initially after 2002, to 
make block grant allocations from regions to woredas, regions adopted the “three-
parameter” formula used at the time for Federal block grant allocations to the regions, 
sometimes with some minor modifications. In this formula, block grants were allocated 
to each woreda on the basis of population, development level, and revenue collection 
effort (Dickovick and Tegegn, 2010; Garcia and Rajkumar, 2008). 
 
While some regions have continued to use the “three-parameter” formula for making 
block grant allocations to rural woredas, others have experimented with different 
approaches. One advantage of Ethiopia’s decentralized system is that regions are 
allowed to choose their own approach for making block grant allocations, as long as this 
is done in a reliable, transparent and formula-based manner. In the year 2003/2004, the 
Southern Ethiopia Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR) pioneered the 
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“unit cost” approach for making block grant transfers to woredas replacing the ‘three 
parameter’ formula. The “unit cost” approach is primarily a “needs-based” approach 
which was later followed by other regions and is currently under consideration for the 
Federal block allocations to the regions. The unit cost approach allocates recurrent 
funding (which accounts for the bulk of total funding) to woredas in a “needs-based” 
manner, with higher per capita recurrent allocations generally going to woredas with 
higher per capita public service provision levels (Garcia and Rajkumar, 2008). 
 
The authority and responsibility of woreda administration with respect to the source of 
revenue, unlike the case in expenditure, is circumscribed (Dickovick and Tegegn, 2010; 
Meheret, 2007). Woreda governments do not have the power to decide on the rate and 
base of taxes. Their responsibility and authority is limited to collecting and using taxes 
and passing a designated portion of it to regional government. Regional governments 
have the primary saying in determining both the tax rates and bases. Indeed the typical 
feature of Ethiopian district level decentralization is the mismatch between expenditure 
responsibilities and the authority to raise own revenue to discharge those 
responsibilities. As explained by Meheret (2007) (cited in Dickovick and Tegegn, 
2010:12) “expenditures are so decentralized while revenue collection is centralized.” 
Besides, woreda governments do not have the power to borrow funds for carrying out 
development project activities. 
 
The limits to the fiscal autonomy of Ethiopia’s local governments begin with the limited 
tax base facing woredas, especially in rural areas. But it is exacerbated by the low levels 
of private sector economic activity in some areas. This leads to a heavy reliance on 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers. In the 1990s, after the establishment of 
decentralization, woreda governments collected an average of only 16–17% of total 
government revenue, with the region raising the remaining 83–84% (Keller and Smith, 
2005: 273). A study in eight woredas found out that on average more than 90% of 
woreda budgets were made up of grants received from regional governments (Meheret, 
2007). This in turn gives the regional government leverage over subnational 
expenditures. A study conducted by Tegegne (2009) indicated that woredas rely heavily 
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on regional governments, with the level of dependence on transfers from regions rising 
to over 80–90%. 
 
In spite of the fact that woreda governments are provided with considerable expenditure 
power and responsibilities, in practice their discretionary power is very limited due to 
the structure of expenditures at woreda level. Evidence indicates that substantial 
amounts of budgets transferred are generally used for recurrent expenditure, with nearly 
91% of woreda budgets earmarked for administrative and operational expenditures 
(Meheret, 2007). This leaves little room for discretionary capital budgeting at the 
woreda level. Most capital activities at the woreda level are financed from donors and 
aid agencies or from specific purpose grants from the region on which local officials do 
not have much say but are subject to regional government guidelines (CIDA, 2005). 
 
3.6 THE LOCAL GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT IN DECENTRALIZED 
WOREDAS 
 
The Ethiopian constitution has set up an adequate legal basis for sound and democratic 
governance at all level of government. The constitution (Article 12) places an obligation 
on public institutions and their officials at any level to be transparent and accountable to 
citizens (FDRE, 1995). In fact, one of the reasons for the extensive decentralization 
process in the country is to improve governance. The stated aim of district level 
decentralization that empowers woredas is also to improve local accountability and 
transparency. However, there are mixed views on the practical impact of district level 
decentralization in Ethiopia. Several writers assert that the EPRDF led government is 
not seriously interested in the stated goals but has designed district level 
decentralization mainly to consolidate its power by penetrating down to the woredas 
and kebele level (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2008; Yilmaz and Vonugopal, 2008). 
Nevertheless, the assessment of the local governance situation in woreda governments 
in terms of political accountability, administrative accountability, financial 
accountability and social accountability arrangements, as presented in the following 
sections helps to reveal the real effort that the government has put to improve local 
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governance, as well as the real intention behind district level decentralization in 
Ethiopia. 
3.6.1 Political Accountability 
In Ethiopian district level decentralization (consistent with the provisions of Article 8 of 
the Ethiopian constitution), elections are vital instruments of accountability that allow 
people to express their preferences and, to this end, secret ballot voting occurs at the 
woreda level once every five years. Nevertheless there are quite a lot of concerns 
regarding the quality of election system. The first is related to the independence of the 
National Election Board (NEB). As has been mentioned earlier, members of the NEB 
(which is responsible for organizing elections including woreda elections in the country 
are nominated by the prime minister and approved by the ruling party dominated 
parliament (FDRE, 1995). This leaves the independence of NEB questionable 
(Pausewang, Tronvoll and Aalen, 2002).  The other most visible problem is that 
opposition political parties, as is common in most transitional democratic countries, do 
not have the capacity to present large numbers of candidates required at the woreda (50 
to 60 candidates depending on the size of the woreda). This has been to the benefit of 
the ruling party which has the capacity to nominate the required number of candidates 
(Aalen and Tronvoll, 2008).  Besides, since the electoral system is a ‘first past the post’ 
rather than proportional representation system, the winning party takes all the council 
seats allocated through the election, meaning that opposition parties have a slim chance 
of winning seats on the woreda council (Yilmaz and Venugopal, 2008).  
 
Perhaps the most worrisome problem in using election as a reliable accountability 
instrument in Ethiopia is the massive gap between the de jure constitutional provision 
and the de facto exercise of the election system. The past elections in Ethiopia not only 
at national and regional level but also at woreda and kebele level have tended to be 
single horse races dominated to a greater extent by the ruling party (Adem, 2008). The 
EPRDF and affiliate parties
13
 have therefore dominated the Woreda Council elections. 
                                                          
13
 EPRDF has formed five affiliate parties including the Afar National Democratic Movement (ANDM), 
Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP), Harari National League (HNL), Benshangul-Gumuz Peoples’ 
Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF), and Gambella Peoples’ Democratic Party (GPDP) 
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In the 2008 woreda elections, for instance, EPRDF and affiliated parties took almost all 
of the seats of Woreda Council, running essentially without opposition (Dickovick and 
Tegegn, 2010). Political competitiveness is therefore highly constrained at the local 
level. There is no a ‘level playing field’ for political competition as the boundary 
between the ruling party and the bureaucracy is blurred where executives and officials 
in the bureaucracy are party loyalists. This gives the ruling party a chance to make use 
of both the administrative apparatus and resources for political purpose (Meheret, 
2007). In addition, as Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003) indicate, opposition parties who 
intended to participate in local election often find their offices closed, their potential 
candidates harassed or arrested, and their supporters warned against voting for them. 
This is also confirmed by Human Rights Watch (2008:1) field research on the 2008 
local election. This situation gives rise to patron client relationship between political 
party leaders at the centre and members at local level. This is to say that local council 
members, executives and officials tend to be more loyal to party leaders than to the 
populace, which undermines downward accountability (Paulos, 2007). The patron client 
relationship is best observed when Woreda Council elections are won by opposition 
parties as seen in the case of Shako Majangir woreda. The opposition party, Sakko 
Majangir Democratic Unity party (the first ever opposition party in the history of the 
country to win local election), won the 2000 local council election. But this council 
experienced extreme budget shortages throughout its tenure due to the fact that the 
ruling party at the regional state level cut the budget significantly (Edjeta, 2008, cited in 
Yilmaz and Venugopal, 2008).   
 
Horizontal accountability mechanisms such as local council oversight are also used to 
ensure accountability of the officials to the people. To this end Woreda Councils in 
Ethiopia have different standing committees to oversee sector activities though their 
effectiveness varies from one region to another. For instance, in Amhara, Oromia and 
Tigray, woreda councils often have four standing committees, such as Budget and 
Finance Committee; Social Affairs Committee; Security Affairs Committee; and 
Women’s Affairs Committee, while woredas in other regions sometimes have no 
committee. Members of these committees sometimes lead the discussions in the 
quarterly meetings of the councils. The quarterly discussion is based on a monthly 
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financial and physical reports presented from sectors. Besides, the budget for the fiscal 
year presented for approval and consolidated woreda accounts are presented at the end 
of the year to the Woreda Council (World Bank, 2001).  
 
Despite such arrangements, council oversight does not live up to its expectation due to 
several factors. In addition to the factors related to local election problems mentioned 
above, the oversight function of the Woreda Council is often compromised due to 
conflict of interest, as most cabinet members in the woredas are also members of the 
council and are unable to objectively oversee their cabinets. This is also the reason why 
discussions and decisions in Woreda Council tend to be dominated and influenced by a 
few executive-council members who are better skilled and informed about how the 
government system operates than other council members (Yilmaz and Vonugopal, 
2008). The overseeing role of councillors is also impeded due to capacity problem 
especially in technical areas, such as planning, budgeting and financial management. 
Apart from capacity constraints, the fact that councillors at woreda level are not full 
time salaried officials, they tend to be less interested in overseeing the activities of line 
managers. Therefore, the councillors’ approval and overseeing role, in general, is often 
not much more than a ‘rubber stamp’ (Yilmaz and Venugopal, 2008). 
 
It should be noted that the councils are accountable not only to the people by whom 
they are elected but also to the regional executive committee through the zonal 
executive committee. Such dual accountability has its own problems in that it might 
relegate accountability to electors to secondary status (Meheret, 2007). Local 
accountability at local level is subdued also by the structure of ruling party that tends to 
foster central control, clientelism, and top-down governance in which decentralized 
units perform more as a passage for centrally imposed policies and directions to flow to 
lower level than for upward communication of local demands (Aalen and Tronvoll, 
2008; Chanie, 2007; Kidane, 2001). The political incentives for the ruling party towards 
decentralization thus may be partly in the interest of improved service provision but not 
necessarily in the interest of more bottom-up accountability. 
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3.6.2 Administrative Accountability 
At the woreda level, besides representative accountability, there is 
administrative/service delivery accountability (CIDA, 2005). This refers to 
accountability within woreda sector offices which are headed by appointed professional 
civil servants. There have been several reforms carried out by the government with the 
support of World Bank through various programs. These include the five-year Capacity 
Building for Decentralized Service Delivery project (CBDSD) which was put into place 
for designing and implementing civil service reform and restructuring and empowering 
local government to ensure transparency and accountability of civil servants to the 
citizen as well as hierarchically to respective officials (Gutema, 2005). So far, there 
have been few studies to evaluate the effectiveness and impact of such programmes. 
However, the evidences suggest that the impact has not been very great, largely because 
of persistent problems associated in particular to the issue of the political-administrative 
interface. As Miheret (2007) has indicated, there is often a blurring of the distinction 
between the elected and appointed personnel, resulting in a great deal of administrative 
as well as political influence and power residing in the hands of the ruling party. 
 
Another factor that seriously inhibits local accountability is the capacity constraints that 
exist at the local level.  In the Ethiopian decentralization process, capacity issues at 
local level are addressed through two components, in rural areas through the District 
Level Decentralization Program and in urban areas through the Urban Management 
Program. The National Ministry of Capacity Building is the responsible federal 
government agency for running the capacity building programs of the country. Hence, 
besides various reforms introduced, efforts are made to train employees of woreda 
administrations and deploy human resource as well as office facilities, equipment, 
furniture and vehicles from regional and zonal administrations to woreda offices. But 
the evidence reveals a mixed result for such efforts. As part of this effort, a huge 
number of employees from zones and regional states’ offices have been selected and 
transferred to woredas, in most cases in remote areas. However, in many cases the 
evidence suggests that those transferred were often short of capacity themselves and 
poorly motivated, especially as few monetary or other incentives were provided to those 
transferred (except for two months allowance for displacement). Some transferred 
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officials have now returned to the zonal or regional offices. Vehicles and equipment 
transferred to woredas were often not also functioning (Berhanu, 2009). 
3.6.3 Financial Accountability 
Capacity building efforts have also been made in the areas of accounting, budgeting, 
reporting and information system to improve the financial governance situation of 
woreda governments. As a result, woreda financial management has changed 
effectively from single-entry book and cash-basis accounting into double-entry book 
keeping and modified-cash basis accounting system. New accounts and budgeting 
system were introduced, including computer based financial management information 
systems in a small number of woredas; and new reporting formats and budget calendars 
were also introduced. The objective was to help woreda governments properly 
discharge their new financial responsibilities devolved from regional governments by 
improving their existing systems in which planned revenues and expenditures did not 
match actual revenues and expenditures collected. Previously, budget planning was ad 
hoc and not linked to policy objectives; revenues and expenditures forecast were 
incremental and thus not rooted in actual information and policy objectives; and, owing 
to poor planning and weak accounting and monitoring practices, accounts payable 
tended to accumulate (USAID, 2006). Despite Peterson’s (2011) claim that the financial 
management reform has been successfully implemented in the country, there is 
currently a dearth of studies to effectively back up this claim. 
 
Woreda governments rely heavily on transfers from regional government, especially for 
recurrent budget purposes. This leaves very little funds for capital budgets. If additional 
funds are provided by the central government or foreign donors, these are often 
earmarked for specific purposes, leaving little control or discretion for the woreda 
governments on the utilisation of such funds. This heavy reliance on transfer and donor 
assistance also undermines downward accountability to the people (Miheret, 2007). 
This is because citizens have little incentive to hold their local officials accountable as 
they know activities are financed by central or regional government grants rather than 
by the taxes and revenues collected from them.    
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Generally, empirical evidences indicate that the downward accountabilities of woreda 
government officials to constituents is seriously lacking. For instance, a recent citizen 
report card survey conducted in seven regions in 21 rural woredas shows that 87 % of 
the households have no information on woreda level government budget, 83 % of the 
households have no information on the strategic plans of the local governments, 85 % 
have no information about the agenda of their local governments, and 84 % are not 
informed of the decision made by Woreda Council (Ministry of Capacity Building and 
Ministry of Works and Urban Development, 2008).  
 
3.6.4 Social Accountability 
Because formal accountability instruments designed in the government system are not 
effective, social accountability arrangements are often believed to fill the gap. But, in 
Ethiopia, social accountability is not a well-developed area in the district level 
decentralization schemes. Ethiopian decentralization makes no reference to civil society 
and there is no provision for members of civil society to represent their constituencies in 
local councils, or the regional and national parliaments (Tegegne and Kassahun, 2004).  
 
In the first place, the involvement and contribution of civil society in strengthening 
local accountability in Ethiopia continues to be a weak link. This may be partly due to 
the existence of the relatively small number of NGOs in Ethiopia. There are currently 
only 500-700 NGOs, which compares very unfavourably to countries such as Uganda 
(where there are 4,136) or Kenya, where there are 2,962 in Kenya (Yilmaz and 
Venugopal, 2008).  Furthermore, NGOs in Ethiopia are engaged substantively in relief 
and development activities rather than in governance issues (Dessalegn, 2002). Those 
that do engage in policy advocacy also tend to opt for safer issues, such as promoting 
the rights of children; and campaigning against cultural practices harmful to women 
(Dessalegn. 2002). Community based organizations also mobilize and involve people 
but largely to improve service delivery and mobilize resources for development 
activities, such as health, education and water management (Kassahun and Tegegne, 
2004). This is partly due to the government’s hostile nature towards NGOs that take up 
policy advocacy and governance (Dessalegn. 2002).  
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Civil society organizations in Ethiopia are generally weak financially as well as in terms 
of managerial or institutional capacity and experience (Dessalegn, 2002). Those that are 
stronger tend to be affiliated to either the government or the ruling political party (for 
instance, REST in Tigray, ADA in Amhara, and ODA in Oromia), and do not therefore 
function as an effective social accountability mechanism (Yilmaz and Venugopal, 
2008).  
 
Advocacy work by NGOs and community organizations has been further weakened by 
changes in the legal environment governing the role and functions of internationally 
supported NGOs. This has limited participation in policy and governance advocacy only 
to local or Ethiopian charities and societies, which are formed under the law of Ethiopia 
with full Ethiopian membership and control (FDRE, 2009). Foreign-controlled charities 
and societies are not allowed to engage in such activities. Moreover, Ethiopian resident 
charities and societies are now not allowed to generate more than 10% of their funds 
from foreign sources. This has imposed severe financial strain on NGOs, many of 
whom depended primarily on external rather than internal resources. This change in the 
law regarding the financing of NGOs is alleged to be a response by the EPRDF to its 
shrinking electoral dominance in the 2005 national election, as it believed that this 
partly the result of the activities of externally funded advocacy groups and organizations 
(Debebe, 2010b). 
 
While there is no legal provision for traditional forms of civil society to be involved in 
local governance, community assemblies and mass associations which are supposed to 
be the first point of contact for citizens to voice their demand are tending to serve, in 
reality, for the ruling party as mechanisms for reinforcement of existing political 
channels (Pausewang et.al, 2002). Women and youth associations are also generally 
perceived as an extension of government structure at the local level (Yilmaz and 
Venugopal, 2008), although there are a few cases, for instance in Amhara and the 
Tigray region, which reveal that a number of such groups have been more actively 
involved in independent stands towards government (EC Non-State Actors Study, 
2004). 
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The contribution of the media (both in print and broadcast media) for providing 
independent information and strengthening local governance is extremely weak in 
Ethiopia even by African standard. This is due to not only the limited availability of and 
access to media at the local level due to geographic and economic realities, but also 
because of restrictions placed on media freedom. Although the constitution and legal 
framework does not allow for government censorship, considerable self-censorship is 
imposed on reporters by punishing those whose reports are thought to compromise 
national security or defame the government. Much of the media in Ethiopia is 
dominated by the state and the ruling party. There is therefore a very slim chance for it 
to serve as a mechanism of strengthening accountability not only at local but even at 
national level. 
3.7 SUMMARY 
 
Chapter 3 has shown that decentralization and local governance are relatively recent 
phenomenon to Ethiopia. It was only after the coming into power of the EPRDF in 1991 
that the government and political system changed from central, socialist, and single 
party system into an ethnic federalist, multiparty and market system. The process of 
devolving political, administrative and fiscal power in the country took place in two 
phases: first regional level decentralization and then district level decentralization.  
 
In the district level decentralization, the focus of this thesis, there are several successes 
in terms of effectively decentralizing significant power and responsibility to woreda 
governments. Besides devolution of political power, woreda governments are provided 
with the power and responsibility of providing basic public services in their jurisdiction. 
Woreda governments decide on the plan, budget and utilization of public resource for 
the provision of those services. The transparent and formula based block grant provides 
them with required resource in addition to the tax they collect from their citizens. 
Efforts, though with variable results, have also been made to build the capacity of 
woreda governments. Notwithstanding such achievements surrounding the progressive 
features of decentralization, many concerns still remain. Most of these are linked, in one 
way or another, to local accountability issues. The lack of a clear legal framework for 
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decentralization and limited revenue raising power are often mentioned as limitations 
relating to the design of district level decentralization in Ethiopia. Coupled with the 
reliance of woreda governments on transfers from regional governments due to their 
limited revenue potential, this has tended to promote upward forms of accountability 
and undermine downward accountability to the people. 
 
Downward accountability is hindered in local governments of Ethiopia mainly due to a 
gulf between the constitutional provision and the de facto exercise. The government’s 
intention to pay lip service to downward accountability becomes crystal clear when it 
comes to political accountability. Single political party dominance in both the 
legislative and executive branches, and even in the bureaucracy, coupled with the 
centralised structure of ruling party, tends to sustain upward partisan accountability over 
downward accountability. Together with the capacity problems faced by woredas, this 
has adversely affected the introduction of an effective system of checks and balances at 
the local level.  
 
Although there have been successes in the implementation of various civil service and 
financial management reforms in such areas as accounting, budgeting reporting and 
auditing, the impact of these reforms on local accountability has yet to be fully  
investigated. At the same time, forms of social accountability are almost totally lacking 
in Ethiopia. 
 
This suggests that the district level fiscal decentralization process in Ethiopia does not 
conform to the requirements suggested by the theoretical framework discussed earlier in 
this thesis in order for fiscal decentralization to succeed in delivering its alleged local 
financial governance benefits. Nonetheless, explaining how these incomplete efforts of 
district level fiscal decentralization interact and affect local financial governance is not 
possible without a more thorough analysis of actual cases. Hence, the forthcoming 
chapters will provide the results of the investigation in the Amhara region district level 
fiscal decentralization process using empirical data from selected four case woredas. 
Before this, however, the research design and methodology adopted for the research 
will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents a detail description of the research paradigm, techniques, methods 
and processes followed in carrying out the research. It consists of three major sections. 
The first identifies the research paradigm chosen to guide the investigation. The second 
outlines the research design adopted for the study. And the third sets out the research 
methods employed, in relation to such issues as the sampling processes used and the 
data gathering and analysis methods employed. 
 
4.1 RATIONALE FOR AN INTERPRETIVE PARADIGM 
 
In this empirical research an interpretive approach was followed. There are compelling 
reasons to use such an approach. Local financial governance is a factor of several forces 
that interplay in the local government. Thus, understanding and analyzing local 
financial governance is a complex endeavor that requires not only looking at the local 
government financial management system but also understanding the views and feelings 
of different people and actors, as well as the political, economic, and social environment 
(World Bank, 2008; Schaefer, 2005). In such a situation, a simple study examining 
cause and effect will not be sufficient. Instead there is a need for a comprehensive study 
that brings the various forces and variables together and examines their interaction and 
consequence in the local financial governance sphere.  
 
That is why the aim of this study is to examine not only cause and effect relationships 
but also the contexts and processes in local financial governance and the intricacies 
involved in the complex network of relationships between various forces in local 
financial governance in the four case woreda administrations selected for the study. 
Therefore, this study involves an interpretative approach as it includes a number of 
cases (units of analysis) while taking several variables into account.  This is the opposite 
of a positivist approach where large sample cases and few variables are needed for 
objective generalization. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
76 
 
 
Another reason for following an interpretive analysis has to do with the nature and 
availability of data. The complex issues addressed in this research (including the extent 
of devolution of fiscal and functional power, as well as the autonomy of woreda 
administrations, adequacy of financial management practices, direct and indirect 
engagement of citizens, and interaction of political factors) can never be fully 
understood or represented in numerical terms. At the same time, as much of the required 
data could not be found in national or regional government reports and statistics, it was 
necessary to gather the required data from structured questionnaires and interviews with 
key stakeholders.    
 
4.2 STUDY DESIGN 
 
In this thesis, a multiple case study approach is followed. Multiple case analyses, as 
explained by Baxter and Jack (2008), involve a process whereby more than two cases 
are examined to understand the effects of a particular program in different contexts and 
to identify factors contributing to differences of such effects between cases. To this end, 
four case study woredas in the Amhara region, namely Mekiet, Bahirdar Zuria, 
Debremarkos and Shebel Berenta are included in the study. These woredas have 
different socio-economic, demographic and geographic features that influence the 
implementation of fiscal decentralization as well as financial management reforms. As 
shown in table 4.1 below, Mekiet Woreda is a relatively remote area and yet, as reports 
from the then Bureau of Capacity Building report show, it is regarded as one of the 
woredas that have implemented the reforms more successfully than the other woredas. 
Shebel Berenta Woreda is the remotest woreda and has not been as successful as Mekiet 
in the implementation of the reforms. Bahirdar Zuria Woreda is closer to Bahirdar city 
(the capital of the region), and consists of all the rural villages on the outskirts of the 
city. Debremrkos town administration, unlike the other woredas, is an urban 
administration and has somewhat different responsibilities and powers in terms of 
function, revenue resource and autonomy. These differences helped the study to make 
more meaningful comparisons and draw more meaningful conclusions regarding the 
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achievements and limitations of the fiscal decentralization process in the Amhara 
region.  
 
Although the four woredas have a number of sectoral offices (as shown in Table 4.2 
below), the study focuses largely on the three most important offices, those of 
education, health and rural water supply respectively. These three offices account for 
the largest proportion of the budget in all four woredas.  
4.2.1 Description of Study Areas 
4.2.1.1 Amhara Regional Government 
This study focuses on district level fiscal decentralization in the Amhara region due to 
the fact that, as already discussed in the previous chapters, the Amhara regional 
government is one of the four regional states that pioneered the devolution of fiscal 
power to woreda administrations. The Amhara regional state is one of the larger states 
that constitute the Ethiopian federal state. It is home for roughly 27 percent of the total 
population of Ethiopia. With an estimated area of 161,828 square kilometers, the region 
is organized into 11 administrative zones and 115 woreda administrations (see the map 
on Appendix 13 (BoFED, 2011). The population of the region, according to the 2007 
national census, is 17,205,000, consisting of 8,636,875 men and 8,577,181 women. 
Approximately 16,925,000 or 88.5% of the population are estimated to be rural 
inhabitants, while 2,195,000 or 11.5% are urban. The majority of the population 
(91.2%) of the region belongs to the Amhara ethnic group. Other groups including the 
Oromo (3%), Agew/Awi (2.7%), Qemant (1.2%), and Agaw/Kamyr (1%) (CSA, 2007). 
The capital of the regional state is Bahirdar which is 565kms far to the northwest from 
Addis Ababa, the capital of the federal government. The Amhara region is principally a 
rural and agricultural region in which 90% of rural dwellers are engaged in small scale 
agriculture activities (CSA, 1999).  
4.2.1.2 Shebel Berenta  
Shebel Berenta is the remotest and the most rural woreda administration of all the case 
study woredas. It is part of the Eastern Gojjam Administrative Zone (see the map on 
Appendix 16). Yeduha is a small village like town serving as the seat of the woreda 
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administration. There is only one route in and out of the town that is isolated from the 
secondary road that connects Addis Ababa and Bahirdar. The woreda is also the 
smallest of all the case study woredas in terms of population. It is found in the low land 
area of Eastern Gojjam and consequently it is one of the most drought prone woredas of 
the Amhara region, due to its low level of rain fall, depletion of natural resources, 
deforestation and soil erosion. Shebel Berenta Woreda consists of 17 rural kebeles and 
one urban kebele. 
 
4.2.1.3 Debremarkos  
Debremarkos is an urban woreda which also serves as the seat of the Eastern Gojjam 
Administrative Zone (see the map on Appendix 16). Debremarkos once served as the 
capital of Gojjam province before the introduction of the 1995 new constitution that 
reorganized the country into ethnic regions. Debremarkos town is located 300 km 
northwest from Addis Ababa and 265 km from Bahirdar. The main road that connects 
Addis Ababa and Bahirdar passes through the town. Debremarkos town administration 
incorporates eight urban kebeles. 
 
4.2.1.3 Bahirdar Zuria 
Bahirdar Zuria Woreda is a rural woreda consisting of the peripheral rural areas of 
Bahirdar city. It is part of the Western Gojjam Administrative Zone (see the map on 
Appendix 16). The seat of the woreda administration offices is Bahirdar city. It is the 
second most populous woreda next to Mekiet. This is a food secured woreda with no 
history of relief assistance. Bahirdar Zuria Woreda administration consists of 40 rural 
kebeles.  
 
4.2.1.4 Mekiet 
Mekiet is the largest rural and the second remotest woreda of all case study woredas. It 
is found in North Wollo Administrative Zone (see the map on Appendix 16). Flakit, a 
small town 220 km east of Bahirdar is the seat of the woreda administration. The main 
road that connects Bahirdar and Woldiya (seat of the North Wollo Administrative Zone) 
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crosses Flakit town. The woreda is one of the most drought prone woredas in the 
Amhara region. Meket Woreda consists of forty rural kebeles and two urban kebeles. 
Table 4.1: Description of the study areas 
Woreda Administ
rative 
Zones 
the 
woreda 
found 
Admini
strativ
e seat 
Number of 
Kebeles 
Populati
on Size 
Proporti
on of 
people 
in rural 
area 
Remoteness of woredas Average 
annual rain 
fall 
Distance 
from 
Bahirdar 
Distance from 
the main road 
Debrem
arkos 
East 
Gojjam 
Debre
markos  
9 urban 
kebeles 
62,497 Urban 265km The main road 
that connects 
Addis ababa to 
Bahirdar 
crosses the 
town 
1380mm 
Shebel 
Berenta 
East 
Gojjam 
Yeduha   17 rural 
kebeles 
and one 
urban 
kebele 
103,988 95.03% 
rural 
345km 70 km from the 
secondary 
road (Unpaved 
or gravel road)  
that connects 
Addis Ababa 
and Bahirdar 
One of the 
most drought 
prone areas 
(food 
insecued) 
Bahirdar 
Zuria 
West 
Gojjam 
Bahirda
r 
40 rural 
kebeles 
182,730 95.94% 
rural 
Rural 
villages 
in the 
outskirts 
of 
Bahirdar 
city  
- 820-1250mm 
Mekiet North 
Wello 
Filakit 40 rural 
kebeles 
and 2 
urban 
kebeles 
226,644 94.92% 
rural 
220 km  The main road 
that connects 
Bahirdar to 
Mekiet crosses 
the seat of the 
woreda/ 
One of the 
most drought 
prone areas 
(food 
insecured) 
Source: Case Wordeas Socio Economic Profile 
Table 4.2: the Organization of woreda administrations in the Amhara region 
Social Sector Offices Economic Sector Offices Administrative and General 
Services Offices 
 1-Education office 
1-Rural Development and 
Agriculture office 
1-Woreda Administrative council office 
 2-Health office 2- Rural Water Supply Office* 2- Justice office 
 3-Rural water supply office 
3-Trade, Industry and Urban 
Development Office 
3-Administration and Security office 
 
4-Women’s Affair Office 
 
4- Micro and Small Scale 
Enterprises Office 
4-Police 
 5-Youth, Sport and Culture office 
5- Co-operatives Coordinating 
Office 
5-Information and Public relations 
office 
  
6-Land Use and Environmental 
Protection Office 
6- People mobilization and 
Administration office 
  
7- Woreda office of finance and 
planning  
7- Civil Service Office 
  
8-Disaster Prevention and Food 
Security Office 
8- Militia office 
  9-Office for municipality service**  
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Source: Case Woredas WOFED 
*Note that water supply office in urban woredas such as Debremarkos urban 
administration has semi-autonomous status. 
**This office is only for Debremarkos urban administration  
 
 
4.3. RESEARCH METHODS 
 
Data on financial governance gathered from a single source using a single gathering 
method is not likely to be sufficient for a study of this kind. Understanding and 
analyzing this complex issue requires bringing different pieces of data together. 
Furthermore, due to the imminent problems in developing countries, obtaining reliable 
data from a single source using a single method is not really possible. It is 
understandable that official documents and financial reports are not likely to be properly 
filed or prepared, reliable or complete. Respondents may fear to give their views openly 
when it comes to governance issues; and officials may not be willing to cooperate or to 
give genuine information and so forth. Therefore, it can be said that the use of different 
pieces of data from different sources is important not just for validity purpose but also 
for improving reliability by securing alternative data. Hence, this research was carried 
out following an eclectic approach, by gathering different pieces of data through various 
data collection methods from multiple sources and following diverse investigation 
processes. A detailed explanation of sources of data, types of data and data collection 
techniques and methods of data analysis employed for the study is presented as follows. 
 
4.3.1 Selection of Respondents, Type of Data and Data Collection Techniques 
In order to gather reliable, valid and complete data, it is imperative to follow different 
primary and secondary data collection methods appropriate to gathering different types 
of data from diverse sources (Baker, 1999). 
 
4.3.1.1 Primary Data Collection Techniques 
In this study, both quantitative and qualitative data were gathered using three primary 
data collection instruments from diverse sources. These are interview, focus group 
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discussions and questionnaires. Respondents for the questionnaires, focus group 
discussions, and interviews were selected using both probability and non-probability 
(purposive) sampling methods, based on their role, responsibility and involvement (as 
decision-makers, service providers or beneficiaries) in the financial decentralization 
processes.  
Interviews 
 
Interviews were administered to officials at various levels including the woreda and 
regional level. The main informants include the heads of the education, health and rural 
water supply offices in the four woredas. A detailed interview of two to three hours was 
conducted with all of these officials. Interviews were also held with the regional BoFED 
deputy head, woreda chief administrators, and Woreda Council speakers. An informal 
interview was also held with the head of the public relations office for the Amhara 
Regional Auditor-General (ARAG), as well as with the deputy head of the regional 
Management Institute.  
 
A detailed check list of issues was prepared and used in the interviews to gather in-
depth information pertaining to the following: 
 The power and functional competencies devolved as well as the fiscal, 
administrative and political autonomy of woreda administrations. 
 The nature of relationship and coordination between woreda and regional offices 
and the extent and nature of regional involvement in woreda financial affairs. 
 The practices of financial management activities such as planning, budgeting, 
budget implementation and follow up in sector offices. 
 The appropriateness of budget appropriation among sector offices and its 
execution.  
 The practice of external auditing in woreda administrations. 
 The manpower situation in sector offices related to financial management 
responsibilities.  
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 The role of Woreda Councils in planning as well as budgeting (from 
appropriation to the evaluation of budget to ensure accountability and effective 
financial management in woreda governments). 
Focus Group Discussions 
 
Focus group discussions were used to gather data that are more likely to be revealed 
through social gatherings and interactions within a group contexts. Two separate focus 
group discussions (FGDs), comprising seven to eight participants each, were 
administered in each of the case study woredas. The first focus group was composed of 
community members, including representatives of the elders, youth, women, religious 
leaders, business community and peasants. Through these focus group discussions, it 
was possible to gather valuable information about the interaction between citizens and 
their government officials, the existing possibilities for citizens engagement in the 
woreda financial management decisions, the availability of information about the 
financial performance of their woreda administration, accountability arrangements, the 
possibilities for engagement of formal and informal associations in government 
financial management process, and the political context of their woreda.   
 
The second type of focus group was held with participants from the Woreda Offices of 
Finance and Economic Development (WOFED) whose responsibilities were directly 
related to the budgeting and finance activities of the woredas. These participants were 
selected purposely on account of their roles and responsibilities in the financial 
management processes  of their woreda administration. They included accountants from 
government finance disbursement divisions; planning experts and budgeting experts 
from planning and budget divisions; experts from internal revenue offices; purchasers 
from procurement and property administration divisions; and auditors from internal 
audit divisions.  
 
All focus group discussions consisted of seven to eight participants. The discussions 
were held for a period of about three hours. Such FGDs were crucial for the researcher 
to be familiar with the financial management system being practiced in the woreda 
administrations. These FGDs helped not only to identify the shortcomings of the 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
83 
 
implemented financial management reforms, but most importantly they were 
instrumental in identifying the gap between the designed financial management system 
and what is going on in practice in the financial management process of woreda 
administrations. In addition, the FGDs helped in gathering information about the 
interaction between WOFED and other sectors in the process of budget implementation; 
the influence of political interests in the financial management process; and the nature 
of their interaction with zone administrations.  
 
All of the FGDs were facilitated by the researcher. Despite their important influence in 
local financial governance, issues related to elections and the role of the ruling and 
opposition parties were not raised and discussed, as people did not want to talk about 
openly about such politically sensitive issues. Even though financial governance in the 
public sector is inextricably linked with political processes and cannot be insulated from 
political influences, the facilitator was forced to take utmost care not to raise issues such 
as these that would likely irritate the participants.  
 
With regard to other (non-political) issues, however, the vast majority of participants in 
the focus groups were prepared to talk openly. With respect to the focus groups with 
community representatives, one of the reasons for this was the widely held perception 
that most of the allocation and spending problems had little to do with the ruling party 
or with the regional or federal government. Instead they believed that the problems they 
identified resulted largely from shortcomings related to their woreda administration 
officials. Thus, they believed that they had to use this opportunity to reveal the existing 
problems in their woreda administration. In fact, one of the challenges in FGDs was that 
some of the participants seemed to regard the FGD as a public meeting organized to 
hear their complaints. It was observed that they wanted to talk all their complaints even 
about issues unrelated with this research. An attempt to interrupt such unrelated talks 
was not easy and even caused disappointment of some of the participants. Therefore, the 
facilitator had taken due care to balance these situations in the FGDs. 
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Questionnaires 
 
Getting the views and opinions of individual people of the case woredas in the region is 
also important. The Amhara region is a large region where the selected case woredas 
are located faraway from each other. Thus, the only effective method to help to obtain 
individual views and perception of a large sample of respondents in such scattered 
woredas was to use questionnaires. In addition, questionnaires were used to support and 
triangulate the information gathered through the interviews and focus group discussions. 
As the research involved a number of issues on which people might be unwilling to 
reflect their feelings openly, questionnaires were therefore used with the intention to 
give anonymity to respondents. Despite this effort, some respondents were still 
unwilling to give their feelings and views. As revealed in table 4.3, this resulted in only 
309 of the 360 questionnaires distributed being completed and returned. Nevertheless, 
given the logistical difficulties involved, this was still an acceptable rate of return from 
which valid findings could be generated.  
Two types of questionnaires (open ended and closed) were prepared in the Amharic
14
 
language. The open ended questionnaires were used for gathering data from individual 
households and were intended for gathering demographic data and especially for 
affording the respondents the opportunity to explain their views and opinions (which 
would not have been possible with a closed questionnaire). Household respondents were 
selected using a two-stage cluster randomization process. Three sample kebele 
administrations were selected from each of the four woredas and then thirty households 
from each of the sample kebeles were selected randomly. 
Questionnaires were distributed to and collected from households by assistant 
enumerators. One teacher and one development agent working in the kebeles were 
recruited for every kebele as enumerators and deployed after being trained by the 
researcher as to how they should go about eliciting data from the households. This is 
mainly due to the fact that, as shown in table 4.3, many of the respondents were 
illiterate and could not fill the questionnaires without support from the enumerators. 
Even those sections of the community who can read and write or have primary 
                                                          
14
 Amharic is the working language in all case woredas 
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education were not able to comprehend the questions without support from 
enumerators. This was not due so much to the difficulty of the questions but rather to 
the opaqueness of the government system to the people and their low level of 
interaction with their woreda government. Besides, some of the questions needed to be 
reinterpreted in other locally understandable languages. This was possible only by the 
use of these enumerators. 
An attempt was made to ensure representativeness of samples by including respondents 
from all sections of the community. As shown in table 4.3 below, these included rural 
and urban dwellers, male and female headed households, literate and illiterate people, 
and youth and elders. The selection was made from the list of households available in 
the kebele administrations. Thus, the questionnaires were designed to include structured 
questions intended to gather data regarding the perception of the respondents about 
issues such as the autonomy of their woreda administrations, the effectiveness and 
responsiveness of allocation and spending, corruption and mismanagement by officials, 
the availability of information about the use of public finance, the involvement of 
people in budget decisions, and the possibilities of holding woreda officials 
accountable.  
Table 4.3: Demographic characteristics of respondents by woreda 
Educational background of the 
respondents by woreda 
Woreda the respondents reside Total 
BDZ Mekiet Shebel Markos 
# % # % # % # % # % 
Educational background 
Illiterate  35 53.8 35 39.3 23 32.4 9 10.7 102 33 
Read and writ 23 35.4 5 5.6 10 14.1 7 8.3 45 14.6 
Primary edu. 3 4.6 10 11.3 4 5.6 4 4.8 21 6.8 
5-8 3 4.7 20 22.5 10 14.1 15 17.8 48 15.5 
9-12 1 1.5 12 13.5 13 18.3 24 28.6 50 16.2 
College  0 0 7 7.8 11 15.5 25 29.8 43 13.9 
Sex of respondents by woreda 
 # % # % # % # % # % 
Sex of respondents 
Female 9 13.8 18 20.2 13 18.3 32 38.1 72 23.3 
Male 56 86.2 71 79.8 58 81.7 52 61.9 237 76.7 
Age of respondents by woreda 
 # % # % # % # % # % 
Age of respondents 
18-25 7 10.7 18 20.3 16 22.5 15 17.9 56 18.1 
26-35 16 24.6 21 23.6 21 29.6 27 32.1 85 27.5 
36-45 16 24.6 12 13.5 15 21.2 25 29.8 68 22 
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46-60 21 32.3 27 30.3 14 19.7 10 11.9 72 23.3 
>60 5 7.8 11 12.3 5 7 7 8.3 28 9.1 
Marital status of respondents by woreda 
 # % # % # % # % # % 
Marital Status of 
respondents 
Single  5 7.8 16 18 15 21.1 18 21.4 54 17.5 
Married 58 89.2 73 82 56 78.9 66 77.6 256 82.8 
Unspecified 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 .7 
Religion of respondents by woreda  
 # % # % # % # % # % 
Religion of respondents  
Christianity 65 100 85 95.5 71 100 78 92.9 299 96.8 
Muslim 0 0 4 4.5 0 0 6 7.1 10 3.2 
Total 65 100 89 100 71 100 84 100 309 100 
Source: Field Survey: 2011  
 
The close ended questionnaires were used to gather information from officials in 
woreda service delivery units in the education, health and rural water supply sectors. 
The questionnaires to be filled by service providers included structured questions to 
gather information regarding their perception about their beneficiaries’ involvement in 
budget decisions and evaluations; the possibility of mobilizing resources from 
constituents; the ability of beneficiaries to hold officials accountable; and the adequacy 
of the provision of finance, materials, facilities and equipment required for quality and 
sustainable service. The questionnaires also included questions about the respondents’  
perceptions about the appropriateness and fairness of the allocation  and use of public 
resources; the adequacy of formal and/or administrative accountability arrangements in 
their institutions and woreda administration; and the planning and evaluation practices 
in their institutions. 
 
4.3.1.2 Secondary Data Collection Methods 
Both quantitative and qualitative data were obtained through different secondary data 
collection methods. Guidelines and manuals prepared by the regional Bureau of Finance 
and Economic Development (BoFED) for the new planning, budgeting and accounting 
system were used in order to understand the nature of the financial system reform. 
Federal and regional government constitutions and the draft legal framework for district 
level decentralization were reviewed to determine the level of power devolved to 
woreda governments. Financial administration directives, manuals and official 
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correspondences (inter-office letters and circulars) also were used to provide a general 
view of the rules and regulations.  
 
Quantitative data was gathered from various official documents such as strategic plans, 
budget documents, periodic financial and non-financial reports, cash flow plans & 
reports, action plans (of case study woredas and the Amhara regional offices) and audit 
reports of the Amhara Regional Auditor General Authority (ARAG). Such data was 
mainly about the extent of expenditure and revenue responsibilities devolved to woreda 
governments; the financial autonomy of woreda governments; the financial 
performance of woredas; the link between development plans and budgets; discipline in 
spending patterns; the match between budget plans and execution; the link between 
financial and non-financial performance; and the practice of auditing and areas of 
irregularity, abuse and misuse reported by auditors.  
 
4.3.2 Data Analysis 
In this thesis, the qualitative data was analyzed using thematic analysis. The data 
gathered in the form of written-up field notes and transcriptions of document analysis, 
focus group discussion and interviews was filtered, abstracted and sorted into various 
themes related to fiscal decentralization and financial governance. Then, the analysis 
was made by creating patterns, meanings and relationships of concepts as well as their 
similarities and differences between cases.  
 
The responses of respondents collected through the questionnaires were changed into 
quantitative values using SPSS. Descriptive statistical analysis methods such as 
frequency analysis, crosstabs, ANOVA, and correlation analysis were used to analyze 
the response of respondents. The results were presented using tables, graphs and 
diagrams. Besides, quantitative data gathered from official documents were critically 
analyzed by creating relationships and comparison among the case study woredas and 
across time in order to assess the accountability and financial management practices. 
Tables, graphs and diagrams were used as well to present the results. 
 
Triangulations of quantitative and qualitative data were made by bringing all the 
empirical data together, so as to interpret and draw meaning out of the empirical 
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investigation about the district level decentralization and financial governance of 
woreda administrations in the Amhara region. Finally, the results of empirical data and 
literature review came together and were compared. Thus, analytical generalizations 
(not statistical generalization) were able to be made about the compatibility of theories 
with empirical evidences regarding the link between fiscal decentralization and woreda 
financial governance and the interaction of intervening forces to influence the link in the 
Amhara region.  
 
Generally, the research process and methods followed in this thesis are depicted by the 
following diagram.  
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Figure 4 1: Diagrammatic depiction of the research process and methods 
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CHAPTER FIVE: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND 
THE FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE OF WOREDA 
ADMINISTRATIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It is to be recalled from chapters one and two that fiscal decentralization is justified for 
its importance of promoting local financial governance. It is stated that fiscal 
decentralization, if properly designed and implemented, leads to effective, efficient and 
accountable local public finance collection and spending. Thus, based on the data 
gathered from four case study woredas, this chapter presents an assessment of the 
adequacy and appropriateness of the design and implementation of the district level 
fiscal decentralization of the Amhara region to promote the financial administration of  
woreda administrations. An evaluation of intergovernmental relations between the 
region and woreda administrations is used as a measure of the efficacy of design and 
implementation of the district level decentralization.  
 
Hence, this chapter consists of two major parts. The first part presents the 
intergovernmental fiscal relationships between the regional government and woreda 
administrations. This examines if the design and implementation of the district level 
fiscal decentralization really can lead to the fiscal empowerment of woreda 
administrations.  The discussion will also focus on the capacity and willingness of the 
regional government to support and strengthen the woreda’s self-administration 
capacity, as well as to regulate their financial management practices to ensure regional 
standards and rules are respected.  The second part sheds light about how the devolved 
functions and financial resources, the subsequent autonomy, and the support and 
regulation by the regional government have influenced woreda financial management 
practices such as planning, budget preparation and allocation, budget implementation, 
revenue collection and financial control.  
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5.2 DISTRICT LEVEL FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN THE AMHARA 
REGION 
 
As noted earlier in this study, the Ethiopian federal governance system has four tiers of 
government. The federal government is the first tier and the second is comprised of 
ethnic based regional governments that are politically, administratively, and fiscally 
devolved and therefore legally capable of self-administration. Zone administrations are 
just branches of regional government that do not have separate devolved powers. 
Woreda (district) administrations are the last tier of government that are empowered by 
their respective regional constitutions (under the federal district level decentralization 
framework) to self-administer. Below woredas, there are also community level units 
called kebele administration, but these do not have devolved powers and functions, and 
are therefore not usually considered as part of the formal government structure. 
In the pre-decentralization period woreda administrations in the Amhara region were 
formed to be subordinate administrative units destined to implement the policy, plans 
and budgets formulated at the regional level. Woreda administrations had been working 
as branches of zone administration and accountable to zone administrations. Their 
budget was prepared and approved by zone administration. Various sector offices in the 
zone administrations were responsible to oversee guide and allocate budget to their 
branches at woreda administrations.  
 
However this administrative structure came to its end in 2001 when district level 
decentralization was declared throughout Ethiopia. To comply with the introduction of 
district level decentralization in the nation, the government of the Amhara National 
Regional State (ANRS) with the support of the District Level Decentralization Program 
(DLDP) in the then Ministry of Capacity Building, took important measures to devolve  
the powers of self-administering political, fiscal and administrative affairs to its woreda 
administrations.  These included the revision of the regional constitution. In the revised 
constitution proclamation No. 59/2001 of ANRS Article 45 (1), the regional 
government is comprised of woreda administrations and kebele administrative units. 
Article 83 made woreda administrations self-administering local government units 
organized on the basis of a tripartite government structure that has legislative, executive 
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and judiciary branches of government. Furthermore, article 84 states that woreda 
administrations are empowered to formulate, execute and finance socio-economic 
development plans within their jurisdiction. The lowest government unit in the region is 
the kebele administrations that are, according to article 96, simply implementing 
administrative units tasked to undertake various community level socio-economic 
activities as delegated by their woreda administrations.  
The adequacy of design and implementation of fiscal decentralization, which this study 
is primarily concerned about, can be assessed to a considerable extent on the basis of 
the degree and extent of devolution of functional competencies, finance sources and 
financial management autonomy devolved to woreda administrations (Smoke, 2001; 
Shah, 1998; Bahl, 199). Thus, the following section provides an assessment of the 
extent of fiscal decentralization design based on a review of the legislation, executive 
decrees and budget documents of woreda administrations.  
5.2.1 Functional Competencies 
The revised constitution of the Amhara regional government provides that woreda 
administrations are mandated to plan, budget and implement their own economic and 
social development programs. They also have, as evidenced in Article 84 (1), the duty 
of implementing the policies and laws of the federal and regional government. 
Nonetheless, it is the document produced by the District Level Decentralization 
Program in the then Ministry of Capacity Building that outlines a framework that 
specifies the functional competencies to be devolved to woreda administrations. The 
framework was adopted by the Amhara regional government to devolve functions to 
woreda administrations though without any additional accompanying legislation. 
Accordingly, woreda administrations are now, as discussed in detail in the last chapter, 
assigned with functions related to primary education and the first cycle of secondary 
education, primary preventive and curative health care services, lower grade rural roads, 
small scale agricultural development activities, land use, natural resource preservations, 
amongst others. 
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5.2.2 Finance 
Fiscal resources are critical for the effective provision of the mandated services. The 
Amhara district level fiscal decentralization process provides woreda administrations 
various means by which they can generate revenues.  
5.2.2.1 Own Revenue Raising   
According to article 86 (2/f), woreda administrations in the Amhara region levy and 
collect certain taxes. They collect rural land use fees, agricultural income taxes, 
personal income taxes and royalty taxes. They also levy and collect service charges and 
fees. However, the power to determine the rate of the fees and taxes is retained by the 
regional government. Furthermore, article 86 (2/g) provides that woreda administrations 
can make use of any other revenue sources within the woreda which are not 
administered by the regional government. 
Thus, woreda administrations in the Amhara region, using this power, have been able to 
raise a limited share of the finance they needed from their own source. The data 
depicted in table 5.1 shows that they raised 232.6, 248.6, 333.2 and 216.4 million birr in 
2005/06, 2007/08, 2008/09 and 2009/10 respectively from their own sources. The data 
reveals an increasing trend of woreda administrations’ revenue collection. Similarly, in 
the case study woredas, as shown in table 5.2, there has been a steady growth in own 
revenue over the last five years (2005/06-2009/10) as the increase is nearly twofold in 
the three rural woredas and tenfold in the Debremarkos city administration.   
Table 5 1: Budget allocation by regional governments and woreda administrations 
 2009/10 2008/09 2007/08 2005/06 
Woredas/Urban 
Administrations Budget 
1,913,987,530 
 
2,964,230,175 
 
2,395,137,914 
 
1,346,068,109 
Block Grant  from 
Regional government 
1,617,138,044 
 
2,501,716,853 
 
2,086,355,165 
 
1,249,286,400 
 
Woreda Own Revenue 216,480,890 
 
333,283,147  
 
248,644,835 232,622,655  
Donor Fund 80,368,595 129,230,175 6,0137,914 92,388,313 
Source: Amhara Regional Government’s Budget Data of Various Years 
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Table 5 2: Total budget allocation and revenue collection by case study woredas 
Woreda  2009/10 2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 
Bahirdar Total budget of the 
year 
42.803,435 
 
38,298,242 
 
24,035,794 
 
17,354,736 16,501,445 
 
Revenue from the 
woreda 
4,950,000 
 
7,064,420 
 
3,022,585 
 
2,447,514 
 
2,691,527 
 
Grant from Region 30,264,190 
 
22,670,530 18,650,887 NA 10,659,312 
D/Markos Total budget of the 
year 
78,341,967 
 
60,112,595 
 
22,646,525 
 
16,891,786 
 
13,825,532 
 
Revenue from the 
woreda 
30,256,883 
 
20,783,559 
 
10,943,258 
 
7,667,925 
 
3,000,000 
 
Grant from Region 31,914,157 18,605,166 17,275,725 NA 10,825,532 
Shebel Total budget of the 
year 
17,913,916 
 
16,043,953 
 
14,198,353 
 
11,905,515 
 
10,719 ,428 
 
Revenue from the 
woreda 
3,534,439 
 
2,844,250 
 
1,842,861 
 
1,314,085 
 
1,599,005 
 
Grant from Region 13,405,214 13,460,939 11,244,524 NA 6,754,004 
Mekiet Total budget of the 
year 
28,448,799 
 
27,260,312 
 
23,305,646 
 
14,894,931 
 
12,197,436 
 
Revenue from the 
woreda 
6,302,516 
 
3,056,000 
 
2,647,890 
 
2,521,800 
 
3,067,344 
 
Grant from Region 19,925,001 21,893,962 19,557,756 NA 8,862,194 
Source: Case Woreda Administrations’ Budget Data of Various Years 
Note:  NA stands for data not available. 
All values are in Ethiopian currency (ETB), 1 Ethiopian birr is equivalent to 0.05 USD as of 
March 2013. 
5.2.2.2 Intergovernmental Transfer 
The fact that woreda administrations could rarely cover their expenditure from their 
own source meant they had to obtain transfers from the federal government or regional 
government. Woreda administrations in the Amhara region do not receive 
intergovernmental grants directly from the federal government. Instead, grants are 
transferred to them by the regional government. The intergovernmental grant that 
woredas obtain from the regional government also takes the form of a “block grant”. 
They get the grants from the regional government without conditions attached. The data 
in table 5.2 shows that that the block grant from the regions to the case study woredas 
has increased at the rate of two to threefold over the last five years (2005/06-2009/10). 
The regional government has used different formulas at different times to determine the 
amount of block grant to be transferred to its woreda administrations. The variables and 
their respective weight used to determine the grant also kept changing. 
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The first block grant formula (the replica of that used by the federal government) took 
into account population size, the development disparity index
15
, and own revenue 
performance to allocate the grant to woredas. This became operational in 2002. To 
solve the problems of some woredas which suffered from budget deficits, the formula 
was revised in 2005 to take into account population size, own revenue collection 
performance, the development disparity index and recurrent expenditure needs with 
weights of 50%, 20%, 15% and 15% respectively (Mohammed, 2007). The allocation 
was made with 70% for recurrent expenditures and 30% for capital expenditures. 
Finally, the complexity of the formula and difficulty of getting the data forced the 
region to switch to the current block grant formula: a unit cost approach (Garcia & 
Rajkumar, 2008). 
The current block grant formula was formulated in 2007 with the primary purpose of 
meeting the expenditure needs of woreda administrations. A unit cost formula is a needs 
based approach which can help to provide well-developed woredas with the needed 
high recurrent funds, and low level of public service woredas with the required high 
investment funds. Therefore, the allocation of weights is given separately to both 
recurrent and capital budget needs. Recurrent expenditure needs are determined based 
on the unit cost needed to provide services to beneficiaries. A unit cost of service for 
every type of service is determined by computing the average salary per beneficiary of 
the service plus the unit operational cost per beneficiary paid for last year.  
For example BGHS= TUC × Number of patients targeted for the budget year 
     Where, BGHS refers to Block Grant for Health Service  
TUC refers to Total Unit Cost which is the summation of salary unit costs which 
represent the ratio of average health workers’ salary unit cost to patient-health 
worker ratio and operational unit costs. 
The same applies to determination of the recurrent block grant for other services such as 
water supply, education and agriculture. However, the estimation of the recurrent 
                                                          
15
  Computing the development disparity index was a complex process that took in to account five factors 
including health index (made up of six components such as number of clinics, number of doctors, number 
of nurses, number of health assistants, number of hospital beds, and the under-five mortality rate); road 
length per KM square; electric power measured as KWH per thousand people; telephone lines per 
thousand people; and percentage of people with safe drinking water 
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budget for administrative and general services is made simply based on past expenditure 
trends and the administrative structure of the woreda. This might influence budget 
execution positively as woreda administration would exert their effort to use their entire 
allocated budget so as to receive an increased grant in the upcoming year. But this could 
be at the expense of effective economic use of the budget as woreda administrations 
might utilize the budget unwisely and wastefully just to ensure that all of it was spent.  
The formula used to determine the block grant for capital budgets is also intended to fill 
the existing infrastructure gaps between woredas for basic services such as water 
supply, education, health, and agriculture and rural development. Therefore, an 
infrastructure deficit index is computed based on percentage gap of each of the service 
indicators from the standard. Each of the indicators is allocated with weights as shown 
in table 5.3. Therefore the share of each woreda from the capital budget is determined 
based on their percentage infrastructure gaps index determined through this process. 
Generally, this index reflects the infrastructure expenditure that a particular woreda 
needs if the existing infrastructure gap is to be corrected. 
Table 5 3: Indicators of Infrastructure gap index along with their allocated weight 
Sectors Indicators Weight 
Education Education 35% 
Student-section ratio 17.5% 
Primary education coverage 17.5% 
Health Health coverage 30% 
Agriculture and Rural 
development 
Number of live stock to livestock clinic ratio 20% 
Water supply Water supply coverage 15% 
    Source: Amhara Regional State BOFED, 2009  
The total bock grant pool to a particular woreda is, therefore, determined by summing 
up the recurrent expenditure calculated based on unit cost and the capital expenditure 
calculated based on the infrastructure gap index. The total block grant pool to be 
distributed to all woredas in the region was originally divided into 75% for the recurrent 
budget and 25% for capital budget. But this proportion changed to 80% and 20% 
respectively in 2002, as it was observed that the actual allocation to capital budget by 
woreda administrations had been declining and much of it was being used to cover 
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recurrent expenditure. However, woreda administrations receive the fund in blocks and 
have their own discretion in makeing budget allocation based on their own woreda 
specific situations.  
An attempt is also made to integrate funds from donors to ensure equity among woreda 
administrations by offsetting 15% of the grant to the woredas. In other words 15% of 
the donor fund to a particular woreda administration is considered in the computation of 
the block grant. Budget offsetting is limited to 15% of the donors fund as such funds are 
not reliable. On the other hand, those donor funds that are allocated by the donors 
directly to a particular sector without the awareness of the regional Bureau of Finance 
and Economic Development (BoFED), or else pass through sector bureaus to their 
corresponding woreda sector offices are not considered for offsetting. Finally it should 
be noted that there is a special grant for urban administration to be used for urban 
development works or urban infrastructure developments. 
5.2.2.2  Borrowing 
Borrowing is also one of the sources that could or should be used alternatively to solve 
the likely gap between the available financial source and the required finance. But 
unfortunately, not only in the woredas of the Amhara region but also in all the regions 
in Ethiopia, local government borrowing is the least utilized means of raising revenue. 
Under the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (EFDRE) constitution, even 
regional governments have very limited borrowing powers, which are restricted to 
internal sources and require authorization by the federal government. However, there is 
no provision at all in the Amhara regional constitutions as to whether woreda 
governments can mobilize finance through borrowing. Currently no such borrowing has 
taken place. Although projects at the woreda level are financed through foreign loan, 
these are arranged, managed and allocated by the Federal Government. 
5.2.3 Autonomy 
The third important question is about the extent to which woreda administrations are 
empowered to make decisions about financing and provision of these functions. The 
constitution of Amhara region provides woredas with full autonomy in making 
decisions with regard to the planning and financing of the devolved functions without 
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interference by the regional or zonal government. Article 86 (2/g) provides woredas full 
liberty as to how to spend the revenue which they receive in the form of block grants or 
they collected from their woreda.  
However, there are a number of concerns in the design of the current district level fiscal 
decentralization that prevent woreda administrations from exercising this power. The 
following section provides an assessment of a number of factors that have contributed to 
this situation, including the lack of exclusivity, the lack of clarity and the inadequate 
assignment of functions to woreda administrations. 
The first problem has to do with the lack of exclusivity that may well result in 
ambiguities in the specification of the autonomy devolved to woreda governments. That 
is to say the regional constitution does not make clear the extent to which the region can 
be involved in matters that are already transferred to woreda governments. What is clear 
is that the local government cannot enact policies contrary to the proclamations and 
policies enacted by the region. In contrast, the constitution does not preclude the region 
from legislating on local matters. Given the limitless legislative power of the region on 
regional matters, the laws and policies enacted by woreda administrations will stay in 
force only temporarily. If the regional government issues new proclamations and 
policies that contradict those of woreda administration, the laws and legislations of 
woreda administration will automatically lose effect. This can seriously undermine the 
autonomy of woreda administrations. 
For instance, the federal/regional government has passed a decision to revoke the power 
of urban administrations to raise revenue from land lease. This was intended to reduce 
the possibility of local corruption. As long as the autonomy is assigned to urban 
administrations, they should have an exclusive right to exercise it in a manner they 
wished. If there was a concern over land corruption, the federal/regional government 
could have given them appropriate support to improve their working system rather than 
to arbitrarily cancel their mandate. This problem of non-exclusiveness can cause a lot of 
pressure in the financial condition of urban administrations, including a decline in 
revenue collection. As shall be seen in detail in the forthcoming sections, one of the 
factors that resulted in a low level of revenue collection in Debremarkos Town 
administration is the arbitrary decision of the federal/regional government to revoke the 
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city administration’s power to raise revenue from land lease. The city administration 
had been generating large amounts of revenue from land lease. Some of the costs of 
various infrastructure development projects undertaken in the city’s administration had 
been covered by such revenue.  But when the federal/regional government withheld the 
practice of land leasing in all cities in the country, the revenue of city administration 
from land lease was interrupted. Consequently, the budget execution of the urban 
administration has declined and the projects that had been partially financed from this 
source could not be completed. 
A closer look at the plan and performance report of the regional government sector 
bureaus also indicates the lack of exclusivity. The lists of planned targets as well as 
their performance presented in the reports of the regional Bureau of Health, Bureau of 
Education and Water Resource Bureau for evaluation and approval by the regional 
council contain the services that are already devolved to woreda administrations and are 
supposed to appear in the plan and reports of woreda administrations. The inclusion of 
these services in the regional bureau plans and reports means regional sectors are 
evaluated based on the performances of services that are devolved to woreda 
administrations. This leads the regional offices to interfere and closely supervise the 
affairs of woreda administrations. Needless to say, this undermines downward 
accountability and woreda administration autonomy while strengthening upward 
accountability to regional/zone administration. 
The second gap in the transfer of functional competencies in the district level 
decentralization of Amhara region is the lack of legislation that clearly specifies and 
empowers woreda administration to decide about socioeconomic affairs of their 
woredas. There have been debates about the issue of specifying the functional 
competencies of local governments through legislation. While proponents for legislating 
argue that financial autonomy and accountability can be adversely affected if functions 
devolved are not clearly specified (already discussed in chapter two), opponents have 
argued that legislating the functional competencies will not allow the local governments 
and higher level tiers of government to flexibly adjust the level of devolution of 
function according to the changing situations.  
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In the Amhara region district level decentralization process, matters of social services 
and economic development within the competences of woredas are not clearly defined 
in the regional constitution. There is no legal framework that specifies the functional 
competencies and powers devolved to woreda administrations. The reflection of 
interviewees and discussants in the expert focus group discussions was sought about 
this issue.  None of the participants seemed to be aware of the importance of having 
legislation and were not concerned about its nonexistence. Most of the interviewees had 
little or no idea how the devolution of such power and functions had been made to their 
office. Since all of them had not been in their position during the original 
decentralization process, they assumed that the then officials of woreda governments 
may well have received some kind of proclamation or directive from the region. But 
none of them could point to any legal instrument or directive in their offices sent from 
the regional office about the functions and powers transferred to woreda governments. 
The head of education office in the Mekiet woreda just assumed that there must be 
some proclamation that explains the powers and functions delegated to woreda 
governments even though he has no knowledge of such a proclamation.  
The head of the education office at Bahirdar Zuria Woreda stated that the functions and 
powers given to woreda governments have been explained in the training organized by 
the zone administration. He further explained that the planning formats and budget 
structures designed by the regional government to be used in the preparation of woreda 
plans and budgets are indicative of the functions and budgeting powers transferred to 
woredas. All of the discussants in the experts’ FGD provided the same explanation.  
All of them witnessed that they have never experienced any conflict with their 
counterpart at the regional government concerning the exercise of powers and functions. 
They mentioned that the regional government would not hesitate to transfer more 
responsibilities and power to woreda governments if it was convinced that the work can 
be better done at woreda level. Similarly, the woreda governments would never resist 
giving up some of their responsibility and power if the region believes the work can be 
better done at the region. They believe that there is little propensity to conflict with each 
other as both of them are working towards a common goal. They said they like to 
emphasis issues which are common to both of them rather than emphasising the distinct 
problems of each woredas. They are of the view that problems of the country both at 
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regional and woreda level can be best addressed by following the overall national and 
regional directions. Thus, the relationship is not only based on the separation of powers 
and functions but also, according to the expert focus group participants, on partnership 
and cooperation between the different tiers or spheres of government. 
Almost all of them believe that the existence or lack of a legal framework for the 
decentralization would not make a significant difference to the current relationship 
between the woredas and the regional government. However, the heads of the education 
and health offices in the Mekiet woreda, as well as the deputy head of BoFED, did think 
that having a clearer legal mandate might have positive impact on the confidence of the 
heads of woreda offices involved in the process of making decisions. Currently, the 
different heads of offices in the woredas exercise their power differently. Some of the 
heads in the woredas who are more experienced and loyal to the ruling party tend to 
exercise their full power while newly appointed officials often do not have the 
confidence to do so and therefore tend to follow what the experts at the zone level tell 
them to do. 
It is not adequate to assess the clarity on the assignment of functional competencies to 
determine the extent of autonomy of woreda administrations. It is also important to see 
the adequacy of the assignment of functions to woreda administrations. In this regard, 
theories advocate that the assignment of functions to local governments will be 
adequate when public services that can be served best and felt by a particular local 
community or area are devolved to local governments. However, in the Amhara region, 
some of the services used by the local people are not in the mandates of woreda 
governments. For instance, administering and financing services such as preparatory 
high school (grade 11 & 12), Technical and Vocational Education and Training 
(TVETs), hospitals, large scale water construction works and so forth belong to the 
regional government.  
The inter-jurisdictional nature of the services might be mentioned to justify their 
retention at regional level. But it is difficult to conclude for all of the services that their 
beneficiaries are from different woredas. It varies from one woreda to another. For 
instance, the students of preparatory schools will be from different woredas if they 
come from small woredas. But those preparatory schools located in larger woredas have 
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students only from that particular woreda. The same is true for TVETs. Furthermore, 
one of the purpose of the block grant formula used to determine the amount of regional 
grant to woreda governments, as explained by the regional government, is to 
accommodate the spill-over cost effects of the cross-jurisdictional services by using the 
number of beneficiaries of services as the primary criteria.   
The case of large scale water constructions (such as deep water well excavation 
projects) also suggests that there are functions yet to be devolved to woreda 
administrations. Large scale water constructions in woreda administration are currently 
under the responsibility of the regional government’s Bureau of Water Resource. These 
large projects involve large budget and would have constituted the largest share of the 
budget transferred to woredas, had the mandate been to woreda offices. A report 
prepared by Water Aid reveals that only 17% of the water supply budget allocated to 
regions is transferred to woreda governments, compared to 50% of the total budget 
allocation (Water Aid Ethiopia, 2008:3). The technical complexity of the work is the 
only reason mentioned for taking this mandate even if the benefit is limited to a 
particular local people. But this reason does not sound convincing enough as regional 
governments could have provided technical support and guidance to woreda 
administrations rather than taking over the mandate.  
It is understood from the heads of the rural water supply offices in the case study 
woredas that it has been a common practice in the region that the power to allocate the 
budget for and supervise deep water well excavation projects belongs to the regional 
water supply bureau. The woreda rural water supply office is involved only in the day 
to day operation. The head of rural water supply office in Mekiet woreda argued that 
there are certain reasons to believe that such projects need involvement from the 
regional bureau. It was mentioned, for instance, that such projects cannot be carried out 
by local contractors that are accessible by local bidding as most of them do not have 
heavy excavating machineries required for the projects. In order to solicit capable 
contractors, it is necessary to announce international bidding which the woreda office 
has neither the capacity nor the expertise to do. In this case the woreda needs support 
from regional government. He said that this, however, does not to mean the power to 
decide on financing and supervising the project should be given to the regional 
government.  
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According to the head of rural water supply office at Mekiet, it has been common in the 
past to hear complaints from the people over delays in the completion of such water 
projects. The office at Mekiet woreda has little power to address such complaints, as the 
mandate to take the necessary corrective measures belongs to the regional bureau. The 
office at the woreda had done its best to let the regional bureau know the extent of the 
problem and the need to take necessary action to ensure the timely completion of the 
project. However, the regional office has not made any substantial effort to take the 
necessary corrective action. This has prevented the woreda office from carrying out 
effectively its delegated responsibilities for supervising and following-up the 
construction, as the budgets allocated by the regional bureau have not been adequate to 
cover the operating costs of the office for carrying out such tasks. Another problem was 
observed when the completed water supplying projects needed maintenance. The 
regional government basically does not allocate budgets to cover maintenance costs. 
The focus is on building new projects rather than maintaining the old ones.  
The head of the education office in Mekiet woreda also recounted an incident that 
reveals how keeping the power to decide and control the budget to the regional 
education bureau caused poor quality of the maintenance of a preparatory school (11-12 
grades) in Filakit town. A few months after the maintenance was completed by a 
contractor, the woreda office received complaints from the students and their parents 
that the class rooms turned into mud and dust. This constituted a danger to the students’ 
health and was extremely difficult for students to attend to their study. Despite repeated 
requests by the woreda education office to the regional bureau, the bureau turned a deaf 
ear to the problem and failed to provide any tangible solution. After waiting for three 
years, the woreda office realized that the regional bureau would never fix the problem, 
and provided its own maintenance by moving resources from within its own budget. 
However such self-initiated actions place an additional burden on their budgets.  
On some occasions the regional government has taken steps to assign such functions to 
the woreda administrations. However, this often takes place without the necessary 
additional budgets being allocated, resulting in unfunded or underfunded mandates.  
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5.2.3.1 Fiscal Autonomy 
Revenue 
Fiscal autonomy with respect to revenue is often measured in terms of the share of own 
revenue raised in the woreda compared to the total amount of revenue secured during 
the fiscal year in question. As table 5.4 clearly reveals, woreda administrations in the 
region have been able to raise 17.28%, 10.38%, 11.24% and 11.31% of the total 
revenue they secured in 2005/06, 2007/08, 2008/09 and 2009/10 respectively, 
representing  an average revenue collection of 11.96%. The revenue collection of the 
case study woredas of Bahirdar Zuria, Debremarkos, Shebel Berenta and Mekiet 
represents on average 14.51%, 37.87%, 15.73% and 16.87% of the total budgeted 
revenue respectively in the period between 2005/06 and 2009/10. The revenue 
collection for the case study woredas was therefore better than the regional average. 
The revenue collection of Debremarkos city administration is far higher than the other 
case study woredas, not surprising fact given its revenue generating base and the fact 
(explained in the previous chapter) that it has greater revenue raising powers than its 
rural counterparts. In general, however, the revenue collection capacity of woredas still 
remains far less than the amount needed to offer them the financial autonomy they need 
to make financial and implement decisions independently.  
Table 5 4: Share of own revenue collected by woreda administrations as a 
percentage of their total revenue 
Share of own 
Revenue to 
Total 
Revenue 
2009/10 2009/08 2008/07 2006/07 2005/06 Average 
All Woredas 
in the Region 
 (11.31) 
 
 (11.24) 
 
 (10.38) 
 
NA  (17.28) 11.96% 
Bahirdar Zuria  (11.56)  (18.44)  (12.57)  (14.1)  (16.31) 14.51% 
Debremarkos) (26.8)  (23.28)  (14.8)  (20.91) (21.9) 37.87% 
Shebel 
Berenta 
 (19.73)  (17.72)  (12.97) (11.3)  (14.91) 15.73% 
Mekiet  (22.15)  (11.21)  (11.36)  (16.93)  (25.14) 16.58% 
Source: Own Calculation from Amhara Regional State and the Case Woredas’ Budget 
Data of Various Years 
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Moreover, there is an equally serious problem that threatens the fiscal autonomy of 
woreda administrations. Woreda administrations are not at liberty to spend even the 
relatively small amount of revenue they collect from their own residents. They have 
only the power to levy and collect revenue from their residents based on the rate and 
base determined by the region. The revenue has to be transferred to the treasury of the 
regional government. Woreda administrations can spend the revenue they collect only if 
approved by the regional government as a portion of the block grant from the region. 
There has to be offsetting on the block grant to be transferred from the regional 
government before woreda governments spend what they collect. In a nut shell, revenue 
administration in Amhara regional government is under the mandate of the regional 
government. It is only the regional administration that determines the tax base and rates 
and their distribution among woredas.  
Nevertheless, there are two conditions which might allow woreda administrations to 
exercise autonomy over revenue collection and spending outside the mechanisms of the 
regional block grant. The first condition is if woreda administrations can collect 
revenues in excess of the planned revenue collection target. In reality, however, this is 
not a very realistic possibility, as woreda administrations rarely collect beyond their 
planned targets, especially as excess revenues can be recognized only after the end of 
the third quarter. 
The second condition according to article 86 (2/g) of the regional constitution is when 
woreda administrations can collect from other revenue sources within their woreda 
which are not administered by the regional government. The constitution of the region 
provides that woreda administration can make use of other sources if there is any source 
of revenue which is not used by the region or federal government. However, the region 
currently is administering and making use of almost all the sources of revenue under its 
jurisdiction. Those that remain outside the remit of the regional or national government 
(such as nuisance taxes) are usually too small to provide a meaningful source of revenue 
to the woredas. 
Regional Fiscal Transfers 
As explained earlier, the fact that woreda own revenue provides only a relatively small 
share of the total resources required for their administration means that they are heavily 
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dependent on regional transfers. The data in table 5.5 shows that between 2005/06 and 
2009/10, on average 89.04 % of woreda administrations total yearly revenue has been 
covered from regional government transfers. The table also shows that the case study 
woredas have been receiving on average between 44.94% and 86.48% of their budgets 
from the regional government in the form of block grants, with Debremarkos and 
Bahirdar Zuria being the lower and upper limits respectively. Debremakos’s reliance on 
regional transfer has been significantly less, not due to the actual size of the transfer but 
because of its better revenue raising potential. In summary, the data reveals that there 
has been a heavy reliance on regional government transfers, which in turn is inversely 
related to the autonomy of woreda administration to decide independently.  
Table 5 5: The proportion of regional grant to total woreda administrations' budget 
The Proportion of 
Regional Block Grant to 
Total Woredas Budget 
2009/10 2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 Average 
Total Block Grant  from 
the Region 
(84.40) (84.39) (87.10) NA (92..81) (86.48) 
Bahirdar Zuria  (70.70) (59.19) (77.59) NA (64.59) (67.61) 
Debremarkos) (40.73) (30.95) (76.28) NA  (78.3) (44.94) 
Shebel Berenta  (74.83) (83.90) (79.19) NA (63.00)  (76.20) 
Mekiet (70.03)  (80.31)  (83.91) NA (72.65 (77.00) 
Source: Own Calculation from the Case Woredas’ Budget Data of Various Years 
Note: NA stands for the data not available 
 
Theoretically, no matter how heavily their budget is reliant on regional transfers, 
woreda administrations would still have the discretionary power to decide on the 
spending of the fund providing regional government transfers are not accompanied by 
any conditions. In this sense, the transfer scheme in Amhara regional government can 
be described as the most empowering form of intergovernmental transfer as the block 
grant transfers from the region to woreda administrations are not attached with such 
conditions.  However, the process and index used for the computation of the block grant 
pool to woredas does weaken this discretionary power.  
The block grant formula is praised for its capacity to accurately estimate the expenditure 
needs of woreda governments as well as correcting the inequality in service delivery 
between woreda administrations. The fact that the formula uses unit costs per standard 
service level means woreda administrations would have the basis for allocating and 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 
  
107 
 
utilizing public resource according to the set unit costs. Moreover, since the unit 
recurrent expenditures are determined based on the number of beneficiaries, this block 
grant formula helps to absorb the spillover expenditure pressures imposed by 
beneficiaries of a particular service from other woredas.  
Despite such strengths of the formula, there are a number of limitations. As 
demonstrated earlier in the study, the block grant is determined based on the relative 
priority given to the sectors by the regional policy. For example, a key focus of the 
regional government as well as of the federal government is on achieving the UN’s 
millennium development goals (MDGs). Thus, the block grant volume to woreda 
governments is also influenced by these targets.  One of the purposes of the block grant 
is to use it as an instrument of linking regional policies to budget allocations. That is to 
say that it is used to impose regional policies on woreda administrations, despite the fact 
that the grant scheme at face value appears to have no conditions attached to it.  
There are some contradictions between the purpose of the block grant allocation and the 
discretion given to woreda administrations. The purpose of the block grant as explained 
earlier is to make allocations based on the expenditure needs of woreda administrations. 
Moreover, woreda administrations are given the guidelines to prioritize MDG sectors in 
the allocation of their budget, thus limiting their discretion. Woreda administrations can 
do little to deviate from the block grant pattern of allocation unless they spend below 
the standard unit cost. This can be done only at the expense of quality and service 
performance of the woreda administrations. Even if they want to spend below the 
standard unit cost, they can do so only on the allocation of operational expenditures.  
One of the reasons for modifying the previous block grant formula is that one of the 
criteria used to determine the block grant has been population size. Woredas with a 
small population but with the same government structure and functions have therefore 
been challenged due to the size of their population.  Rather than encouraging woreda 
administrations to set up government structures that fit their small size, the current unit 
cost approach of computing block grant formula allocates operational budgets to small 
and large woredas in the same way. This is because the block grant for operational 
expenditures is computed based on the number of sector offices in the woreda. 
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Moreover, the capital budge computation is made based on only the capital expenditure 
needs to expand new services to correct the existing service gap between woreda 
administrations. It does not take in to account the resources needed for improving the 
existing quality or sustainability of services. The resource needs of the woreda 
administration to cover maintenance costs, for example, are not taken into 
consideration.  
5.2.3.2  Financial Management/Budgeting Autonomy  
The revised constitution of the region provides that woreda administrations have the 
autonomy to formulate their own socio-economic development plans (article 84), as 
well as to spend the finance (article 86/g) they collect from residents and receive from 
the regional government in the form of regional transfer. They can prepare plans and 
budgets and carryout various financial management activities independently without 
any interference of zonal or regional government provided that regional policies, laws, 
standards and regulations are respected. Just to make sure that such regional ordinances 
are respected, the Amhara regional constitution, according to article 84, allows regional 
government to exercise regulatory and supervisory roles. However, there is no clearly 
stipulated procedure according to which the regional government can assess local 
government. In addition there is no clear procedure of intervention by the region when a 
woreda administration fails to discharge its responsibilities. There is only one provision 
in article 115 that gives clear power to agencies such as the Amhara Regional Auditor 
General (ARAG) to inspect the accounts of woreda administrations.  However, it is 
clear in the proclamation that the regional government cannot interfere in the financial 
management activities of woreda administrations. All of the FGD discussants as well as 
the interviewees in the case study woredas uniformly agreed that the preparation of 
socioeconomic plans and budgeting are entirely done by the woreda administrations 
themselves. 
5.2.4 Perceptions towards Woreda Level Decentralization 
In order to gauge the perception of citizens towards the current fiscal decentralization in  
woreda administrations, citizens and civil servants were asked which government body 
or social body they would like to be involved in the process of administering public 
finance used for local development. Then, those bodies were arranged in order based on 
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the number of votes they received. Table 5.6 shows that woreda government 
involvement was the first choice, receiving 74% of the votes of civil servants and 68.5% 
of community members. The second choice was people involvement which received 69 
% of the votes of civil servants and 68 % of community members. Higher level 
government was the third preferred government option, followed by kebele 
administration, and finally government by elders and religious leaders. The order of 
choice is consistent between the civil servants and community members and there is no 
statistically significant mean difference in the response between the case woreda 
administrations. This confirms that the current district level fiscal decentralization is 
consistent with the preference of people. But at the same time, the involvement of 
citizens, higher level government and kebele administration in financial administration 
are still given significant importance.  
Table 5 6: Preferences of respondents regarding the bodies that should be involved 
in financial administration for development purposes 
 Frequency Total Missing Valid total Valid percent Rank 
 CS Co CS Co CS Co CS Co CS Co CS CO 
 
Higher level 
government 
60 200 100 309 1 3 99 306 
 
60.6 
 
65.4 
 
3
rd
 
 
3
rd
 
Woreda 
Government 
74 209 100 309 0 4 100 305 
 
74 
 
68.5 
 
1
st
 
 
1
st
 
Kebele 
Administration 
45 199 100 309 0 3 100 306 
 
45 
 
65 
 
4
th
 
 
4
th
 
People 69 208 100 309 0 3 
 
100 
 
306 
 
69 
 
68 
 
2
nd
 
 
2
nd
 
 
Elders and 
Religious Leaders 
42 153 100 309 
 
0 
 
3 
 
100 
 
     306 
 
42                       
 
44.1                       
 
5
th
 
5
th
 
             
Source: Field Survey: 2011 
Note: CS stands for civil servants and Co stands for community members 
 
Interviewees (woreda officials) were asked for their opinion towards the currently 
devolved power of planning and spending.  All of them opted to highlight the benefits 
that have been derived from decentralization rather than the drawbacks. They stressed, 
in particular, that due to the decentralization of power to woreda governments, they 
have been able to utilize the government money in the most economic manner 
allocating it according to their specific woreda situations. They feel that they have been 
able to utilize the money properly by minimizing wastages, corruption and 
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embezzlements. The administrative inconveniences (bureaucratic cumbersome) that had 
existed in the pre-decentralization period, such as the long time in obtaining regional 
government approval, has been removed. They believe that projects that are carried out 
under the responsibility of woreda government have been started and completed more 
effectively, timeously and responsively that would have not been the case if they had 
been carried out by the regional government. A much faster and effective response to 
complaints from the public has also been made possible. This is primarily due to the 
fact that woreda officials are closer and live together with the people so that they can 
directly experience and empathize with the discomfort that the people suffer due to poor 
services. Hence, woreda officials are under a much greater practical as well as moral 
obligation to address these problems as soon as possible without waiting for approval 
from higher levels, as long as the power to fix the problem is in their hands. Despite 
such benefits, most of the civil service respondents nevertheless acknowledged that they 
still faced capacity problems in addressing complaints from the public, resulting in them 
having to sometimes seek support from regional governments to do so. 
The head of education office at Mekiet Woreda placed emphasis also on the efficiency 
in budget allocation and utilization that the woreda office has achieved. The head 
referred to the 5 primary schools they had built with 800,000 birr they received from the 
region in recognition of their performance in primary education coverage. These 
schools have been constructed with the contribution of people. He stated that “the 
money could not have been enough to construct more than one primary school, had the 
construction been carried out by the regional education office”. The head of the health 
office in Bahirdar Zuria Woreda also explained that they have constructed three health 
centres in three kebeles using the funds saved due to efficient use of money and 
prioritizing the most critical need of people in the woreda.  
The respondents also indicated that decentralization has created a spirit of healthy 
competition between woredas. It has become common to see when one woreda 
announces a fund raising event, others follow. It has helped them to look for alternative 
sources of finance to fund development activities in their woreda, and not rely only on 
finance from the government. This has created an opportunity for woreda 
administration officials and citizen to work together towards the development of their 
respective woredas.   
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In addition, as the head of rural water supply office in Bahirdar Zuria explained, self-
government has helped the woredas to “understand, identify problems, and look for 
immediate solutions of smaller budget or less cost”. It has also helped them to identify 
and provide various kebeles with appropriate types of water supply facilities according 
to their different needs and water reservoir capability. The fact that the woreda office 
has been able to mobilize the people to contribute towards the construction of water 
supply facilities is the result of decentralization. This would not have been possible if 
such powers were kept at the regional office. But the head of education office at Shebel 
Berenta believes that much more needs to be done to devolve financial power not only 
to the woreda but also to the sector offices. He was of the opinion that the current single 
pool finance system has taken away the power of sectors and has created a lot of 
obstacles on sector offices to utilize their budgets efficiently.  
Generally, communities in the focus groups (FGDs) in all woredas had a similar 
positive perception of the benefits of decentralization in bring government closer to the 
people. Regional government, it was felt, can never have the required information about 
the specific desires and priorities of people and what is needed to address them. They 
believed that if the decision on the allocation and use of budgets remained at regional 
office, the money would not come down to the people, or else, it would tend to be 
allocated only to those woredas closer to the regional capital. Rural woredas far from 
the regional capital would be overlooked.  All of the respondents in the focus groups 
believed that decentralization should go even further at the local community level.  
Discussants at Debremarkos suggested that decentralization had increased the 
willingness of people to contribute to the development activities of the town. The 
carrying out developing activities was previously seen solely as the responsibility of 
government for too long.  But, since the advent of decentralised woreda governance,   
people have voluntary participated and contribute towards various fund raising activities 
organised by the government. They now feel that they have an important role to play, 
together with local government, in their own development. They also referred to the role 
played by the media (the print media and radio and television) in reporting on the 
different development programmes being carried out in the various wordas. This has 
helped to create a momentum by encouraging people to initiate similar activities in their 
own woredas. 
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In summary, benefits related to administrative efficiency, utilization efficiency and local 
resource mobilization are most mentioned in the discussions and during interviews with 
officials. However, there were significantly fewer references made to the benefits of 
fiscal decentralization with respect to transparency, accountability and the active 
participation of people in fiscal affairs decisions.   
5.3 THE DESIGN OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT 
5.3.1 Local Socio-Economic Planning 
Theoretically, preparing specific local socio-economic development plans is the 
responsibility of woreda administrations, provided that such plans are consistent with 
the broad federal and regional policy frameworks. Nevertheless, the regional 
government sector bureaus through their respective agencies at zone administration 
level have been clearly interfering in the planning process of woreda administrations. 
Zone administration offices interfere in the planning process of woreda administrations 
at least twice in the planning process. 
The first incident of interference is when the planning process begins at woreda 
administrations. Woreda government plans are required to reflect not just the 
socioeconomic problems of their people but also to comply with regional specific 
targets. Woreda governments and their heads of various sector offices are required to 
have contact and get information about the socio-economic development targets set by 
the regional government for the upcoming year, and should determine derived target for 
their woreda in line with these. Both the interviewees and expert focus group 
discussants agreed that zone administrations and their different offices provide 
preliminary base information to their counterparts at woreda governments each year 
about the targets that the region plans to achieve. Woreda governments are therefore 
required to take into consideration not only their own woreda socioeconomic situation 
and goals but also the regional planning targets. 
The second incidence of interference is when zone offices provide their feedback in 
response to the plans sent by the woreda offices seeking their approval. The feedback 
might be to include new activities and/or targets. The zone offices often give feedback 
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to the woredas several months after the submission of the plans and after the required 
budget has been allocated and the implementation has been started. The deputy head of 
BoFED affirmed in the interview that the zone administration would interfere in the 
woredas’ planning process if their coverage in health, education and water supply is 
below the regional average. In this case, to bring their coverage level at least to the 
regional average level, woreda governments are often forced by their respective zone 
offices to increase their coverage target. The deputy head of BoFED stated further that 
woreda administrations often plan a target below the required level due to the 
uncertainty they feel about the adequacy of their budgets in realising such targets. In 
fact, data or information shortages also contribute to the deviation between regional and 
woreda plans. 
The question that arises is whether such interference from the zonal administrations 
should be regarded as a support or as an imposition. To answer this question it is 
important to assess the extent to which woreda administrations conflict with zone 
administration over planned targets and how far woreda administrations are prepared to 
go in refusing to modify or change their targets in line with those of the zonal 
administrations.  
The experience of the case study woredas shows that zonal interference is often an 
imposition that the woreda administrations are often forced to accept. Education sector 
planning is one source of conflict between woreda governments and zone 
administration. The number of students at the age of five to be enrolled in the year has 
been the area of dispute between the woreda education offices and zonal 
administrations in all the woreda cases covered in this study. The experts at zone level 
often suspect that the number of students planned to be enrolled by woreda offices is 
understated and that the numbers should be increased in order to meet the regional 
targets. However, the woreda officials interviewed insist that their targets are based on a 
realistic estimate of what in practice is achievable. In 2009/10, for example, the 
Bahirdar Zuria Woreda education office planned to enrol 8000 new students, but the 
education office at zone level had instructed them to increase it to 10,000. The 
informants claimed that this target was unachievable, not least because the total number 
of children who turned 6 in the woreda was less than this number. The education office 
at Shebel Berenta woreda was also ordered to change its student enrolment target for 
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2009/10 from 24,459 to 30446.  The education office head interviewed claimed that 
their plan was based on accurate data from kebele administration records of the number 
of children at age 7. 
The same is true in the case of the number of children planned to be vaccinated in the 
year. The health offices of woredas and their counterpart at zone level often dispute 
such targets. The head of the health office at Bahirdar Woreda mentioned that they were 
forced to change their plans on the number of households to be targeted for 
improvements in household hygiene in 2010/11 from 37,034 to 45,110. Household 
hygiene refers to ensuring that households have appropriate toilet and sanitation 
facilities in place, as well as separate partition for the family and livestock.  According 
to his explanation, the difference is mainly due to the different types of data they used. 
The woreda office used the number of households registered by the woreda Internal 
Revenue office while the zone office used the estimation of World Health Organization.  
But the head of the woreda office is not convinced insisting that the woreda does not 
even have the number of household residents targeted by the zonal administration. No 
matter how strongly the woreda insisted, the zone office has not been ready to 
compromise on those targets. Generally, the woreda government offices did not accept 
those imposed targets voluntarily but are often forced to do so. Such impositions by the 
regional and zonal sector bureaus are often put in place because the regional sector 
bureaus have to present consolidated performance reports of the woreda administrations 
to the regional cabinet and the regional council. Even though these basic services are 
formally devolved to woreda administrations, regional sector bureaus are still 
accountable for their performance.  
One of the functions that often passes through such revisions and modifications process 
is revenue collection. In Mekiet woreda, for instance, the plans of the woreda revenue 
office were 3 million and 7 million respectively in 2008/09 and 2009/10, whilst the 
zonal office pushed them to achieve targets of 6.3 million and 9 million respectively.  
The deputy head of the regional BoFED makes clear that woreda governments in the 
region often understate their plan especially when it comes to revenue collection. This is 
because if they set higher targets of revenue collection, the amount of grant that comes 
from the region would decline.  The woredas are often not certain if they will be able to 
collect the target levels of revenue. If they are not able to collect what they have 
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planned, there would be a budget deficit and there is no guarantee that the regional 
government would give an additional grant to cover the deficit. The woredas therefore 
have a natural inclination to be on the safe side when estimating their revenue targets. 
Another incentive relates to the fact that if they collect in excess of their planned 
targets, the regional government (as discussed earlier) would allow them to use it for 
their own woreda development activities. This is why the planning targets of the 
woredas and the zonal administrations are often at variance with each other.  
Generally, it is unlikely for woreda government officials to ignore the targets and 
feedback from the zonal administrations with respect to revenue and expenditure 
targets. This is because they are ultimately dependent for a large amount of their 
revenue through the block grants provided by the regional government. Continuous 
refusal to accept regional targets could easily result in a reduction of such block grants. 
In some ways, therefore, the planning activities of woreda administrations seem to 
conform more to deconcentration rather than genuine devolution.  
5.3.1.1 Consequences of Interference in the Planning Process 
 Undermining the Importance of the Legislative Power of Woreda Councils 
Zonal offices often seek to change the service targets of woreda administration not only 
at the beginning of the planning process but also when they give feedback several 
months after the plan has been approved by Woreda Council. That means that the plans 
approved by the highest body of woreda governance may well be subject to change by 
those (the zonal administrations) that do not have formal power to do so. The Woreda 
Councils are in theory supposed to go over the development plans in considerable detail 
in order to ensure that they aligned to the development needs of the woredas. However, 
if the plans are going to be arbitrarily changed subsequently by zonal offices, there is no 
adequate reason for Woreda Councils to waste their time and energy to attentively 
examine and approve the plans. Therefore, it can be said that Woreda Council members 
are likely to become uninterested in the plan reviewing process, as their role is in many 
ways to merely rubberstamp. This, in turn, impacts on the process of holding executive 
officials accountable for their performance. It is often quite confusing which of the 
plans (the plan approved by the council or the one modified based on the feedback from 
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the zone offices) the Woreda Council should use as a benchmark for evaluating the 
performance of officials. That is why the head of education at Shebel Berenta Woreda 
described the contribution of the Woreda Council to the development plans approval 
and evaluation process as non-value adding.  
Undermining Planning from Below 
Theoretically, woreda administrations follow the bottom-up planning approach. It 
begins at kebele and service delivery institution level. Planning for education and 
health, for instance, begins at school and health centre/health posts in each of the 
kebeles. Schools in the process of preparing their plan are supposed to consult teachers, 
community members, students and parents. The plan prepared by the schools is 
presented to kebele administration and their opinion is sought. Upon the completion of 
this process and its approval by the kebele council, the plan is presented to the woreda 
education office. The same process is followed also in the health service. Health 
centres/posts in each kebele prepare their institutional plan based on the facts they 
gather in the kebele or surrounding beneficiary kebeles. After discussions and consensus 
with different bodies in the kebele, the plan is sent to woreda health office. Kebele 
administration offices also prepare their plans for the expansion of new service delivery 
facilities, emphasizing in particular the development projects and activities that can be 
carried out with voluntary contributions from the people. This may include new schools, 
new health centres/posts, rural roads, water supply taps, natural resource and soil 
fertility conserving activities and so forth.  Kebele plans are supposed to pass through 
approval by the kebele council. Upon their completion, both kebele wide and service 
delivery institutional plans are supposed to be sent to the woreda administration as well 
as to corresponding woreda sector offices.  
In practice, however, woreda sector offices often do not take the targets set in the 
institutional and kebele plans at their face value. According to heads of the case woreda 
education offices, the plans of schools often are often unreliable and unrealistic and 
cannot be trusted. This is because student enrolment targets are usually uninformed 
about regional policies and targets, as school directors and teachers are often unaware of 
these. School directors and teachers prepare plans only based on the capacity of their 
school and the data available to them. The head of education office at Shebel Berenta, 
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for instance, admitted that his office has had to modify the school plans because they 
were inconsistent with the targets set by the region. The head of the Mekiet Woreda 
education office indicated that the woreda education plans are not based on information 
supplied by the schools but rather on the annually updated census data produced jointly 
by the Ministry of Education and Amhara Region Bureau of Education. The same 
applies for woreda health office.  
Budget Deficit and Disruption 
The pressure and disruption on budget plans, as well as the likelihood of budget deficits, 
are among the consequences of planning from above. The experts from Mekiet Woreda 
Inland Revenue stated in the focus group discussion that the woreda had experienced a 
budget deficit of 600,000 birr in 2007/08, due to the shortfall in meeting the over-
ambitious targets set by the zonal administration. The regional government eventually 
agreed to cover the deficit after negotiations and a series of requests from the woreda. 
In 2008/09 and 2009/10 the Mekiet woreda was able to collect more than they planned 
due to unanticipated changes in the sources of revenue. One of the events that helped 
them to increase their revenue collection was an average 36% salary increment to civil 
servants all over the country that helped to raise the levels of income tax collected. 
Another was the increase in royalty payments from a Chinese Road Construction 
Project for the sand gravel it used in constructing the main road that passes through 
Mekiet woreda. This is not a sustainable revenue source as the project is now about to 
be completed. Had these unanticipated sources of finances not occurred, the woreda 
would not have met their targets and would have been confronted with the same budget 
shortage problem.  
Inadequate Time for Well-conceived and Prudent Planning 
A major problem in the establishment of well-conceived and prudent planning processes 
in the woredas is related to delays in the planning process caused by the interference of 
the zone administration. The woredas have to wait until they receive preliminary 
information from zone administration about the targets that the region wants to focus for 
the year. According to discussants in the experts focus groups in all the case study 
woredas, the delays in the planning process can be attributed in the main to the inability 
of zone administrations to timely provide those targets to their woredas. Some of the 
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sector offices in the Debremarkos urban administration attempt to get the information 
by personally contacting their counterpart offices at the zone (since both Debremarkos 
City administration and the office of Eastern Gojjam zone are located in Debremarkos 
Town). This was not as easy for the rural-based woredeas. In Mekiet some of the 
woreda officials sought to get the information by telephone, but not with great success. 
Thus, many of the offices in the woreda governments did not make such attempts to 
solicit advanced forms of information, but rather waited for the provision of such 
information by the zone administrations. The delay left the offices in the woredas with 
little time to make careful considerations and computations in the design of the plan, 
resulting in inadequate attention being paid to the accuracy of the specific targets and 
activities proposed.  
 Planning as an Ineffective Tool of Financial Management 
As has been discussed earlier, woreda administrations are supposed to send their plan to 
their respective offices at zone level and make necessary modifications and changes on 
their planned targets when they receive feedback. However, reviewing and scrutinizing 
the plan of each woreda to make sure that they are in conformity with regional target 
and giving approval accordingly is apparently a time consuming process for the zone 
administrations. The zone offices often give feedback to each of the woredas several 
months after the completion of the plan (as noted earlier in this chapter). The feedback 
from the zone administrations comes often in the second quarter of the financial year 
after plan implementation has already begun. The feedback may require embracing new 
activities and/or targets. It is unlikely that woreda government officials will be able to 
ignore such feedback, for reasons that have been discussed above. Consequently the 
importance plan to serve as a guiding tool for financial management is reduced. The 
problem is not only in the planning process but also in the budget preparation, allocation 
and execution process.  
A Declining Level of Attention to Planning 
A declining level of attention paid to the preparation of plans is also another 
consequence of zonal interference in the planning process. One can imagine how 
disappointing it would be to be forced to make significance changes in the plan in the 
middle of its implementation. For the head of the education office at Mekiet woreda, 
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this was particularly disappointing. Such repetitive modifications in the plans have also 
caused woredas officials to be less concerned about the preparation of plans. The 
attention given to planning is in some cases minimal and woreda officials and civil 
servants pay more attention to political alignment and routine tasks, according to the 
expert focus group discussions at Debremarkos and Shebel Berenta.  
Another reason for the declining level of attention to planning is because the 
performance of politicians is not evaluated according to the achievement of targets but 
rather according to the levels of political loyalty and commitment. As they know that 
their fate will be ultimately determined by their political performance rather than their 
success in achieving planning targets, woreda officials are often occupied by executing 
the various seasonal activities instructed by higher level political officials rather than 
attempting to implement what has been put in place in the plans. In general, planning 
has thus received lip service. In most cases officials and experts prepare their plan by 
making slight modification from the previous year’s plan. 
 Strategic Planning as an Ineffective Tool of Financial Management 
More fundamentally, the interference of zone administration in the preparation of 
annual plan leaves the strategic development plans of woredas as virtually useless. New 
targets which had not been part of the strategic plan may be imposed by the zone 
administrations. Zone administrations frequently fail to consider the strategic plans of 
woredas when devising and imposing their own plans and targets on the woredas. This 
gives woreda government officials the impression that planning is not taken seriously 
even by their higher level officials. Hence, investing time and effort on the preparation 
of the strategic plan and efforts to link it with annual plans is often perceived by woreda 
officials to be unnecessary. According to the expert focus groups held with officials, 
little interest is also shown (especially by the Woreda Council members) and little time 
is spent in the evaluation of strategic plan performance. 
The Undermining of Bottom-up Planning Approaches 
The decentralized planning processes in woredas are supposed to be based on a bottom-
up approach, as discussed earlier in this thesis.  However, effective bottom-up planning 
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is frequently undermined by a number of factors, including the non-alignment of lower 
level (kebele and local service delivery institutions) plans with the woreda budgets.  
Kebele administrations, unlike local service institutions, often set ambitious plans, 
especially when it comes to the fulfilment of facilities, maintenance and construction of 
new schools, new health centres/posts, and new water supply facilities. In most cases, 
these targets are merely reflections of the arbitrarily set desires of kebele 
administrations without consideration to available budget resources. The woreda 
administrations rarely accept the kebele plans as they are. There are various factors 
which they take into consideration before the kebeles plans are included in the woreda 
sector plans, including the availability of budgets, the severity of the problem, the 
number of users of the service, the feasibility of the plans, and the fulfilment of 
preconditions by the kebele administrations. For example, in the case of new school 
construction requests, the head of Mekiet woreda education office explained that the 
woreda office evaluates kebeles requests in terms of factors such as the existing number 
and capacity of schools in the kebele, and how likely the people residing in the kebele 
are to cover at least 75% of the cost of construction.  However, the plan of kebele 
administrations to mobilise resources from people are often over ambitious and very 
challenging to achieve given the existing budget shortages. Hence, such plans cannot be 
accepted as they are unless there is a guarantee that the people of kebele will voluntarily 
contribute towards their implementation.  
By the same token, woreda rural water supply offices decide which of the kebele 
administrations’ requests to include in the worda plan, based on several factors, such as 
the severity of the water supply problem, the availability of reliable water sources, the 
cost of the project and its feasibility with respect to the expected budget, the number of 
anticipated service users, and the willingness of the people to contribute towards the 
implementation of the plan. Therefore, the plans of the kebele administrations will be 
crosschecked in terms of those variables by experts of the office. The head of Bahirdar 
Zuria Woreda further states that kebele administrations are also required making sure 
that the kebele administrations have organized a committee comprising genuinely 
elected representatives of the community.   
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Therefore, it can be understood that planning at kebele level is carried out more to show 
that formal procedures have been followed rather than for the actual contribution it 
makes to the woreda planning process. In many cases the kebele administration plans 
are largely ignored or rejected by the woreda administrations, due to their over 
ambitious nature and the lack of budgetary provision.  
However, discussants in the community focus group discussions felt that the mismatch 
is not necessarily due to budget deficiency but rather due to the lack of genuine 
involvement by kebele administrations in the budgeting and financial management 
processes of the woredas. This has often resulted, according to the respondents, in 
unfair budget allocation among the different kebeles. The discussants in Bahirdar Zuria 
put it clearly when they argued that they do not believe their kebele administration is 
getting its fair share of government resources. They suspect that the money allocated by 
the regional government to the woreda is being diverted to a few favoured kebeles. 
They argued that they wanted to know more clearly the amounts of funds allocated to 
their kebele. They believed that currently there is no fair and transparent basis for the 
allocation of budgets among kebeles. Their desire is not to obtain full responsibility 
over budgetary matters but rather to ensure that kebele administrations are assigned a 
meaningful role in identifying the priorities of people and controlling the proper 
utilization of budgets. They also stressed that there was an urgent need to improve the 
capacity of kebele administrations that would allow them gradually to play a more 
active role in the budgeting processes in the kebele.  
5.3.2 Budget Preparation/Allocation 
Budgeting at woreda level is formally the exclusive duty and power of woreda 
administrations. It is one of the activities in financial management that the regional 
government follows with a relatively hands-off approach. All of the interviewees and 
expert FGD discussants in all the case study woredas maintained that they prepared 
budgets and allocated expenditure without any direct involvement of regional 
government or zonal administrations. The only means by which the regional 
government seeks to influence the budget process is through the guideline that it sends 
along with the block grant. The guidelines serve to remind woreda administrations of 
the need to prioritize pro-poor sectors in the budget allocation. However, in most cases, 
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there has not been a serious follow up from the region to make sure that the guidelines 
are strictly followed. As observed in table 5.8 (see later in this section), woreda 
administrations have not been following a uniform pattern of budget allocation to pro-
poor sectors. In general, the budget preparation process has been the most independent 
activity when it comes to the involvement of region/zonal offices. 
Nonetheless this discretion in the budget preparation process has not been fully 
translated at the practical level in the allocation of budgets. This is due to a number of 
limitations in the design of fiscal relationships, as well as the interference of 
regional/zonal offices in the planning process as has been discussed earlier. 
The budget is allocated for the implementation of development plans which, as noted 
earlier, are formulated under considerable influence from the regional government. The 
main focus of the region in the last five years (2005/06-2009/10) has been to increase 
access to and the expansion of basic social services, particularly primary education, 
primary curative and preventive health care services, and the provision of clean water 
supply, with the objective of attaining the MDGs. Woreda administrations have been 
urged by the regional government to prepare their socioeconomic plan to achieve the 
targets set by the regional government.  
Achieving this ambitious plan normally entails a large amount of budgetary resources 
for capital expenditures to construct schools, health institutions and water supply points, 
particularly in the rural kebeles. Despite its commitment to expand these services, 
however, the regional government has not been able to provide woreda administrations 
with adequate financial resources to support such infrastructure projects. Instead, the 
regional government chose another strategy for increasing access to services in rural 
woredas. It has taken a political decision to build many schools, health institutions and 
water supply points in rural kebeles with low capital investment. The contribution of 
people has become the primary source of resource particularly for school construction. 
In all woredas except Debremarkos, most rural schools have been constructed with less 
than 25% support from government and with at least 75% from the public.  The woreda 
governments essentially provide a limited amount of construction materials such as 
corrugated sheets and nails while the people contribute money, labour and other 
construction materials. By following this strategy, woreda administrations have 
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succeeded in building at least two primary schools, and at least one health post and 
water supply point in each rural kebeles in the last five years. This, in turn, required 
woreda administrations to hire a large number of teachers, health workers and technical 
and administrative workers to work in these institutions. The deputy head of BoFED 
explained that more than 40,0000 new workers have been employed in woreda 
administrations of the region in the last five years. 
Consequently, all of the case study woredas have registered significant success in 
improving access to primary education, primary health service and rural water supply. 
However, due to the fact that use has been made of local materials contributed by the 
people, nearly all the schools are poorly constructed with mud and wood walls and 
dusty floor. Several of the schools collapsed or have been blown away by the wind 
shortly, thus requiring extensive maintenance not more than a year later. As a result, 
most of the schools constructed in such way have not been good enough to deliver the 
required services. Moreover, most of the schools also lack necessary facilities, such as 
desks and chairs, blackboards, clean water, toilets and office facilities for teachers. Only 
a few schools constructed with support from donors or NGOs have been properly 
constructed with brick walls and asphalt floor and equipped with appropriate facilities.  
The same is true for health centres and health posts. Health posts and health centres in 
most cases are short of drugs and health facilities, such as delivery beds, blankets, bed 
sheets and laboratory facilities. They also lack proper sanitation facilities. At the same 
time, the evidence seems to suggest that many of the new health workers employed 
have not been of appropriate quality.  
Although access to clean water has shown a significant increase in rural areas in the past 
five years, several of these water points are now not providing the service as either the 
water taps are broken or the water source has dried up.  
As shown on table 5.7 the result of the response of surveyed community members also 
highlights a range of important constraints surrounding their service institutions in the 
education, health and water supply fields.  
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Table 5 7: Perception of respondents about existing constraints in service delivery 
institutions 
 Frequency Total Missing Valid total Valid 
percent 
Rank 
 CS Co CS Co CS Co CS Co CS Co CS CO 
 
Poor construction quality 84 251 100 309 1 4 99 305 84 82.3 1
st
 3
rd
 
Limited service capacity 38 153 100 309 1 5 99 304 38 50.3 5
th
 5
th
 
Lack of skilled personnel 67 230 100 309 1 4 99 305 67 75.7 4
th
 4
th
 
Lack of timely 
maintenance 
84 258 100 309 1 4 
 
99 
 
305 
 
84 
 
84.6 
                     
1
st
 
1
st
 
 
Lack of facilities, 
equipment and furniture  
83 257 100 309 
 
     1 
 
4 
 
   99 
 
305 
 
83 
 
84.3 
 
3
rd
 
2
nd
 
             
Source: Field Survey: 2011 
Note: CS stands for civil servants and Co stands for community members 
 
From the table above it can be deduced that 84.6%, 84.3% and 82.3% of the surveyed 
community members are certain that the lack of maintenance, lack of facilities and poor 
construction quality respectively are the most critical limitations that challenge service 
delivery institutions, although the lack of skilled personnel and limited service capacity 
are also highlighted as important constraints. Such perceptions are consistent with the 
result of another survey conducted to assess service delivery in other woredas of the 
Amhara region (ADA, 2009). 
The Annova test (see Appendix 3) shows that there is no statistically significant 
difference in the mean response between the case study woredas. This shows that the 
constraints are common both in rural and urban woredas, despite the fact that 
Debremarkos, the urban woreda, has been able to access much larger sources of revenue 
that could have been used to improve the existing education, health and water supply 
facilities. Discussants in the Debremarkos community FGD indicated that the city 
administration has invested little to improve service quality problems. Much of city 
administration’s investment focus has been on large scale infrastructure projects in line 
with the regional urban development plan. Although a number of health centres have 
been constructed recently, most of the service delivery institutions are old and in urgent 
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need of maintenance and upgrading. Resulting problems include the lack of sanitation 
facilities and the shortage of drugs and lack of laboratory facilities in the health centres, 
as well as a shortage of classroom furniture and text books in the schools. The focus 
group discussants also mentioned the low calibre of staff as a concern in many of the 
service delivery facilities.  
5.3.2.1 Internal Facilities and Maintenance in Service Delivery Institutions  
The lack of internal facilities in service delivery institutions is a widespread problem 
across all case study woredas. The head of the education office at Mekiet expresses his 
frustration that despite taking 52% of the woredas budget, schools are still rarely 
provided with benches, books, laboratory facilities, toilets and water facilities. The head 
of the education office in Bahirdar Woreda provided data that revealed that none of the 
primary schools in the woreda have fulfilled the facilities required for effective 
teaching-learning process. Sixteen of the 57 schools do not have any single combined 
chairs and the rest of the 41 schools do not have all the required combined chairs they 
need. In some schools, he stated that even the teachers do not have chairs or tables. In 
Shebel Berenta, only 63% of the woredas have been able to provide the required 
number of combined desks.  
The head of the health office in Bahirdar Zuria Woreda highlighted the challenges that 
have been faced in equipping the nine health centres constructed in the past two years 
with the required facilities and staff, although many of these challenges have now been 
resolved through direct assistance from the federal government. The community focus 
group discussants in Bahirdar Zuria also stressed that the health centres had not 
functioned properly for a long time due to lack of facilities and medical staff. Delays in 
securing facilities from the federal government meant that it took a long time to fully 
equip and make them functional.   
A key problem with respect to the full functionality of service institutions is that of 
maintenance. According to the interviews and focus groups with officials, none of the 
case study woredas have a strategy or plan for regular inspection, maintenance and 
repair. Nor have they allocated any budgetary provision for such activities. Once 
facilities are constructed, the woreda administrations largely leave the responsibility for 
maintenance to the staff working in the institutions or the communities served by them. 
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However, the service delivery institutions rarely have adequate internal sources of 
revenue to complete such tasks, and most communities are unable or unwilling to 
contribute in any major way.  
Furthermore, many of the schools constructed by community contribution are not 
repairable. The only thing that can be done is to remove them and rebuild new schools. 
Replacing all the poorly constructed schools would require a huge investment, well 
beyond the financial capacity of the woredas. The head of the education office at Shebel 
Berenta Woreda stated that, instead of repairing them, it would be better to replace or 
upgrade them. They have been doing so whenever they have received support from 
outside donors, such as the Safety Net Program. However, the pace of replacement and 
upgrading still lags well behind what is really needed.  
According to the interviews and focus group discussions, many of the water supply 
points constructed in the various areas (kebeles) are not functional due to either poor 
quality materials used in the construction or inappropriate or misuse of the facility by 
the constituents. Despite such widespread problems, none of the woredas have allocated 
budget for repairing water supply points. The priority, according to the instruction from 
the regional government to woreda administrations is the expansion of services, not the 
quality and sustainability of services. All of the interviewed woreda officials agreed that 
there is no adequate budget for maintenance and repair, and that the responsibility in 
this regard has been left to the local communities.  
Another issue that all of the discussants in the community FGDs uniformly emphasised 
is the quality and competency of service providers. They indicated that both in terms of 
number and qualification, all of the schools and health centres appeared to be fully 
staffed. But they were concerned about the quality of many of the staff working in such 
institutions, and suspected that the qualifications of some of the staff may well not be 
genuine. As a result of the expansion centred strategy of the government, it was felt that 
many of the new staff recruited were simply massed produced without going through a 
quality education process. 
As a result of the problems highlighted above, many of the community respondents 
surveyed by this study felt that the expansion in the numbers of education, health, water 
supply and other facilities has compromised the sustainability and quality of service 
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delivery. They explained that they have contributed money, labour and materials for the 
construction of schools, health institutions and water supply points, with the expectation 
that the government would make further investments to improve the poorly constructed 
and equipped institutions. However, neither the regional nor woreda governments have 
so far demonstrated any indication of allocating capital budgets for improving buildings 
and making the required facilities available. The emphasis continues to be placed on the 
mere expansion of facilities rather than their quality or sustainability. 
Therefore, the complaints of constituents of the woredas over the quality and 
sustainability of services are increasing. It is one of the reasons why parents tend not to 
send their children to schools. Students themselves are not happy to go to such schools. 
Patients and mothers in labour do not want to go or take their children to health 
centres/posts for treatment. If they have the funds they would rather use private clinics 
that are mostly found in the towns.  
Most of the officials interviewed for the study were cognizant of the poor service 
quality being offered in the schools, health centres/posts and water supply points, as 
well as the popular discontent with this situation, and agreed that the service quality and 
sustainability problems needed to be addressed as a matter of urgency. However, 
without a change of the regional priorities (favouring the expansion rather than 
maintenance of facilities), resulting in the allocation of the necessary budgetary 
provision for maintenance and quality improvement, there was little they could do to 
rectify the situation.  
5.3.2.2 Responsiveness in Budget Allocation 
One of the indicators that can be used to evaluate the responsiveness of woreda 
administrations in budget allocation is the share of budget allocated to pro-poor sectors 
compared to the total budget of the woreda administrations. As it can be observed in 
table 5.8 below, woreda administrations could be considered to have the most 
responsive budget allocation. The budget allocation in the period between 2005/06 and 
2009/10, as revealed in the table, shows that Bahirdar Zuria, Shebel Berenta and Mekiet 
respectively allocated 72-75%, 62-81%, and 67-84% of their annual budget to pro-poor 
sectors. All of the interviewed woreda officials also believe that pro-poor sectors are 
given priority over other sectors in the allocation of budget in their woredas. For these 
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reasons, it can be concluded that the attempt to ensure responsiveness of budget 
allocation in rural woredas through top-down approaches, in line with regional 
priorities, has succeeded. 
Table 5 8: Proportion of budget allocated to pro-poor sectors 
Woreda  2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
Bahirdar Total Budget as % of 
SP Budget 58.43 53.6 71.52 172.33 188.27 
Pro-poor budget 12101511 12502861 NA 28058864 32276055 
Pro-poor % of total 
budget 73.3 72.0 NA 73.2 75.4 
Shebel 
Berenta 
Pro-poor budget 
8707704 7410205 11199231 16043953 12307623 
 Pro-poor % of total 
budget 81.2 62.2 78.8 NA 68.7 
Mekiet Total Budget as % of 
SP Budget 25 28.24 37.88 41.52 46.50 
Pro-poor budget 8281673 10659798 15674687 23146311 19301924 
Pro-poor % of total 
budget 67.9 71.5 67.2 84.9 NA 
Source: Case Woredas’ Budget Data of Various Years 
Note: NA stands for data not available and SP stands for strategic plan 
Of course, pro-poor sectors are widely thought to address the need of the people and to 
help them get out of poverty. However, there are still unanswered questions about the 
responsiveness of budget allocation. These include the extent to which the service 
institutions are functioning properly and providing the intended service, as well as the 
extent to which the services provided are really benefiting the targeted citizens In this 
context, it is important to highlight the fact that only 13.2 % of the community members 
surveyed in the questionnaires felt that the budget allocation by their woreda 
administration had been responsive of their socio-economic problems. As the table in 
Appendix 2 shows, 54.5% of the respondents replied ‘don’t know’ and 32.5% felt that 
the budgetary allocations were unresponsive. There was no statistically significant mean 
difference between the case study woredas in their responses to this question. 
As noted above, the woreda officials surveyed in the study acknowledged that they 
were aware of the popular discontent about this lack of responsiveness, but felt that they 
had little power to rectify the situation. The main reason for this is related to limitations 
in the autonomy of woreda governments. Contrary to their formal autonomous status, 
woreda governments have been obliged (as noted earlier) to follow the direction and 
targets set by the regional governments in their planning processes. According to the 
interview with the deputy head of BoFED, the performance of woreda officials is 
evaluated primarily in terms of the coverage they have achieved not in terms of the 
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quality or sustainability delivered by schools, health centres/posts and water supply 
points. Woreda administrative level and zone/regional level evaluations are all about 
coverage not quality and sustainability.  
The second reason has to do with lack of opportunity for the local people to voice their 
demands and needs, as well as to hold officials accountable. This will be discussed in 
greater detail in chapter seven. 
The effort of the woreda administrations to comply with regional government targets 
imposed through guidelines and plan approval processes has in many ways eroded 
woreda discretion over budget allocation. The strategy chosen by the region to meet its 
own service coverage targets has had a major influence on the budget structure, shifting 
it towards non-discretionary expenditure and away from discretionary expenditure. This 
is to say that the allocation of the budget in the woredas has been forced to be biased 
towards salary expenditures for increasing numbers of employees, and associated 
administrative expenditure, leaving only a small amount in the capital budget for 
improving the condition of service delivery institutions as well their facilities.  
As it can be observed in table 5.9 below, in general, the non-discretionary budget 
(recurrent budget) that contains both payroll and operational expenditure takes nearly 
the full budget of the woreda governments, very little left for capital expenditure. 
Capital expenditure in the woreda governments, if any, is funded largely from foreign 
assistance or loans. This trend in budgetary allocations has been in place for the past 
five years and, according to the interview with the deputy head of BoFED, it will 
continue until the regional government’s commitment to achieve 100% coverage 
succeeds. Although people have been complaining and officials are aware of the quality 
and sustainability problems due to underinvestment, woreda administrations have had 
little or no choice in the matter, due to their heavy reliance on regional planning 
priorities, as well as regional allocations which in most cases constitute the largest 
proportion of woreda revenue. 
The only exception is in Debremarkos city administration in the past two years (2008/09 
and 2009/10) when capital budget constitutes large proportion of the budget (61% and 
70% respectively). The reason for such allocation is because the city administration 
anticipated that it would secure adequate revenue from municipality services. But such 
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budget allocation has not become reality due to the fact that, as observed in table 5.13 in 
the forthcoming section, the planned amount of revenue has not been collected. 
Table 5 9: Budget structure (by percentage) of expenditures of the case woreda 
administrations 
Woreda  2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
Bahirdar Zuria Operating 22.53 18.08 13.44 20.55 11.34 
Payroll 61.78 71.26 78.92 53.89 53.49 
Capital 15 10.38 7.49 25.5 35.17 
Capital(SP) 34.23 44.01 46.24 16.75 16.04 
Debremarkos Operating 16.46 19.07 15.69 9.21 4.12 
Payroll 62.26 65.67 64.90 29.57 25.79 
Capital 22.53 15.25 19.40 61.2 70.08 
Shebel Berenta Operating NA 16.65 14.46 NA 14.31 
Payroll NA 58.74 66.85 NA 79.35 
Capital NA 25.02 
(11.57) 
18.67 
(10.93) 
NA 6.33 (0.94) 
Mekiet Operating 21.97 12.42 13.71 11.30 NA 
Payroll 70.69 87.06 76.94 75.81 NA 
Capital 7.33(2.21) 6.22 (0) 9.33 (7.95) 12.87 (4.8) NA 
Capital(SP) 28.11 31.64 25.89 24.01 NA 
Source: Case Woredas’ Budget Data of Various Years 
Note: NA stands for data not available 
           SP stands for budget allocation in the strategic plan 
 
Recently the regional government seems to have paid greater attention (though still 
quite limited) to the quality and sustainably concerns surrounding basic services. 
However, most of the recent quality improvement efforts have been related with 
programs designed to improve employee capacity, service management and 
administration, and curriculum improvement in schools. As of yet, there has not been a 
substantial effort to address quality and sustainability problems that demand capital 
investment. This situation is likely to remain the same unless the volume and priorities 
of the regional block grant change substantially. All interviewees agreed that the current 
block grant from the region is far below that required for their woreda to improve the 
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quality and sustianability of their service facilities. It is not even adequate to achieve the 
new service expansion targets that they are required to achieve each year.  
The inadequate capital budget available for improving the current service quality and 
sustainability problems has forced woreda administrations to rely, where possible, on 
donor funds. However because such funds are usually earmarked by the donors for 
specific projects, they do not allow woreda administrations to decide on their own 
allocations and utilization according their specific woreda situations.  
 Administrative Interference and its Pressure on Budget Allocation 
Currently, there is no clear indication in the district level decentralization framework of 
the Amhara region whether the mandate to set up organizational structures of woreda 
administrations belongs to the regional government. However, in practice the regional 
government has reformed and re-designed the organizational structure of woreda 
administrations on a number of occasions. To some extent this may well have been with 
the genuine intention of building the organizational capacity of woreda administrations. 
However, the focus group discussants argued that these reforms and their uniform 
application across all woredas had in many ways served to weaken the discretion of 
woreda administrations in allocating their budgets efficiently according to their specific 
local socio-economic problems.  
The most recent structural reform organized all woreda administration into 21 sector 
offices, without taking into account differences in the size of the various woredas. In the 
smaller woredas, it would have made greater sense, according to many of the officials 
surveyed, to have merged a number of the sector offices into more economical units. 
Some of these offices are not believed to be good enough to be organized as a separate 
office and two or three of them could have been merged into a single office. Having so 
many different sector offices in the smaller woredas has caused an unnecessary increase 
in operational expenditures as all the offices require their own personnel and 
administrative support systems. This additional expenditure could have been used for 
capital investments to improve the quality of service provision. In general, the uniform 
organizational structure imposed by the region on woreda administrations has served to 
reorient the woreda budgets even more to non-discretionary recurrent items. 
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Another example of interference in the activities of the woredas concerns the 
interference by zonal administrations in the personnel practices of the woredas. 
Although woredas are assigned the responsibility for hiring and administering their civil 
servants, zone administrations have sometimes been involved in the hiring of woreda 
staff, as well as the secondment of staff to the woreda administrations. This, in 
particular, has been the experience in woreda health offices and education offices. The 
head of health office at Bahirdar Zuria and the head of the education office at Shebel 
Berenta expressed concern that they were forced to accept employees hired by their 
respective zone office despite the shortage of budget provision to cover their salaries. 
They insist that this practice has caused the bulk of the budget to be used for non-
discretionary recurrent budgets. The discussants in the expert focus groups in Bahirdar 
Zuria and Mekiet stated that there is a lot of pressure from higher level government to 
hire more employees. They expressed their suspicion that this might be a political 
decision to reduce the growing unemployment in the region.  
Unfunded Mandates and their Budget Pressure 
The budget pressure under which many woredas operate has been compounded by the 
fact that woreda administrations have also been forced to allocate budget for unfunded 
mandates. As argued earlier (in the case of preparatory schools and TVETs), woreda 
governments have sometimes been required to allocate budgets to activities which are 
basically under the mandate of the region. As the head of the education office at Shebel 
Berenta indicated, the woreda contributed one million birr in 2009/10 for the 
construction of the preparatory school in their woreda, despite the fact that this should 
have been the responsibility of the regional government. The Mekiet woreda also 
allocated one million birr in 2009/10 for the construction of TVET in the woreda in 
2008/09. Woreda administrations have compelling reasons for contributing to the 
construction of such education infrastructures in their woredas. The lack of access to 
Preparatory Schools/TVETs is an issue that the people in Mekiet and Shebel Berenta 
have been complaining about for long time. Because of the lack of preparatory 
School/TVETs, residents have been forced to spend large amount money for their 
children to study in other towns. Accordingly, the woreda governments could not 
realistically refuse the regional government’s offer to construct preparatory 
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schools/TVETs in their woredas, despite the fact that they would be obliged to 
contribute a share of the finance required.  
The block grants that the woreda administrations receive from the region are supposed 
to finance only those activities that are in their mandates. Un-mandated activities are not 
taken in to consideration in the process of determining the amount of block grant. Thus, 
the enforcement of unfunded mandates upon woredas by the regional government has in 
practice led to the diverting of budget resources away from those activities that are 
within the mandate of the woreda administrations.  
5.3.2.  Budget Allocation for Quality Improvement 
Despite turning a blind eye to the problem for a long time, the regional government 
seems to have been aware of the quality problems in rural schools of woreda 
governments. For this reason the regional Bureau of Education (BoE) has established a 
standard for the additional amount of budget to be allocated for each student for the 
purpose of improving the quality of education and set aside grant funds for this purpose 
that can be accessed by woreda administrations. The customary procedure is to allocate 
a standard amount of money per student according to their grade. The standard is 15 birr 
per student in 1-8 grades schools and 20 birr per student in 9-10 grades schools.  
However, budgetary constraints in the woreda administrations have often forced them 
not to follow such quality improvement standards set by the regional government. Many 
woredas have therefore been forced to budget below the regional standards, in order to 
meet other important socio-economic commitments. In Bahirdar Zuria, for example, the 
woreda administration has only been able to fund schools at the rate of 8 birr per 
student for 1-8 grade schools and 10 birr for 9-10 grade schools. Shebel Berenta has 
done better in this respect because it has allocated the standard rate required by the 
regional government for a longer time. It allocates 7 birr per student to 1-4 grade 
schools, 10 birr per student to 5-8 grade schools, and the standard rate to 9-10 grades 
schools. In Debremarkos and Mekiet, the woreda administrations have not allocated this 
grant to their schools.      
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 
  
134 
 
5.3.3 Budget Implementation 
The power to implement budgets as planned for the purpose of tackling various local 
socio-economic problems in the woredas belongs to woreda administrations. They have 
full autonomy to spend, transfer, procure, and enter into contracts to accomplish various 
planned activities. However such discretion has often been handicapped by the 
inflexible planning and budget structures, resulting from the interference of the regional 
government.  
5.3.3.1 Budget Transfer   
Budget transfer is a process by which local government administrations can implement 
their activities flexibly in an effective and efficient manner by transferring funds from 
one budget item to another to accommodate various unexpected situations. Up to an 
acceptable level, such transfers are clearly beneficial. However, if excessive, they can 
easily result in indiscipline in budget implementation.  
As revealed in the interviews and focus groups, budget transfers from one sector to 
another, as well as from one budget item to another within sectors, has been prevalent in 
all the case study woreda administrations. As observed in table 5.10 below, the case 
study woreda administrations have made regular use of high levels of budget transfers. 
Sometimes such transfers were made to woreda administration office budget as a 
contingency fund to be used later when unexpected/unplanned expenditure needs arose. 
Interviewees explained that this practice is common also in each sector offices. Since 
the unpredictability of activities in sector offices is rising, they have opted to keep some 
amount of their operational budget in certain budget items such as stationary, training, 
office equipment maintenance and so forth, which can be transferred to other priorities 
as when the need arises. Even though this practice is neither formally known nor 
explicitly told, it seems to be a common practice in all case woredas.  
This practice also, as most interviewees agree, opens a loop hole for wastage and 
misuse. Discussants in all the FGDs stated that most of the transfers are made in the last 
two months of every fiscal year. Furthermore, experts in the WOFED of all case study 
woredas indicated that the majority of transfers from contingency funds are used to fund 
per diems and transportation costs of personnel. In some woredas the amount left in the 
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contingency fund is shared among all employees with the major share going to 
administrative council members (cabinet members). Even those employees who have 
not travelled for business purposes may still get paid a share. No one in the woreda sees 
this as violation of financial rules and regulation as it is known that the woreda offices 
rarely have sufficient budgets to cover the per diem of those employees who frequently 
travel for field work. As will be discussed in the next chapter, unless supported by 
donors, all woreda sector offices cover only a maximum 3 days per diem per month, 
regardless of the number of days the employees might travel. Accordingly, employees 
as well as officials do not see the sharing of the budget left over as a violation of 
financial rules.  
Table 5 10: Percentage of budget transferred 
  2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
Bahirdar 
Zuria 
Amount (% of 
total budget) 
NA NA 2791324.44 
(11.61) 
3989855.45 
(10.41) 
2319116.13 
(5.41) 
 Number of times NA NA 357 448 442 
Debrema
rkos 
Amount (% of 
total budget) 
NA 3711487 
(21.97) 
2559721.17 
(11.30) 
8773176.73 
(14.59) 
2490200 (3.17) 
 Number of times NA NA NA NA NA 
Shebel 
Berenta 
Amount (% of 
total budget) 
4836716.7 
(45%) 
2199474 
(18%) 
4572252 
(32%) 
5316732 
(33.13) 
2490200 
(13.9%) 
 Number of times 300 (13t) 335(14t) 321 (13t) NA 398 (17t) 
Mekiet Amount (% of 
total budget) 
NA NA 7862888.64 
(33.73) 
3150713.65 
(11.55) 
2974715.16 
(10.45) 
Source: Own Calculation from the Case Study Woredas’ Budget Data of Various Years 
Note: NA stands for data not available  
 
Several factors are responsible for the high levels of budget transfer in the case woreda 
administrations. But here only those factors which have connection with the design of 
fiscal decentralization are discussed. 
 Autonomy Related Factors 
The first reason has to do with the high levels of non-discretionary funds resulting from 
zonal administration interference in the woreda planning processes. Woredas, as noted 
earlier in this chapter, are often forced to rely on community resources for the 
construction of capital projects (such as schools and clinics), due to insufficient grants 
from the region to meet regionally identified targets. This has had an effect on budget 
transfers, as pointed out by the head of rural water supply in Mekiet Woreda. The use of 
community funds together with the small capital budget apparently helped the sector 
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office to expand access to clean water and to meet the service targets imposed from the 
zone office. However, this has not been without the need for additional operational 
funds especially for the purposes, such as per diems, transportation costs, and the 
coordination and inspection of construction projects. The budget appropriated for this 
purpose is not adequate to cover such expenditures. This requires the particular office to 
transfer budget from one budget item to another within the operational budget. Budget 
transfers of such kind result due to the fact that woredas lack autonomy to follow their 
own targets rather than targets imposed from zone administration. 
 
The other factor mentioned in all the FGDs is the need to fund unplanned seasonal 
activities, most of the time of a political nature, imposed by the regional/zonal 
government. These include meetings, training sessions, conferences and evaluation 
sessions, all of which cause an additional budget burden, especially on per diems, 
stationary materials, and entertainment. Such unanticipated expenditure disrupts the 
planned budgetary processes, and is a contributory cause of excessive budget transfers.  
Under such circumstances, it has been difficult if not impossible to curtail the excessive 
use of budget transfers. The cases of the Mekiet and Shebel Berenta woredas are a good 
example to demonstrate this. In order to prevent excessive budget transfers prevailing in 
the woredas, the East Gojjam Zone administration had circulated an internal memo to 
woredas in 2009/10 that budget transfers by sectors be confined to only once in each 
quarter of a year. But by the third quarter of the year, it was realized that most of sector 
offices had not used their budgets. This was because the zonal directive had prevented 
them from using their budgets flexibly according to their specific changing sector 
situations. Consequently, the zone administration was forced to lift the restriction in the 
third quarter of the same year. 
 Failure of the regional government to play its regulatory and supportive role 
The loose follow up, monitoring and support from zone/regional offices has also 
encouraged officials to make use of excessive budget transfers. This was highlighted in 
particular during the interviews and expert focus group discussions in Debrenarkos.  
Despite the regular submission of reports to zonal/regional offices, the woreda has 
received little or no feedback, evaluation, criticism or support from the regional/zonal 
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offices. The lack of effective monitoring by the regional level authorities has in some 
ways encouraged woreda administrations engage in conduct that violates standard 
financial routines and practices, as little or no consequences are likely to come from the 
regional government for doing so. This has therefore served to further encourage the 
practice of budget transfers by the Debremarkos officials.  
5.3.3.2 Budget Execution 
All the discussants and interviewees agreed that budget execution is not a major concern 
with respect to recurrent budgets. Concerns related to low levels of budget execution are 
confined in the main to capital budgets and especially those funded by donors. It is 
unlikely that there will be low levels of budget execution for payroll, as long as the 
personnel establishment remains unchanged. Such costs are essentially fixed. 
Operational budgets are also unlikely to be under-spent, given that most of the case 
study woredas complain that face serious operational budget shortages. Moreover, 
woredas are unlikely to under-spend on their recurrent budgets, as this would result in a 
lower allocation in the regional block grant for the subsequent financial year. The main 
problem, of course, as pointed out in the expert focus group interviews and discussions, 
is the fact that sector offices tend to rush to finish their operational budgets before the 
end of the financial year, often on fairly wasteful and unnecessary items of expenditure. 
This can easily impact adversely on the optimal and effective use of budgetary 
resources throughout the financial year. This, of course, has to do with the limited fiscal 
autonomy of woreda administrations. Had woreda administrations been able to raise all 
the finance needed from own sources, they would not be so tempted to use their budgets 
in a potentially wasteful manner just to ensure that their subsequent grants from the 
regional government would not be reduced.  
As Table 5.10 shows, the level of execution for recurrent budgets is better than that of 
capital budgets, in the two woredas covered by the table. Government funds also tend to 
have a better execution rate than those from donors. Table 5.11 reveals, however, that 
there are significant year on year variations in the execution rates.  
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Table 5.11: Budget execution of the case study woreda administrations (%) 
Woreda  2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
Bahirdar Zuria Payroll  
99.92 99.57 98.88 99.95 99.99 
Operating 
88.52 93 89.77 94.6 98.79 
Capital 
51.39% 73.22 78.88 39.8 80.92 
Shebel Berenta Payroll NA 
94.22 66.85 
NA NA 
Operating NA 
97.71 14.46 
NA NA 
Capital NA 
72.23 18.67 
NA NA 
Source: Own Calculation from Two Case Woredas’ Budget Data of Various Years 
The fact that woreda administrations rely heavily on block grants and donors funds, one 
of the reasons for low execution of capital budget has been the delay in the release of 
the budgeted funds from the regional government or donors. Because of frequent delays 
in the disbursement of federal funds to the regions, the regional block grant to woredas 
often only arrives at the end of September, or later in some cases.  However, the 
financial and planning year begins on 1 July in the woredas, which means that they 
have to operate for three months or so with a shortfall. Although formally woredas are 
only able to use their own internally generated revenue once it has been included in the 
regional block grant, they are typically allowed by the regional government to use such 
revenue to cover personnel and operating expenditure in the period before the block 
grant is disbursed. However, they are not able to engage in capital expenditure until the 
block grant is received. This means that annual plans for capital investments on 
infrastructure and other projects in the woredas can only start in later September or 
early October (except for projects that were already started in the previous year but are 
still  incomplete). As a result the actual time available in a year for projects to be carried 
out is squeezed into nine months. Thus, various programs/projects start very late and 
cannot be accomplished as planned. This is a serious challenge that cannot be tackled by 
woredas themselves, unless the existing two-step intergovernmental transfer system is 
changed or expedited, or woreda administrations are empowered to spend their internal 
revenue on capital as well as operational expenditure.  
According to the expert focus groups and interviews with officials, there are similar 
problems associated with the release of donor funds. Donor funds promised and 
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included in the woreda budgets often come as late as the second or even third quarter of 
the year. Such delays are accentuated by the lengthy process that has to be gone through 
in presenting invoices and settling accounts. In most cases, the settling of accounts has 
to go through the regional bureau of finance and economic development (BoFED). 
Thus, woreda finance officers have to collect and present invoices along with 
performance reports to BoFED. It is the responsibility of accountants at BoFED to 
examine the validity of invoices and to balance the accounts. Some of the funds even 
require project completion reports in order the final payment to be released. Some 
donors only refund the cost of the project when the project work is completed and 
necessary invoices and documents have been provided. Others typically make revisions 
on the amount of the budget they have already promised. This makes the time span for 
the actual work of the project or purpose very tights and consequently the management 
of the funds becomes very difficult.  
The head of education office at Mekiet indicated that the delays mentioned above are 
often compounded by problems related to the bidding process with contractors. The 
bidding process itself takes at least a month, and often longer. Due to the lack of private 
sector capacity in many of the woredas, bids often have to be re-advertised because 
there were insufficient bidders in the first bidding process. Unless woreda officials rush 
and give the contract to a contractor (however uncompetitive) without following the 
procedures properly, this situation will result in additional delays in the use of donor 
funds. This has resulted in most of the projects funded by donors not being completed in 
time. This situation has been particularly prevalent in the Bahirdar Zuria Woreda 
education and health offices, where most of the capital budgets have been funded by the 
Local Investment Grant (LIG) program since 2008/09. The respective heads of these 
offices pointed out that the late release of funds from the program has resulted in the   
low level of budget execution, and often in poor construction quality. The respondents 
also indicated that regional officials were also well aware of such problems. On some 
occasions, donor funds have not been released, even though the bidding process has 
been completed and contracts awarded. In some cases, this has led to successful contract 
winners resorting to legal recourse.  
The head of education office at Mekiet Woreda referred to 117,000 birr that was 
allocated to a project by a particular donor. However, the funds had not been released 
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by the time the project was over.  The respondent suspects that this delay may well have 
been caused due to the fact that the regional BoFED unit charged with managing donor 
funds has become overburdened. He argued that it had now become beyond BoFED and 
regional sector bureaus capacity to supervise and closely follow up on the timely release 
and execution of such budgets. Thus the donors’ choice to retain the controlling and 
administration responsibilities of their funds at the regional level (with the intention of 
protecting against possible financial misappropriation and misuse by woreda 
administrations) has served in many ways to negate the essence of the on-going fiscal 
decentralization process, and has led to adverse consequences in financial utilization at 
the woreda administration level. 
However, in contrast to most of the cases revealed by the study, the head of rural water 
supply at Bahirdar Zuria Woreda argued that the Community Development Fund (CDF) 
projects in the woreda had been very successful in terms of budget execution. The head 
said that, unlike the previous arrangement in the Water, Sanitation and Health Program 
(WASH), the new CDF approach has helped the woreda to execute the allocated budget 
according to the plan. Under the CDF approach, there is no delay in the release of the 
fund as well as in the completion of the projects. The designated money is already 
deposited in the Amhara Credit and Saving Institute (ACSI) in the name of the woreda 
committee responsible for managing the funds, and is readily available whenever 
needed. This supports the argument in favour of the further decentralization of financial 
responsibilities closer to community level. A more detailed discussion of the CDF is 
presented in chapter eight). 
Another factor that exacerbates the low budget execution of donors fund has been the 
low level of attention paid to such funds by both the heads of sector offices and the 
woreda administrations in general. The heads of the education and health offices 
interviewed for the study highlighted that often they do not seriously follow up the 
execution of funds from such sources. There is a widespread feeling among the heads of 
the sector offices that such donors’ funds do not really belong to the woreda 
administration. They therefore treat such funds with a low sense of ownership and 
commitment. With the exception of funds that are included in the treasury fund, donor 
funds do not usually pass through the formal financial management and budgeting 
process in woredas. The regular quarterly budget execution evaluation by woreda 
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administrations does not include such off- treasury funds. Some of them are specific to 
single sectors and the woreda administration has little or no responsibility for them.  
The result is that woreda administrations do not consider off-treasury funds as their 
resource and are therefore not worried about their timely or successful execution. 
Unlike the normal treasury funds most of such funds are administered in a separate bank 
account, with no systematic way of notifying the relevant sector offices of the release of 
such off-treasury funds.  
The cause for low level of budget execution is different in Debremakos City.  Unlike all 
other case study woredas, capital budgets in Debremarkos are not predominantly 
supported by donors. Besides, the city raises a significant amount of finance from 
internal municipality services which are not accounted in the block grant and the City 
can use it without obtaining approval from the regional government. Therefore the 
impact of the late release of funds on budget execution is not as bad as it is in the other 
case study woredas.  
Unlike rural woredas, urban administrations in the Amhara region receive 
intergovernmental transfers in the form of a special grant scheme made on ad hoc basis 
(not formula driven) designed to support their infrastructure development projects. 
Debremarkos City has received a large amount of fund through this scheme. With the 
presumption that such grants from the region will continue, the city administration has 
begun a major infrastructure programme, focusing in particular on the upgrading of 
existing roads and the construction of new ones. There are, however, doubts whether 
such ad hoc grant funding to Debremarkos will continue at the same level, especially as 
the regional government has recently upgraded an additional number of towns to urban 
administration status, resulting in the grant funds havening to be shared with an 
increasing number of urban administrations. The special grant for Debremarkos City 
has already started to decline in quite a major way. This highlights the unpredictability 
of reliance on ad hoc forms of intergovernmental transfers.  
Thus, the city administration has opted to compensate for the dwindling regional grant 
by expanding and diversifying its internal revenue sources, at least to enable it to 
complete the development projects that have already been started. One of the sources 
that have been generating significant revenue is land lease to investors. The City 
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administration has also planned to increase its revenue by leasing their construction 
equipment to the private sector. However, such sources of internal revenue have now 
declined in importance as the federal government has ordered the municipality to stop 
land leasing, and the hiring of machinery to the private sector has not derived major 
benefits as much of the equipment is in a state of disrepair. As a result, it seems likely 
that the City administration will not have the funds to successfully complete a number 
of its infrastructure projects. Thus, in Debremarkos, the main factors for low levels of 
budget execution with regard to capital expenditure have been the reliance on 
unpredictable sources of regional grants (given the regional government’s tendency to 
change its priorities and methods of grant delivery), as well as its own over-ambitious 
plans for internal revenue generation. 
5.3.33 Procurement 
The regional government has formulated a legal framework for all procurements made 
by government agencies both at the regional as well as woreda level (Proclamation No. 
179/2011). The framework, though it allows for various procurement methods to fit 
different conditions, places emphasis on the importance of open bidding (Article 20).  
This, it is argued, is the best way of preventing various forms of corruption, as well as 
ensuring quality, value for money and reliability through open competition. Therefore, 
the legal framework requires woreda administrations to make use of open bidding 
procurement methods, save for a few exceptional situations. 
However, as the expert focus group discussions and interviews with sector officials 
revealed, the woreda administrations often do not comply with the competitive bidding 
requirement, particularly for bulk procurements. Instead direct procurement from 
existing providers is often used, as this avoids going through a lengthy tendering and 
bidding process. In addition, in the rural woredas, there is shortage of available 
providers and contractors. Often, therefore, not enough bids are submitted to meet 
formal tender requirements, and the whole bidding process has to start again. 
Other reasons for the lack of compliance with formal tender regulations have to do with 
the factors discussed earlier in this chapter as causes for the non-compliance with 
annual plans and budget plans. It was noted that such plans have often not been 
followed due to either unplanned activities imposed from the top, the disruption in the 
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plans triggered by the late release of block grant and donors fund, or an immediate 
change in the budget structure due to shortage of budget funds to achieve the targets 
imposed by regional government.  
Discussants in all the case woredas explained that unplanned training and evaluation 
meetings and workshops imposed on the woreda administrations by the regional 
government have contributed to the lack of compliance with the formal requirements for 
procurement. Often these unplanned activities imposed by the regional government 
have to be organised at a moment notice. Thus, stationery materials, drinks, food items 
and various entertainment arrangements needed for such functions often have to be 
procured in an instant manner through direct procurement methods.  
Interviewees also indicated that the unreliable nature of donors funds, as well as other 
problems surrounding budget shortages (as discussed earlier in this chapter), have also 
contributed to the tendency to use direct forms of procurement (rather than competitive 
bidding processes) that can enable officials to respond more quickly to changes 
necessitated by such an uncertain budgetary environment. In such cases, a motivation to 
use more direct forms of procurement has to be submitted and approved by the chief 
administrator of the woreda. Given the need to harness development activities and meet 
performance targets, in the face of uncertainties about donor funding and problems of 
budget shortages, such approval is generally forthcoming. 
Even in situations where woreda administrations were able to use open bidding 
procurement methods, they were often not able to reap the intended benefits. This has 
been a problem for all woredas but, as noted earlier, it has been a particular challenge 
for the remoter rural woredas such as Shebel Berenta and Mekiet, where adequate 
numbers of contractors and suppliers are not available to meet the requirements of a 
competitive tendering process. Together with the limited time span to implement 
projects, resulting from the late availability of the fund from donors or the block grant, 
as well as the pressure to meet unplanned activities imposed by the regional 
government, this has left most woreda administrations with little choice other than to 
engage in direct forms of procurement, accepting the price and quality offered by the 
suppliers selected. The deputy head of BoFED explained that the regional government 
is aware of this situation, and essentially has turned a blind eye to the non-compliance 
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with formal procurement regulations due to the exigencies under which many of the 
smaller rural-based woredas have to operate.  
5.3.3.4  Construction  
With respect to construction, the problems are not merely confined to challenges in the 
tendering and supply chain management processes. A key problem in many of the 
woredas is the failure of contractors to complete construction projects on time and to 
the agreed quality. This often is connected with the limited capacity of woreda 
administrations to supervise construction works and enforce contracts (as explained, for 
example, in the interview with the deputy head of BoFED). 
Shebel Berenta and Mekiet woredas do not have their own construction experts to 
supervise constructions works. They have therefore had to obtain expert support from 
their respective Zone Urban and Works offices. As mentioned earlier, this arrangement 
has had limited success. Experts from the zone office are only able to go to these 
woredas and supervise the construction works on an intermittent basis (as they have to 
cover other woredas in the zone as well). Construction projects, however, need regular 
and continuous inspection and supervision. 
More fundamentally, the weak and dubious accountability of the experts for the quality 
and progress of the construction work may also lead them to be reluctant in their 
supervision duties, as well as to be exposed to corruption. All interviewees in the two 
woredas confirmed that the zone experts are not fully committed and serious about their 
responsibilities with regard to the supervision of construction projects. They even 
blamed them for colluding with contractors against the interest of the woreda 
administrations, by giving contractors a go ahead despite defects or unsatisfactory 
progress they noticed in the construction. The head of education office in Shebel 
Berenta maintains that the consultant engineers assigned to Shebel Berenta have sided 
with the contractors whenever the disputes aroused between the woreda administration 
and contractors. In recent years it has become common for contractors to demand 
additional payment due to unexpected ground situations and/or the price hike in   
construction materials. The consultant engineers’ suggestions typically confirm such 
claims, despite the fact that on many occasions they have been contested by the woreda 
administration. The support from the consultant engineers has increased the likelihood 
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of the contractors pursuing successful legal cases against the woredas. As a result of 
such legal cases, or to avoid going to court in the first place, most woredas end up by 
agreeing to the additional payments, even though this often places considerable pressure 
on their budgets. According to the interviews with officials in the case study woredas, 
there is a strong suspicion that the consultant engineers are either bribed by contractors 
or do not critically examine the problem.  
The head of the education office in Shebel Berenta also indicated that the lack of 
effective supervision also impacted the quality of many of the construction projects. For 
instance, the library building constructed for the high school in Yeduha town entirely 
collapsed just one year after its completion. Mekiet woreda also had similar 
experiences, as explained by head of education office. This was due largely to the 
difficulty faced by woredas in holding accountable the consultant engineers approved 
by the zone administrations. It is only the zone administrations that have the effective 
power to hold such officials accountable, not the woreda administrations. The 
respondents in the focus groups with officials all agreed that the experts sent by the 
zonal administrations seem to believe that they have authority over employees of 
woreda administrations. In general, it can be inferred that the assistance provided by 
zonal administrations with respect to the supervision of construction projects has in 
many ways undermined rather than strengthened the accountability systems in the 
woredas, due mainly to the dominance relationship that exists between zone 
administrations and the woredas.  
5.3.3.5 Revenue 
The study reveals that ambiguity and confusion exists to some extent regarding the 
extent of the revenue raising power devolved to woreda governments. The legislation 
does not provide a clear indication or explanation of which sources of revenue belong to 
woreda governments. In practice, there are lists of areas where woreda governments can 
raise revenue in the form of taxes, fees and service charges. These include revenue 
collected from trade and transport (in the form of tax, licensing or licence renewing); 
agriculture income tax and land use fees collected from small peasants; employment 
tax, mainly from government employees; and royalty taxes on mining (Worku, 2005). 
The deputy head of BoFED, however, stated in the interview that woreda governments 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 
  
146 
 
have limited powers when it comes to revenue. The power to decide on the tax base and 
rate belongs to the region. Woreda governments can only levy and collect tax on behalf 
of the region, complying with directives provided by the region, and using or 
transferring revenue to the region as required by the regional office. However, there is 
currently no practice of transferring revenue collected from the woredas to regional 
governments, as the amount collected could cover only small proportion of the budget 
that the woredas need. Rather, the transfer has been the other way around from region to 
woredas to fill their budget shortage in the form of block grants. The revenue collected 
by woredas is, however, considered as revenue of the region and there is offsetting from 
the total block grant for the amount collected from the woreda.  
Urban woredas, on the other hand, are empowered to collect and use charges and fees 
for services provided by the municipality. In all of the woredas, with the exception of 
Debremarkos, the types of revenues collected lie under the C category, which means 
businesses that have an annual turnover below 100,000 birr. These are businesses that 
are not required to present books of accounts or profit and loss statements. At the same 
time, these businesses are not supposed to pay VAT. The woredas collect tax also from 
informal vendors. Furthermore, schools in the woredas are empowered to collect several 
sources of revenue (though usually very small amounts) and use this to assist in 
covering their various administrative costs. These sources include revenue from the 
selling of grain they harvest or trees in their plot, and a very small registration fee they 
collect from students.  
One of the indicators that reveal the existing woreda administrations’ disincentive for 
effective revenue collection is the frequent conflict that is observed between woreda 
administrations and the regional government over the revenue collection targets. The 
only mechanism through which the regional government tries to encourage or force 
woreda administrations to improve their revenue collection is by reviewing and revising 
their revenue plans. However, when the regional government has attempted to push 
woreda administrations to achieve higher revenue collection targets that, according to 
the woreda administrations are beyond their capacity to achieve, this has often resulted 
in conflict between the two tiers of government. 
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In Mekiet woreda, for instance, the initial plan of the woreda Inland Revenue office was 
3 million birr in 2008/09 and 7 million birr in 2009/10 but the office was later forced by 
the zone inland revenue office to increase these targets to 6.3 million and 9 million 
respectively. The deputy head of the regional BoFED made it clear in the interview   
that woreda governments in the region often understate their revenue collection targets. 
This is because if they set higher targets, the amount of the regional block grant would 
decline, as the regional grant is calculated based on the expenditure need of the woreda 
not revenue collection capacity. But the interviews with officials demonstrated that the 
woreda administrations often are not certain that they can collect the amounts of 
revenue insisted upon by the regional zonal offices. This is a risky situation that they 
want to avoid as much as possible. If they are not able to collect what they have 
planned, they would face a budget deficit, and there is no guarantee that the regional 
government would give additional grants to cover such a deficit. On the other hand, if 
their revenue collection plan is low and they collect in excess of their planned targets, 
the regional government would allow them to use the excess revenue collected for their 
own woreda development activities. That is why most woreda governments tend to set 
fairly low revenue targets.  
Even though woreda administrations are not willing to accept the targets set for them by 
the region, the regional government, in most cases, forces them to accept them. 
However, this has often failed to realise the intended result. The experts from Mekiet 
Woreda Inland Revenue stated in the FGD that because of such unachievable revenue 
collection targets imposed by the zone office, the woreda had faced a budget shortage of 
600,000 birr in 2007/08. The regional government, after negotiations and a series of 
requests from the woreda, eventually agreed to cover this shortfall through additional 
transfer. In 2008/09 and 2009/10 the woreda was able to collect more than they had 
planned, due to the occurrence of certain unanticipated sources of revenue. One of these 
was the introduction by the federal government of a 36% salary increment all over the 
country, which increased the levels of income tax collection. The other was the growth 
in royalty tax collection from the Chinese Road Construction Project that has been 
constructing the main road that passes through Mekiet woreda. Without these additional 
sources of revenue, the woreda would not have achieved its revenue targets for these 
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years. The royalties from the road project are not sustainable on a longer term basis of 
course, as the road project has now been completed. 
Table 5 12: Percentage of revenue budget execution (%) 
 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
Bahirdar 81.39 96.11 118.4 107.59 118.67 
Debremarkos NA 128.1 102 80.20 57.38 
Shebel 
Berenta 
NA 103.4 110 98.16 99.31 
Mekiet 81.02 89.86 144 204.77 107.3 
Source: Own Calculation from Case Woredas’ Budget Data of Various Years 
Note: NA stands for data not available 
 
Unlike the rural woredas, where the problem has been the understatement of revenue 
targets, the problem in the Debremarkos city administration has been, paradoxically, the 
setting of very ambitious targets for revenue and municipal service charges. As noted 
earlier, the city administration has full discretion to determine the size and utilization of 
such sources of revenue. As observed in table 5.12 above, the reason why the revenue 
budget execution of the city administration has been declining (unlike that of other 
woredas) is because the city administration has been setting ambitious revenue 
collection targets. The fact that the mandate to utilize the revenue collected from 
municipality services has been given to the city administration has motivated it to take 
full responsibility and to make entrepreneurial efforts to increase the administration’s 
revenue so that to cover some of the finances needed for various infrastructure 
development activities. This was especially the case, as observed in table 5.13 below, 
for revenues from municipality services in the past two years (2008/09 and 2009/10) 
when the special grant from the region declined. However, due to the challenges 
mentioned above, the city administration was unable to achieve the increased targets 
set. 
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Table 5 13: Debremarkos city administration municipality service revenue trend 
Year 
Revenue 
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
Planned 3,000,000 3,180,000 5,329,762 14,000,000 21,000,000 
Actual 3,066,802.64 3,758,422 4,110,227.65 7,552,427 6,980,241 
Execution 
(%) 
(102.2%) (118.1%) (77.1%) (53.9%) (33.2%) 
Source: Own Calculation from Debremarkos City Administration Budget Data of 
Various Years 
 
One of the few incentives that the regional Revenue Authority has attempted to use to 
encourage rural woreda administrations to increase their revenue collection is the 
discretion given to them to use the additional revenue if they collect in excess of the 
planned targets (without this being considered as part of regional block grant). If they 
collect this excess revenue, they have the discretion to use it in any development 
activity they think is critical to their communities. As presented in table 5.12, woreda 
administrations have been able to collect more than their planned target. However, as 
discussants in the FGDs stated, such excess revenue collection has sometimes been used 
for wasteful expenditure rather than for developmental activities. The fact that such 
excess revenue collection is often unplanned and happens unexpectedly, it is impossible 
to have a well-conceived and viable development planning process that is responsive to 
the priorities of the people. In addition, in most cases, the excess collection of revenue 
is only recognized after the end of third quarter of the financial year, leading to a very 
short time period available to plan and design useful development project. Such excess 
revenue collection has also often been used to cover per diems gaps that the woreda has 
not been able to pay due to operational budget shortages. For instance, the allocation of 
excess revenue collected in 2009/10 in Mekiet woreda revealed, as shown in table 5.14, 
has been used mainly to cover operational expenditures and other sundry expenditures. 
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Table 5 14: Utilization of excess revenue collected in the Mekiet Woreda 
Amount (birr) Sector Office Amount (birr) Purpose 
54880 Woreda administration 
office 
30000 As incentive to high 
performing Kebeles 
6680 Administration and 
security office 
15000 CWE projects 
6000 Support for EPRDF 
headquarter 
construction at Wadla 
woreda 
Source: A Letter from Chief Administrator on 09/26/2002 EC to WoFED 
Another issue revolves around the collection of business taxes. Discussants in the 
community FGDs indicated that the effort to improve revenue collection by bringing 
informal businesses into the formal and legal system has so far achieved very limited 
results. A number of campaigns have been launched in this respect, usually at the behest 
of the regional government, but these have often stopped when the attention shifts to 
other issues.  
It therefore seems that it has been easier for woredas to increase the tax burden on  
already registered legal businesses than attempting to tax small informal businesses and 
untaxed businesses. One participant in the community FGD recounts the conversation 
he had with the previous head of the revenue office when he asked him why the office 
has levied higher amounts of tax on his business while other and more successful 
businesses have been required to pay much less. The revenue office official’s reply was 
“our effort to increase revenue can be acknowledged by the woreda administration as 
well as by zonal office only when registered and known businesses like yours 
complained for excessive taxation”. Thus, discussants in the focus groups insisted that 
the current approach results from the fact that revenue officers in the woredas do not 
want to risk their social relationship in the community by directly confronting those 
businesses that are not paying tax or paying very low levels. These problems in the 
taxation of businesses have led some established businesses to shift to informal 
businesses or else run another informal business alongside their formal ones.      
In general, the approach of withholding the power of woredas to raise revenue and 
making woreda administrations upwardly accountable has weakened their 
entrepreneurial effort to increase revenue by looking for alternative sources.  
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5.3.4 Regional Support in Staffing Woreda Administrations 
In the current practice, while woreda administrations take the responsibility of hiring 
and firing of their staff, the regional government is responsible for the design of 
personnel structures, salary scales and the capacity building of employees. However, as 
observed from the interviews and focus groups with officials, there is a wide gap in 
training between woredas as well as between what is required and what is provided.  
For instance, Bahirdar Zuria has received training in all its units, and the discussants in 
Debremarkos did not complain about inadequate training opportunities. In Mekiet 
woreda, however, training opportunities have varied from section to section. 
Discussants from the finance and disbursement section were relatively satisfied with the 
training opportunities provided, whereas employees in the audit, procurement and 
property management sections expressed discontent about the lack of opportunities to 
upgrade their skill. Employees in both sections indicated that they are running their day 
to day duties without getting any training. In general, Shebel Berenta lags behind all the 
case woredas in terms of training opportunities. Thus, the overall impression in the 
discussions was that the regional government is not playing its role as adequately as 
required to strengthen the capacity of woreda administrations in administering their 
financial resources. 
Although all the case woredas have been affected by successive restructuring required 
by the regional government, especially in terms of the experience levels of staff, wide 
variations continue exist in terms of staff expertise and experience between the case 
woredas. Bahirdar Zuria has the most experienced employees and a relatively stable 
personnel establishment, followed by Debremarkos. In Mekiet, there is variation 
between sections. The audit section has the most inexperienced employees followed by 
procurement and property management section. Disbursement and government finance 
has relatively better experienced employees followed by the budget and planning 
section. Shebel Berenta Woreda suffers severely from inexperienced employees. None 
of the employees in the procurement office, for example, have more than one years of 
experience. The main reason for this problem, particularly in Shebel Berenta, is the high 
rate of human resource turn over. It has been a common trend in Shebel Berenta woreda 
that employees rarely work for more than two years. Due to the remoteness of the 
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woreda, most of the employees look for jobs in other woredas after obtaining one or 
two years of experience. Even though other woredas closer to cities are the recipients of 
experienced employees, Bahirdar Zuria and Debremarkos are the primary beneficiaries 
of this situation. The opportunities available in the larger and better resourced woredas, 
and especially in the urban centres of Bahirdar and Debremarkos, acts as a magnate. 
Consequently, Shebel Berenta has the highest staff turnover followed by Mekiet 
woreda.  
The only means by which the existing manpower turnover trend in remote woreda 
administrations can be addressed is through differential compensation systems. 
Currently, the region has a uniform salary structure across all woreda administrations. 
The regional government could have designed a differential compensation system that 
provides an incentive for employees working in rural woredas to remain in their posts. 
To date, however, there have no signs that the regional government has any intention of 
resorting to such differential compensation approaches.  
5.3.5 Transparency and Accountability and Performance Reporting 
The absence of a legal framework that clearly reveals the distinction in the respective 
functional competencies of the regional government and woreda administrations, has 
led to a considerable degree of uncertainty and confusion amongst woreda officials and 
the broader community as to what functions belong to the woredas and regional 
government agencies respectively. As can be observed from table 5.15 below, only 
12.4% of the people and 15% of civil servants stated that they are able to differentiate 
the power and responsibility between the region and their woreda administrations 
(without statistically significant mean variance between woredas). The majority of the 
respondents have no clear idea about the distinctions. This data was derived from the 
questionnaire responses of both community members and civil servants. 
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Table 5 15: Clarity of intergovernmental relations between the woreda 
administrations and the regional government 
Extent of Clarity Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 CS Co CS Co CS Co CS Co 
Valid 
.00 15 82 15.0 26.5 15.0 26.8 15.0 26.8 
.25 19 24 19.0 7.8 19.0 7.8 34.0 34.6 
.50 43 132 43.0 42.7 43.0 43.1 77.0 77.8 
.75 8 30 8.0 9.7 8.0 9.8 85.0 87.6 
1.00 15 38 15.0 12.3 15.0 12.4 100.0 100.0 
Total 100 306 100.0 99.0 100.0 100.0   
 missing 0 3       
          Total  100 309       
Source: Field Survey: 2011 
This is why most of the participants in the FGDs highlighted the importance of using 
hierarchical accountability recourses to hold local officials accountable. Few if any of 
the respondents correctly viewed their woreda administration as independent political 
units. When they were asked to whom they would report if they noticed any improper 
use of woreda finances, all of them explained that they would present their complaints 
to different government bodies following the hierarchical structure of government. First 
this would be to the head of the particular office, then to the chief administrator, then to 
the zone administration, then to regional administration and so on. They believe that if 
woreda officials do not abuse public money the only reason is because they fear the 
reaction from higher levels of government, rather than because of the pressure from 
bottom-up accountability structures. 
Therefore, whenever they felt that woreda government finance is being embezzled by 
individual woreda officials, they feel that their only recourse is to complain to the next 
level of government in the hierarchy as long as this is convenient and feasible for them. 
Participants Bahirdar Zuria and Debremarkos explained that they are able to do this as 
the woredas are close to the seat of the zone or regional government. However, little 
action normally follows such complaints, as the woreda officials are typically protected 
by the zonal or regional officials, especially if they are connected through the political 
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party system. Hence citizens have little confidence that their complaints will be 
addressed effectively. 
Because people have not effectively understood the intergovernmental relationship 
between their woreda administration and the regional government, attempts to hold 
woreda officials popularly accountable have often lost momentum when woreda 
officials explain that it is the regional government’s failure to release the expected grant 
that has resulted in the failure to deliver services as promised. Despite existing weak 
initiatives from the people, there have been a few cases where citizens have enquired 
about the utilization of public money, especially when the funds were contributed from 
the communities themselves. Discussants in Debrmarkos, for example, explained that 
the people in Debremarkos City have on occasion complained about delays in the 
construction of city roads, as well as rumours of embezzlement of the budget by city 
administration officials, when they have been called together for public meetings. 
Particular concerns were directed at a construction project going on in the city funded 
jointly by the woreda government and the community. The fact the people contributed 
their own money encouraged them to question the authorities, especially about the slow 
pace of delivery and the rumours circulating about corruption. The authorities 
responded that the accusation of embezzlement was a baseless accusation and the only 
reason for the delay of the construction was the decline in the transfers from regional 
government. The city administration officials pointed out that the money they expected 
from the region was not transferred. This situation left the people undecided whether to 
accept or reject the explanation as they did not have any idea as to how much money the 
regional government was expected to transfer.  
As discussed earlier, due to the high reliance on block grants from the regional 
government citizens have not shown a willingness to demand accountability for the 
utilization of such funds. They have tended to count on higher levels of government to 
control the proper use of finance at the woreda level. As shown in table 5.16 below,  
questionnaire respondents chose higher level government control as the first important 
factor (mean=.9443) for ensuring the proper utilization of public finance in the woreda 
administrations, as opposed to woreda administration autonomy which is the least 
preferred (mean=.5508) factor among the list of factors to determine public financial 
utilization.   
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Table 5 16: Factor determining for proper allocation and utilization of public finance 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Control from higher level 
government 
305 .00 1.00 .9443 .20320 
Autonomy to lower 
government 
305 .00 1.00 .5508 .45870 
Citizens should have role 303 .00 1.00 .8894 .27923 
Elders should have role 304 .00 1.00 .7829 .35260 
Religious leaders should have 
role 
305 .00 1.00 .6852 .40670 
Capable executives (skill & 
experience) 
302 .00 1.00 .9503 .18903 
Police and court should have 
controlling role 
302 .00 1.00 .8725 .29016 
Valid N (listwise) 298     
Source: Field Survey: 2011 
 
The deputy head of BoFED also stressed in the interview the importance of relying on 
upward accountability arrangements to fill existing accountability gaps in woreda 
administrations. He said that in a situation where about 75% of woreda administration 
budgets come from the regional government, woreda administrations should be held 
primarily accountable by the regional government itself for achieving regionally set 
service standards.  
Nonetheless, the deputy head explained that to date few actual mechanisms have been 
put in place to hold the woredas accountable, except by giving directions as to which 
sectors and areas they should prioritize in budget allocation. There is, however, an 
intention of signing performance contracts with woreda governments that can place a 
clear and enforceable accountability on them to achieve appropriate service 
performance levels with the budgets they are provided. 
This also supports the idea that is held by participants of the FGDs that the more the 
woreda administrations rely on finance from regional government, the less people feel 
the pain of its misuse and, as a result, the less interest is shown by them in trying to hold 
their local level officials to account. Discussants in the FGDs explained that they lack 
the initiative and commitment to try and follow up and expose financial abuses because 
they do not think that they have the mandate or power to ask for information, as the 
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money largely comes from regional government or donors. They think higher level 
officials have more interest than citizens in controlling the utilization of public finance. 
However, they indicated that they would still like greater access to information about 
the utilization of such resources, even if this does not lead to greater forms of popular 
accountability and control. 
Discussants also mentioned an issue that symptomizes the need for further financial 
decentralization down to community level. They believe that popular accountability 
would be strengthened if allocation decisions and control were decentralised where 
appropriate to the kebele level. The discussants argued that most people were not very 
interested, nor capable of really understanding, what was happening in other parts of the 
woreda. But they would be interested in understanding and having a greater say in what 
was happening in their own kebeles. By bringing financial matters down to kebele level, 
the discussants argues that the pool of beneficiaries would be reduced and any financial 
transactions and utilization could be easily traceable so that misuses and irregularities 
could more easily be noticed and controlled. 
5.3.5.1 Performance Reporting 
Performance reports (both financial and physical) are crucial for providing financial 
transparency and accountability (for both downward and upward accountability). In the 
Amhara region, with the aim of facilitating transparency and accountability, there is a 
formal requirement that woreda administrations and their sector offices should prepare 
and present integrated performance reports, covering both financial and physical 
performance. Despite the requirement, none of the woreda administrations have done so 
to date. Financial performance reports for all sector offices are prepared centrally by 
WOFED whereas physical performance reports are prepared by the respective sector 
offices. Interviewed sector office heads mentioned two reasons for the impracticality of 
preparing integrated performance reports.  
The first reason mentioned by interviewees is connected with the budget structure, in 
particular the skewing of budgets towards recurrent expenditures required by the 
regional government. In a situation where recurrent budgets become the dominant 
expenditure, it is difficult to systematically link financial spending with performance or 
programs. Recurrent budgets, in most cases, are by their nature inter-activity 
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expenditures incurred for a pool of activities and are not easily traceable to a single 
activity performance. That is to say the more expenditure allocated to recurrent 
expenditures, the more they become difficult to be identified with single activity. 
Therefore, the interviewees explained that they have not been able to report their 
performance by effectively and systematically linking financial and physical 
performances.  
Besides, the ambitious performance targets imposed by the regional government, as 
discussed earlier, has led the capital investments of woreda administrations to be 
dominated by non-discretionary donor funds. As noted earlier, these often have no 
systematic link with the plans of woreda administrations. This is why sectors such as 
rural water supply offices, which have relatively larger capital investments to undertake, 
are unable to engage in effective forms of performance reporting, as the capital; 
investments come primarily from donors. 
There is therefore no clarity in the performance reports of woreda administrations as to 
which part of government activities is funded by government and which part by donors. 
For example, activities such as family planning, child health and nutrition, vaccination, 
maternal health and HIV/AIDS in the woredas are often supported by various donor 
funded projects. However, such activities are also funded by the woredas themselves. 
Woredas which attempt to follow the formal reporting format typically provide data on 
their own performance and budgets whilst ignoring the activities funded by donors. As 
donor funding is the dominant form of funding for capital investment projects in most 
of the case woredas, this form of reporting distorts the actual performance on the 
ground and provides an inadequate basis for holding local officials accountable. 
 
The second reason is connected with failure of officials and their offices to prepare and 
implement planning and budgeting based on a systematic link between finance and 
physical activities. Although several factors are responsible for this, only those factors 
related with intergovernmental relationship are discussed here. Due to the arbitrary 
changes and modification through the successive interferences of the regional 
government, the importance of planning and budgeting as a tool to implement woreda 
level development has declined. Similarly the attention given by woreda officials to the 
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preparation and implementation of plans and budgets has also declined. In this situation, 
interviewees stated that there is no systematic link between physical activities and 
financial performance. Even if there is a limited link, this typically changes because 
plans are often not followed as intended. Activities to be performed are changed as a 
result of unanticipated impositions from zone administration and budget plans are 
frequently upset by budget shortages resulting from delays in the reciept of the regional 
block grant and donor funding, as well as other factors described in detail in the sections 
above. 
5.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter addresses the impact that intergovernmental relations has had in shaping 
and determining the financial governance of woreda administrations. Thus, it started 
with an assessment of the level of autonomy afforded to woreda administrations and the 
supportive and regulatory role of regional government. It is understood from the revised 
constitution of the Amhara Regional government that woreda administrations are 
autonomous political units mandated to undertake specified functions for which they 
can also raise and spend funds. The expenditure roles are almost entirely devolved to 
woreda governments, whereby they can formulate their socio economic plans, budget 
the required resources and spend them. Nonetheless, the fact that neither the regional 
constitution nor other legal instruments clearly specify the functional competencies 
devolved, a lack of clarity has characterized the district level fiscal decentralization of 
the Amhara region.  
In terms of revenue rather than expenditure, woreda administrations have not as yet 
been devolved with significant powers to raise revenues, as many of these powers 
continue to remain within the competence of the regional government. In this respect, 
urban administrations are in a better situation as they are empowered to raise their own 
revenue from the provision of municipal services. Otherwise, the dependence of most of 
the case woredas on regional block grants and donor funding, coupled with limited local 
revenue generating potential and the inability to borrow, has resulted in the lack of 
financial autonomy. Their revenue responsibilities are in the main confined to the 
levying and collection of various taxes in line with regional requirements and therefore 
essentially through de-concentration rather than genuine devolution. Thus, the limited 
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revenue raising power coupled with no right to raise revenue by borrowing and woredas 
low level of revenue potential resulted in woreda administrations not to be financially 
autonomous. Currently, woreda governments are highly dependent on regional transfer.  
A further issue, however, is the extent to which the limited financial autonomy of 
woreda governments has been translated into a loss of spending autonomy. The fact that 
the block grants transferred from the regional government are unconditional grants 
means that woreda administrations, at least in theory, do have the discretion to decide 
on the allocation and utilization of the funds. But in practice, the regional grant formula 
which determines the volume and distribution of block grant effectively dictates in 
many ways that the plans and budgets of the woreda governments must be aligned to 
regional rather than local priorities. 
More fundamentally, the constitutionally recognized spending autonomy of woreda 
governments in the Amhara region has been constrained in practice by the constant 
interference of the regional government through its zone administration structures. 
Various sector offices in zone administration have interfered in the plan preparation of 
woreda sector offices by dictating to woreda governments what goals and targets to 
include, either by providing planning guidelines, through their plan approval processes, 
or through the evaluation of woredas sector offices performance. The interference of 
zone sector offices has sometimes been also in terms of hiring employees for woreda 
administrations, as well as compelling woreda officials to engage in unplanned 
activities for which no budgetary provision has been made, thereby forcing the woredas 
to switch funds from its own budgets and divert resources from its own planned 
activities.  
Despite the budgetary challenges experienced by the case wordas, most of them have 
nevertheless made progress, particularly in areas such as expanding access to services, 
the more economic use of resources, increases in administrative efficiency by 
streamlining bureaucratic processes, and the mobilization of local resources for 
development purposes. However, none of the case study woredas have showed signs of 
achieving some of the other claimed benefits of decentralization, such as the 
involvement of citizens in local financial allocation and utilization decisions, the 
provision of financial information to citizens, or the engagement of the people in 
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holding local officials accountable. In a number of key respects, therefore, the kind of 
decentralization that has been put in practice in the Amhara region exhibits the features 
of decentralization by de-concentration rather than decentralization by devolution. 
The chapter also provides evidences to show how intergovernmental relationships have 
negatively affected the financial governance of woreda administrations. Most of the 
case woreda administrations have not been able to respond adequately to the needs and 
demands of citizens, or meet desired levels of service quality, due in the main to the 
inflexible budget structure resulting from interference from the regional and zone 
administrations. Changes required by the zone administrations, particularly those in the 
middle of the fiscal year, have had serious adverse effects in disrupting the budgetary 
and financial management process starting, from budget preparation to evaluation. 
Woreda administrations have experienced serious budget pressures as a result of the 
administrative interference by zone administration, due to assuming the responsibility 
for unfunded mandates imposed by the regional government. Excessive budget transfers 
and unplanned procurement have been caused as a result of the consequent disruption in 
the planning and budgeting processes. Another problem has been the low levels of 
budget execution in most of the case woredas, caused by delays in the release of the 
regional government transfers and donor funds.  
The ability and willingness of woreda administrations to try to identify and raise 
additional sources of internal revenue has been discouraged by the fact that they have 
no power to utilize such revenue unless approval is granted by the regional government. 
The urban woreda of Debremarkos was to some extent an exception in this regard, as it 
did have the power to raise and utilize additional sources of revenue for its own 
purposes. However, such powers have recently been curtailed by the regional 
government.  
The current unclear assignment of roles between the regional government and woreda 
administrations seems to have led local citizens to resort to voicing their concerns 
through hierarchical rather than local voicing mechanisms. Moreover, it was observed 
that the more local projects are financed through regional grants or donor funds, the less 
likely are citizens to have seek information about the finances and hold their local 
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authorities accountable. Such accountability might well be enhanced by expanding 
decentralization to the local community or kebele level. 
The preparation of transparent financial report that link financial performance to 
activities carried out has not been possible to date. This has been due in part to 
disruptions in the planning and budgeting processes, but in the main to the fact that the 
majority of woreda budgets are spent on recurrent expenditure (especially personnel), 
which cannot be readily attached to specific activities.  
Finally, the lack of adequate human resource experience and expertise in the financial 
management process in most of the woredas can be attributed to a considerable extent 
to the regular restructuring processes directed by the regional government, as well as to 
the lack of training and other forms of support provided by the regional and zone 
administrations. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  BUDGETING REFORM AND LOCAL 
FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE OF WOREDA ADMINISTRATIONS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
It has already been discussed in the earlier chapters that local financial governance is a 
function of the interplay of various determining factors. The analysis of the impact of 
intergovernmental relations on woreda administrations financial governance was 
covered in chapter five. Another factor that plays a determining role in local financial 
governance is the public arrangement of financial management system installed in the 
local government system. There are several forms of public arrangements in financial 
management systems that might need to be reformed. The focus in this thesis will be on 
two broad categories of processes relating to public financial management systems: 
first, the arrangements designed for proper budgeting (upstream processes), and 
secondly the arrangements designed for proper budget implementation (downstream 
processes). While the arrangements in the first category are designed to improve such 
processes as  budget estimation, allocation and appropriation, the arrangements in the 
second are to improve processes such as revenue assessment and collection; cash 
management; procurement; internal controlling; accounting and recording; internal and 
external auditing; and external scrutiny. This chapter concentrates on issues related to 
the first category, and chapter seven focuses on issues related to the second. 
This chapter therefore presents an analysis and discussion of the nature, adequacy, and 
appropriateness of the public arrangement reforms implemented to improve budgeting 
processes and their impact on the financial governance of woreda administrations in the 
Amhara regional government. The chapter begins with an analysis of the reforms in the 
woreda planning processes and approaches and the impact on budgets, followed by a 
detailed presentation of the nature and adequacy of the budgeting reforms and their 
impact on the proper appropriation, allocation and execution of woreda budget. First, 
however, a brief assessment will be presented of the financial management reforms that 
have been undertaken in recent years in the Amhara region. 
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6.2 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REFORMS IN THE AMHARA REGION 
 
Subsequent to the commencement of the district level decentralization in Ethiopia, the 
then Ministry of Capacity Building in 2002 introduced a District Level Decentralization 
Program (DLDP) to facilitate the decentralization process in all regions. The program 
was one of the fourteen programs that have been undertaken by the Ministry of 
Capacity Building (MCB) and one of the six sub-programs incorporated in the larger 
Public Sector Capacity Building Program (PSCBP). It aimed at supporting the woreda 
level decentralization in the regions by promoting good governance, enhancing 
organizational effectiveness and manpower capability, institutionalizing decision 
making processes and improving rural woreda working systems as  part of the county’s 
poverty reduction and sustainable development strategy (Worku, 2005).  
Each of the regions, supported by the DLDP, has taken respective measures to facilitate 
the devolution of power to their woreda administrations. Apart from amending the 
regional constitution, adopting the functional assignment framework and replicating the 
federal block grant system to allocate finance directly to woreda governments as 
discussed earlier, the Amhara regional state has also introduced several reforms in the 
public sector to strengthen the self-administering capacity of woreda administrations. 
To this effect the Bureau of Capacity Building (BoCB) in the Amhara region  
established a district level decentralization program (DLDP), the replica of the federal 
government MCB, to address the capacity building needs of decentralized woreda 
administrations in the region.  
Some of the efforts undertaken by the regional DLDP in this respect include the 
redeployment of experts and personnel from regional and zone offices to woreda 
administrations, the reorganization of public institutions in the woreda administrations, 
the strengthening of the institutional capacity by providing administrative and office 
infrastructure, and efforts to strengthen grass roots participation in the activities of the 
woreda administrations. At the same time, the regional Bureau of Economic 
Development and Finance (BoFED) was assigned the responsibility for rolling out 
various finance management reforms that had already been introduced by the federal 
government in the regional administrations down to the woreda level. Consequently, 
through its Decentralization Support Activity Project, BoFED has undertaken 
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successive reforms in various finance activities including planning, budgeting, cash and 
disbursement, procurement, accounting and internal auditing, using the ‘getting the 
basics right first’ approach. The introduction of a Medium Expenditure Framework, 
together with program budgeting and full accrual accounting is also being planned, but 
has yet to be into practice. Discussants in the experts’ FGD and interviewed officials in 
all case study woredas confirmed that these reforms were implemented in all the case 
study woredas financial management system. 
To begin with planning, bottom up planning and strategic planning are the approaches 
introduced to transform the planning practices to make them fit to the needs of the self-
administering woreda administrations of Amhara region. As discussed in detail in the 
previous chapter, the practice of preparing five year strategic plans began in woreda 
administrations in 2003/04. Annual plans and budgets are expected to be derived from 
the strategic plans. The planning process, at least theoretically, follows a bottom up 
approach. As described in the previous chapter, it begins at kebele and/or service 
delivery unit level where citizens at grass root level supposedly participate and have a 
say in determining the targets of the plan. Woreda level sectoral and  comprehensive 
plans are expected to include the planning decisions made at the kebele and service 
delivery unit level. 
Budgeting is also another component of the financial management reform. The new 
budget system has introduced a new budget classification system and codes designed to 
more effectively track government expenditures from a number of different dimensions. 
The new system is based on administrative structures grouped under three functions: 
administrative services, economic services and social services. These services are 
further divided into sector offices based on sub-services. Expenditure tracking is further 
sub-divided into categories such as personnel emoluments, operational expenditure and 
capital expenditure. The classification has also made preparation for programme 
budgeting which will be introduced in the next phase of financial reforms. 
A new budget calendar has also been developed. The budget calendar defines the 
sequences of budget planning along with the roles and obligations of the different sector 
offices of woreda governments. These reforms have been supported by the introduction 
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of a number of in-service training programs, designed to strengthen the self-
administration capacity of woreda government officials and staff (Worku, 2005). 
The recording and accounting systems have also been improved as part of the financial 
reform process. A new chart of accounts has been introduced, based on a double-entry 
and modified-cash accounting system, It is anticipated that this will facilitate a more 
complete picture of expenditure than the previous single-entry cash accounting system.  
Another fundamental reform has been the adoption of single pool finance system in 
woreda administrations of the region. The single pool finance system enables all 
treasury funds to be managed through a single bank account and all accounting and 
reporting activities to be handled at a single location. The regional government has 
implemented this with the aim of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of 
reporting, the use of scarce human resources, service delivery, cash management and 
control across all the sectors of woreda administrations (Muhammed, 2006).  
Procurement procedures have also been overhauled, with the introduction of open 
bidding systems and tighter controls. The internal audit system has also been reformed, 
with the previous system of pre-audit inspection and verification being replaced by a 
new post-audit and sample based system. Manuals have been prepared, and in-service 
training has been provided, to guide woreda officials in implementing these new 
systems. A clarification of the roles and duties of officials has also been undertaken, 
together with the reshuffling of personnel, to ensure that appropriate financial personnel 
systems are in place. 
Generally, it can be argued that such incremental reforms were justifiable, given the 
organizational, institutional and manpower capacity limitations of woreda 
administrations. However, most of them were introduced at the time of the 
decentralization process, and have not been followed during the past ten years by 
further reforms (such as the introduction of a MTEF framework or the introduction of 
the kind of New Public Finance Management reforms discussed earlier in this thesis. 
Discussants in the experts FGDs in all the case woredas indicated that quite a number of 
the reforms that were originally contemplated (in areas such as planning, budgeting, and 
evaluation) were later put aside. They mentioned that reforms have been successfully 
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sustained only in areas such as recording, accounting, cash management and financial 
reporting. However, their real impact of these reforms on woreda financial governance 
has yet to be fully examined. As indicated earlier, this chapter attempts to present an 
analysis of the impact of the reforms in the budgeting system on the financial 
governance of woreda administrations. The next chapter (Chapter 7) will provide an 
assessment of the impact of reforms in recording and accounting, cash management, 
procurement, and internal and external auditing.  
6.3 BUDGETING REFORMS AND WOREDA FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE 
6.3.1 Planning in Woreda Administrations 
Discussions about local budgeting are only meaningful if placed in the broader context 
of planning. The role of budgets is to translate the socio-economic priorities of local 
communities as identified in the development plan into financial allocations and 
utilization. This can only happen effectively if an appropriate planning system exists, 
and there is a systematic link between plans and budgets. Before turning to an analysis 
of the budgeting systems in the Amhara region, it is therefore important to look at the 
planning practices in woredas. 
6.3.1.1 Planning Process in Woreda Administrations 
During the pre-decentralization period plans were prepared by sector offices at the zone 
administration level and sent to their counterpart at woreda level. Therefore, woreda 
administrations were destined to prepare only implementation plans. But now, as part of 
the district level decentralization process, the procedure followed in the planning 
process has been overhauled. Consequently, woredas are now responsible for the 
formulation and implementation of their own five year strategic socio-economic 
development plans, as well as the annual plans derived from them. Moreover, woredas 
are required in the planning processes to take account of the interests and priorities of 
local citizens by incorporating into their own plans (by incorporating the plans from 
kebele administrations and service delivery units). The strategic plan for woreda 
administrations is prepared by a planning committee (often a task force composed of, in 
most circumstances, representatives of each sector office and coordinated and chaired 
by WOFED). The formulation of the strategic plan involves not only the identification 
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of development activities to be carried out in the five year period, but also an estimation 
of expenditures required in the given period to guide the annual budget.  
After the strategic plan is prepared, each sector office in woreda administrations has an 
important role in the process of annual plan preparation. Sector offices are designated to 
prepare their annual sectoral plan under the framework of the strategic plan, taking in to 
account the service delivery units plan and kebele administrations plan. After plans from 
each sector offices are collected, a consolidation is made at the woreda Office of 
Finance and Economic Development (WOFED). In fact, here a planning committee to 
handle all these tasks is also formed. But it has to be noted that the committee is an ad 
hoc committee and its role is limited to consolidating the woreda plan. In addition to its  
coordinating and technical advisory role in consolidating the woreda plan, WOFED is 
permanently responsible for providing technical assistance and ensuring that plans 
prepared at various sector offices, units and levels follow the appropriate planning 
structure and process.  
The consolidated plan of the woreda should then be submitted to Woreda 
Administrative Council (the highest executive body in the woreda) for review. If 
improvements and revisions need to be made, these are referred back to WOFED and 
the planning committee. The plan is then approved by the Woreda Council. The Woreda 
Council being the highest political body in woreda and has the ultimate responsibility 
for ensuring that the targets in the plan are feasible and in line with the needs of the 
people. 
Hence, in principle, the general features of the reforms in the district level planning 
process (such as a bottom up approach; strategic planning; woreda sector offices 
autonomy to prepare their plan; plan consolidation by WOFED and approval by the 
Woreda Council) are in line with what are generally acknowledged to be the 
requirements for self-governing district level decentralization.  
However, the relationship of such planning processes in woreda administrations to 
budgeting can be identified only through a detailed evaluation of each of the planning 
practices.  
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6.3.1.2 Planning Approaches in Woreda Administrations 
As noted above, woreda administrations are responsible for the formulation and 
implementation of both longer-term strategic plans and annual plans. In doing so, they 
are required, at least theoretically, to follow a bottom-up planning approach, whilst at 
the same time ensuring that their plans conform broadly to the policies and development 
priorities and goals of the regional and federal governments. 
 Planning from below 
Although woredas are supposed to follow a bottom-up planning approach, it was 
demonstrated in Chapter 5 above that, in practice, they have often struggled to find the 
right balance between plans from below and regional plans and targets (plans from 
above). Because of interference from the zone administrations, woreda plans are often 
biased towards the priorities of the regional government rather than needs of the people 
expressed in the kebele plans. 
This bias has not only been the result of the way in which the current system of 
intergovernmental relations tends to operate in practice as presented in detail in Chapter 
5, but also due to a number of internal challenges in the district level planning process. 
For instance, one of the factors mentioned by heads of woreda education offices for  
ignoring school level plans is due to the fact that woreda education offices suspect that 
school directors and teachers intentionally understate their plans. The same is true in the  
case of health posts/centres. All of the interviewed heads of woreda sector offices 
argued that officials at the service delivery unit level do not want to get into trouble by 
setting high level targets for themselves. They therefore tend to targets that can quite 
easily be met. This is because they think that their careers depend on the evaluation by 
the woreda administration of their performance in meeting such targets. It is ironical 
that while such local level officials are supposed to set targets through a process of 
consultation with the people, their performance is evaluated by their respective sector 
offices not by the people.  
Another reason for service delivery units setting relatively easy targets and goals is 
because they suspect that the kinds of higher level targets required by the regional 
government are politically motivated, over ambitious and unrelated to the actual 
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challenges on the ground. As noted in the previous chapter, local people are often not 
convinced of the quality of the services provided by the woredas, and, where they have 
the choice and the means, prefer to use private education and health facilities rather than 
those provided by the government. Under such circumstances, setting ambitious targets 
for service usage would almost inevitably result in underachievement. Much more 
clearly needs to be done to improve the level of service provision, as well as to raise 
popular awareness about the kinds of services provided. Without an increase in the 
levels of popular awareness about such services, as well as popular confidence and trust 
that they will be effectively delivered, ensuring genuine interest amongst the people in 
participating in the planning processes is likely to remain a pipe dream. According to 
the perceptions of all the expert focus groups discussants, a related factor in promoting 
genuine forms of bottom-up planning and accountability is the fact that citizens and 
communities are aware that ambitious targets for service delivery are unlikely to be met 
because of budget shortages and constraints. This is why they do not challenge the 
relatively low targets put forward by the kebele level officials. 
Strategic Planning in Woreda Administrations 
As explained earlier, woreda administrations have adopted the use of medium strategic 
planning following the implementation of district level decentralization in the region. 
However, given the competency limitations in many woredas, there are doubts about 
how well and carefully the strategic plans are prepared, as well how effectively the 
annual plans are linked to them. The head of education office at Mekiet Woreda, for 
example, indicated that heads of woreda offices and their planning experts do not have 
the necessary qualifications, skills and training to prepare such complex plans.  
Besides such competency problems, several other reasons were mentioned in the 
interviews and focus group discussions for limitations in the strategic planning 
processes and the link between strategic and annual plans. The first reason has to do 
with the challenges of preparing strategic plans in circumstances where there is a lack of 
predictability about the activities to be carried out by donors. Preparing an integrated 
strategic plan requires first acquiring information concerning the possible sources of 
finance from both government and donor agencies. However, while those activities to 
be carried out with finance from government sources are fairly predictable, at least 
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based on past trends, woreda administrations rarely have access to complete 
information as to what activities donors have planned to carry out in their woreda. In 
most cases, donor funded programs are arranged at the federal level and come down to 
woreda administration through the respective regional government. There are limited 
opportunities for woreda administrations to know in advance which activities will be 
carried out by donors and how much funding will be made available.  Thus, woredas 
tend to simply put activities and targets to be accomplished in their strategic plans 
without identifying which of them are to be financed from government sources and 
which of them from donors funds. A strategic plan prepared in this manner is not much 
more than a wish list of targets that are thought to be reflective of the regional 
government targets.  
In this situation, it is hard to say the strategic plan is a valuable document for the 
preparation of annual plans, and the attempt to link it up with annual plan is just a token 
effort. The discussants in the experts FGDs mentioned that the attempt by the planning 
division in WOFED to a certain whether the preparation of annual plans was consistent 
with the five years strategic plan has not been an easy task. In general, despite the fact 
that considerable proportions of development activities carried out in the woredas are 
being supported or directly operated by donors, the lack of information about the 
availability and extent of donor support, as well as the lack of a systematic method of 
integrating donor plans and performance with those of woreda administrations, means 
that effective forms of both strategic and annual planning is problematic.  
All of the interviewed heads of the woreda sector offices, as well as discussants in the 
expert FGDs, unanimously agreed that targets in the strategic plans have never been 
seriously considered and followed in the preparation of annual plans. Even if the heads 
of offices in the woredas are keen to align their annual plans with the strategic plan of 
the woreda, they find it extremely difficult to obtain information about which part of the 
activities will be implemented by their office and which part by the donors.  
According to the head of education office at Mekiet Woreda, another planning 
challenge is the high rate of turnover of the politically appointed heads of various 
offices in the woredas. Due to the frequent reshuffling caused by the restructuring of 
woreda administrations, or for essentially political reasons, many heads of offices rarely 
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stay in office for more than a year. In most cases, they transfer from one office to 
another, or are given promotion to higher level positions. This has proved a major 
challenge, because implementing strategic plans through their derived annual plans 
needs relatively stable management. Implementing officials need to be familiar with 
what has been planned in the strategic plan, and capable of following up and evaluating 
consistently whether their offices are heading towards the achievement of the plan 
targets. In the current situation, however, senior woreda officials are more likely to give 
more importance to the day to day and seasonal activities imposed from above than to 
their own long term development objectives contained in the strategic plan.  
Another factor, related to the high rate of turnover of senior officials; that contributes to 
the weak link between annual and strategic plans, is the improper handover of 
documents by the outgoing officials to the incoming ones. The replacement of officials 
in the woredas is often made in a state of hastiness. Outgoing officials are often 
reluctant to hand over the appropriate information to their successors, either because of 
time constraints or because they do not want to make it easy for their successors 
perform more effectively than they have. Incoming officials also often do not seriously 
enquire about a proper handover of information, as most of them do not know how the 
handover process is supposed to take place. Moreover, they know that their success in 
their new positions will depend more on their achievement of politically motivated 
targets imposed by the regional government than the priorities and goals set out in the 
strategic plan. There is often no attempt made to enforce proper handover by anybody in 
the woredas. Since officials are typically removed, transferred, or promoted for political 
reasons rather than their performance in office, little effort is made by the woreda 
governments to evaluate their performance in office and the extent to which strategic  
planning targets have been achieved. This means the incoming officials often lack the 
one of the necessary information to discharge their responsibilities effectively.  
For instance, the planning expert in the WOFED of Shebel Berenta Woreda and the 
planning expert in the education office of Bahirdar Zuria Woreda explained that, 
following their appointment, they could not find the strategic plans prepared for the 
period 2006/07-2009/10, even though these were clearly needed for the evaluation of 
performance and for the preparation of the next five years strategic plan. Therefore, the 
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incoming officials often opt either to prepare their own plan or continue from the 
recently annual plan of the outgoing officials.  
Finally, it is worth noting that, with the exception of Mekiet, none of the woredas  have 
carried out an effective evaluation of the performance of their strategic plans. According 
to the FGD discussion with officials in Mekiet, an evaluation was carried out by the 
Woreda Administrative Council, but it was found that there was a positive deviation 
between the plan and the actual performance, and there was little or no link between the 
strategic and annual plans. 
Link between Plan and Budget  
One of the arrangements to insure the link between plans that are basically thought to be 
driven from strategic development targets and budget is through medium term 
expenditure plans. These have not been introduced as yet in the Amhara region. Instead, 
expenditure estimation is made for the five years strategic plan of the woredas. 
However, such expenditure estimations in the strategic plan have not proved very useful 
in linking woreda development policy initiatives with the annual plan and budget. The 
following graph (figure 6.1) clearly shows a huge deviation between the expenditure 
plan in the strategic plan and the actual budget in Bahirdar Zuria and Mekiet 
woredas.(The researcher was able to find the strategic plan of only two woredas. Shebel 
Berenta’s strategic could not be found and Debremarkos City strategic plan did not 
include an expenditure plan). As it can be understood from the graph, Mekiet Woreda in 
2005/06, 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09 and 2009/10 respectively has been able to secure 
only 25%, 28%, 38%, 41%, and 46% of the funds they needed to achieve the targets in 
the strategic plan. The budget the woreda has secured is far below the required amount 
and this is an indicator of a huge gap between strategic expenditure plan and actual 
annual expenditure. There is also a wide gap between in Bahirdar Zuria. The graph 
shows 58%, 53% and 71% in 2005/06, 2006/07 and 2007/08 respectively which are 
below the strategic plan estimations. However, in 2008/09 and 2009/10, Bahirdar Zuria 
Woreda secured 172% and 188% of the estimated budget. This was due to the Local 
Investment Grant (LIG) fund (a Wold Bank fund) that has allocated budget for capital 
budget investments since 2008. In any case, the data shows that the expenditure plan in 
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the five year strategic plan is not reliable as a basis to determine the annual expenditure 
budget. 
Figure 6.1: Annual woreda actual expenditure across years as percentage of the 
expenditure estimation of the strategic plan 
 
Source: Own Calculation from Woredas’ Budget Data of Various Years  
 
This is due to various reasons. The first reason relates to limitations in the preparation, 
appropriateness and implementation of the strategic plan. As discussed earlier, the 
strategic plans in the case study woredas are in general not well prepared, documented, 
and followed properly. Nor are they evaluated regularly. That is to say the activities 
included in the strategic plan are not reflected appropriately in the annual plan.  
Even if we assume that strategic plans have been prepared and followed properly, 
woreda officials and experts do not have the required information, competency and 
commitment to prepare realistic strategic expenditure plans. They severely lack 
information about future macroeconomic variables such as inflation, possible sources of 
finance, and exact cost of activities to be carried out in the period. Expenditure 
estimation without obtaining information about such factors is highly likely to be 
unrealistic. Besides, the capacity and commitment of staff members currently is not 
currently capable of enabling them to systematically estimate the expenditure for the 
strategic plan. Thus, it has been difficult to link the actual annual expenditures budgets 
with estimates of the strategic plan. 
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It is also important to examine the budget preparation process in each sector of the 
woredas to assess how budgets are linked to planned activities. Normally woredas 
follow an incremental method to estimate the cost of their planned activities. As will be 
discussed in the following section, estimation of the budget for the upcoming year is 
incrementally based on the previous year’s allocation. Such incremental budgeting 
estimation is essentially inconsistent with the essence of strategic medium term 
expenditure planning. 
6.4 BUDGET PREPARATION 
Budget preparation in the woredas theoretically begins when the first budget call letter 
from the regional government is received, usually in February (18
th
 February according 
to the budget calendar) (Appendix 1) to announce the temporary ceiling. The first call is 
made before the actual block grant to the regional government from the federal 
government is known, and is based on the previous year’s government revenue, foreign 
aid and loans. Up on receiving the first budget call from the BoFED, woreda 
administrations are supposed to make temporary allocations between their capital and 
recurrent expenditures on condition that these will be adjusted or revised up on the 
notification of the actual ceiling. Practically, however, the temporary ceiling has little 
purpose for budget preparation process. Basically, the WoFED and other woreda sector 
offices in the case study woredas do not do substantial work based on the temporary 
budget ceiling. Most of them do not even pay attention to it and just file it. Others, such 
as the WoFED in Shebel Berenta use it for some preparatory work, including the 
preparation of ledgers. Interviewees in Mekiet and Bahirdar Zuria stated that the 
temporary ceiling lets them know roughly the extent of the increments that can be 
expected based on the previous year’s budget. 
A few days before the budget ceiling data is distributed by the regional government, the 
required data to be used by the BoFED for the upcoming year’s block grant formula is 
also supposed to be sent. This relates to the personnel establishment and salary levels in 
the various woredas, together with the previous year’s budget execution. This has been 
discussed in detail already in the previous chapter.    
In practice, however, all of the interviewees and discussants in the experts’ FGDs 
agreed that budget preparation in the woreda governments practically begins when the 
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second budget call announcing the actual budget is received. This is supposed to happen 
on 17 May, but in practice usually happens in July or early August. The actual budget 
ceiling typically contains information about the total budget for the year, the sources of 
the fund, areas that the woreda should prioritize in the allocation of the budget, and  
financial rules and regulations that various bodies in the woredas should be reminded of 
in the process of budget allocation and implementation. The amounts to be transferred 
from the region, to be collected from own revenue, to be transferred from donor aid, and 
to be acquired through loan arrangements are also indicated. The budget ceiling 
announced is in the form of a lump sum, except for earmarked program based funds 
from donors.  
Thus, the moment the WoFED of woredas receive it, they pass it to every sector offices 
instructing them to prepare and submit their budgets for the new fiscal year. In this 
process, the woreda sector offices have the task of adjusting their work plans to the 
budget ceiling, determining the cost of activities in the work plan, and completing the 
standard format for the submission of their budget request. Budget preparation by each 
sector office is made differently. For instance, in Bahirdar Zuria, Debremarkos and 
Mekiet Woreda health and education offices, where they have experienced staff in their 
planning offices, the planning officers actively involved in the computation of the total 
budget needed to carryout activities specified in their plan. Whereas in Shebel Berenta 
Woreda, where there is lack of experienced staff in their planning sections, the three 
deputy heads of the sector and division heads are responsible for the computation of 
their budgets. Sector budget requests are submitted in lump sum and are not allocated to 
individual budget line items. 
Upon the receipt of each sectorial budget request, the WOFEDs of the woredas  analyse 
and consolidate these into a single woreda comprehensive budget proposal and present 
it to the Woreda Administrative Council (Cabinet). Therefore, the power to closely see 
the details and decide on the appropriation of the budget among sector offices resides 
with the cabinet. The cabinet is a standing committee where each of sector offices is 
represented by their heads, and is chaired by the Chief Administrator. Tough  
discussions, debates and negotiations take place in the cabinet meetings. However, 
before the budget is presented to the cabinet, it is supposed to be reviewed by the budget 
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hearing committee whose members are assigned by the chief administrator.Recently, 
however, such hearing committees have been omitted from the budget process.  
The budget appropriation made by the Woreda Administrative Council is also subject to 
review and approval of the Woreda Council, though practically no change is expected 
from it. Upon approval of the council, the WOFED notifies the actual budget 
appropriated to each of the sectors instructing them to make allocations to each budget 
item accordingly. The mandate to make such allocation is given to each sector office to 
provide them with some flexibility in the utilization of their budget. In normal 
circumstances, budget allocation is made only once at the beginning of every fiscal 
year. Once approved by WOFED, the respective office is bound, at least in theory, to 
implement as planned. Monthly allocated cash flows and action plans must be submitted 
and approved by WOFED. This process is supposed to be completed by 25
th
 July of the 
new budget year. However, in all woredas, due to the delays noted earlier, this rarely 
takes place before September. 
Thus, despite the fact that the time available for preparation of the budget in woreda 
administrations is clearly specified (with the primary purpose of giving woreda 
administrations adequate time to prepare their budget systematically) in the budget 
calendar adopted as part of the reform process, the officials in the FGDs in all the 
woredas indicated that woreda administrations were not able to comply with the budget 
calendar. The calendar gives about three months to carryout activities between the 
actual budget notification and sector office budget allocation. Nonetheless, as discussed 
earlier, the time available for woreda administrations to prepare their budget is often 
squeezed into less than two months. In addition, the time for the completion of budget 
preparation is often pushed back by as much as two months (from 25
th
 July to the end of 
September). The short time period available for sector offices to allocate their budget 
among budget results from the fact that the allocations made following the 
announcement of the temporary budget ceiling are not really serious. The actual 
allocation made before the notification of the approved budget to the sector therefore 
tends to be highly overstated, and is intended largely for budget debate in the cabinet 
(this will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections of this chapter). The actual 
allocation in the sector offices is made after the approved budget is notified by 
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WOFED. Thus, the actual time available for this allocation is often not more than a 
week. The short time period for the budget allocation process is due not only to the 
delay in the announcement of the actual budget ceiling (block grant), but also to 
weaknesses in the strategic plan and its expenditure estimates to guide the annual 
planning and budgeting processes. If the strategic plan was the main guiding document, 
and there was a strong link between this plan and the annual planning and budgeting 
processes, sector offices would not be so likely to have difficulty in beginning serious 
budget allocation when the temporary budget ceiling is notified.  
6.4.1 Inter and Intra-Sector Budget Appropriation/Allocation   
As already mentioned, the allocation and computation of budgets to each sector, as well 
as to each budget item, within sector offices effectively begins when the actual budget 
ceiling is received from the region. The allocation of budgets basically follows an 
incremental system using line item budgeting. Therefore, sector offices in woreda 
administrations start estimating and allocating budgets to each budget items in their 
sector offices, as all interviewed heads of sector offices indicated, often using three 
types of information. The first is the budget ceiling that is indicative of the extent of the 
increment they can expect on each budget item of their last year’s budget. The second is 
their sectoral budget performance for last year, and the third is the work plan of their 
offices. Thus, based on these indicators, they estimate the amount of fund to be 
allocated to each item of budget. They are also supposed to make necessary adjustments 
in their planned activities so as to fit the budget ceiling.  
However, despite such formal requirement, unrealistic budget requests by the sector 
offices are often made without due regard to the budget ceiling of the woreda. The  
intention behind this is typically to try and take up the largest slice of the woreda budget 
for their sector. This naturally creates difficulties for Woreda Cabinets in determining 
and approving the budget appropriation between sector offices and has almost become a 
tradition in the budget request process in many of the woreda governments. The head of 
the education office in Bahirdar Zuria Woreda mentions three reasons for such  
exaggerated budget requests. The first reason is related to excessively sector-oriented 
rather than woreda wide socioeconomic development attitudes on the part of the heads 
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of sector offices. They want to achieve high levels of performance in their own sectors 
by motivating for a disproportionately excessive slice of total woreda budget. 
Many sector offices insist, nevertheless,  that the budget they request is not exaggerated, 
when compared to the responsibilities they shoulder and the scope and size of activities 
they plan to accomplish. The only practical choice would be to make changes in the 
scope of their work plans, but this is not easy given the pressure they are under from the 
regional/zone administrations to achieve unrealistic high performance targets. An 
attempt to achieve such targets without adequate budgeting is likely to lead not only to a 
poor quality of service but also poor work relationship in their sectors. Currently, sector 
offices are not able to pay employees the appropriate per diem and refund transportation 
costs employees incur when they travel for fieldwork. It is a common practice in all 
sector offices, except those supported by donors, to pay a maximum of three days per-
diem in a month irrespective of the number of days they travelled. Thus, they argue that 
the budget they request is genuine, although it may well not be realistic with respect to 
the funds available in the total woreda budget ceiling.  
The second reason is related to the attempt to secure a bargaining position in the cabinet 
budget dialogue process by letting others know that their sector needs in fact a huge 
financial resource to discharge its responsibilities effectively. There is a widespread 
believe among the woreda sectors that if the sector requests lower and more realistic 
budgets, it would get much less than what it needs or deserves. There is always a 
deduction from the budget request no matter how realistic and fair the request is. 
Therefore, sector offices often intentionally inflate their budget requests.  
The third reason is to use budget shortages (which will be inevitable given the inflated 
requests submitted) as an excuse for possible unsatisfactory performance. The sector 
offices would not have sufficient justification for their failure to achieve their targets if 
they received the full amount of budget they requested.  
All of the interviewees confirmed that all sector offices always make exaggerated 
budget requests. As a result, the budget allocation discussions in the Woreda 
Administrative Council are typically characterised by unprecedented strong arguments 
and debates among cabinet members, unprecedented because council discussions on 
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other issues ends to be a much more harmonious affair. The various sector offices try to 
convince each other as to why their sector should be given priority in the budget 
appropriation. Sectors sometimes group themselves into factions in fighting such battles 
in the administrative council. 
6.4.2 The Process of Budget Appropriations between Sector Offices 
The budget appropriation process in the Administrative Council (Cabinet), as all 
interviewees agreed, begins with compulsory expenditures. Therefore, the first 
appropriation that is relatively the easiest to decide is that of payroll.  The amount of 
budget for payroll in each sector depends on the number of employees working in the 
sector offices and their remuneration for the year. In all woredas, overwhelmingly the 
largest proportion of the budget is taken by payroll. In most cases, this leaves relatively 
little for other forms of expenditure, both operational and capital. 
The appropriation of the capital budget in most cases is based on previous decisions in 
the planning phase. Priority decisions for capital investments are often made by the 
administrative council in the plan review process and in most cases are based on 
instructions from and agreements with the regional/zonal government offices. The 
capital budget generally receives the smallest share of government finance. The 
majority of capital budgets in the woreda administrations are therefore by donors. As 
noted earlier, donor funding is in most cases earmarked for specific capital programs 
and projects, leaving little influence in the matter to the Woreda Administrative 
Councils. For this reason, there is generally little dispute or complaints from the sector 
offices in the woredas over the appropriation of the capital budget. Additional capital 
expenditure may take place, however, usually in the third or fourth quarter of the year, 
providing there are unused budget items in the woreda budgets that can be used for such 
purposes, or if additional transfers are approved and released from the regional 
government. 
With respect to operational budgets, there is currently no method of objectively 
appropriating operating budget to sector offices. Therefore, as the discussions in the 
interviews and FGDs demonstrated, appropriation decisions are exposed to the 
influence of dominant individuals or groups. Not surprisingly, all of the heads of sector 
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offices interviewed complained about the appropriation of operating budgets, and 
claimed that shortages in operational funds were one of the main reasons for not 
meeting planning targets.  
Although the financial rules and regulation of the region do not allow for contingency 
expenditures, it is also a common practice amongst all the case woreda governments 
that the Administrative Council keeps some portion of the budget for contingency 
expenditures, either in the woreda administration office or in the WoFED account.  
6.4.3 How Fair and Appropriate is the Budget Appropriation among Sectors? 
All of the officials surveyed in this research believed that pro-poor sectors are given 
priority over other sectors in the allocation of budget in their woredas. Despite such pro-
poor budget appropriation, sector offices still complain that the total budget for the 
woreda and their sector is far below the required amount to undertake all the planned 
activities. They feel it is the overall budget shortage in their woredas that has hindered 
their offices efforts to achieve the targets set.  
However, the head of the education office at Shebel Berenta Woreda feels his office has 
been discriminated against in the appropriation, as it gets less than 50% of the woreda 
budget. In the other woredas the education sector usually receives at least 50% of 
woreda budget. The argument between the sectors offices particularly over operational 
budget allocation seems never ending. All of the heads of education offices (except in 
the case of Mekiet Woreda which receives approximately 53% of the woreda budget) 
complain about the unfair appropriation between sectors. They believe that their sector 
is discriminated against, particularly with respect to operational budget appropriation. 
They argue that other sectors, such as health, agriculture and rural water, are being 
supported by donor funds, whereas this is not the case with respect to education. 
On the other hand, the heads of health and rural water supply offices are of opinion that 
their offices are not getting what they need or deserve, because they are also in receipt 
of donor support. They argue that the reduction in their operational budget is often  
much larger than the budget support they get from donors. In addition, donor funds are 
often earmarked for capital expenditure, with the expectation that the woredas will 
cover the associated operational expenses. Donor funds, of course, come in various 
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forms: some of them cover only the capital budget (as indicated above); some have 
earmarked budgets over which woreda officials have little or no say; whilst others leave 
the discretion over allocation of budget between capital and recurrent budget for woreda 
sector offices (though this latter variation is not very common). 
The head of rural water supply at Mekiet Woreda argued that those donor funds which 
come through the regional government are often earmarked only for capital expenditure. 
This was with the presumption that the construction work would be given to private 
contractors. However, given the relatively small funds available, this approach has 
typically failed to lead to the construction of the number of water points planned. The 
woreda realized, therefore, that the donor funds could be utilized more efficiently if it 
buys the construction material itself and hires local artisans to carry out the work. This 
has helped the woreda to significantly increase water supply coverage in the district. 
However, there has nevertheless been a difficulty in ensuring the appropriate amount of 
operational funds to support such projects, as these were not covered by the donors. The 
operational budget allocated from the government treasury has not been adequate to 
cover such operational expenses, forcing the  woreda to re-allocate operational funds 
from other budget lines. 
The head of rural water supply in Bahirdar Zuria mentioned an incident that reveals 
how donors fund might require even additional operational budget allocations from the  
government treasury. The head explained that his office has faced operational budget 
deficits due to the woreda’s failure to allocate the matching fund required to undertake 
projects supported by the donors. According to the agreed arrangement with the donor, 
to support water point constructions in the woreda, the woreda government was 
supposed to provide matching funds for such operational expenses as fuel, vehicle 
repair and maintenance, per diems, training and stationery. However, it proved difficult 
in practice to access such additional funds, due in particular to the perception amongst 
the members of the Woreda Administrative Council that the rural water supply office 
already had more than sufficient donor funds to cover such expenses. 
In general, therefore, all of the sector offices (with the exception of the health offices) 
complained about the inadequacy of their operational budgets, irrespective of the 
amount of donor funds received. In particular, they complained that the shortage of 
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operational funds has forced them to curtail expenditure, for example by paying 
employees a maximum of four days per diem per month, even though many of them 
were away from the office for much longer periods. This has caused a lot of discontent 
among their employees.  
However, unlike the case in other sector offices, health projects funded by donors have 
usually received a relatively large proportion of funds for operational expenditures. This 
is because many of the activities carried out by donor funded programs are not 
significantly different from the planned regular activities of the health offices. These are 
activities that do not involve major capital investment and are in the areas of family 
planning, child health and nutrition, vaccination, maternal health, and HIV/AIDS 
related activities and so forth. Therefore, as the head of health office at Bahirdar Zuria 
explained, his office integrates its own activities with those funded through different 
donor programs. The operational budgets that the donors allocate can be used also to 
carry out the activities of both the donor program and the normal activities of the sector 
office. Had the fund from donors not been available, the operational budget allocated 
from the government treasury would not have been adequate to cover more than three 
months of their operational expenditures in the budget year.  
This is why most heads of sectors (except health) and the deputy head of BoFED were 
of the view that donor support, whilst vital, has served in many ways to create an unfair 
distribution of funds between the different sectors in the woredas. The discussants in the 
expert FGDs raised another issue. This was that when donors did provide non- 
earmarked operational funds, these were often used wastefully. Such funds, it was felt, 
should be either earmarked or included in the treasury fund of the woreda, where their 
utilization could be supervised and monitored properly. Moreover, all the sector 
officials interviewed agreed that funding from the government treasury should not be 
cut with the presumption that this will be fully offset by donor funding. As noted in 
earlier sections in this study, donor funding is often unreliable, with promised funds not 
forthcoming or being released very late in the annual planning cycle. 
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6.5 BUDGET EXECUTION AND FOLLOW UP 
As has been discussed earlier, once the appropriation of the budget to each of the 
sectors has been approved, each of the sectors are required to submit their budget 
allocation by budget item alongside monthly action plans and cash flow plans. Although 
the practice varies slightly from one sector to another, such documents and plans are 
prepared following discussion by the management committee of the various sectors. 
The management committees comprise the deputy heads and heads of division in the 
sector, and are chaired by the head of the sector. The execution of budget effectively 
starts only when the submitted documents are approved by the Woreda Office of 
Finance and Economic Development (WOFED). 
Therefore, the responsibility of administering and checking if the disbursement requests 
from the sector offices are in line with the budget approved, as well as the cash flow 
plans and action plans, resides with WOFED. WOFED officials also have to make sure 
that sector budget requests are in compliance with the financial rules and regulation of 
the regional government. They are also responsible for producing and submitting 
periodical reports on the execution of budget to sector offices and the Woreda 
Administrative Council. On the other hand, the sector offices shoulder the responsibility 
for utilizing the budget appropriated to them in an efficient and responsive manner, and 
in line with financial rules, regulations and standards. Their disbursements are supposed 
to comply with their budget allocation and the monthly cash flow plan approved by 
WoFED.  
One of the arrangements that financial management systems in the woreda 
administrations use to ensure the proper utilization of budget by sector offices is the 
requirement that sector offices must present their monthly action plans and cash flow 
plans. However, compliance with this provision varies significantly from one woreda to 
another. In Mekiet Woreda and Bahirdar Zuria Woreda, the submission of action plans 
and cash flow plans is a strict requirement for the budget allocation to be approved and 
put in to effect. In Shebel Berenta Woreda, this was a strict requirement in the past but 
has now been relaxed, with the result that some sector offices have been spending their 
budget without submitting cash flow plans and action plans.   
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Sector offices are also responsible for monitoring the proper utilization of their budget 
based on the records they keep and the periodical reports they receive from WoFED. 
Transfers from one budget code (budget item) to another, on condition that revisions on 
the action plan and cash flow plan are made, are also made by sector offices. Whilst the 
authority to approve such disbursement requests always belongs to the head of the 
sector, other members of the staff in the sectors are usually involved in the process of 
budget utilizing, administering and monitoring in the sector offices.  
However, the extent of involvement of other members of the staff, such as members of 
management committee and other experts, in the process of implementing, 
administering and monitoring varies significantly from office to office. Initiatives for 
action on the budget often come from deputy heads (in Mekiet and Shebel Berenta 
Woreda education offices), and division heads (Mekiet Woreda health office and rural 
water supply office, Bahirdar Zuria education office and health office). Recording, 
filing and following up disbursements from the budget by sector offices is made only in 
offices which are relatively better-staffed and organized. The Bahirdar Zuria health and 
education offices are examples of the very small number of sector offices that have been 
able to properly shoulder this responsibility. The education and health offices in Mekiet 
and Shebel Berenta have separate planning offices but these are inadequately staffed. In 
Mekiet only 11% of the total required staff are in place in the planning division of the 
health office, and in Shebel Bernta only a third of the posts in the planning division in 
the education office are filled. Therefore, whilst the heads of the offices try to maintain 
record keeping, this process is not carried out effectively, partly because the heads have 
many other duties to attend to, and partly because of the lack of training and experience. 
Similarly, the heads of smaller offices, such as rural water supply, which do not have 
their own planning offices, also try to handle this duty themselves but not really 
effectively due to similar problems.  
All of the discussants in the expert FGDs argued that the practice of recording, keeping 
files and following up budgets by reconciling them with the regular budget execution 
reports from WoFED varies significantly depending on the commitment and skill of the 
head of the sector as well as the availability of well-staffed planning offices in the sector 
offices. They argued that since all of the heads of sectors are political appointees based 
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on only their political loyalty, they often have neither the experience nor the expertise to 
carry out such activities. Many of them have had little or no prior managerial experience 
before they took their positions, and little training is provided to develop the financial 
management capacity of woreda leadership. This concern was shared among some of 
the heads of sector offices as well. The head of the health office at Mekiet Woreda 
emphasised the need for financial management training or at least orientation especially 
for recently appointed officials. Similarly, the head of the education office at Shebel 
Berenta Woreda felt that many sector heads are carrying out their responsibilities   
based on individual intuition rather than professional expertise. The deputy head of 
BoFED also shared such concerns, and felt that the relative lack of experience of many 
of the sector heads was one of the main reasons for ineffective budget administration.  
Another problem mentioned by the discussants was the lack of attention and time paid 
to budget control. The discussants in the expert FGDs indicated that officials are overly 
burdened with political duties assigned from the top. They are unlikely, therefore, to 
give adequate attention and time to effective budget control, even if they had the 
expertise and experience to shoulder the responsibility. 
6.5.  Budget Out-turn 
Budget out-turn is a measure of the level of budget execution which is widely used to 
evaluate the efficacy of budgeting in sector offices as well as in the woreda 
administrations as a whole. In fact, it is the only type of report the WoFED produces to 
show how effectively the budget has been executed. It is one of the reports that the 
Administrative Council of woredas looks at in its quarterly evaluation. Generally, low 
budget out-turn indicates poor budget execution and a high level of budget out-turn 
indicates a better level of budget execution. Nonetheless, it is still a crude measure of 
measuring the efficiency effectiveness of budget execution. It only shows the extent of 
budget execution by computing the extent of deviation between plan and 
accomplishment. Despite its limited capacity, budget out-turn has been widely used in 
all woreda administrations to evaluate the performance of budget.  
As already discussed in detail in the last chapter, a low level of budget out-turn has not 
been a major concern for recurrent budgets in the case study woredas. But it has been a 
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problem in capital budgets and typical those funded by donors. The execution of 
budgets funded from the government treasury in general is much better than that of the 
donors. Several factors responsible for this were discussed in detail in the previous 
chapter. These revealed that the major problems in budget execution are not necessarily 
related with the absorptive capacity of woreda administrations. 
Low budget execution is not entirely related to problems associated with funding 
sources. It is also connected with limitations in the management of projects and their 
ability to complete on time. This is a typical problem with respect to construction 
projects. This is related with the capacity of both private sector and public sector to 
properly discharge their respective roles of complying with the contract and following 
up progress to make sure that the project is completed timely. With respect to private 
contractors, a variety of problems have been experienced in most of the woredas. In the 
first place, an adequate number of bidders might not appear, leading to tender notices 
having to be announced on several occasions, with obvious implications for completion 
times. In the second place, contractors sometimes interrupt their work or walk away in 
the middle of a project. This typically occurs when the work of the project confronts 
unexpected circumstances and incurs additional costs. If the woreda government is 
unwilling to fund such additional costs, the contractors sometimes cut their losses and 
walk away before the project is completed. 
From the side of woreda government, a major problem is the lack of capacity to follow 
up on the progress of projects and to take necessary remedial action when progress is 
found to be unsatisfactory. Most woreda offices have serious capacity limitation with 
respect to supervision and the follow up of development projects. All of the case 
woredas (with the exception of  Bahirdar Zuria) do not have site inspectors to shoulder 
this responsibility. Only the education and health offices at Bahirdar Zuria Woreda have 
their own site inspectors. But the head of education in Bahirdar Zuria still has 
reservation about the capacity of these inspectors to effectively carry out their work. 
The inspectors cannot always be present at all construction sites. There should also be  
follow up by teachers, school directors and the community. According to his 
explanation, his office has attempted to set up such structures at local level where 
construction has been going on. These involved school directors, kebele training boards, 
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and kebele administration officials. But such structures have not been as effective as 
planned, due their lack of appropriate know-how to follow upon progress and quality.  
6.5.2  Excessive Budget Transfer 
As stated earlier, in a situation where budget shortage is a primary concern for woredas; 
the level of budget out-turn is a crude measurement and cannot be an adequate indicator 
for the extent of the efficacy of budgeting or the proper execution of the budget. 
Woredas with budget shortages tend to use their budget fully. Therefore, it is important 
to look for other indicators that can indicate the proper execution of planned budgets. 
Budget transfer, in this case, can be a better means of measuring the execution of the 
budget.   
Budget transfer, in normal circumstances, is a tool used for efficiently utilizing the 
budget. As mentioned earlier, if there are certain funds that have not been used for the 
designated purpose, for whatever reasons, these can be transferred, subject to approval,  
from one budget item or sector to another. The Administrative Council is entrusted with 
the power to decide on the transfer of budgets from one sector to another based on the 
quarterly evaluation of budget execution. If a particular sector office does not use its 
appropriated budget and if there is an expectation among Woreda Administrative 
Council members that it will not be used before the end of the fiscal year, the 
administrative council has the power to transfer the funds to another sector. 
Furthermore, if there are funds kept as contingency funds, these could also be 
transferred with the approval of the administrative council, as could any additional 
subsidies received from the regional government. 
Budget transfers are made not only from one budget item to another but also from one 
sector to another for the reason that a surplus in one budget item/sector can be used to 
make up a shortfall in another. In the former case, the transfer is made by the head of a 
particular sector while, in the latter case, the chief administrator representing the 
administrative councils makes the transfer. All of the transfers made are subject to the 
provisions of financial rules and regulations. For instance, under no circumstances can  
transfers be made from capital budgets or payroll to operating budgets. Besides, 
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transfers prior to the modification of action plans and cash flow plans are strictly 
prohibited. 
 
In spite of the fact that such transfers are meant for using the budget efficiently and 
flexibly to accommodate unforeseen expenditures, if they are used excessively this can 
be an indication of undisciplined spending practice. The data presented in the earlier 
chapter showed that excessive budget transfer is prevalent in all case study woredas. 
Besides, all the interviewees and participants in all expert FGDs admitted that excessive 
budget transfer is prevalent in all case woredas. All sector offices, except the rural water 
supply and education offices at Bahirdar Zuria Woreda, admitted that they have made 
budget transfers on a regular basis, and that such transfers frequently constitute a 
significant percentage of the total budget spending of their sectors. The Amhara region 
Auditor-General (ARAG) Authority audit report of Bahirdar Zuria Woreda also noticed 
excessive budget transfer in the woreda administration.  
In fact, there have been efforts to limit the excessive use of budget transfers. 
Discussants at Mekiet Woreda mentioned that in the past they were not allowed to make 
budget transfers on more than four occasions per year. However, this often resulted in a 
significant proportion of the budget being unutilized. The former restriction was 
therefore subsequently revised and sector offices were then allowed to utilize their 
operational budgets without any limit (subject to the provisos regarding transfers from 
capital budgets and payroll noted above). However, this has created an enormous work 
burden particularly in WoFED. Thus, the woreda administration has now decided to 
limit budget transfers to between 1
st
 and 5
th
 of every month, yet still without any limit 
on the amount and number of times of budget transfer. Due to this fact, there still exists 
excessive budget transfer in the woreda. It was also noted in the previous chapter that 
the attempt by the Eastern Gojjam Zone Administration to curb excessive budget 
transfer in Shebel Berenta Woreda has failed.  
There are various factors mentioned by participants of FGDs and interviewees for the 
prevalence of excessive budget transfers. As discussants in the expert FGD at Mekiet 
Woreda stated, some of the main contributing factors include the lack of experience, the 
lack of due attention to and problems in the preparation of plans and budgets by the 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX: BUDGETING REFORM AND FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE IN WOREDA 
ADMINISTRATIONS 
  
189 
 
heads of sector offices, and the lack of attention and compliance to action plans. To 
begin with, it was mentioned that some of the heads of sector offices as well as their 
supporting staff do not have adequate knowledge or experience in budgeting. Thus, they 
sometimes arbitrarily put figures in the wrong budget items when preparing the budget 
for their sector. Consequently, it has not been uncommon for some sector offices to 
make disbursement requests from expenditure items for which they have never allocated 
any budget. Inexperienced staff members of the woreda cannot be expected to properly 
prepare and follow plans and budgets in their sector. The same thing applies for 
preparation of action plan. As stated in the FDGs and in the interviews, inexperienced 
heads of sector offices or supporting staff prepare monthly action plans and cash flow 
plans merely by dividing the total budget into twelve months, rather than on a realistic 
estimate of likely spending patterns related to the nature and timing of the work 
involved. All of the discussants agree that the existing shortage of experienced and 
trained staff is caused mainly by the high levels of turnover and the reshuffling of both 
officials and staff members.  
Excessive and often unnecessary budget transfers also result from the lack of effective 
political control and oversight of the budget planning and implementation processes. 
Cabinet members in the woredas spend most of their time travelling in the rural areas 
largely for political purposes. As they are political appointees, their attention is directed 
more to political duties rather than administrative ones. In addition they often are 
unwilling to delegate such administrative power to non-political staff members. Thus, 
they prepare plans and budget in haste, without due care and attention to prioritizing the 
activities planned and the determination of their costs. This has resulted in conspicuous 
deviation in the budgets allocated to different budget items between the plan and the 
actual situation. Thus, in order to correct this deviation they often have to make 
modifications in their action plans and cash flow plans and budget, entailing  transfer 
from one item to another.  
Another problem is the significance difference that frequently occurs between the 
budgets requested and those approved. Because of budget shortages, sector offices in all 
woredas argued that they rarely received what they requested. Over time this has led 
officials to be less careful in the preparation of their plans and budgets, particularly in 
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terms of linking plans with budgets. This situation has been exacerbated by the short 
time span for the preparation of budget, as noted in the previous sections of this study.  
Inflation is also another factor that has disrupted effective action planning and 
budgeting, thereby contributing to excessive budget transfer. There has not been any 
practical effort taken by woreda officials or from the regional government to enable  
budget estimations take in to account the prevailing inflation rate in the region/country. 
The budget preparation manuals issued by the regional/zone administrations provide no 
guidance on how to take projected increases in inflation into account. Given the high 
rates of inflation in recent years, this has led to major problems in operating within the 
budgets set. 
 
An additional problem highlighted by several of the respondents in the expert FGDs and 
interviews, concerned the tendency, noted above, for some sectors to obtain a 
disproportionate amount of the woreda budget allocation, largely because of the 
influence they have in the Administrative Council. Because of the relative large amount 
of operational budgets received, there is a tendency for such sectors not to allocate the 
amounts effectively or to monitor the actual spending patterns in line with action plans. 
In such a situation there is a natural tendency towards wasteful expenditure and the 
excessive use of budget transfers. 
Interviewees also mentioned that some operational budget items are quite often set aside 
as contingency funds to cover possible unplanned activities. Since the unpredictability 
of activities in their offices has been rising, they have opted to keep some funds in  
budget items such as stationery materials, training, office equipment maintenance and 
so forth, which are not likely to be fully spent and can therefore be made available to 
cover contingencies should they arise. Discussants in the experts’ FGD explained also 
that there are a number of budget items for which the sector offices have never incurred 
expenditure. However they keep allocating budgets to these items also for possible 
contingency purposes. Such practices, as most interviewees and all of the participants of 
the expert FGDs agreed, open an obvious loop hole for wastage and misuse. 
There are also unexpected expenditure incidents that might necessitate the transfer of 
budgets from one item or sector to another. The head of the health office at Bahirdar 
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Zuria explained that the unexpected incident of a serious Malaria outbreak in the 
woreda required the transfer of a large amount of resources from other budget items. 
The head of rural water supply at the same woreda also explained that budgeted items 
may sometimes be underspent due to the non-availability of the items that it was 
proposed to purchase. This was the case with respect to the purchasing of iodine, for 
example. Because supplies of iodine were extremely low in the country, it was not 
possible to access any, and the budget was therefore transferred to other budget items.  
6.6 SUMMARY 
The prime aim of this chapter is to present an analysis of the extent to which budgeting 
reforms (introduced as part of the public arrangements of financial management reform 
in the Amhara region), have served to promote effective forms of  decentralized 
financial governance in the case study woredas in the region. The reforms introduced to 
overhaul both the budgeting and planning processes have followed a ‘getting basics 
right first’ or an incremental approach. In the process a range of new initiatives and 
practices were introduced.  These included, amongst others, new  budget classifications 
and codes, a new budget calendar, and new procedures and roles for the  different 
organs involved in the planning and budgeting processes, including the linking of 
budgets with annual development plans, the role of the Woreda Council in budget 
approval, the introduction of a bottom-up planning and budgeting approach through the 
development and integration of kebele plans, and new practices for preparing cash flow 
plans and action plans. These reforms were designed to foster effective forms of 
autonomous district level financial governance, as part of the federal government’s 
move towards political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation.  
However the reform processes fell short of a number of other necessary elements for 
effective forms of self-governance at the woreda administration level, such as 
performance/program budgeting, zero-base budgeting and medium-term expenditure 
planning. In the place of these practices, woredas are still using line item budgeting, 
incremental budgeting, and rough expenditure estimates for strategic planning. 
Furthermore, despite the original idea that the implemented reforms would be 
incrementally followed by further reforms towards full-fledged budgeting reform, it was 
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clear from the evidence gathered by the study that none of the case woredas have 
introduced any new reform since the initial implementation. 
This chapter further attempted to present and discuss the effects of these incomplete 
reforms, as well as of their incomplete implementation. The findings indicate that,  
despite the reforms, a number of undesirable features of budgeting have been visible in 
the case study woredas. This include undisciplined budget execution, the excessive use 
of budget transfers by sector offices, the failure to compile accurate cash flow plans and 
action flow plans, disputes among sector offices over budget appropriation (or 
misappropriation), and serious budget shortages. Such weaknesses in budgeting can be 
attributed in part to the incomplete nature of the reforms, and in part to the lack of 
effective implementation in both the budgeting and planning processes.  
For instance, the failure to include the use of medium term expenditure plans in the 
reform process has made the linking of strategic plans with annual budgets problematic. 
That is why excessive budget transfers have become a common phenomenon in all case 
woreda sector offices, resulting in large part from the divergence between planned 
expenditure and the activities derived from the strategic plan. This has also been partly 
to blame for disputes over budget appropriation and complaints about unfair 
appropriations, as appropriations are not based on medium term expenditure plan. In 
this situation it is also difficult to say that budget allocation has been genuinely  
responsive to the needs or preferences of the people. Furthermore, because expenditures 
are estimated based on historical cost (incremental budgeting) rather than on the cost of 
activities to be carried out in the fiscal year, budget estimations are rarely  reflective of 
the real costs of planned activities (as there is no systematic link between plan and 
budget). This has contributed not only to excessive budget transfer but also to unfair 
budget appropriation among sector offices. Similarly, the experience of the case 
woredas shows that the failure to allocate budget items to performance/activities has 
made it difficult if not impossible to estimate the cost of performance/activities. This 
has caused a major deviation between the planned budget allocations and the actual out-
turn, that in turn has led to excessive budget transfers. Budget appropriations and 
allocations in this situation are unlikely to be a fair reflection of the planned targets.  
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Moreover, one of the reasons why woreda administrations do not prepare well-thought 
and systematic budgets is because budget preparation in woreda sector offices takes 
place in practice within a short period of time, much shorter in practice than the time 
allocation provided for by the regional government in the budget calendar. As noted 
earlier in this study, there have been a number of reasons for this, in particular serious 
delays in the announcement of the budget ceiling by the regional government. However, 
had performance budgeting and zero base budgeting been in place, as well as a medium 
term expenditure framework, sector offices would have been able to start the budget 
allocation to planned activities much earlier, deriving the information from the medium 
term expenditure plan instead of waiting for the announcement of actual budget ceilings 
by the regional government.  
In addition to weaknesses and shortcomings in the design of the financial 
decentralization framework, another important weakness has been failures of 
implementation. These have resulted in budgets in the case woreda administrations not 
being reflective of the activities to be accomplished or of the preferences of people, and 
not being executed as planned. There have been serious budget shortages in some 
sectors and wastage in others. Strategic plans have not been prepared, documented, 
followed, and evaluated properly in the case study woredas. Similarly, budgets have not 
been prepared or executed properly. Cash flow plans and actions plans have not been 
prepared seriously or followed properly. The findings indicate that such reform 
implementation failures are caused by a number of factors, including the lack of 
personnel and the lack of capacity and commitment amongst those officials and staff 
members that are in place. The findings of the study reveal, perhaps not surprisingly, 
that those sector offices with better manpower have generally performed much better in 
terms of planning and budgeting than those that have suffered from serious staff 
shortages. Moreover, in both the better and poorer staffed woredas, the competency 
levels of officials and staff members has in general been inadequate in terms of the 
preparation of annual plans and budgets. In most of the woredas, this situation has been 
compounded by the lack of managerial stability caused by the high levels of turnover 
and the successive reshuffling of woreda officials.  
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The findings in this chapter reveal that sector offices are reluctant, or lack the 
commitment, to properly prepare and follow up plans and budgets. In most cases this is 
due to the absence of appropriate administrative accountability arrangements. One of 
the main reasons why many officials and experts have not been sufficiently serious in 
the preparation and implementation of plans and budgets is because they are not 
evaluated based on the level of accomplishment of targets in the plan or budget. To a 
large extent, senior woreda officials tend to prioritize their political responsibilities over 
their administrative responsibilities. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: BUDGET IMPLEMENTATION AND  
CONTROL SYSTEM REFORMS AND 
THE FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE OF WOREDA 
ADMINISTRATIONS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Public financial management is not just a process of formulating a budget at the 
beginning of a year. It is also about the day to day activities to be carried out throughout 
the year to make sure that the planned budget is implemented in an efficient and 
economical manner for the intended purposes. Consequently, reforms in the public 
financial management system are intended not only to change the budget planning, 
allocation and appropriation processes but also to improve activities in the budget 
implementation process, such as budget execution, accounting and reporting activities, 
and external scrutiny. In Chapter 6, an assessment was presented of how reforms in 
budgeting process have impacted the local financial governance situation of woreda 
administrations in the Amhara region. This chapter is a continuation of the previous  
chapter, and focuses on an assessment of the adequacy and appropriateness of various  
reforms that have been introduced in the budget implementation process. These relate in 
particular to issues such as internal control, accounting systems and practices, cash 
management, procurement, internal and external auditing, and legislative scrutiny. 
To this end, this chapter begins by presenting an assessment of the efficacy of reforms 
in budget execution processes such as revenue assessment and collection, cash 
management, procurement and internal controls and auditing practices. This is followed 
by an assessment of the adequacy of reforms in accounting and reporting system, in 
particular in relation to their ability to provide reliable, timely and relevant financial 
information to be used for facilitating management and control functions. Finally, an 
assessment is undertaken of the efficacy of external auditing and legislative scrutiny in  
guarding against corruption and mismanagement, and facilitating efficient and 
accountable forms of budget implementation. 
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7.2 BUDGET EXECUTION ACTIVITIES 
The implementation of the planned budget involves basic activities such as mobilizing 
revenue, disbursing it for the intended purpose, acquiring supplies and services to 
deliver the intended services and ensuring these activities are carried out through 
efficient and economic spending of the finance. There are various activities that have to 
be carried out properly in order to get the planned budget properly implemented. 
Revenue has to be mobilized; cash has to be available and timely disbursed; supplies 
and services need to be procured; and all these activities have to be monitored and 
controlled to make sure that they are carried out properly. Therefore, the reforms 
intended to improve local financial governance have to incorporate activities such as 
revenue assessment and collection; cash management and disbursement; as well as 
procurement and internal control.  
It has already been discussed in detail in chapter two that the implementation of 
appropriate reforms in these activities helps to determine local financial governance. 
The deputy head of BoFED also stressed that the reforms undertaken by the government 
in woreda financial management systems, designed to improve budget implementing 
activities in general, were expected to play an important role in ensuring proper and 
economic spending and utilization of the budget, as well as minimizing the possibilities 
for corruption, embezzlement and the mismanagement of public resources in woreda 
administrations. However, he expressed doubt that such reforms might not be adequate 
by themselves to completely address such wrongdoings in public finance. Compliance 
with the rules, regulations and procedures might not necessarily guarantee the proper 
spending and use of public finance. Corruption and mismanagement may still take place 
without a formal violation of the established financial rules, regulations, procedures and 
processes. This is because there are still several loopholes that may allow public 
officials to manoeuvre public resource for their private gains.  
Participants in the community FGDs also suspected that officials could abuse public 
resource elusively under the cover of the complex formal financial processes that are 
hard for outsiders to understand. They mentioned, for instance, that procurement 
through falsely inflated prices (overbilling) and other forms of collusion with suppliers 
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(for example through the provision of fictitious invoices) are some of the most common 
forms of corruption that cannot easily be traced through internal financial process 
controls or by external auditors. Therefore, what seemed evident from the interviews 
and discussions was there were loopholes that could expose the woreda administrations 
to corruption, despite the existence of formal rules, regulations and internal control 
systems to prevent or discourage such activities. 
 Hence, it is not sufficient just to assess the appropriateness and adequacy of the reforms 
that have been put in place. It is also important to identify areas where further reforms 
are needed to ensure honest and effective financial governance.  
7.2.1 Revenue Assessment and Collection 
As already discussed earlier in chapter five, levying and collecting tax, based on the tax 
base and rate determined by the regional government, is a responsibility that lies within 
the jurisdiction of woreda administrations of the Amhara region. Hence, it is necessary 
to examine the revenue assessment and collection practices of woreda administrations, 
as these clearly have an impact on the efficacy of the budgeting and financial 
management processes and practices in woreda administrations. 
With the exception of Debremarkos, the tax paying businesses in the other case woredas 
are typically small scale businesses that are not required to present book of accounts or 
profit and loss statements. Because of this, the tax assessment process in these woredas 
follows two somewhat subjective methods. The first involves an estimation of business 
turnover by a committee that comprises members from the woreda revenue office and 
business community representatives. The second method is a flat rate levied on 
particular sectors such as grinding mills and transportation. In this case the amount of 
tax is determined by multiplying the flat rate by the numbers of grinding mill machinery 
or vehicles.  
However, not all businesses in rural woredas are small businesses. Discussants in the 
expert FGDs explained that there are a small number of businesses in the woredas 
whose annual revenue apparently exceeds 100,000 birr. These should therefore present 
books of accounts or profit and loss statements to the Inland Revenue Office for 
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taxation purposes. However, such businesses often fail to do so, essentially for two 
reasons. The first is the bureaucratic procedures that have to be followed which the 
businesses feel are unnecessarily complicated. The second and most important factor is 
their lack of capacity to produce such financial statements. The requirement that such 
businesses should submit a book of accounts prepared by qualified accountants was 
regarded as unrealistic by the business representatives in the community FGDs. They 
explained that they cannot afford to permanently hire accountants, nor are there any 
qualified accountants in their home town for them to hire on a part-time basis. The only 
choice they have is to collect invoices and bring accountants from nearby cities to close 
their monthly accounts. Such an alternative is not affordable by most of the businesses. 
Participants in the expert FGDs in all case woredas revealed their frustration about the 
widespread practice of concealing information about business operations with the 
intention of tax evasion. Such evasion exists, they believed, because of the lack of 
awareness among the people about the use and rationale of tax. However, the views of 
the discussants in the community FGDs were different. They explained that no one in 
their community objects to the essence of tax. They know that they have both a moral 
and legal obligation to pay tax to the government. This is supported by the data in 
Figure 7.1 below, which shows, amongst other things, that 72.5% of respondents 
believed that citizens have to pay tax properly to finance various development activities 
and public services. That implies that citizens are at least aware of the importance of tax 
paying for the development activities as well as service delivery in their surroundings. 
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Figure 7 1: Respondents' opinion as to how should development activities and public 
services to be financed  
 
Source: Field Survey: 2012 
 
Despite this, attendance at meetings arranged by the woreda administrations to raise 
awareness about tax paying is still very low. The revenue offices in the case woredas 
have a separate work unit for advocating, promoting and enhancing the awareness of tax 
payers, members of the business community in particular. However, discussants in the 
expert FGDs stated that the turnout whenever they call for a meeting has been 
extremely low.  Members of the business community, in particular, have shown little or 
no interest in participating in such meetings. Discussants in the community FGDs also 
admitted that they were no longer interested in taking part in such meetings, as they do 
not think they are relevant in solving existing problems in the taxation process. As one 
participant uttered “we have never understood each other, we tell them to stop the 
corruption, they give us explanation about the importance of tax and why we have to 
pay. We never questioned the importance of taxation”. Discussants maintained that 
none of the meetings organized have resulted in tangible results for combating 
corruption in the taxation process. 
The discussants in community FGDs admitted that, whilst they understood the rationale 
for paying tax, it was not uncommon for people to avoid or delay their tax payments. 
Percentage of respondents 
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Several reasons were put forward for this, from the perspective of rural peasants as well 
as the urban business community. Rural peasants blame the wrong timing of tax 
collection as the primary reason for the hesitation of peasants to pay tax. In most cases 
agricultural income taxes and land use fees are collected between December and 
January. There is no practice of distributing the amount to be paid over the whole year. 
Such an arrangement (involving the collection of a small amount of tax from a large 
number of peasants) would impose a major administrative burden on the woredas and 
kebeles. It is therefore administratively easier to confine the tax collection to a specific 
period of the year. 
This arrangement, however, is unsuitable for peasants. Rural peasants who live a hand-
to-mouth life have to wait until they harvest their crops and sell them at the market. The 
harvest time for seasonal rain dependent peasants is between December and January. 
Thus the timing of the tax collection used by the revenue office seems perfect but 
actually it is not. In most cases, when they take their harvest to market and pay their tax, 
they experience a considerable price fall. During this time, the demand for grain falls as 
all the peasants are bringing their supplies to market at the same time. Thus, participants 
in the FGDs indicated that peasants may well be reluctant to pay their tax, in most 
cases, unless forced and intimidated by kebele officers. They also indicated that  
economic deprivation might also not allow peasants to pay tax.   
In spite of the fact that revenue officers admit that the tax assessment process for 
agricultural income tax is problematic, most peasants are not critical of the tax 
assessment processes and procedures. They explained in the FGDs that they have never 
enquired about how the tax assessment processes actually work. They do not expect the 
kebele officers to explain the tax procedures because they think this is a complex 
process and cannot easily be comprehended by ordinary person like themselves. Though 
they would be happy if there is transparency in the taxation process, they do not have an 
intense desire to know how the process is determined. They can only judge how fair the 
tax was by comparing the current year tax to the previous year’s assessment, as well as 
comparing their own taxes to those of other fellow peasants.  
Discussants in the focus groups were asked if their willingness to pay tax has been 
affected by the level of transparency of the utilization of the government budget by the 
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woreda administrations. They indicated that this was not the case, since the tax they pay 
is seen as immaterial when compared to the amount of funds granted by higher levels of 
government and the donors. They did not think that it is logical to put the transparency 
of budget utilization as a prerequisite for paying tax. Instead they thought that it is 
always a requirement for citizens to pay tax regardless of the level of service the 
government provides.  
On the other hand, urban tax payers the majority of whom are business people have 
different views. For them, the main reason for reluctance to pay taxes is their suspicion 
that the tax assessment processes are subjective, dubious and exposed to corruption. 
One representative from business community in Mekiet Woreda explained furiously “I 
have never complained about the tax I paid but what has always been annoying me is 
the amount of tax some traders pay which is less than I paid while it was apparent that 
they have been making better business than I did”. The first cause of such inconsistency 
in the amount of tax levied has to do with bias and corruption. All the participants in the 
urban community FGDs agreed that the assessment processes were too subjective, 
giving rise to biased tax assessments that favoured some businesses over others. On the 
other hand, the revenue officers interviewed argued that this distrust in the integrity of 
the tax assessment procedures was based on perceptions rather than reality. It is not 
because there is bias or corruption in the tax assessment that people complain about the 
amount of tax they pay. Rather, it is because the assessment is somewhat subjective that 
lets them to believe there is corruption. Thus, the revenue offices explained that it was 
difficult to provide strong evidence to silence the critics, as the concerns about bias and 
corruption were based on feelings and perceptions rather than actual facts.  
In all woredas, tax assessment committees have been established with the intention of 
curbing possible corruption in tax assessment processes. These comprise members from 
both government offices and representatives from the business community. However, 
all of the discussants in the community FGDs, while acknowledging the theoretical 
importance of this arrangement, believed that the representatives on such committees do 
not have adequate information, power and dedication to prudently follow up and 
influence the tax assessment process. In the first place, the business community 
representatives are more interested in carrying out their own activities than wasting their 
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time in committee meetings. In the second place, there is an imbalance in information 
and knowledge between the business community representatives and government 
officers who are much better informed about taxation procedures, rules and regulations. 
The business community representatives therefore tend to follow whatever the officers 
say rather than attempting to influence decisions.  
A major problem associated with the payment of business taxes relates to the high 
incidence of informal businesses, many of which pay little or no tax at all. This has an 
obvious knock-on effect on the owners of more formal businesses, who wonder why 
they should pay tax, when most of their informal counterparts (some of whom are far 
richer) get away without paying. Discussants in the expert FGDs admitted that this was 
a major problem. They explained that measures had been taken to encourage informal 
businesses to register as formal businesses, but without much success. The revenue 
raising efforts of woreda governments has been severely limited to tax such businesses, 
many of whom play an intermediary role in the exchange process between buyers and 
sellers. Their businesses do not involve storing or exchanging visible goods and 
services, and most also do not have physical addresses. Consequently, tracking their 
business and the extent of their revenue is very problematic.  
This situation has brought about other repercussion. In particular it has encouraged 
business people in general to incline towards illegal or informal business activities. In 
an attempt to avoid taxation, some have defused their business to several of their family 
members, as well as to different shops and different stores. In turn, this has encouraged 
other businesses to follow a similar path. For many local businesses such practices have  
now become part of their business strategy to increase profitability.  
Urban dwellers were also asked in the FGDs if the lack of transparency in the utilization 
of government money has influenced their willingness to pay tax. While mentioning the 
importance of transparency and their desire to know how government resources are  
being allocated and utilized, they did not associate this with their willingness to pay  
tax. They insisted that they have been paying taxes even when there was no investment 
from the governments. Taxation for them is just taken for granted no matter how it is 
utilized. They do not think that development activities can be carried only with their tax 
contributions, and are aware that most revenue comes from the federal and regional 
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governments as well as from foreign donors. They therefore do not think that 
transparency in the utilization of government finance has been the primary factor in 
their willingness or unwillingness to pay their taxes. However, this does not mean that 
they are not interested in getting information about budget allocation and utilization. 
They did indicate, however, that they would be more willing to cooperate in the taxation 
process if they were convinced that the taxation process is fair and free from corruption. 
7.2.2 Disbursement and Cash Management 
The adoption of a single pool finance system has helped to bring all resources together 
into a single bank account. This arrangement often known as ‘single treasury system’ 
minimizes the chance for the accumulation of idle funds and shortages of cash for 
payment. It helps also to make disbursements according to the priority and timing of 
expenditure needs in the woreda. Thus, all the participants in the experts FGDs 
acknowledged the benefits that have been realized from this system in the financial 
governance of their woredas. However, some of the interviewed sector office heads 
indicated that their power to decide on their own sectoral budgets has been hijacked to 
some extent by WOFED due to this arrangement, especially when WOFED tries to 
force them to be abide by varies rules, regulations and procedures (for example the 
requirement that spending has to be according to cash flow plans). As noted earlier, 
sector offices often fail to respect such ordinances, due to a variety of planning and 
budgeting problems. Therefore, they think that the requirements that WOFED tries to 
enforce are not consistent with the existing reality. How, for example, are they to ensure 
that their spending is in line with cash flow plans, when annual plans and budgets have 
been neither carefully prepared nor followed? This indicates that their discontent has 
nothing to do with the single treasury system. It rather indicates their concern about 
deficiencies in the prerequisites that should have been in place in order for a single 
treasury system to deliver its benefit.  
Interviewees in Bahirdar Zuria also identified a number of practical problems they have 
faced due to such centralized arrangements. Since most of the offices of woreda 
administration are scattered in different locations far from the office of WOFED, 
sometimes it has been difficult to respond swiftly to disbursement requests. 
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Consequently, there have been some complaints over the inconvenience and dalliance 
of payments. 
A cash flow plan is one of the arrangements used to manage cash properly so that the 
woreda does not run out of cash whenever the need for disbursement arises. 
Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, the spending practices of most of the case woredas 
has been characterised by a weak link between cash flow plans and actual spending, as 
well as by the low levels of attention given to the role of cash flow plans. However, 
with the exception of Debremarkos city, the discussants in the experts FGDs agreed that 
this has not led to any serious cash shortages in their respective woredas. One reason for 
this, explained by the deputy head of BoFED,  is the fact that BoFED has been sending 
at least 1/12
th
 of the total grant each month. Furthermore, most of the recurrent 
expenditure in woredas is taken up by personnel expenditure, leaving only a relatively 
small amount of budget for operational spending. Even though the disbursement from 
operational budget tends to vary and disrupt the cash flow, the fact that it is a small 
proportion of the total budget means that it has not caused a major excess or shortage of 
cash in the woredas.  
The budget that could have created a lot of trouble for cash management is the capital 
budget, particularly if it is provided by donors. However, unlike in the case of the 
normal budget process, woredas do not start projects funded by donors unless the 
budgeted money is secured in their bank account. This practice has saved them from  
possible cash management problems. However, it is important to note that this is the 
case only for off-treasury donor funds that have their own separate bank accounts.  
This does not mean that cash flow problems do not exist in the woredas. A particular 
problem has been posed, as noted earlier in this study, by the late release of the block 
grant from the region. Often this is only released two months after the start of the new 
fiscal year. This means that only a limited amount of cash left over from the previous 
year is available to cover current expenditure. This therefore has to be prioritized and 
tightly controlled to avoid serious cash flow problems. Most of such funds are therefore 
targeted at committed forms of expenditure, including payroll and expenditure related to 
capital projects carried over from the previous year. Woredas only become fully 
functional in financial terms about two to three months into the fiscal year. The problem 
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becomes even worse when it comes to donor funding. As noted earlier, donor funds are 
often only released in the third quarter of the year. The challenge of cash shortage is 
handled by not commencing with the work until the funding is released. 
The situation is somewhat different in the Debremarkos City Administration. The city 
administration has faced severe cash shortages mainly caused by the deviation between  
planned and actual internal revenue. When the special grant from the region started to 
decline, the city administration has resorted to covering the cost of construction projects  
by mobilizing revenue from various sources. However, as indicated in the sections 
above, the planned sources of revenue often proved unsustainable. This has resulted in 
project activities being started and their costs covered from the regular budget, with the 
expectation that the planned revenue would be collected in due course.  However, such 
revenue has often not been forthcoming, resulting in serious cash flow problems. In 
some cases, the city administration was not only unable to pay contractors and labourers 
working on  projects. It also did not have adequate amounts of cash to cover the normal  
functions of the city administration. This has caused a lot of conflict with regional 
government officials. This is mainly due to the use of the single pool finance system 
which allowed the city administration to use the cash deposited for other purposes for 
construction works.  
With respect to cash security, there have not been serious problems. Remoteness from a  
bank was one of the factors that exposed their cash management practice to security 
problems. Mekiet Woreda, for instance, had no bank in their town (Flakit), and had to 
travel about 200 kilometres to deposit their cash in bank in Woldiya. But now, they 
have a new bank in their town which has resolved the problem. However, Shebel 
Berenta Woreda is still suffering from the same problem as there is no bank in their 
town (Yeduha). For this reason, they have to keep cash in their office beyond the 
allowed limit. Discussants, explained that it has been costly, inconvenient and unsafe to 
travel every day to the nearby town (Bichena) to deposit and withdraw from the bank. 
Therefore, they resorted to keeping a sizable amount of money in the office, although 
they expressed concern that this practice is highly exposed to theft.   
The other unsafe practice in all the case woredas but Debremarkos is the excess cash 
kept by assistant cashiers deployed in different rural areas of the woredas. In addition to 
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the payment and collection made at WoFED, the woredas have deployed assistant 
cashiers who pay salary and other expenditures to teachers, health workers, 
development agents, police and the like who are assigned to work in these remote areas. 
Assistant cashiers also collect tax particularly agricultural income tax and land tax from 
rural peasants. Furthermore, there are assistant cashiers at rural health centres to pay 
salaries as well as to collect service charges and money from drug sales. Because these 
assistant cashiers are placed in rural areas and are therefore unable to travel every day to 
the seats of the woreda administrations to handover the cash to main cashier at WoFED, 
they have to keep large amounts of cash beyond the designated limit in their poorly 
constructed and insecure offices, or else they have to take the cash with them to their 
home every night. This too is an unsafe cash management practice. 
Bank reconciliation is one of the methods woredas are required to use in order to follow 
up and manage their cash properly. It is a process by which woreda administrations 
reconcile cash balance in their record against their bank accounts to check if all 
payments and deposits are recorded properly. Since decentralization, three of the case 
study woredas have been doing monthly bank reconciliation, and this is still the case in  
Bahirdar Zuria and Mekiet Woreda. However, in Shebel Berenta this practice has now 
been discontinued, due to the lack of manpower. In Debremerakos bank reconciliation 
has never taken place, again primarily due to human resource shortages.  
The problem is worse when it comes to the case of donor funds. It is indicated in audit 
reports of the three audited woredas (Mekiet, Shebel Berenta and Bahirdar Zuria) bank 
reconciliation has never been done for off-treasury donor funds, irrespective of 
differences in manpower.  This situation raises the debate as to whether donor funds 
should be off-treasury funds or part of the treasury funds. It has been discussed earlier 
that the treatment of donor funds as off-treasury funds helps woreda administrations to 
protect themselves from the possible disruption in cash management that might have 
been caused by unpredictable and unreliable donor funds. But at the same time it is 
widely accepted that a single treasury system should be inclusive and cover all funds. 
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7.2.3 Procurement and Construction Contracts 
The evidence reveals that procurement activities constitute the largest share of 
government spending in most woredas. On the other hand, as the following graph 
clearly shows both community members and civil servants in the case study woredas 
suspect that procurement activities are highly exposed to embezzlement. Having a 
dysfunctional procurement system and construction contract administration process 
means exposing the biggest proportion of public money to corruption. Graph 7.1 shows 
that procurement and construction activities in the woreda administrations are perceived 
by both community members and civil servants to be more exposed to corruption or 
embezzlement than other activities such as tax assessment and service delivery.  
However, while community members think procurement is slightly more exposed to 
corruption than construction, civil servants think the other way around. The graph 
shows that civil servants see more chances of corruption in procurement and 
construction than community members do. This difference is not significant but might 
be due to the difference in the level of information they are equipped with. Civil 
servants have more access to information about their woreda government operations 
than community members. In the following sections, procurement and construction 
activities are discussed separately despite the link. Here, procurement refers to the 
process of acquiring goods and service whereas construction refers to constructions of 
various facilities contracted out to private contractors.  
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Figure 7 2: Mean response of community members and civil servants about the level 
of suspicion towards various government activities exposed to corruption 
 
Source:  Field Survey: 2012 
Note: the possible responses include 0, 0.5 and 1, where the value 0 refers to ‘no suspicion’, 
0.5 refers to ‘undecided’ and 1 refers to ‘yes’ 
Dysfunctional procurement systems and practices not only tend to cause corruption or 
embezzlement of public finance but, as indicated earlier in this study, they also 
contribute to low levels of budget turn-out.     
7.2.3.1 Procurement of Supplies and Services 
Procurement is one of the areas of financial management of woreda administrations in 
the Amhara region where reforms have taken place. In the new procurement system, 
procurement activities in woreda governments are carried out at centrally in a single 
unit of WOFED. Sector offices are responsible for identifying the specification of 
supplies or services they want to be procured and for making payments to the suppliers 
upon the receipt of goods and service. It is also the responsibility of the sector offices to 
investigate the quality of supplies and service delivered to ensure that they are in 
accordance with the specifications.  
At the beginning of each year, the procurement unit makes a procurement needs 
assessment across all offices in the woreda. The need assessment process involves 
gathering information about the number and type of items sector offices need together 
with the time when they are needed. A procurement action plan is then prepared 
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accordingly. The most preferable method of procurement in all case woredas is the 
limited number of bulk procurements, although the actual number of times 
procurements are made varies from one woreda to another. Procurements in Bahridar 
Zuria Woreda are made only twice a year but four times in Mekiet Woreda. In 
Debremarkos procurement is also meant to take place four times a year. In practice, 
however, Debremarkos woreda has never stuck to this arrangement. Shebel Berenta also 
procures without following a specific plan. The procurement offices in Debremarkos 
City Administration and Shebel Berenta Woreda collect procurement requests from the 
sector offices, and procurement only takes place when the procurement requests 
amassed are large enough to enter into a bidding process. However, making small 
procurements based on individual requests is not allowed in all case woredas, except in  
exceptional circumstances.   
Recently there has been a general shift in all the woredas from the old pro forma or 
direct procurement method to a new open bid method. In the old pro forma method of 
procurement, invitations were distributed to certain known suppliers or candidates to 
present their price quotation and then the best offer was selected. This method, as all of 
the discussants and interviewees agreed, is highly exposed to corruption, limits the pool 
of candidates, weakens competition and involves high transaction cost. For instance, the 
rural water supply office in Bahirdar Zuria Woreda was forced last year to reject the 
flag (for the event organized to celebrate with donors the annual water coverage 
achievements) bought through pro forma methods due to its falsely inflated price. 
Moreover, the rural water supply office had a dispute with the central procurement unit 
due to the fact that bicycle tyres bought last year through pro forma methods were not 
genuine.  
In the new bid method of procurement, procurement tenders have to be advertised on 
public notice boards, as well as through broadcasts and press media. This procurement 
method is intended to enhance competition so as to ensure a combination of the best 
price, quality and delivery times, whilst at the same time minimising the possibility of 
corruption, as well as reducing transaction costs. 
However, all of these new reforms, including single unit procurement, open bid 
methods and a planned procurement process, have not been without problems, 
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according to the interviews with the heads of sector offices. Most of the heads of sector 
offices complained about the quality, price and delivery time of the goods and services 
currently being procured. Procurement units in each of the woredas, on the other hand, 
blamed sector offices for making arbitrary procurement requests without following their 
procurement plan. Procurement is, of course, one of the activities causing disagreements 
in the relationship between sector offices and their respective WoFEDs. Sector offices 
feel that their power to decide on budgets by making procurements according to their 
specific office situation has been once again being limited through the working of the  
centralized single unit procurement system. Most of them currently believe that 
procurement activities should be restored to each sector offices. On the contrary, the 
procurement unit of WoFED would like more rights to make payment orders from 
sector office budgets for procured items, as heads of sector offices are sometimes 
hesitant to quickly approve the payment for the suppliers. This, as the procurement 
officers argued, causes delays in the payment process and dissatisfaction amongst 
suppliers, thereby compromising the effective operation of the future procurement 
process. They expressed their frustration that even a short time delay in payment easily 
dismays the suppliers and destroys long established relationships.  
 Quality of Supplies and Service  
One thing that is similar across all case woredas is complaints over the quality of goods 
and items procured. This is mainly related to the difficulty in identifying genuine from 
counterfeit products. All of the heads of sector offices complain that some of stationery 
materials, spare parts and electronics procured have been found to be counterfeits that 
have been neither functional nor durable. The procurement officers in all case woredas 
admitted the problem and highlighted the difficulty they encountered in identifying 
genuine ones from fakes. They argued that the weak standardization and grading system 
in the country’s commodity distribution has further complicated the task. Together with 
their own lack of experience, this has caused a lot of problems in the past in the quality 
of goods procured. In recent years, however, procurement officers have increased their 
experience in identifying counterfeit from genuine products, and in determining the 
details of specification of products they procure. In some of the case woredas, such as  
Bahirdar Zuria Woreda and Mekiet Woreda, use of experts is now being made at the 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: BUDGET IMPLEMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM REFORMS AND THE 
FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE OF WOREDA ADMINSTRATIONS 
  
211 
 
time of delivery of products, especially information technology experts to inspect 
electronic products.  
However, procurement officers still continue to blame sector offices for not identifying 
quality problems and informing the procurement unit early. If they had, low quality 
items could have been returned or legal action could have been taken against the 
supplier. In most cases, sector offices only notice quality problems when they start to 
use the items for the intended purpose after they have been received and stored for some 
time. This is due to several reasons. As heads of sector offices argued, in the first place, 
counterfeit products are not easily detectable even to experts, let alone to  inexperienced 
heads or staff of a particular sector office. In the second place, sector offices, besides 
their lack of capacity, do not pay due attention to the inspection of the quality of items 
as they think the responsibility has been already assumed by the procurement units. This 
is the result of lack of clarity in the relationship and orientation to sector offices about 
their duties and responsibilities.  
Other alternatives such as legal recourses have not so far been effective in helping to  
correct the problem. Officials do not have confidence or know how to deal legally with 
such problems and secure compensation for any damage thereof. This lack of clarity 
creates a loophole for corruption by officers and collusion with suppliers. The 
involvement of officers in this process is not easily detectable.  
Discussants expressed their feeling that bulk procurement through the bidding method 
has also contributed in an important way to problems surrounding the quality of 
procured products. This is because the whole of a bulk purchase may be counterfeit. 
Had the procurement been in smaller volume, the magnitude of damage caused by fake 
products would have been minimised.  
As procurement officers indicated in the interviews, the problem is exacerbated by the 
lack of attention and capacity of the sectors to identify the specification of the products 
they require. Although some of the items to be purchased require detailed information 
about their specification, officials in the sectors are often unable to provide this due to 
their own inexperience. However, discussants in the expert focus group discussion at 
Bahirdar Zuria stated that they have been able to handle this problem by providing 
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support to sector offices in the process of procurement planning. After receiving the 
procurement plan from the sectors, the procurement officer in WOFED directly contacts 
the sectors to support them in the description of the specification of the product. This,  
they argued, has helped considerably to address quality concerns pertaining to 
specification problems. However, this practice has not been observed in other case 
woredas. Therefore, it can be generalized that the lack of clear accountability 
relationships between procurement units and sector offices pertaining to the quality and 
specification of goods, together with capacity limitations, has caused officials to blame 
each other and given rise to the existing quality problems of goods and services 
procured. 
Price 
One of the problems of the procurement process, and probably the most critical for all 
of the discussants and interviewees, is the falsely inflated price of procured materials. 
All of them agree with the opinion suggested by one FGD participant in Shebel Berenta 
Woreda that “if we let it keep going this way, anyone can expect in the near future that 
the entire public money will be flowing into bank accounts of corrupted suppliers in the 
name of payments for procured goods and services instead of being used for 
development activities.” There is a widespread perception among sector office heads 
and other staff that the price of items procured through the bid process has been highly 
and falsely inflated. The benefits that bulk procurement was thought to bring through 
the bidding process, such as better quality items at the cheapest possible price, has not 
been fully realized due to various contextual factors in the woreda administrations. This 
has been especially the case in relatively remote woredas, such as Shebel Berenta and 
Mekiet, where most local business people do not have the capacity to fulfil the 
requirements of the bid and capable suppliers in the larger cities are not attracted by the 
tender. This has meant that only a very small number of suppliers participate in the bid 
process, and the absence of genuine competition, especially on price, has resulted in the 
tendency of suppliers to vastly inflate the prices. 
All of the interviewees stated that there is suspicion that these few suppliers know each 
other and collude to set prices higher than market prices and share the profits from this 
(bid rigging). Although they have no detailed evidence to confidently confirm this 
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allegation, they are certain that the price of most of the items purchased through the 
bidding process and delivered to their office have been much higher than the market 
price. The deputy head of BoFED also suspected that remote woredas might not be able 
to capture the benefits of open bidding due to such contextual problems. This practice 
leaves the woreda administrations worse-off by having to pay higher prices, while all of 
the competing suppliers, no matter whether they win or lose in the bid, are better off 
through sharing the profit they got out of falsely inflated price they charged the woreda 
administrations. Thus the bidding procurement method in remote woredas, far from 
ensuring the cheapest price and better quality, creates an opportunity for corrupt 
suppliers to abuse public money.  
Community members in FGDs and some of interviewees insisted that this would not 
have been possible without backing from staff or officials in the woreda 
administrations. Such backing, they suspect, comes not just from ordinary procurement 
officers but also from the leadership in the woreda administrations. They maintained 
that had there not been any backing from leadership, the bidding process would have 
been cancelled or legal action would have been taken against suppliers, given the 
widespread awareness of the problem even among sector office heads. Some of the 
interviewees argue that cancelling the bid or taking legal recourse would not have been 
effective, in any case, given the poor record of woreda administrations in winning court 
cases, largely due to the inability to present adequate evidence to support the case.  
Thus, despite widespread awareness among officials, staff and community members, 
little has been done to combat price rigging by suppliers. 
The deputy head of BoFED explains that in some situations woreda officials have been 
forced to accept whatever price the supplier offers, due to the fact that there was no 
response from suppliers to the original tender (sometimes on two or three occasions). 
Eventually they are forced to accept whatever proposal is submitted just to ensure that 
projects are started, especially given that they are often under pressure from the regional 
government to complete their development activities and meet their performance targets 
on time. However, this problem has not been as prevalent in Bahirdar Zuria Woreda and 
Debremarkos City Administration as in the other two woredas. This is mainly because 
they usually have an adequate number of bidders whenever they announce tenders. But 
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this does not mean that price fixing does not happen at all in these two woredas. 
Additional measures have thus been taken recently by Bahirdar Zuria Woreda to further 
combat the problem. Market assessments have been undertaken to obtain information 
about the maximum possible price suppliers can offer. 
Despite the interest and pressure to use bulk procurements through tendering, a 
significant proportion of procurements that involve a huge amount of money are still 
made through direct procurement or pro forma methods. This has happened for several 
reasons. The first is due to the failure of sector offices to follow their procurement plan, 
according to some of the procurement officers interviewed. Most sector offices would 
prefer to get the needed materials instantly without careful advance planning of the 
type, size and time of item to be procured. But in order to use the bulk and bid method 
of procurement, compliance with procurement planning is required. However, all of the 
interviewed heads of sector offices admitted that they have not been following the plan 
strictly, largely because they feel that the current practise of using bulk procurement 
creates a lot of inconvenience in the smooth running of the activities of their offices. 
The head of the education office in Bahirdar Zuria Woreda, for example, stated that 
bulk procurement twice a year is far from realistic. He stated that this procurement 
practice has inhibited his office from smoothly undertaking activities. For instance the 
second procurement for last year was made just one month before the end of the year (in 
June). This is unacceptable and does not have any purpose except for minimizing the 
work load in the procurement unit. He inquires “what are they going to do throughout 
the year if procurements are made only twice a year”. All other interviewees highlighted 
the same reasons for why following the procurement plan has been impossible.   
 Delivery Time 
Issues pertaining to delivery time have also been the cause of disputes between 
procurement units and sector offices in the woreda administrations, though most 
respondents agreed that this had not been as critical a problem as quality and price 
issues. 
However, delivery time has been quite serious in Shebel Berenta Woreda, according to 
the interview with the head of the education office. Sometimes it takes as long as six 
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months to obtain items procured through the procurement unit. He stated that the 
procurement unit is “the most sluggish and non-functional unit” which prevents the 
office from effectively undertaking its duties. Writing a reminder letter is not adequate. 
The head of the education office has to go in person and remind them every now and 
then in order to get the required items purchased. This problem results from the fact that 
Shebel Berenta is the worst of all case woredas when it comes to the capacity to attract 
suppliers due to its remoteness.  Besides, the woreda administration procurement unit is 
poorly staffed both in terms of experience and number. All of the procurement officers 
in the unit are new university graduates with little or no experience. And the three 
officers assigned to the procurement unit is clearly insufficient for the unit to discharge 
its duties effectively. The discussants in the experts FGD admitted that this  
procurement unit is yet to be organized effectively. There is no procurement plan. 
Instead the procurement unit simply collects purchase requests from sector offices and 
waits until the total volume of procurement requests reaches the point where bidding 
becomes viable. As the head of the education office explained, the time span required 
for the volume of procurement requests to reach that point may take up to six months. 
This means that the office may well have to wait until February for procurement 
requests made in September to be met. Furthermore, the fact that the staff members are 
inexperienced means that they are unnecessarily cautious in each and every move in the 
procurement process to safeguard themselves from any possible risk of illegal 
procurements. This is one of the reasons for the delays in the procurement process and 
annoys sector officials and suppliers. Thus the head of the education office argued that 
procurement could have been undertaken much more efficiently and effectively if it was 
left to the office itself rather than the procurement unit. 
While complaints about the late delivery of required items come from the sector offices, 
the complaint that comes from the procurement units is that sector offices have a 
tendency to order instant procurements without following the procurement plan. Certain 
sector offices might sometimes need to get the item before the timetable mentioned in 
the procurement plan. When such reasons are acceptable, procurements can be made 
either through direct procurement or pro forma method. However, in such cases, 
procurement officers cannot usually give a guarantee to deliver the needed items at the 
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required time, as they have little control over factors that determine the delivery time of 
unplanned procurements.  
Unplanned Procurement, Why? 
As noted in the sections above, although all the case woredas have adopted the system 
of planned procurement through an open bidding process handled by the procurement 
units, a considerable amount of money is still spent procuring items through direct and 
pro forma method that are more susceptible to corruption and wasteful and ineffective 
expenditure.  
In the interviews and focus groups with officials, several reasons were mentioned for 
this.  The first reason, as the head of education office and health office at Bahirdar Zuria 
Woreda argued, is that a procurement arrangement of only twice or three times a year is 
unrealistic even for the relatively predictable procurements. The time span between 
successive procurements is about six months and sector offices are supposed to 
determine in advance the number and type of items to be used in six months. This, as 
the respondents argued, is difficult when uncertainties are likely to happen in their 
sectors. They labelled this arrangement as inflexible and felt that it did not 
accommodate the existing reality in their sectors. This concern was also shared, though 
to a slightly less extent, by interviewees in Mekiet Woreda where procurement is made 
at the beginning or end of each quarter.  
The second reason has to do with the factors already discussed in the previous sections 
as causes for not complying with annual plans, budget plans, action plans and cash flow 
plans.  It is to be noted that those plans have not been followed due to either impositions 
from the top, constraints within the internal woreda administrations, or problems 
associated with the structure and source of funds. Discussants in all the case woredas 
explained that unplanned training and evaluation meetings and workshops (most of 
which imposed from zone administration and were of a political nature) have been one 
of the main causes for unplanned procurements. Thus, stationery materials, drinks, food 
stuff and various entertainment arrangements needed for such functions are often 
procured at short notice through direct procurement methods. Interviewees indicated 
that other factors that contributed to the prevalence of unplanned procurement included 
the irregularity and unsustainable nature of donor funds, as well as changes in the 
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budget structure because of budget shortages to execute the budget as planned. Such 
unplanned procurements are not automatic, however, need to be justified and obtain 
approval from the chief administrator. Given the need to accelerate development 
activities and meet performance targets, as well as awareness about the problems with 
donors’ funds and budget shortage, such approval is nearly always obtained. 
Sometimes unplanned procurement requests can be accommodated without suffering 
from the risks associated with direct procurement and pro forma methods. This is 
through a procedure which allows 20% of the procurement to be obtained from previous 
suppliers at the same price (adjusted for inflation), without going through a bidding 
process. However, the remotest woredas such as Shebel Berenta and Mekiet have not 
been able to take full advantage of this arrangement. This is mainly due to fact that the  
locational distance between the seat of the woreda administrations and the suppliers 
means that it is not easy for the woredas to make instant procurements from their 
previous suppliers. For instance, in Mekiet Woreda, the procurement unit has not been 
able to make direct purchases from the previous bid winners as they are from either 
Bahirdar or Dessie that are more than 230 km from Flakit. The situation is worse in 
Shebel Berenta where almost all of their suppliers are either from Debremarkos or 
Bahirdar. 
As stressed by discussants in the experts FGD at Shebel Berenta, there is a need for 
some level of relaxation within the current bid procurement methods to allow direct 
procurement and pro forma methods, given the remoteness of the woreda and the lack 
of an active and capable private sector to bid for tenders. Furthermore, and more 
generally, as reflected in most of the interviews, there is a desire amongst sector offices 
to take the responsibility of for procurement activities themselves, instead of the current 
single unit procurement method. There is also a desire by woreda governments to 
decide by themselves according to their specific woreda realities without being limited 
by the procurement directives imposed by the regional government. However, the 
deputy head of BoFED insists that, without such directives, procurement may well have 
been exposed to even more corruption and wasteful expenditure than is currently the 
case. There is a lack of accountability mechanisms at the moment to safeguard against 
such practices. Thus, he suggests that further modifications be introduced on the current 
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procurement directive, to address some of the problems and concerns outlined above,  
rather than simply disregarding it and giving the power to the woreda governments. 
7.2.3.2 Construction 
In construction, the procurement units in the woredas have a more limited role than they 
do in the procurement of goods and services. Their role is limited to providing various 
forms of technical support in the construction bid process. These include making bid 
announcements after they receive requests and bid documents from the respective sector 
offices; coordinating and assisting in the evaluation of bid proposals; keeping records of 
documents; announcing the winner of the bid; and completing the contracts with the bid 
winners. In the case of construction projects that are carried out largely through the 
voluntary contribution of the people, procurement units are also responsible for 
procuring the construction materials needed for the project through pro forma or direct 
procurement methods. However, most of the discussion below will focus on 
construction projects contracted out to private construction companies. 
In the construction bid process, there is also involvement of representatives from the 
respective sector offices, internal auditors, and engineering experts. The responsibility 
of following up the construction process belongs to the consultant company in the case 
of larger construction projects, and to woreda site inspectors in the case of small scale 
projects. The respective sector offices are also responsible for following up and taking 
necessary measures whenever problems occur, as well as for making processing 
payment orders for contractors in line with the contract and the progress of the 
construction project. Actual payments are made by the woreda finance and 
disbursement units, who are also responsible for keeping accounting records and for 
producing reports on the disbursements. 
The main concerns relating to construction projects in the case woredas relate to poor 
quality, the relatively high costs of construction and delays in the completion of 
construction projects. In most cases, these problems start right from the beginning of the 
bid process. Remote woredas such as Shebel Berenta and Mekiet rarely receive an  
adequate number of capable bidders in their first bid announcements. They often only 
get a minimum number of bidders after 3 or 4 announcements. Such bidders are often 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: BUDGET IMPLEMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM REFORMS AND THE 
FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE OF WOREDA ADMINSTRATIONS 
  
219 
 
not  competent enough to complete the construction as required. In general the pool of 
bidders available in the woredas is inadequate to reap the claimed benefits of open 
bidding: namely lower price and better quality. As noted earlier, the evidence seems to 
suggest that collusion is quite common amongst competing bidders, resulting in price 
rigging and the possibility of poor quality construction. The fact that woredas are 
working against the clock to get the construction completed according to their plans 
means they often tend to accept any price and quality offered as long as there is a 
chance of minimum standards being met.  
The problem is not only associated to the remoteness of the woredas. Most of the 
construction carried out under woreda administrations are small scale projects in which 
most of capable contractors (both in terms of technology and project management 
capacity) are not interested.  
Problems associated with quality, price and delays are not limited to the remote 
woredas such as Shebel Berenta and Mekiet (though they are particularly intense in 
such areas), but also occur in Bahirdar Zuria and Debremarkos. As noted earlier in this 
study, delays in the completion of construction projects is a serious problem in all the 
woreda administrations, and are one of the main causes of the low level of capital 
budget execution. The head of the education office at Mekiet Woreda, for example, 
explained that it has become a common practice of construction contractors to stop 
working in the middle of the construction work when they realized that they would not 
get a major return from the project. The head believes that this is due to their lack of 
project management skills and experience. Most of the money often vanishes in the 
middle of the project and the construction is therefore stalled. He mentioned the 
interruption of the construction of a health centre in Mekiet Woreda after reaching 75% 
of its completion. 
Poor quality and late completion of projects are not only caused by problems in the bid 
process but also by the lack of capacity in woreda administrations to enforce contracts 
in which such problems occur. To enforce contracts, woredas so have some supervision 
arrangements. However, as agreed by all the respondents, these have not been 
sufficiently effective to ensure that construction projects are completed according to the  
designated quality and time. Several reasons are responsible for this. As pointed out by 
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the deputy head of BoFED, the first has to do with the capacity of woreda 
administrations to supervise construction works. Shebel Berenta and Mekiet Woreda, 
for example, do not have their own site inspectors to supervise constructions works. 
They have to get site inspectors from their respective Zone Urban Works department. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this arrangement has been inconvenient and is 
exposed to corruption, and therefore does not help effectively to follow up the quality 
and progress of construction.  
Withholding a proportion of the total cost of the construction for one year after the 
completion of construction is one of the arrangements that woreda governments have 
been using to make sure quality of the construction meets standards. They withhold, for 
instance 2.5% for water supply taps in Bahirdar Zuria Woreda; and 20% for building 
construction works in Mekiet Woreda. The retention fund is to be released to the 
contractor after one year, after checking if the constructed facility is good enough to 
provide the intended service. If there is any defect, the contractor is supposed to make 
necessary adjustments prior to getting the money. However, this arrangement has not 
been as successful as intended as a safeguard. In most cases it has been realized that the 
money held over by the woreda is not enough to cover the costs of correcting the 
problems in the construction, especially as the costs involved will have increased due to 
inflation. In most cases it is therefore insufficient to encourage or force contractors to 
return and complete the work to the original standard. 
This points to the importance of having strong supervision and follow up in the 
construction process, to ensure that payments made to the contractor correspond to the 
progress of construction. Had there been strong supervision and follow up, the 
contractor would have been told earlier to make correction before further payments 
would be made.  
Shebel Berenta and Mekiet Woredas do not have their own construction experts to 
supervise and follow up the progress and quality of construction. Thus, they borrow 
experts from their respective Zone urban works departments. As discussed in detail in 
the previous chapter, this temporary arrangement has not been effective due to the 
resulting accountability gap, which exposes construction projects to the possibility of 
corruption.  
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The problem is not limited to Shebel Berenta and Mekiet woredas but extends also to 
Bahirdar Zuria, despite the fact that some of its sector offices, notably the health and 
education offices, have their own site inspectors. However, the heads of both of these 
offices admitted in the interviews that there are still problems related to both quality and 
delay, as one expert cannot handle the duty of supervising all the construction works in 
the entire woreda. Unless the inspector spend all his time at the construction sites (or 
unless they have a resident inspector), it is impossible to make sure that contractors are 
progressing adequately and complying with quality standards. Close supervision on a 
daily basis is not possible for the woreda, as prevailing budget shortages do not allow it 
to fully cover the per diem and transportation costs of the inspector. Acknowledging 
this challenge, the education office of Bahirdar Woreda has encouraged the community 
surrounding the construction project to actively take part in the supervision and follow 
up process. School directors, kebele administration officials, kebele training board, 
parents and teachers association are supposed to follow up and inform the office 
whenever there are deviations. However, this practice has rarely been effective because 
the capacity, commitment and attention given by such actors have not been adequate. 
Bahirdar Zuria and Mekiet woredas have used other supplementary arrangements to 
follow up the progress of construction works. A committee chaired by the head of the 
planning and budget unit in Bahirdar Zuria WOFED has tried to play a supervisory role 
but its actual engagement in the process has been erratic at best. Similarly, the planning 
and budgeting unit in Mekiet makes post-construction field visits annually to gather 
information about the status and functionality of its facilities and construction projects, 
by interviewing the surrounding people. They then make suggestions to the respective 
sector offices either for the maintenance of facilities and corrective action in the case of 
non-performing construction projects. However, the evidence suggests that the sector 
offices have in most cases done little to respond to the recommendations contained in 
the reports of these field visits. 
7.2.4 Internal Control 
Internal control systems are the formal arrangements in the financial management 
system that include rules, regulations and procedures, as well as defined roles and duties 
for various organs, in order to make sure that financial activities in the administration 
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are safeguarded from wastage, embezzlement, and other forms of illegal use of 
government finance.  
7.2.4.1 Financial Rules, Regulations and Procedures 
The Amhara regional government financial proclamations (Proclamation No. 18/1997, 
6/1998 and 37/1999) provide a detailed description of financial rules and regulation to 
be respected by all government agencies in the region including woreda 
administrations. These proclamations did not recognize woreda governments as self-
ruling government units as they were set up during the pre-district level decentralization 
period. Therefore, following the implementation of district level decentralization, 
amendments have been made, as part of the overall financial management reforms,  to 
make the proclamations relevant and useful for the current self-administering woredas. 
However, the fundamental essence of the original financial rules, regulations and 
procedures remains unchanged. According to the deputy head of BoFED, only relatively 
minor changes needed to be made in order to adapt the proclamations to the needs of 
self-administering woredas. 
7.2.4.2 Clarity of Roles and Duties 
Effective financial control can happen only when there is clarity of roles and duties 
between the various organs and individuals that are involved in the woredas’ financial 
management process. In the current financial system of woreda administrations, the 
power and duty of administering their budget is entrusted to sector offices. But their 
spending practices are always subject to financial rules, regulations, standards and 
routines. WOFED assumes the responsibility for following up and monitoring to make 
sure that the spending practices of sector offices are consistent with financial rules and 
ordinances. However, as shown in the external audit reports, WOFED has not been able 
to effectively enforce compliance with financial ordinances. One of the reasons for such 
failures of compliance, as all of the discussants in the expert FGDs agreed, is the lack of 
clarity in the respective roles of officers in WOFED and sector heads. Also mentioned 
was the fact that the finance and budget manuals prepared by the regional government 
are incomplete in terms of specifying dos and don’ts, as well as providing clarification 
on how to enforce rules and regulations, and the consequences of violating them.   
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: BUDGET IMPLEMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM REFORMS AND THE 
FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE OF WOREDA ADMINSTRATIONS 
  
223 
 
Budget transfer is, for instance, one area mentioned by the interviewees and focus group 
discussants which demonstrates this lack of clarity. On the one hand, the power to 
decide on the appropriated budget is given to sector offices. On the other hand, WOFED 
is required to follow up and make sure disciplined financial spending by sector offices 
takes place. But participants asked what if the heads of sector offices insist they want to 
transfer their budget as many times as they wish? There is no clarity as to what extent 
can the WOFED office reject such transfer requests. The same applies to various 
requirements, such as the requirement to submit action plans and cash flow plans; the 
spending pattern to follow such action plans and cash flow plans; modifications in the 
cash flow plan prior to disbursement request if the spending pattern does not follow the 
cash flow plan; the requirement that budget spending should not exceed the planned 
budget; and the requirement that there should be no transfers from personnel 
expenditure to the operational budget.  
Discussants in the Debremarkos expert FGD mentioned that even though WOFED 
announced that sector offices will not get their disbursement requests accepted unless 
they submit their action plans and cash flow plans, in practice it has been allowing them 
to use their budget without them doing so. WOFED could not stop them from spending 
their budget without submitting the said documents. The level of determination that 
WOFED is supposed to have in enforcing such requirements has been compromised by 
the lack of clarity in the responsibility and accountability relationship between experts 
and officials. The same goes for all other financial rules and regulations. Had the 
WOFED experts tried to be strict and halt such spending practices, they would have 
apparently been blamed for obstructing the development activities of the city 
administration. The pressure is not only from woreda officials but sometimes it is also 
from regional government officials. For instance, the letter from Bahirdar Zuria Woreda 
WOFED, in response to ARAG’s audit comment about the woreda’s excessive budget 
transfer, reveals that such excessive transfers had been caused mainly by pressure from 
the regional government officials to relax the budget transfer requirements to sector 
offices.        
Due to such blurred relationship, officers and experts in WOFED have always been 
hesitant to refuse disbursement requests, especially from politicians, even if they were 
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aware of the illicit nature of the requests. This is because, apart from lack of clarity, 
there is a widespread perception among finance and budget officers that working in 
agreement with those politicians is considered to be more important for their current and 
future career than sticking closely to the financial ordinances. The finance officers 
admitted that at times, for genuine reasons, they have accepted disbursement requests 
even if they know that these are against the established financial rules and regulations. 
The officers maintain that rejecting such requests might not directly impact them, but 
certainly may have consequences indirectly for the long term career prospects of the 
individuals. Officials who declined to process such requests are often considered to be 
stubborn and obstacles to the development endeavour of the administration. This in turn 
risks their individual future fate in the administration and might damage their reputation 
among politicians. Such personal characteristics are widely perceived among local 
politicians as incompatible with higher level responsibilities. Thus, the individual’s 
application for promotion would never get their attention whenever there is a chance for 
job promotion. In general, finance/budget officers have not had the confidence or the 
means to challenge illicit spending or to strictly enforce financial rules and regulations. 
Discussants in the community FGDs also shared concern about this problem. One of the 
participants stated that “accountants, auditors, and purchasers are their own, and they 
could make them do whatever they want to do. They do not have the courage to refuse 
illicit disbursements from officials, rather they might cooperate with them to cover up 
or help them in using the loopholes in the financial rules, regulations and procedures”. 
The worst thing that officers fear is the lack of clarity as to whether officers or 
politicians individually or jointly would be accountable for such illicit spending if such 
illicit spending is identified by external auditors. But they suspect that such illegal 
spending might make them accountable while leaving political decision-makers free 
(accountability without power). Discussants believe that the current reluctance to follow 
financial ordinances could have been solved if there were clear assignment of 
accountability for politicians. If political officials were made accountable, they would 
have required the strict following of rules and regulations as well as strong auditing and 
control arrangements.  
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On the other hand, interviewed sector officials, agreeing with the idea of lack of clarity, 
felt that such dubious relationship have contributed to their power on budget spending 
to be essentially get hijacked by finance and budget experts. This is true especially for 
new heads of sectors, as explained by the head of health office at Mekiet Woreda. The 
head recalled that he had been forced to consult on each and every financial activity, 
and had to accept whatever the WOFED experts told him to do. This was because he 
was new to the position and had no prior experience in such responsibilities, and had 
not been provided with guidance manuals or orientation as to how to handle such 
responsibilities. The head has only recently become aware of some of the basic financial 
ordinances from financial performance evaluation discussions in the Woreda 
Administrative Council as well as from repetitive correspondence with finance and 
budget officers.  
The lack of training of woreda officials on budgeting and financial management has 
exacerbated such problems. The deputy head of BoFED maintains that the region is not 
providing appropriate training to woreda officials. The main focus of the current 
management development training of woreda officials is on developing their political 
capacity. Finance and budget administration issues did not receive the attention they 
deserve in the training organized for woreda officials. During an informal conversation, 
the deputy director of the Amhara Management Institute shared the concern that the 
current management development training offered to woreda officials should have 
included much more training on financial management issues.  
Bahirdar Zuria Woreda is the only woreda where its WOFED has provided orientation 
on budget preparation to the heads of sector offices at the beginning of each year. The 
heads of rural water supply and education office acknowledge the modest impact of 
such orientation yet felt that it did not fully address the clarity problems. However, the 
head of the education office at Mekiet Woreda did stress the supportive relationship that 
had been developed between finance/budget officers and sector office heads in the 
woreda. Instead of focusing on clarity in authority and accountability relationships, he 
felt that real need was for the development of cooperative relationships between the 
different parties.  
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7.2.4.2 Sustainability of Internal Control Reforms 
Another issue that has to be discussed here is the sustainability of the reforms. It is not 
just the suitability of the reform and its initial implementation that matters most if the 
reform has to bring tangible result in the financial management system. Sometimes 
properly designed reforms might be implemented quickly for political cosmetic 
purposes but might not last long. Therefore, to observe how sustainably the internal 
control reforms have been implemented, it is important to look at the degree of 
compliance of woreda administrations financial activities to different financial 
ordinances. In this case, a close look at the compliance audit reports of the Amhara 
Regional Auditor General (ARAG) would be of great importance. The compliance audit 
reports by ARAG in the three case study woredas (Debremarkos has never been 
audited) show several irregularities and malfunctions in the financial management 
system of the case woredas. Table 7.1 below shows that out of a total of 129 findings 
(from medium to too severe), the highest number of findings (50) were recorded in the 
2008/09 audit of Mekiet, followed by Bahirdar Zuria with 28 findings, and Shebel 
Berenta with 26 findings. From the 2005/06 audit, Mekiet had another 25 findings.   
Table 7 1: The number of audit findings and their estimated severity by woreda 
 Woreda audited Total 
BDZ MKT01 MKT98 SHB 
Estimated severity of 
the problem 
medium 
Count 15 21 10 15 61 
% within Woreda 
audited 
53.6% 42.0% 40.0% 57.7% 47.3% 
% of Total 11.6% 16.3% 7.8% 11.6% 47.3% 
Severe 
Count 9 23 12 6 50 
% within Woreda 
audited 
32.1% 46.0% 48.0% 23.1% 38.8% 
% of Total 7.0% 17.8% 9.3% 4.7% 38.8% 
too  
severe 
Count 4 6 3 5 18 
% within Woreda 
audited 
14.3% 12.0% 12.0% 19.2% 14.0% 
% of Total 3.1% 4.7% 2.3% 3.9% 14.0% 
Total 
Count 28 50 25 26 129 
% within Woreda 
audited 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 21.7% 38.8% 19.4% 20.2% 100.0% 
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Source: Own calculation from ARAG audit reports of various woredas 
Even though the audit reports do not clearly show the causes of such non-compliance, 
an attempt has been made to draw the possible causes based on what the report implied. 
Thus, as shown in Table 7.2 below, it can be observed that 75% (97) of findings are 
most probably caused by negligence, of which 37% (36) could also be caused by 
additional capacity related problems. There is a probability of 0.3 that non-compliance 
could be caused by capacity problems (20, 10 and 6 findings caused by lack of skill, 
lack of manpower and institutional problems respectively). Twenty one percent (28 
findings) of non-compliances could be caused through the intentional abuse of public 
resources, or collusion in such abuse, with 82% (23 findings) of these caused by also 
negligence. There are also a few cases of non-compliances 3% (4 findings) caused by 
factors that rarely happen and are beyond the control of the woreda.  The data indicates 
that overwhelmingly most of the non-compliances of financial ordinances have been 
caused by negligence followed by capacity problem and intentional violations. 
Furthermore, non-compliance caused by negligence and intentional violation of 
financial rules and regulation, as indicated in table 7.1, equally contribute to the ‘too 
sever’ problems. ‘Too sever’ problems are those for which the collected evidence is 
strong enough to indicate that they badly constrain the capacity of public agencies to 
deliver the intended service.  
A comparison of the number of findings between woreda administrations for the 
purpose of determining the relative level of reluctance of woreda administrations to 
follow financial rules and regulations is not easy, as the case study woreda are 
significantly different to each other in terms of volume of transactions and the amount 
of finance involved. However, a comparison of the two audit reports of Mekiet Woreda 
that were carried out in different years shows some ironical results. As opposed to the 
presumption that woredas will improve their financial management practice over time, 
the data in table 7.1 above shows that the number of audit findings increased from 25 in 
2005/2006  to 50 in 2008/2009. In this situation it can be said that the sustainability of 
the reform processes can be called into question. 
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Table 7 2: Possible factors responsible for non-compliance 
 Frequency Percent 
 Negligence 61 47.3 
 Intentional 5 3.9 
 Negligence/Lack of training or experience 20 15.5 
 Negligence and Lack of adequate number of work force 10 7.8 
 Negligence/intentional 23 17.8 
 Negligence/Factors beyond the control of woreda 1 .8 
 Negligence/Organizational capacity problem 6 4.7 
 Capacity/Factors beyond control of woreda 3 2.3 
 Total 129 100.0 
Source: Own Calculation from ARAG Audit Report of various woredas 
 
7.2.4.3 Internal Auditing 
One of the formal arrangements in the public sector to ensure accountability and to 
safeguard public resource from abuse and wastage is internal auditing. The practice of 
internal auditing is one of the areas that have been incorporated into the reforms 
introduced by the new financial management systems. Consequently, the practice of 
internal auditing in all public bodies of Amhara region including woreda administration 
has changed from pre-auditing to post-auditing. Therefore, as affirmed by the 
discussants in all expert FGDs, the role of internal auditing is to control financial 
transactions by examining documents presented for disbursement and financial reports 
through sampling, unlike the previous pre-audit transaction verification practice. Audit 
investigations now take the form of compliance auditing. Areas investigated include the 
extent to which (i) transactions are in compliance with financial rules, regulations and 
procedures; (ii) source documents provided for disbursement are genuine; (iii) records 
are kept properly; (iv) subsidiary and general ledgers are prepared properly; and (v) 
financial reports are prepared properly.  
Internal auditing is also carried out when a request comes from sector offices, 
suspecting that some wrong doing is going on in their office or service delivery 
institutions. Procurement activities in the woreda are also audited, as the internal audit 
unit is one of the members of procurement committee. In addition, internal auditing is 
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expected to support and make recommendations for improvements in the work system, 
especially whenever officers encounter problems of implementing financial procedures, 
rules and regulations.  
Despite these important powers and responsibilities, it is a generally known fact that 
due to capacity and independency problems, as will be discussed below in detail, the 
role of internal auditors in woreda administrations has been relegated literally to 
inspecting stores and witnessing the proper handover of properties between outgoing 
and incoming employees. 
In general, the coverage of internal auditing practice in the woreda administrations is 
quite limited; focusing only on financial transactions to verify if the internal financial 
control system is functioning properly. In all case study woredas, as participants in 
expert FGDs stated, internal auditors never attempt to investigate the integration of 
strategic plans and annual plans; annual plans and budget allocation; annual physical 
performance and financial performance. This, of course, is not really possible in a 
situation where woredas follow line-item budgeting.  
In terms of capacity, according to the deputy head of BoFED, internal auditing has 
perhaps been the weakest part of the financial reform processes. This is due to the fact 
that internal auditing was the last process to be reformed among the WOFED units. 
Therefore, the assignment of employees to internal auditing was made after the reform 
of other units had already been finalized. Employees with better capacity even those 
with auditing expertise had already been assigned to budget, procurement and 
accounting units and auditing was left with the lowest quality of employees. As a result 
it has the weakest manpower in all woredas. It is also short of adequate number of 
employees. In Mekiet Woreda 3 out of 7 positions and in Shebel Berenta 4 out of 7 
positions in the audit section are still vacant. In Bahirdar Zurial Woreda 4 out of 7 
positions had until very recently been vacant (though they have now been filled). In the 
city administration of Debremarkos, filling the internal audit positions has not been a 
problem. 
The capacity problems are particularly important, given that auditors, more than most 
other woreda financial and sector officials, need to have an all-round knowledge about 
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the operations of all other units. As mentioned earlier, most of the employees assigned 
as auditors have no or little auditing experience. Besides, they are often employees who 
have been filtered out in the process of selecting employees for other units of WOFED. 
Some of them have been promoted from lower lever jobs.  
The expectation of the deputy head of BoFED that such capacity problems of internal 
auditing will improve through time could have been possible if effective training 
programmes had been developed and provided for internal audit officers. However, in 
practice, fewer training opportunities have been created for such officers than for 
officers in other departments and agencies. According to the evidence gathered in this 
study, none of the auditors in Shebel Berenta and Debremarkos have received any 
training. Only one of the auditors in Mekiet Woreda has been sent for training, only on 
one occasion, since the financial reforms took place. Bahirdar Zuria Woreda is better off 
than other woredas as two of the auditors have been trained on two occasions. Thus, as 
participants in the expert FGDs stated, most auditors have been carrying out their  
auditing duties based on either the experience they shared with each other or just by 
reading whatever manuals have been provided. 
Capacity is not the only factor that determines the effectiveness of auditing in ensuring 
accountability. The independence of the auditors is also very critical. However, the 
independence of the internal audit units is questionable, largely because they are 
accountable in the organizational structure of the woreda governments to the head of  
WOFED. It is difficult to expect auditors, in this situation, to detect and report any 
financial irregularity committed by the head or his colleagues (other sector officials). 
One of the auditors in Debremarkos argued that their role has been limited to pointing 
out irregularities to the individual bodies (largely the sector offices), rather than in 
following-up on compliance or on reporting irregularities to the Woreda Cabinet or 
Administrative Council. 
Most of the auditors emphasised the importance of working in cooperation and 
partnership rather than increasing their independence. One of the auditors in Bahirdar 
Zuria, for example, argued that woreda officials have become gradually aware that the 
role of auditing is not just one of error finding but of support. He also felt that, if the 
capacity of the auditors improved and their findings became stronger, realistic and 
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convincing, officials would be likely to accept the findings and suggestion of auditors. 
However, he was not certain how likely officials would be to willingly accept the audit 
recommendations if the audit findings were very critical of their actions.  
Nevertheless, other participants in the expert FGDs did not want to rule out the 
importance of the independence of the auditors. Participants in Debremarkos and Shebel 
Berenta, for example, stated that one of the most important reasons why auditors were 
often reluctant to expose financial irregularities was that their independence was not 
effectively guaranteed or protected. They mentioned a number of irregularities that 
continue to take place regularly in their woredas. These included disbursements being 
made without the submission of cash flow plans and action plans; budget transfers being 
made without adjusting cash flow plans; the lack of bank reconciliation; and  
procurements being made without following procurement plans. Although there was 
fairly widespread knowledge about such irregularities in the woreda, the internal audit 
unit had done little to expose or correct them. 
 
7.3 ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING 
7.3.1 Accounting and Recording 
Two notable reforms were introduced in 2003/04 in the accounting and recording 
systems of woreda administrations. These were the double entry book keeping system 
and the modified cash accounting system. The double entry accounting system has 
improved the preparation of reports and closing of accounts, in particular through less 
paperwork, fewer processing steps, greater accuracy and ease of reconciling accounts. 
The closing of accounts has now become more up-to-date. WOFED prepares a 
consolidated government financial statement annually. As the deputy head of BoFED 
described, woredas used to take a long time to prepare comprehensive annual financial 
statement after the end of financial year, but this has now been reduced to few months. 
In addition, the reform has helped woreda administrations to prepare complete financial 
statements that contain full information about revenue, expenditure, financial assets and 
liabilities, though transactions in donor-funded projects or extra-budgetary funds are not 
included in the statement. All the respondents in the expert FGDs agreed that the 
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adoption of the new double entry accounting system has contributed a lot towards such 
achievements, and can be regarded as one of the success stories of the financial 
management reforms.  
 
However, it is also important to note that there were a number of limitations in the new 
accounting system. The first is its failure to track all financial transactions. The 
modified cash accounting system recognizes only cash (on hand and in bank) and 
advances as the assets of woreda administrations. It does not provide any means of 
recording fixed assets such as investments, or long term assets such as vehicles, 
machinery and buildings. In fact, woreda administrations do not currently have the  
mandate or capacity to make financial investments. However, buildings, machinery, 
equipment, and vehicles that woreda administrations have acquired are not recognized 
in the accounting system. According to the GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles) they have to be recorded as assets and can change to periodic expenditures 
according to their rate of depreciation. However, the system currently recognizes these 
assets as capital expenditure when they are acquired, not as assets. This kind of 
treatment of assets distorts the financial information by bringing into one year the 
expenditure that should have been distributed over the life of the asset. It also removes 
property administration activities from the accounting system. Thus, it is very difficult 
to follow up the status of these properties and to detect and correct improper conduct. 
Several cases of the improper handling of property assets are mentioned in the audit 
reports of all audited case study woreda, as shown inAppendix6. Due to this weakness 
in the accounting systems, woreda administrations find it difficult to make proper 
budget allocations for repairs and maintenance. It is also likely that lost properties will 
not be noticed. Besides, the existing accounting system does not recognize contributions 
in kind that may come either from people or the private and NGO sectors. Since these 
are not reciprocal transfers and do not involve cash, they cannot be recognized in the 
books of accounts. Despite the fact that the labour and material contributions from 
people and sometimes from NGOs constitute a major proportion of woreda government 
development investments, it is not reflected in the statement of accounts. Currently, 
such contributions are presented by various sector offices in a varied and disorganized 
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manner. In this context it seems clear that the financial statements presented to woreda 
councils is not complete enough to reflect all the financial activities in the woreda. 
 
Woreda administrations in the Amhara region have only two types of payments that are  
recorded as receivables (suspense accounts, not expenditures) namely advances to staff 
and purchase advances. Advances to staff are often short term advances in the form of  
per diem and travel allowance advances when an employee travels for fieldwork, or in 
the form of salary advances. WOFED might also receive and keep money on behalf of 
organizations or individuals for temporary custody for different reasons such as when 
ordered by courts or other appropriate public bodies. Furthermore, woreda 
administrations can enter into contracts with private sector organizations to purchase 
items, for example for constructions But, as it has been argued in the last chapter, under 
the current fiscal decentralization framework, they do not have the mandate to enter into 
long term commitments such as debts. Given these contexts, one can suggest that the 
current modified cash accounting system is advisable. The modified cash accounting 
system enables woredas to treat such short term receivables and commitments properly. 
7.3.2 Performance Reporting 
Regular performance reporting is one of the traditional methods of enhancing 
transparency and accountability in the public sector. The capacity of reports to provide 
understandable, reliable and comparable information determines their contribution in an 
effort to enhance transparency and accountability. Performance reporting in all the case 
woredas follows nearly the same procedure. The WOFED in each of the woredas 
prepares monthly financial performance reports primarily to be sent to zonal offices. 
Each of the sector offices also receives its monthly budget execution and outstanding 
balances. Sector offices prepare their sectoral performance reports and send them to 
their counterparts at the zonal administration on a monthly basis, as well as quarterly to 
WOFED. After quarterly reports from the sector offices are compiled at WOFED, they 
are presented to the woreda administrative council for discussion and evaluation. The 
same type of reporting and evaluation is also made semi-annually and annually, but in 
this case the reports are presented and evaluated also by the Woreda Council. Despite 
the mandate and duty entrusted to the planning and budget unit in WOFED, such units 
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(with the possible exception of Mekiet) rarely make field visits to check if the reports of 
the sector offices are in agreement with what has been done on the ground. 
Discussants in the experts FGDs mentioned two challenges that have most probably 
served to undermine the contribution of the current reporting practices towards effective  
performance evaluation. These are the failure to prepare performance reports comparing 
actual and planned performance, and the failure to prepare reports that integrate 
physical and financial performance. The discussants indicated that several sector offices 
have failed to prepare their performance reports which compare actual performance 
with that of planned. This is one of the main areas of conflict between the planning and 
budget unit in WOFED and the sector offices. Thus, the planning and budget unit has 
sometimes gone to the extent of adjusting the performance reports of some of the sector 
offices in the proper way, as it has been hard for such units to convince and enforce 
sector offices do so.    
Although sector offices are expected to prepare performance report that integrate their 
physical performance with the amount of budget they have utilized, none of the sector 
offices, according to the evidence collected by this study, have so far prepared such 
integrated performance reports. The budget execution report is the only type of report 
that WOFED can produce to show the manner of spending. It is the only report that the 
administrative council of woredas looks at in its quarterly evaluation. Although this can 
be useful in indicating the absorptive capacity of a particular sector office or woreda,  
budget execution remains a crude measure of the manner of spending of public finance. 
It only shows the extent of budget spending by computing the extent of deviation 
between planned and actual budgets. It does not show how economic and efficient the 
spending is. One of the reasons for the failure to prepare integrated reports may be the 
fact that in the current practice, financial performance reports for all sector offices are 
prepared centrally by WOFED, whereas physical performance reports are prepared by 
the respective sector offices. This is due to the fact that, as already mentioned in earlier 
sections, most sector offices do not have appropriate records of their budget utilization.  
Interviewed sector heads, while admitting their failure to keep adequate records of their 
budget utilization, also mentioned that integrated performance reporting is impractical 
for two reasons. The first has to do with the current budgeting system. Currently the 
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woredas are following line-item budgeting system that allocates budget for various 
items to be used by sector offices. Budgets are not allocated to the outputs expected 
from the offices. Thus, the allocation of most of the budget is for a pool of activities 
rather than for a single activity performance or program target. In this situation, it is 
difficult to trace the resources utilized for a particular activity or program and therefore 
to prepare a performance report that integrates financial and physical performance. 
Currently, some sector offices prepare reports of both financial performance and 
physical performance. But their reports show only the total amount of budget they have 
utilized and their performance. They do not show a systematic linkage between specific 
performance targets and the finance used.  
The second reason has to do with the inability or failure to comply with budget plans. 
Interviewees argued that preparing such integrated reports would not have been possible 
even if they were using program or performance budgeting, due to the disruption in the 
budget plan caused by interventions from zone administrations. Due to such 
interference, that has been discussed in detail in the previous chapter, not only have  
budget structures been changed but the link between budget and performance outputs 
has been disrupted. In this situation it would be also difficult if not impossible to 
produce a performance report that integrates financial and physical performance.  
Evaluation of performance takes place at various levels. Upon the preparation of the 
report, sector offices make their own internal evaluation. This evaluation is usually 
made quarterly in management committee meetings. Evaluations at the Woreda 
Administrative Council, which are considered to be the most important, are made 
quarterly, semi-annually and annually. Such evaluations centre on an assessment of the  
physical performance and budget execution of sector offices. The Woreda Council also 
makes an evaluation of the performance of the woreda administrations at the end of the 
year. Zone administrations also make field visits to woreda administrations and 
organize evaluation sessions. 
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7.4 EXTERNAL SCRUTINY 
7.4.1 External Auditing 
The Amhara Region Auditor General (ARAG) authority is the responsible body in the 
region to play the external auditor role and inspect the financial activities of regional 
offices as well as woreda administrations in the region. The external auditing practice, 
like that of internal auditing, is based on compliance auditing that focuses on proving 
the functionality of the internal control system by inspecting various revenue and 
disbursement source documents and financial statements. The inspection involves 
investigating randomly selected financial documents of a single fiscal year. Since 
woreda administrations as well as regional bureaus do not use program/performance 
budgeting, program/performance auditing is not yet being used by ARAG. Because of 
the implementation of a single pool finance system that brings all financial activities 
together in a single office (WOFED), the external auditors do not have to see and 
review the documents in the various sector offices, except for inspecting the stores that 
the sector offices use to stock their supplies.   
Given the financial irregularities that occur in the case study woredas, and the 
weaknesses and shortcomings of the internal audit systems, it seems clear that the 
effective inspection and evaluation of woreda administrations by external auditors is 
critically important.  The results of the survey as indicated in table 7.3 confirm the 
critical need of external auditing. More than 74% of the respondents agreed that the 
allocation and utilization of government finance in the case woreda administration have 
to be verified by an independent third party, be it an external auditor or any other 
organization. The Annova test (see Appendix 4) revealed that there was consistency in 
this respect amongst the case woredas, with the exception of Shebel Berenta
16
. 
However, the current limited capacity of ARAG does not allow it to cover all or even 
most of the regional bureaus and the woreda administrations in the region. In 2008/9 it 
was only able to cover 20 % of them, rising to30% in 2009/10. Currently ARAG 
prioritizes the auditing of regional bureaus rather than woreda administration offices, 
                                                          
16
 The response of respondents in Shebel Berenta is statistically different and below that of Mekiet and 
Debremarkos. This could well be due to their low awareness about the importance of external verification 
as the woreda administration is very remote and was only audited for the first time very recently. 
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and has been able to cover 75-80% of regional bureaus in recent years. However, its 
current coverage of woreda administrations may improve as it has planned to increase 
its total coverage of to at least 50% by 2010/111 (MoFED, 2008:57). 
Table 7.3: Are you happy if the finance performance investigated by third party 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
No 70 22.7 25.5 25.5 
Yes 204 66.0 74.5 100.0 
Total 274 88.7 100.0  
Missing 99.00 35 11.3   
Total 309 100.0   
Source: Field Survey: 2011 
 
There are, of course, important variations between the different woredas in the Amhara 
region in terms of the frequency of audits. Debremarkos city administration, for 
example, has not been audited by external auditors since decentralization. Shebel 
Berenta was audited for the first time in 2009/10, and Bahirdar Zuria has only been 
audited once in the period since decentralization, in 2006/07. Mekiet, however, has been 
audited twice, the first time in 2006/07 and the second in 2008/09. This clearly reveals 
that external auditing in the case study woreda administrations has not been able to fill 
the accountability gap created by the weak internal auditing systems currently in 
operation. 
It is also imperative to assess the extent and nature of the inspection carried out by 
external auditors to explain how external auditing practices in the woreda 
administration can influence the extent of accountability. As mentioned earlier, the 
inspection is limited to compliance auditing. However, this practice has limitations in 
terms of revealing information about how effective and efficient the utilization of the 
budget has been in the woreda administrations. In fact, it can be said that ARAG can do 
little to improve this, for the reason that it is not possible to carry out performance 
auditing in a situation where the woredas are not following program/performance 
budgeting. However, there are some important aspects of financial management that 
could have been inspected in the current line-item budget system. These include, for 
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instance, the level of compliance with budget plans, cash flow plans and procurement 
plans; and the level of integration between the recurrent budget and capital budget. 
However, except for the audit report on Bahirdar Zuria, which did attempt to comment 
on the issue of excessive budget transfer, none of the external audits carried out in the 
other case woredas paid any attention to the above issues and the problems that 
surround them. Line item budgeting cannot be an excuse for not inspecting such issues 
and problems. Thus, it can be inferred that external audit reports are not complete 
enough to uncover the financial management situation of woreda administrations. 
Instead, they still stick to the old control based auditing system, despite some limited 
reforms in the financial management system. It can therefore be said that the external 
auditing practices are not compatible with the reforms in the financial management 
systems being used in woreda administrations.  
Compliance auditing, if carried out properly, could still help to uncover fraud, wastage, 
and other irregularities in woreda government finance. However, a close look at the 
audit reports shows that all of the case woredas have received similar audit opinions 
despite differences in the nature and extent of the detailed findings. ‘Qualified except 
the above concerning issues’ is an audit opinion issued similarly for all case woredas. 
There are obvious concerns about this kind of audit opinion. The first concern is the 
generic nature of this opinion, which tends to cover up several fundamental 
irregularities and breaches of financial rules and regulations that should have resulted in 
legal and administrative action.  
The following are just a few examples of the violation of financial rules and regulations 
that are revealed in the audit reports.  
 In Mekiet, the  2006/07 and 2008/09  audits revealed respectively that payments 
made for procurements that did not pass through appropriate procurement 
procedures amounted to  Birr 21,908.08 and 273,985.20; that payments that 
were not supported by genuine documents amounted to Birr11,301.62 and 
153,101.54; and that per diems paid illegally amounted to Birr 849.95 and 
36,832.50.  
 In Shebel Berenta, the 2009/10 audit revealed that payments not supported by 
genuine documentation amounted to Birr 1,501,989.00; that payment made for 
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procurements that did not pass through the appropriate procedures amounted to 
Birr 2,900; and per diems paid illegally amounted to Birr 1,416.30 
 
Despite findings of these serious violations in the woreda administrations finance 
system, the auditors could not suggest anything beyond issuing the generic audit 
opinion “qualified with exception.” While auditors knew that there were substantive 
violations, the solutions they suggested were not strong enough to address the problem. 
Common audit opinions or suggestions included “the documents to be fulfilled or if not 
the individual responsible for it to return the money,” or “such violations not to be 
repeated in the future.” No legal or administrative measures were recommended for 
punishing such violations or ensuring that they were not repeated in the future. This 
supports the assertion made earlier in this section that external auditing has had little or 
no impact in terms of improving the financial practices in the case woredas. As the two 
audits carried out in Mekiet reveal (as shown above), financial irregularities and 
violations actually increased between 2006/07 to 2008/09, despite the conventional 
assumption that auditing should lessen such malfunctions. 
7.4.2 Consequences of External Auditing 
The main purpose of auditing is not only to disclose irregularities or malfunctions in the 
financial system of different bodies but also to make sure that audited public bodies take 
the the necessary measures to correct them. ARAG does have a follow up procedure to 
check if corrections have been made in line with the auditors’ recommendations. 
However, apart from the weak suggestions given by auditors, the unsatisfactory level of 
response to such suggestions from the audited organizations reflects the inadequate 
impact that external auditing has had in terms of combating the problems in local 
government financial practices. According to the PEFA report (MoFED, 2008:59), only 
68% of audited agencies have been able to respond to ARAG’s request to submit  report 
on the actions they have taken to combat the problems disclosed by the auditors. 
In assessing the extent to which action has been taken to address problems revealed by 
the external auditors, the researcher was able to obtain access to the reports sent by 
Mekiet Woreda and Bahirdar Zuria Woreda about the actions they have taken in 
response to auditors’ findings, as well as the external auditor’s comments on the 
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adequacy of such responses. Based on the assessment of auditors, about 52% of the 
measures taken by Mekiet Woreda administration were deemed to be unsatisfactory in  
fixing the problems, while Bahirdar Zuria was able to take satisfactory measures to fix 
only 58% of the problems. However, a close investigation of the reports shows that 
even some of those measures labelled as satisfactory were not truly satisfactory. For 
instance, the Mekiet Woreda merely issued a warning to the concerned offices or 
individuals not to repeat the violations or in some cases to return the money back. There 
was no effort to take necessary legal or administrative measures against individuals who 
were responsible for such violations. Thus, it can be concluded that the enforceability of 
auditors’ recommendations is quite inadequate.  
A further limitation affecting the impact of external audit reports is the fact that they are 
frequently not presented to the Woreda Council. Only in Mekiet Woreda a copy of the 
audit report is sent to the speaker of the Woreda Council who often does little beyond 
keeping it on file. As speakers in the case study stated during the interviews, in none of 
the case study woredas have the audit reports been presented to the general council 
sessions by the auditors or the speaker of the council.   
7.4.3 Political Arrangement of Financial Accountability 
Despite the lack of consistency in the empirical evidences, the assumption that various 
conventional political arrangements, such as elections and check and balance systems, 
can influence financial governance in a positive way is widely accepted. Even if several 
people question the adequacy and appropriateness of such democratic practices in 
Ethiopia, as discussed in chapter three, the practice of Woreda Council elections and the 
arrangements of the three branches of government at woreda administration level are 
legally recognised as parts of the district level decentralization process to ensure local 
financial accountability and local governance in general. A close examination of such 
practices at woreda level might help to reveal their significance with respect to the 
financial governance of woreda administrations. 
With respect to the possible impact of local council elections, it proved difficult to 
obtain much in the way of useful evidence from the community FGDs. This was due in 
the main to the tense political environment in most of the woredas, which made most of 
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the respondents reluctant to express their views freely.  As has been discussed earlier in 
the literature chapter, both woreda and kebele elections in the Amhara region take place  
every five years. Two or three representatives from each kebele(depending on the size 
of the kebele), are directly elected to the Woreda Council following the ‘first past the 
post voting system.’  
However, the interest of local people in taking part in such elections and other political 
activities is questionable. During the survey, community members were asked about 
their interest in participating in different types of public meetings. As shown in table 7.4 
below, people in the case woredas are less willing to participate in meetings called as 
part of local election campaigns than the other types of meeting listed in table 7.4. The 
response of the surveyed civil servants who are closely working and have frequent 
interaction with the community shows that they also believe that people are less willing 
to attend election campaign meetings than other types of public meetings. One of the 
main reasons for this situation is the political stranglehold held by the ruling party in the 
case woredas. All the seats on the Woreda Council in the four case woredas are 
currently held by the ruling party. As a result of this dominance, opposition parties 
typically do not even bother to put up candidates for the district elections. Given this, it 
is not surprising that citizens take little interest in election campaign meetings, as the 
results are essentially a foregone conclusion. It also suggests that local elections are not 
really an effective means of holding their local government accountable. 
Table 7 4: Willingness of people to participate in public meetings 
 Frequency Total Missing Valid total Valid percent Rank 
 CS Co CS Co CS Co CS Co CS Co CS CO 
 
Local election Campaign 34 180 100 309 - 3 100 306 34 58.8 4
th
 4
th
 
Expansion of schools, 
clinks, roads and so forth 
79 287 100 309 - 3 100 306 
79 93.8 2
nd
 2
nd
 
To evaluate woreda 
government performance 
39 235 100 309 1 3 99 306 
39.4 76.8 3
rd
 3
rd
 
To improve peace and 
security 
82 288 100 309 - 3 
 
    100 
306 82 94.1 1
st
 1
st
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Source: Field Survey: 2011 
An additional explanation for the disinterest of the people in local elections, according 
to one anonymous interviewee, might be the fact that local elections take place one year 
later than the federal and regional elections. The results of these elections tend to have a 
major impact on the voting behaviour of people at the local government level. People 
feel that there is not much point in voting against the party that has already come into 
power at the federal and especially the regional level. The greater importance attached 
by voters to regional rather than local elections is demonstrated in Figure 7.3 below. 
This shows that two thirds of the respondents believe that people in the woreda are 
more interested in taking part in regional/federal elections than in local Woreda Council 
elections. 
Figure 7 3: Percentage of citizens' preference to participate in regional and local 
government elections 
 
Survey: Field Survey: 2011 
 
As can be seen from Table 7.4 above, people are more interested in attending meetings 
called for evaluating the performance of their woreda government than to participate in  
election campaign meetings. This might be an indication that people are more interested 
in directly evaluating the performance of their woreda administration officials than in 
the election of their Council representatives. However, it has to be noted that the 
willingness of people to participate in government evaluation performance meetings is 
still lower than in other types meetings.      
66.3 
33.7 
Regional/Federal
Woreda
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In assessing the effectiveness of other political accountability arrangement, in particular 
the check and balance systems, in supporting local financial governance, it is important 
to examine the workings and performance of the Woreda Council. Respondents were 
asked to evaluate the effectiveness of their Woreda Council in serving as a steward of 
the people over the Woreda Executive. They were asked four types of questions to  
evaluate the dimensions of the effectiveness of the use of Woreda Councils. These were 
the extent of contact between people and Council Members; Council Members’ 
awareness about the preference of people and the capacity of Council Members to 
represent them; and clarity concerning the role of woreda Council Members. Their 
responses were averaged and are shown in Table 7.5 below. The average evaluation was 
58.76 in a 0-100 scale, without statistically significant mean differences in response 
between the case study woredas (see Appendix 5). This suggests that the people do not 
have a fully clear picture of the role of their Council members or of their effectiveness 
in representing the views and interests of their constituents. 
Table 7 5: The effectiveness of woreda council to channel the voice of people 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
How effective are council 
members in  channelling  the 
voice of people 
304 0.0 100.0 58.768 23.7781 
Valid N (listwise) 304 
    
Source: Field Survey: 2011 
 
The role of Woreda Councils was also discussed in the community representative 
FGDs. A revealing fact that emerged from these discussions was that most of the 
respondents were unable to name any of their kebele representatives in the Woreda 
Council. A much greater number were able to name their representatives in the federal 
and regional legislatures. This suggests that local people are unlikely to use their 
representative in the Woreda Council as an effective mediator to channel their voice in 
woreda administration. 
As discussed in detail in the literature chapter, the capacity of Woreda Council 
representatives to exercise stewardship and oversight on behalf of the people is 
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generally very low throughout the country as a whole. The experience of the case study 
woredas is in line with this general trend, although in recent years the capacity of 
council members has been increased to some extent through awareness raising training. 
However, most members of Woreda Councils in the case woredas are still not fully 
aware of their overseeing role and power in their woreda administrations. 
7.5 HUMAN RESOURCES FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
As already discussed in this study, shortages of staff and the lack of appropriate skills 
and experience has been partly responsible for failures in the implementation of 
financial management reforms and non-compliance with financial rules, regulations and 
ordinances. Hence, it is important to assess the capacity and status of the human 
resources involved in woreda financial management processes, in terms of number, 
training, experience, stability and motivation. Generally, as the evidence gathered from 
the case study woredas shows, there is a wide variation in the human resources  
engaged in financial management process in the case study woredas in terms of number, 
training and experience. Bahirdar Zuria and Debremarkos have an almost full 
complement of staff, with only 3 and 2 vacant posts respectively which are expected to 
be filled very soon. Mekiet also does not have a serious problem with staff shortages, 
except in audit section where 4 of the 7 positions are still vacant. But Shebel Berenta 
has a serious human resource shortage problem as only 35 of the 55 established 
positions are currently filled.   
However, complaints were made by the discussants in Debremarkos and in the planning 
and budget sections in all the case study woredas that the number of established 
positions in the approved job structure are not reflective of the actual work load. 
Discussants in Debremarkos believe that their financial units have been allocated the 
same number of job positions as other smaller woredas, despite the fact that the volume 
of work in city administration of Debremarkosis much greater. Moreover, planning and 
budget experts in all the case woredas felt that the formal posts assigned to the planning 
and financial functions were not nearly sufficient for the work to be carried out 
effectively. 
In terms of training, discussants in Bahirdar Zuria and Debremarkos felt that the 
training opportunities provided had been adequate. In Mekiet Woreda, however, 
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perceptions about the adequacy of training opportunity varied from section to section. 
Discussants from the government finance and disbursement section were relatively 
satisfied with the training opportunities provided, as were those from the planning and 
budget section (though with less enthusiasm). However, employees in the audit as well 
as procurement and property management sections were unhappy with the opportunities 
that have been provided to enable them to upgrade their skills. Employees in both 
sections indicated that they are carrying out their day to day duties without any training. 
In general, Shebel Berenta lags behind all the case woredas in terms of training 
opportunities.  
As noted earlier, although all the woredas had suffered, in terms of staff experience, 
from the reshuffling of employees created by the last restructuring in the woreda 
administrations, there is still a quite wide variation in this respect between the case 
woredas. Bahirdar Zuria has more experienced employees and a relatively stable 
manpower situation, followed by Debremarkos. In Mekiet, there is a variation between 
the different sections, with the audit section having the most inexperienced employees, 
followed by the procurement and property management section. However the  
disbursement and government finance unit has relatively better experienced employees, 
followed by the budget and planning section. Shebel Berenta Woreda severely suffers 
from inexperienced employees. The problem has been particularly acute in the  
procurement unit, where none of the employees have more than one year experience, 
but a problem exists through the various planning, budgeting and financial units. The 
main reason for the lack of employment stability has been the high rate of staff 
turnover, which has been particularly pronounced in Shebel Berenta. Due to the 
remoteness of the woreda, most of the employees look for jobs in other woredas after 
getting one or two years of experience in the woreda. Woredas closer to urban centres, 
such as Bahirdar and Debremarkos, have been the primary beneficiaries of this 
situation.  
In terms of motivation and commitment, all woredas have limitations. All of the 
discussants in the expert FGDs expressed discontent with the current compensation 
system. They felt, in particular, that they were unfairly treated in comparison with 
employees of the regional government carrying out similar financial functions. All of 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: BUDGET IMPLEMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM REFORMS AND THE 
FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE OF WOREDA ADMINSTRATIONS 
  
246 
 
the discussants, except in Mekiet Woreda, felt that the discriminatory compensation 
system had a direct effect on their  performance.  
7.6 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter shows that reforms following the “getting the basics right first” approach 
have been introduced to improve various budget execution and control activities such as 
the introduction of double entry systems, modified cash accounting systems, new 
accounting codes, a single treasury system, open bid procurement methods, financial 
and performance reporting, and sample-based post auditing. 
 
Despite such reforms, the evidence presented in this chapter reveals that the 
inconsistency and shortcomings observed in the previous chapter in relation to budget 
design and implementation have also been prevalent in the case of budget execution and 
control reforms. 
 
Furthermore, the chapter reveals that shortcomings and inconsistencies in the design 
and implementation of planning and budget reforms have had a direct knock-on effect 
on the budget execution and control activities. For instance, the use of line item 
budgeting and incremental budgeting has created problems in the orderly 
implementation of the budget, reflected in the excessive budget transfers that 
characterise most woreda administrations. Without performance/program budgeting and 
zero base budgeting, it is rarely possible to have the proper discipline in budget 
execution. It is also observed that unplanned procurement has had a disruptive effect on 
budgets, in particular by making cash management difficult. Sector offices have not  
been able to produce the designated types of report that compare performance against 
plans, as well as financial performance against physical performance. Line item 
budgeting also blocks the opportunities for performance auditing. One result is that both 
performance reports and audit reports presented to the Woreda Council have not been as 
useful as they were supposed to be. This in turn has undermined the overseeing role of 
Woreda Council, and meant that holding officials or sector offices accountable for their 
performance has not been possible.  
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Besides the inconsistencies that have resulted from the budgeting reforms, the chapter 
also shows how inconsistencies in the design and implementation of budget execution 
and control reforms have affected woreda financial governance. To start with, the 
accounting and reporting system, and modified cash accounting system, recognises only 
cash and some short term advances and commitment expenditures. However, long term 
assets are recognised as expenditure, rather than assets, and non-finance donations and 
contributions are not recognised. Therefore, it is very difficult to say that the reports 
prepared, on the basis of such an accounting system, are complete and that the Woreda 
Council has the necessary information to play its overseeing role properly.  
The failure of woreda administrations to comply with financial rules, regulations and 
ordinances laid down by the regional government has also been an important problem. 
Most of the case woredas, for example, continue to allocate budgets to contingency 
funds, although they are not formally allowed to do so. Audit reports show many 
examples of mis-recording. Some woredas have failed to carry out bank reconciliation. 
Sector offices have frequently been unable to clearly indicate the specification of the 
items they wish to procure. And some sector offices have failed to make procurement 
requests in line with their procurement plans, and have been unwilling or unable to 
prepare transparent and relevant financial reports.  
In general, therefore, it seems clear that the financial reforms introduced as part of the 
financial decentralization process in the Amhara Region have not been effectively 
implemented. Two of the reasons for this relate respectively to human resource capacity 
problems on the one hand and inadequate administrative accountability arrangements on 
the other. Generally in all or most of the case woredas, sector office officials have 
neither the experience nor the training to properly plan and budget. Some sector offices 
have suffered from serious staff shortages, and most have suffered from high rates of 
staff turnover, as well as from the lack of experience and training. 
The lack of adequate administrative accountability arrangements has also been an 
important contributory factor in explaining the lack of success of the financial reform 
processes. In the absence of effective oversight and accountability arrangements, offices 
and officials have tended to be negligent in carrying out their duties, in particular in 
diligently preparing and follow plans and complying with established procedures, 
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standards and rules. Although WOFED has the responsibility to enforce compliance 
with financial ordinances and the implementation of the reforms, in most of the case 
woredas the WOFED units have not succeeded in doing so. Officials are rarely 
dismissed or severely disciplined when they have been found to transgress financial 
rules and regulations. The situation has been compounded by the weak capacity and 
lack of independence of internal audit units in the woredas. 
Nonetheless, the adoptions of a double entry accounting system and a single treasury 
system have been more successful. The double entry system has helped woredas to 
improve the accuracy of their recording of information, as well as to facilitate an 
improvement in reconciliation and timely account closing (despite some continuing 
problems resulting from skill deficiencies or negligence). Likewise, the single treasury 
system has helped woreda administrations to utilize their cash more efficiently. 
The chapter shows that practice of both internal and external auditing has not so far 
promoted adequate levels of transparency and accountability. One reason for this has 
been the limited scope of both internal and external auditing, confined to transactions, 
thereby excluding the planning and management aspects of financial management. 
Another reason, specific to external auditing, has been the limited capacity to cover all 
woredas in the region. Currently, the external audit unit of the regional government can 
audit only a small number of woredas each year. Moreover, the external audit reports 
have in general not been clearly indicative of the intensity of wrongdoing, nor have the 
audit opinions and recommendations been strong enough and effectively enforceable to 
effectively address the identified wrongdoings. 
The assessment of political arrangements such as local election and the operation of the  
Woreda Councils shows that both elections and the checks and balance systems have 
been not proved to be effective means of holding woreda administrations accountable. 
Given the dominance of the ruling party in the Amhara region, neither local people nor 
opposition political parties have been interested to take part in local elections. Woreda 
Council members do not seem to have been either interested or capable in encouraging 
popular interest and participation in debates surrounding the preparation of proposed 
plans and budgets. Moreover, the documents (plans, budgets and reports) presented  by 
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officials to the Woreda Councils have not been sufficiently informative to enable the 
council members to exercise effective oversight and control. 
The chapter also pointed out a number of variables and external contextual factors that 
have impacted the effective implementation of financial reforms. Rural woredas, for 
example, have struggled to take advantage of the potential competitive price benefits of 
the open bidding procurement system, because of the small number of local suppliers 
and contractors available. These have often colluded in price-rigging. The smaller and 
rural-based woredas have also faced internal revenue generating difficulties, because of 
the dispersed nature of their populations, the high proportion of informal businesses  
and the low tax base of the population. 
Hence this chapter contends that the contribution of the reforms in woreda financial 
management and financial governance has depended on a complex interplay of various 
factors, such as the extent of synchronisation in the reform processes, the adequacy of 
administrative accountability and human resource capacity, and the extent of the 
separation of party and state in the woreda administrations. This is notwithstanding the 
impact of intergovernmental relations and mechanisms for the direct involvement of 
citizens that are discussed in the preceding and following chapters respectively. 
The fact that financial management systems are systems that comprises a number of 
interrelated processes means that a deficiency in one process can easily cause the whole 
system to fail. A major conclusion emerging from this study is that the reforms in the 
various processes of financial management have not been effectively synchronised with 
each other. The findings also show that, irrespective of how well the reforms have been 
designed and synchronised, they are unlikely to be implemented effectively in ways that 
promote effective financial governance unless improvements in administrative 
accountability and manpower capacity are incorporated and addressed in the design and 
implementation of the reform processes. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL FINANCIAL 
GOVERNANCE BEYOND THE STATE REALM 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
An attempt has been made in the earlier chapters to reveal how various formal 
arrangements in the government system, such as intergovernmental relation 
arrangements and public financial management arrangements, have helped to shape and 
determine the financial governance of woreda administrations in the Amhara region. 
Consideration was devoted in particular to important pitfalls in intergovernmental 
relations and public financial arrangements that have adversely affected financial 
governance of woreda administrations.  At the same time it was observed that there are 
areas in the financial governance of woreda administrations that have remained 
problematic and could not be addressed through such formal arrangements in the 
government system no matter how well they are designed. This situation calls for an 
explanations as to why the formal government arrangements and reforms have failed to 
adequately address the financial governance problems in woreda administrations, and 
how such failures might be resolved in the future. 
To this end, this chapter addresses two of the factors that are out of the domain of the 
formal government system that might profoundly determine local financial governance 
such as social accountability arrangements, and intra-party system and structure. 
Therefore, how does the extent of use of social accountability arrangements to facilitate 
direct involvement of the citizenry determined woreda financial governance and how 
the nature of intra-party system and structure of the ruling party influences woreda 
financial governance are the two issues to be addressed in this chapter. Consequently, 
this chapter has two broad components- the first is for discussing social accountability 
arrangements and the second is for intra-party system and structure.  
The first component of the chapter consists of three parts. The first is to show the gaps 
in the financial management systems that the formal woreda administration system 
couldn’t address but could be resolved through social accountability arrangements. The 
second part is to assess the experiences of social accountability approaches and identify 
their impacts on financial governance. The third part is to present the prospects and 
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challenges of the use of social accountability arrangements to promote financial 
governance in woreda administration by analysing the situation of the existing formal 
and informal civil society organizations.  
The second component presents issues such as the nature of relations within the regional 
ruling party (ANDM) between the party leadership at zone level and woreda level 
influence the autonomy of woreda administrations to determine woreda financial 
governance; how the ruling party system and structure at woreda level influences the 
working of the formal woreda financial system; and how the ruling party system and 
interactions between party members and the people determine the effectiveness of social 
accountability arrangements to facilitate financial governance of  woreda administration 
in the Amhara region. 
8.2 SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY ARRANGEMENTS 
The practice of social accountability in the financial management process of woreda 
administrations in the Amhara region is almost non-existent. Only the formal 
government system has been in use for woreda administrations to allocate and utilize 
their finance. Citizens have been totally ignored in the process. The reforms 
implemented to improve financial governance of decentralized woredas have targeted 
only changing the intergovernmental relations and the public financial management 
systems (formal arrangements). The reforms so far have not incorporated initiatives to 
improve the direct involvement of people in financial matters of woreda 
administrations. Efforts to create opportunities for citizens to participate have been only 
in unorganized and non-empowering manner. For instance, the government has set up a 
program named Financial Transparency and Accountability (FTA) program to promote 
transparency and accountability in financial affairs through the involvement of citizens. 
Nevertheless, the practice has not gone beyond displaying crude information of woreda 
budget allocation and execution to the people. There is also one social accountability 
initiative launched in a few woredas with the support of the World Bank but it is also 
still at a pilot phase. CDF projects are also following a social accountability approach to 
improve access to tap water in rural villages but its impact on social accountability is 
yet to be examined. Therefore, this component of the chapter is to document evidences 
about the need for social accountability arrangements and the current status of direct 
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participation of people in financial affairs of woreda administrations; and why woreda 
administrations failed to present their people with the opportunity to engage in the 
financial decisions as well as to present the argument, from the experience of such 
limited social accountability initiatives, if the gaps in the formal financial management 
system can be filled with social accountability approaches to serve local financial 
governance. 
8.2.1 The Demand for Social Accountability arrangements in Woreda 
Administrations’ Financial Management 
In the last chapter we have witnessed the challenges that the case study woreda 
administrations have encountered in the formal financial management system. Some of 
the financial governance malaises have been connected with limitations in the efficacy 
and appropriateness of the design of formal financial management systems while others 
are connected with flaws in the design and implementation of intergovernmental 
relations between the region/zone and woredas. Nevertheless, several cases have been 
mentioned that indicate such formal arrangements in the government system couldn’t 
address some of the problems, no matter how adequate and appropriate its design has 
been. Some of the cases presented were indicative of the need for alternative 
arrangements that allow direct involvement of citizen in financial affairs of woreda 
administrations. These cases as presented below prove not only the need for direct 
involvement of people but also for the social accountability arrangements that facilitate 
empowered and genuine participation of citizens.  
8.2.1.1 Why Alternative Mechanism is Needed 
Generally, in the current financial management system of woreda administrations in the 
Amhara region, there is no either formally designed arrangement or woredas 
individually initiated practice of involving people in the financial affairs of their 
administration. There is no arrangement to provide financial information directly to the 
citizens or to let people directly voice their discontent about any possible misallocation 
and misuse of government finance. But the question now should be has there been any 
thing wrong in the public resource allocation and utilization because of the absence of 
the direct involvement of the people? Of course, the deputy head of BoFED admitted, 
while emphasizing the importance of the reforms currently adopted by the government 
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in woreda financial management system, that they are not adequate to combat all 
possible corruptions, embezzlements, mismanagement of public resource. The deputy 
head stated that there are still chances for corrupted officials and civil servants to abuse 
public finance without violation of any of the established financial rules, regulations, 
procedures and processes. There are several loopholes that may allow public officials to 
manoeuvre public resource for their private benefits. He believes, in fact, it is unrealistic 
to look for a formal system that can work to address problems in all possible scenarios. 
Thus, he expects several wrongdoings to happen without transparency and direct 
involvement of citizens. 
Some of the problems in the financial governance of woreda administrations are 
triggered by lack of active and empowering engagement of people in public financial 
affairs. Starting with planning, the main reason for failure of the practice of bottom up 
planning in the woreda administration, as discussed in detail in the earlier chapter, is 
lack of arrangement to ensure direct involvement of people in planning process and in 
holding experts at service delivery institutions accountable. The problem, in fact, was 
not limited to lack of involvement of people but also has connection with woreda 
impositions. However, had there been active involvement of people in plan preparation 
and evaluation of performance of service delivery institutions, there would have been 
pressure from below to create a balance between targets imposed from the woreda and 
preference of the local people. Therefore, it can be inferred from this case that having 
informal arrangements that can allow direct engagement of people might support even 
the effective functioning of formal arrangements.  
 
Another area of financial decision making that clearly show a gap in the formal 
arrangements that can possibly be filled with direct involvement of people is location 
decision of various infrastructures and service delivery units. The issue of location 
decision of various infrastructures is often highly contentious and if taken without 
involvement of people often leads to conflict among groups of people and misuse of 
resources. An example of how decisions made without involvement of people can cause 
devastating problems is an incident that has happened in Yeduha town of Shebel 
Berenta Woreda. Discussants of community FGD in Shebel Berenta Woreda stated that 
the wrong location decision for the site of stadium and publicly owned residence houses 
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made by woreda officials concealing it from the public have caused damages in public 
resource. Two open sites were identified when the woreda administration made known 
its decision to construct one stadium and resident houses to address some of the house 
problem of the people. Choices had to be made to determine which of them had to be 
constructed on one site and which one on another place. For some reason some 
influential individuals wanted the stadium to be constructed on the site closer to their 
resident area and the publicly owned residents houses on another site. However, this 
was not the interest of the majority of the people of the town and the people wanted it to 
be the other way around. The main reason is the people knew that if the houses 
constructed on the site chosen by those influential individuals, it would be closer to the 
source of water that supplies the entire town and the liquid wastage that come out of the 
houses would contaminate with the water. Despite such conflicts of interest, the woreda 
administration has made the decision behind closed doors, as discussants believe, just to 
make decisions in the interest of those influential individuals. Nevertheless, within 
months after the construction was completed it was realised that the liquid wastes of 
these houses including from their toilets went to the water well. Thus, the woreda 
administration eventual ended up with the decision to block the water well. Discussants 
explained further that the current water supply shortage in the town is partly the 
consequence of such wrong location decision by the woreda administration. This is an 
indication of the fact that the formal systems in the government office alone can never 
be reliable to result in a decision that is viable as well as reflective of the people 
interest.   
Another case is about how non-participative budget allocation decisions lead to non-
responsive budget allocation. As already discussed in the last chapter, discussants both 
in community as well as in experts FGD agree that had there been an empowered and 
meaningful involvement of citizens, the allocation of the budge in the woredas would 
not have been made just to reflect the political interest of the ruling party. Allocations 
would have been made not only to expand new services but also to ensure quality and 
sustainable services. Participants believe that citizens would force officials to allocate 
adequate budget for improving the poor conditions of the already existing schools, 
health posts and water supply points.   
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One of the challenges that the case study woreda administrations have faced in the 
endeavour to increase access to various pro-poor services is their sustainability mainly 
due to the community’s misuse of services coupled with problems in the quality of 
constructions and materials used. Attempts to mobilize adequate funding from the 
community for maintenance cost have not been as effective as intended due to lack of 
economic capacity or willingness of the community to contribute. Furthermore, several 
water points do not supply water during summer season as they have been constructed 
in unsustainable water reservoirs. Due to lack of careful study by geologists from Zone 
administration or inadequate consultation with the surrounding community, some of the 
water points are constructed on a water springs and shallow wells which often dry up 
during summer seasons. This has been common in countless water supply point projects 
executed by WASH program in various rural areas as opposed to those constructed 
under CDF approach in Bahirdar Zuria Woreda. The main contributing factor for such 
difference between two approaches is the degree of involvement of people in the 
projects. In the WASH programs the involvement of community members has not been 
as organized and genuine as in CDF program (this will be discussed in detail in the 
forthcoming section). 
One of the issues mentioned in the last chapter as a reason for late completion and poor 
quality of construction projects in the woreda administration is lack of construction 
experts to follow up the progress and quality of constructions. All of them except 
Bahirdar Zuria have no the required expert to do so. The attempt to borrow experts from 
zone urban construction office has not been viable as well as exposed to corruption. 
Even Bahirdar Zuria and Mekiet Woreda administration whose education office and 
health office respectively have their own construction experts has not been relieved 
from such concerns. Making sure the quality and progress of construction projects are in 
line with the desirable standard and pace could have been possible if only the experts 
did their following up construction projects on daily basis which was practically 
impossible and not viable. That is why both education office and health office heads 
still have concern over the quality and pace of constructions going on in the woreda. It 
can be understood from this fact that the situation could never be easily turned around 
without active and organized involvement of the surrounding community in the 
constructions. 
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Another problem, perhaps the most concerning adverse issue in the procurement 
process for all discussants and informants, is the falsely inflated price of procured items 
and services. The implementation of the new procurement method which is based on 
open bid procurement and planned bulk procurement for practical reasons hasn’t 
safeguarded the case woreda administrations from such uneconomical procurements. 
The planned bulk procurement method has not been practically possible due to some 
unplanned activities carried out in offices, nonexistence of adequate number of supplier 
to bid and the small size of purchases. Even when it was applied, the existing small 
numbers of suppliers in the woreda colluded and offered prices even higher than market 
prices. Therefore, the reform in the procurement process has not been effective to 
realise the intended benefits or to safeguard wastage of government resources in the 
procurement process. There is adequate evidence to indicate that there are gaps in the 
formal procurement process that could be solved if citizens are allowed to be involved 
in the procurement process. 
Revenue assessment and collection is one of the areas that required the involvement of 
citizens. It has been observed from the earlier chapter that the main factor that 
contributed for business community tend to evade tax is the lack of credibility on the tax 
assessment process. The fact that business activities in the case woredas are dominated 
by small scale informal traders that do not keep record of their financial turnover makes 
objective, consistent and transparent tax assessment difficult. Furthermore, the woredas 
failed to bring illegal traders into legal system. The attempt to involve business 
community representatives in the assessment process didn’t help to lift its credibility as 
their involvement has not been as genuine and empowered as needed by the business 
community. Therefore, community members still demand empowered involvement of 
active, dedicated and informed representatives in the assessment process as well as to 
convince illegal traders to pay their fair share tax. 
The credibility of performance reports prepared by various sector offices has been 
subject to question somehow except in Mekiet Woreda as the planning and budgeting 
division in WOFED that is supposed to verify the reliability of these reports through 
field visits have not been doing so due to some practical problems such as budget 
shortage, lack of capacity and power imbalance with sector office heads to openly give 
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their feedback about the credibility of the report and enforce the change in the report 
accordingly. Even in Mekiet Woreda administration where planning experts do field 
visit of various works of sector offices do not dare to openly criticise their report. It can 
be said that had there been empowered involvement of citizens in the process of 
performance report preparation, its credibility wouldn’t have been in question. 
In the last chapter, it was mentioned that the legal complexity in general and the 
difficulty of producing evidence in particular has made holding those suspected officials 
and contractors accountable very difficult. One of the reasons why people have been 
tolerant to corrupted behaviours and not dare to expose it is the formal legal system that 
discouraged them from doing so by demanding them to provide tangible legal evidence. 
Even if they have information ordinary citizens might not have the capacity or the 
desire to put them-selves in to the complex procedure of producing legal evidence. The 
legal complexity was the reason also for woreda administrations not to go for legal way 
outs when contractors and suppliers failed to meet the contract. Thus, all participants in 
the community FGDS believe that had there been a system that allows them to involve 
in the evaluation of officials, contractors and suppliers, they could have at least publicly 
embarrassed them even if they couldn’t hold them legally accountable.        
Therefore, we have seen thus far that the specific cases that reveal how the lack of 
citizen involvement in the woreda financial management process could lead to 
undesirable decisions and financial consequences. The following section is just to see 
how the current limited and non-organized manner of involving citizens have been 
practiced in the case of woreda administrations. 
8.2.2 Citizen Participation, Financial Transparency and Accountability 
8.2.2.1 Participation and Nature of Citizen Participation 
One of the issues posed in the FGDs was about the nature and extent of citizen 
participation in the planning, budgeting, follow up and controlling process. Participants 
speak in one voice that the involvement of people in government financial management 
process would be extremely important to facilitate effective and efficient allocation and 
utilization of public finance. They didn’t forget to mention that such community 
participation is not to replace the role of the government but to work in partnership with 
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government so that to ensure efficient and effective allocation and utilization of 
financial resources. This is to mean that woreda government should handle the 
bureaucratic, professional and technical responsibilities of administering the finance 
while allowing citizens to have saying in the determination of their priorities and budget 
allocation, follow up and controlling its utilization. The role of distributing budget to 
different sections of community should remain with the woreda government as the 
participants see the tendency that every community wants to develop their own 
surrounding at the expense of others’ and compete for limited budget. Woreda 
administration officers can facilitate citizen involvement in the follow up and evaluation 
process by enhancing financial transparency through availing clear, reliable and 
understandable financial information to the public. This can be done effectively 
particularly for small projects their benefit is limited to a particular community. But 
participants noted that this might not be effective for larger projects their benefits 
extend across the woreda as the community in a particular village or neighbourhood 
could not have information to follow up and control the utilization of its budget. 
Participants in the experts’ FGD also support the essence of citizen involvement stating 
that officials would be embarrassed when their wrongdoing in the government finance 
is uncovered in public evaluations than in administrative or political evaluation process 
that takes place in the government formal system.  
How the current participation of citizen in government finance system looks like was 
also one of the issues discussed. Generally, their views reveal that there has not been 
any case where people invited for and discussed on issues of any financial matter. 
Neither in planning, in priority identification and in budget allocation, nor in follow up 
and controlling have they been involved.  
The willingness of people to participate in meetings called by government is also 
questionable. The willingness of people to participate in such meetings is extremely low 
as confirmed by discussants in both experts’ and community representatives’ FGDs. 
The surveyed civil servants also have similar perception about the willingness of people 
to participate. As table 8.2 reveals the willingness of people to participate in the 
meetings according to their belief is far below average (mean=0.2952). Even the 
response of the surveyed community members about their own willingness, as table 8.1 
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shows, is only a little far from average (mean=0.679). Annova test (Appendix 5) shows 
that there is no statistically significant mean difference in the response of both 
community members and civil servants between the case woredas. 
Table 8 1: Willingness of people to participate in the meetings called by woreda 
administration (community members) 
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
BDZ 62 .629 .2854 .0362 .557 .702 .0 1.0 
Mekiet 88 .693 .2978 .0317 .630 .756 .0 1.0 
Shebel 70 .650 .3110 .0372 .576 .724 .0 1.0 
Markos 84 .726 .2504 .0273 .672 .781 .5 1.0 
Total 304 .679 .2871 .0165 .647 .712 .0 1.0 
Source: Field Survey: 2011 
 
Table 8 2: Civil servants' perception about the level of willingness of people to 
participate in the meetings called woreda administrations 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
BDZ 45 .489 .3452 .0515 .385 .593 .0 1.0 
SB 16 .375 .2887 .0722 .221 .529 .0 1.0 
DM 15 .367 .2289 .0591 .240 .493 .0 .5 
MK 24 .542 .2041 .0417 .455 .628 .0 1.0 
Total 100 .465 .2952 .0295 .406 .524 .0 1.0 
Source: Field Survey: 2011 
Several reasons are identified for the lack of peoples’ willingness to take part in such 
meetings. The first reason is, as stated by discussants, the type of public meetings that 
have been organized by their local governments didn’t go along the preference of 
people. They mentioned four types of meetings where they have been called for a 
meeting by woreda administration. The first is for election campaign by ruling party 
when the next election approached which most people are not interested to attend. The 
second is when monetary, labour or material contribution from the people is needed for 
various purposes sometimes for development works of the surrounding. The third is the 
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meeting called to announce or disseminate a particular new policy, proclamation or new 
legislation passed from top (region as well as federal government) for its 
implementation. Fourthly, there are irregularly held meetings of people called by 
government to discuss about general development activities in the surrounding. 
Discussants believe that these are meetings organized just to elicit information about the 
view of the people. Since they are irregular no one knows when they to be held. They 
are more of general discussions that are not systematically organised where people 
reflect their view and finished without any satisfactory response or reaction from 
government side. These are the most common types of meetings held between people 
and government body.  
On the other hand, as presented in chapter seven, table 6.4 showed that elections and 
political related meetings are among the least preferred types of meetings that people 
like to attend. They prefer to attend pragmatic meetings that are organized to discuss 
overcoming their problems, such as the improvement and expansion of schools, health 
services, water supply, peace and security and so forth. Moreover, the kind of result 
people expect from the meeting influences their willingness to take part in the meeting. 
The surveyed respondents were asked which of the expected results of meetings would 
attract them to participate if they were invited for a budget allocation and utilization 
discussion. Their response reveals that they would be willing to participate first in a 
meeting that they expect to improve various public services, second is a meeting that 
they expect they will influence the budget decision; and third the meeting they expect 
they will be heard. However, they give the least importance to the private gain that the 
meeting would bring to them.  
On the other hand, respondents were asked if they would be discouraged from 
participating in budget discussions because of various other factors such as, individual 
inconvenience; lack of information about how the government system works; lack of 
technical knowhow in budgeting and finance; and the assumption that they don’t have 
the mandate to discuss about government finance. However neither of these factors are 
important for them to determine their willingness to participate.     
Thus, it can be concluded that the current low level of willingness to participate is 
attributed to the attitude of ‘no result expectation’ that the people have towards public 
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meetings. Nonetheless, discussants pointed out also the legacy of forced participation 
that the last regime used as contributing to the low level of peoples’ participation. In the 
Derge regime, people were forced to attend any meeting organized by the government 
through intimidation and threat of fine and imprisonment. Thus, people had been 
attending public meeting without their willingness and had developed a negative 
attitude towards meeting in general. Several discussants believe that this adversative 
mind-set has not changed. 
Discussants stated that public meetings organized by kebele administrations at grass 
root level are, except in few occasions, attended often only by powerless, poor and less 
informed section of the people who became ruling party members just seeking job or 
support in any other form from the government. Nevertheless, those sections of society 
who have information and can challenge government body in most cases do not attend 
such meetings. For instance, in Debremarkos city relatively more informed, educated 
and influential section of people, such as civil servants working in various government 
and non-government offices as well as business community reside. However, they have 
rarely attended the meeting organized by kebele administrations. Thus, discussions in 
such meetings are between two imbalanced bodies and, as already mentioned earlier, 
official use them only to dictate, inform and elicit information from the people.  
In order to address the issue of low level of local participation, the government has 
recently devised an innovative method called a one-to-five networking. In this 
arrangement residents in every kebele are supposed to organize themselves in to a team 
consisting of five members. Any form of basic public service and government policy is 
promoted and reach the people through this network. Though it is now at early stage, 
the government has a plan to use the network as a prime means of involving all people 
in the local development works. However, as the Ethiopian Reporter (Yemane, 2013), a 
weekly newspaper, commented that the use of such network is being extended beyond 
local development purposes. The ruling party is using it as a means of garnering local 
people’s support for the party. It is commented that each team is being led by the ruling 
party cadres who are in charge of promoting party ideology and seek support from the 
people. Thus, a shift in the purpose of the team is being witnessed as the team leaders 
force members to evaluate each other based on the level of loyalty and support they 
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have towards the ruling party. The attachment with the ruling party might harm genuine 
participation as there are people who begun to cease participation when they realized 
that the team is being used for party purpose and ideas and views different from the 
ruling party ideology and line are considered anti-development and unwelcome.    
8.2.2.2 Community Contribution 
As explained earlier briefly one of the methods of involving people in financial 
management process is just by asking them to contribute in the form of labour, material 
or money ‘voluntarily’ for the project proposed to be constructed in their surroundings. 
According to the discussants such practices of mobilizing resources from the local 
people through voluntary contribution are a new phenomenon. In the past, financing 
public services has been regarded as the mere responsibility of government. But since 
the last few years, following the emergence of a spirit of competition not only among 
the officials but also the people of woredas or city administrations as people got 
information about the development activities carried out in other areas particularly 
through media, they have become motivated and willing to contribute what they can 
afford for the development of various infrastructures in their surroundings. This could 
be in the form of money contribution particularly in urban areas as well as in labour and 
material contribution. People, business community in urban areas in particular, 
participate actively in fund raising events such as bazars organized by woreda or city 
administrations for raising fund for various development activities. Rural woredas such 
as Mekiet, Bahirdar Zuria and Shebel Berenta have mobilized resources for the 
construction of primary schools and health posts (about 75%-85% of the resource) and 
water supply facilities (about 15% of the resource). City administrations such as 
Debremarkos and towns in rural woredas (Mekiet and Shebel Berenta) also raised a 
significant amount of resources through bazar for construction of paved road, libraries 
and cultural centres in the city. 
Furthermore, discussants in community FGDs mentioned that efforts of the government 
to develop infrastructures in the last three or four years has also inspired people to 
contribute voluntarily. However, they mentioned also people could have been more 
willing to contribute resources, had the woreda or city administration involved them at 
the initial planning stage of such development efforts. Discussants in Debremarkos 
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stressed on lack of consultation with the people in the planning stage and lack of effort 
to create broad awareness. In all remaining case study woredas, people have been 
consulted or informed about the project or activity to be carried out only when the 
government wanted contribution from the people. That is why it is very difficult to say 
all the contributions in the rural kebeles for the construction of schools and health posts 
have been made voluntarily. Kebele officials attempt to force people to contribute 
through different means. Discussants explained that it is not affordable for them to 
refuse to contribute. Due to resistances from the people, some rural kebele 
administrations resort to cover the money expected from the people selling some 
publicly owned natural resources such as eucalyptus trees. Thus, lack of woreda 
administrations’ effort to involve people at planning stage of the project is the primary 
factor for such resistance from the people even though participants explained their 
economic problem might also contribute its part. 
Such discussions should result in the priorities of people being addressed in the 
planning process. People are more willing to contribute if the proposed project activities 
can address the priorities of people. For instance, participants who came from Yinessa 
Kebele in Bahirdar Zuria Woreda explained that they would be glad to contribute 
willingly all they can if their woreda administration starts any project to construct water 
supply facilities given their existing sever water supply problem. Moreover, discussants 
explained that the magnitude of their willingness to contribute boosts when the benefits 
of the proposed projects or infrastructures for their surroundings become visible or 
tangible.   
Nonetheless, discussants explained also the failure of local officials to provide adequate 
information to the people about the manner in which the contributed resource has been 
utilised might in the future affect the willingness of people to contribute. Discussants 
mentioned that they have observed that unlike in the previous time people became keen 
to know and start to discuss with each other how the money they contributed is used for 
the intended purpose. FGD participants in Mekiet and Debremarkos explained that they 
have never been invited in any meeting organised by woreda/city administration to 
discuss or explain the utilization of the money despite the widespread rumours of 
embezzlement by officials. Even the responses given by officials of Debremarkos city 
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administrations in public meetings have not been adequate and lacked clarity. As a 
result people couldn’t take a position about the effectiveness and efficiency of its 
utilization. Discussants believe that this might hamper future efforts of mobilizing 
resources from the people. They ask “how the people would be willing to contribute in a 
situation where the proper use of the money is doubtful”. People apparently need 
convincing clarification about the proper use of the money they contributed if they 
should contribute voluntarily. Unlike the kind of information government body 
currently presents about the use of finance from government source, people need clear, 
specific and understandable financial information if they should be convinced about the 
proper use of finance and contribute voluntarily to future development endeavours in 
their localities. 
8.2.2.3 Accountability 
The participation of people is not just in the form of involvement of people in 
development works and contribution of resources. But people’s direct involvement of 
people in holding officials accountable for misallocations, mismanagements and 
embezzlements is also always of importance. The first issue is the attitude and reaction 
of the local community towards corrupted officials and their act. Discussants in 
community FGD were asked to explain the extent to which people are concerned for 
illegal use of government money. All of them admitted that peoples’ concern for 
embezzlement of public money is declining. Stealing money that doesn’t belong to one 
is generally a condemned act in the society. Despite the difference in intensity the same 
had been true in the past for embezzling public money. Since some time now, however, 
as discussants at Mekiet contended, the tendency of citizens to condemn individuals for 
embezzling public money is declining. In the past they were likened to thieves but now 
their action is being regarded as a business. In fact, corrupted behaviour of officials is 
not a recent phenomenon. Local officials in the past had been abusing their power to 
their own personal benefits.  But much of the corruption had been in the form of taking 
bribes from individuals and it was considered to be their right as the popular Amharic 
saying goes ‘he who did not benefit when promoted, would regret when demoted’. But 
they argue that there was no visible behaviour of embezzlement of government finance 
as there had not been significant amount money involved at local level. As the matter of 
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fact, citizens had no awareness or information or interest to know about public resource 
allocation and utilization as the role of government in their every day to day life had 
been very insignificant until recently. Therefore, it was in the interest of higher level 
government to investigate and expose if the small local public money used by local 
officials is deemed to be inappropriate. If they are caught and exposed, however, not 
only the punishment from the higher government body had been harsh but most 
importantly the individual would have been disregarded by the society.  
Discussants stated several reasons for the decline in the magnitude of social sanctions 
against such corrupted local officials. One elder participant in Debremarkos explained 
that the reluctance that higher level government official have shown in several public 
money embezzlement cases for various reasons, such as lack of adequate evidence has 
discouraged people from disregarding such acts. As he described it  
in the past if government official embezzled government money and higher 
level government knew about it, the individual would definitely be punished 
for it. However, now we hear every now and then about several 
embezzlement cases and I guess higher level government officials are also 
aware of it but they don’t take any action. They tell you there is no enough 
evidence to take legal action. What else they need if the people knew about 
it. How could the people condemn this individual if the government itself 
doesn’t care about its own money. 
There is a belief among discussants that the legal complexity that doesn’t threat corrupt 
local official because of shortage of legal evidences could be discouraging for the local 
people to be concerned about public resources. In fact, this was an issue of debate in 
community FGDs but most of them still believe that there should have been a 
mechanism to hold officials accountable even if adequate evidence is not available.  
Another reason could probably be related with the popular Amharic saying mentioned 
by one of the discussants “you can abuse a belonging of thousands but never mess up 
with a brother (relative) of thousands”. This conception has just similar connotation as 
the concept of ‘the tragedy of commons’ that reflects the widely held misconception 
among people that public finance is a common resource that is no one’s resource and no 
one takes care of it.  People do not have sense of ownership to public money. Generally, 
as discussants in the FGDs contend that the initiative of citizens to hold woreda officials 
accountable for any wrongdoings in the financial administration is diminishing. But 
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now, the question is besides such attitude related problems what else does prevent 
citizens from holding woreda officials accountable. Several factors might be responsible 
for this.  
Firstly, even if people might have the initiative discussants stated that political and legal 
complexities might prevent them from exposing illicit use of public finance. All of 
participants have explained that, despite the declaration of woreda self-rule, they still 
present their complaint following the hierarchical government structure. First to a head 
of the particular office, then to chief administrator, then to zone administration then to 
regional administration and so on. None of them have mentioned anti-corruption 
offices, woreda courts, woreda police, or Woreda Council members. One participant at 
Debremarkos mentioned that their kebele administrations in the city has recently 
launched anti-corruption unit to entertain such complaints from the people. But none of 
the participants except him was aware of even its existence. One community 
representative in Mekiet Woreda revealed his fear that legal recourse such as reporting 
to police and court cannot be useful and it even might backfire on the individual. The 
required strong evidences for court and police are hardly available to an individual 
citizen. Even if such evidences were available, he doesn’t believe that woreda police 
and court are independent and able to convict woreda officials. They believe that the 
only reason if woreda officials do not abuse public money should be because they fear 
their higher level officials. Thus, they believe that it is only benevolent higher officials 
who care for the people can stop any possible corrupted acts of woreda officials. 
Besides, as already explained earlier in the last chapter, no one takes Woreda Council 
members seriously to use them as a reliable checking mechanism of the woreda 
administration officials’ power.   
Therefore, whenever they felt that woreda government finance is being embezzled by 
individual woreda officials, they only resort to expose it to the next level of government 
in the hierarchy. Nonetheless, exposing it using this mechanism is not always 
convenient for ordinary citizen particularly to the people of rural woredas that are far 
from zone offices as well as regional offices. Participants at Bahirdar Zuria and 
Debremarkos explained that they have relatively better access to zone or even to 
regional government as their woreda is closer to it. Thus, this mechanism is not being 
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used by the majority of people but only by few individuals who are courageous and 
determined to expose it. 
Furthermore, participants revealed their fear of retaliation they might face from woreda 
officials. They suspect that woreda officials are more likely to be protected by zonal or 
regional officials and measures might not be taken against them as they are connected 
through their political party system. One participant expressed this beautifully  
why should I complain to zone or regional authorities when I know they 
would reject my complaint just for lack of legal evidence. How could I risk 
myself by exposing woreda officials to zone or region officials while I know 
it is enough just to label me as member of one of the opposition parties for 
him/her to imprison me.   
Discussants believe that woreda officials are protected by their next level officials as 
long as they obey the ruling party ideology and work to eliminate opposition party 
support by all means. Whatsoever accusation of embezzlement or wastage of woreda 
government finance reported on them woreda officials would avenge the complaining 
individual just by attaching him/her with one of the opposition parties. One participant 
at Shebel Berenta imagined a situation where the moment he came back from zone or 
regional office he went for exposing the corruption committed by one of the woreda 
officials he just found his home “surrounded by local militias and his family members 
being intimidated”.  
But this does not mean there has not been any attempt by citizens to account woreda 
officials.  As explained earlier, especially if the fund is from the contribution of the 
people, people often enquire information about its utilization. For instance, even though 
there has been no formal enquiry so far, people in Mekiet Woreda are concerned and at 
least talk and discuss with each other about the whereabouts of the money collected in 
the bazar for various development purposes. People in Debremarkos have even gone 
further to raise questions related to the utilization of the money collected in the bazar in 
every public meeting organized for other various purposes. They have been 
complaining every now and then whenever there was public meeting seeking 
explanation for the delay of the construction of city road and for the rumour of 
embezzlement of the budget by city administration officials. This case can tell that 
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people are more concerned and tend to hold local officials accountable if they make 
contribution. 
The contribution was made by the people of Debremarkos city for the purpose of 
constructing various infrastructures in the city. Much proportion of the fund for the 
construction was from government and small proportion of it from people contribution. 
As participants in community FGD stated the fact that people have contributed money 
for it makes them to be curious and ask officials persistently. Nonetheless, officials 
responded that the accusation of embezzlement was full of lies and the only reason for 
the delay of the construction was the decline in the transfer from regional government. 
The city administration officials pointed out that the money they expected from the 
region wasn’t transferred. This situation left the people in dilemma to accept or reject 
the explanation as they didn’t have any idea as to how and how much money the 
regional government was expected to transfer, and gradually weakened peoples’ 
determination to hold officials accountable. This case can be an indication that 
intergovernmental financial transfers tend to be obscured to the people and affect 
accountability through direct involvement of the people. In addition, the case 
manifested that citizens tend to not to ask about the use of finance if its source is mainly 
from higher level government or donors as they think they have no the mandate or 
power to ask for information. They think higher level official have more interest to 
control how it is utilized than the citizens do. To change such attitude, WOFED in 
Bahirdar Zuria very recently set up a Financial Transparency and Accountability (FTA) 
committee to promote the awareness of people in the woreda so that they would seek 
information. But its outcome is yet to be seen. 
Despite the existing difficulties, participants at Bahirdar Zuria and Shebel Berenta also 
insist that people still have the courage to expose corrupt activities. Participants at 
Bahirdar Zuria mentioned the case of Meshenti Peasant’s Cooperation officials who 
charged the people extra money beyond the standard price when they bought improved 
bee hives and sheep breeds distributed through the cooperative. Thus they managed to 
get the extra money paid back as they organized themselves and complained to the 
woreda administration. Participants at Shebel Berenta also mentioned the case of kebele 
officials who used the money that supposed to be distributed for the people for their 
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private use. After people had several challenging fighting, they were able to expose it 
and as a result to get them put in jail. These two particular cases can show that peoples 
may actively involve in exposing embezzlement if the money embezzled is felt directly 
by individuals and perhaps if individuals are not powerful. The researcher still wonders 
to what extent such efforts by people could have resulted in punishment if the accused 
individual were one of the woreda officials. 
Even though not in an organized manner, people had also few chances to voice their 
complaint on the allocation and use of government money through various public 
meetings. Participants mentioned that few individuals still have the courage to expose 
any wrongdoing in public meetings. However, their efforts have not been turned into 
effect as such meetings were organized irregularly just to hear what the people were 
saying. This is just to say that citizens’ effort to expose such wrongdoings have been 
stalled by the poor quality of participation. Participants explained that instead of 
addressing the complaint, woreda officials tended to criticise and attack the individual. 
Any critique has been seen as a threat to the ruling party. Particularly since the 2005 
election crisis in the country, political labelling has been one of the problems that 
hampered people from voicing. Any criticism voiced by citizens has been given 
political meaning and the individual would be intimidated just labelled as opposition 
party member. If the pressure from the people becomes strong, officials might admit 
and pledge to correct the problem. But if there is next meeting, those officers who 
pledged to correct the problem might not come to the meeting and the new ones would 
make the people to discuss the same issue as a new agenda. Consequently, it has been 
common to discuss over and over the same issue without any tangible solution. 
Thus it can be indicated from the earlier discussion that, given the abovementioned 
difficulties reduced, people would be interested to expose and hold corrupted officials 
accountable. The surveyed respondents were asked if they dare to expose misuses and 
wastages by government officials given that they had adequate information and were 
involved in an empowering type of meeting. As shown on table 8.3, their mean response 
confirms that they would be more likely (mean= 0.821) to expose such corrupted 
activities. Their response has been tested for variability and the result shows that there is 
no statistically significant mean difference in respondents’ response between case 
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woredas. Therefore, it can be inferred that if all obstacles of accountability addressed 
properly, citizens would not hesitate to hold their local officials accountable.   
Table 8 3: Respondents' tendency to expose abuse and misuses of government 
resource if they participated in a meeting organized for such purposes 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
BDZ 63 .794 .4079 .0514 .691 .896 .0 1.0 
Mekiet 87 .805 .3988 .0428 .720 .890 .0 1.0 
Shebel 68 .926 .2629 .0319 .863 .990 .0 1.0 
Markos 84 .774 .3674 .0401 .694 .854 .0 1.0 
Total 302 .821 .3684 .0212 .779 .863 .0 1.0 
Source: Field Survey: 2011 
8.2.2.4 Financial Transparency 
The other most important factor that limits financial accountability has to do with 
financial transparency. Transparency is always at the heart of the accountability of 
financial management system. However, transparency of government financial affairs 
directly to the citizens is the least addressed element of financial governance in woreda 
administrations of the Amhara region.  All the discussants in the community FGDs have 
expressed that they would be pleased if their woreda government could provide them 
with information particularly about the budget allocated and utilized for projects carried 
out in their kebele. They were asked also if they had information about the finance 
allocated and used when different development projects such as schools, health centres 
and so forth built in their surroundings. Let alone getting information about the finance 
allocated and utilized for the projects carried out in their surroundings, they received no 
information about the plan for new project to be set up through the formal channel from 
kebele administration or any other source. They said “we hear rumours from those who 
are closer to kebele administration officials that a lot of things were going to be 
constructed. But such gossips, in most cases, have been lies only few of them have been 
true”.  
It has been a tradition that kebele officials called people for a meeting and explained 
about the development project to be constructed only because they needed contribution 
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from the people either in the form of labour or money. Even in such cases, officials 
didn’t come back to the people to explain about the utilization of the money. This is 
clearly observed in Debremarkos and Mekiet where the administrations have mobilized 
a remarkable amount of money by organizing bazar events. In Mekiet Woreda, there 
have been rumours spreading among the people in the woreda that the money raised in 
the bazar is embezzled by officials. But strikingly, there has not been any discussion 
held with the people to clear the rumour and explain about the whereabouts of the 
money collected in the bazar. The discussants revealed their concern that this situation 
might affect future resource mobilizing efforts that people would never be willing to 
participate in the same events anymore. Officials in Debremarkos city administration 
were reluctant to give information. But the immense rumour sprawling among people 
put pressure on them eventually to call a meeting and give the people a chance to reflect 
their views and ask for explanation about the whereabouts of the money and its 
utilization. But the response officials gave not only lacked clarity but also was 
unsatisfactory.  
Realizing the need for arrangements of providing financial information directly to the 
citizen besides the formal reporting systems, BoFED has launched a program to 
promote financial and budget transparency and accountabilities in its woreda 
administrations. Even though the deputy head of BoFED expressed that the program 
consists of several initiatives that facilitate transparency of information about the 
allocation and utilization public money by woreda administrations, only limited of these 
initiatives are so far put in place. Displaying information concerning the allocation and 
periodical execution of budget on public notice boards is part of this program currently 
being in practice in the woreda governments. In all case woredas, the notice boards are 
thought to be accessible and visible to the general public as they are placed either at 
squares or closer to woreda administration offices. It is also sent to kebele 
administration offices to be displayed on notice boards. This information is also 
distributed to each of the council members and solicited to give their feedback on it. 
The information posted on notice boards include the approved budget allocation to pro-
poor sectors indicating budget category as capital budget and recurrent budget as well as 
budget sources as from regional transfer, from the woreda and from donors. At the end 
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of each quarter and the year, the execution of budget using the same format is displayed 
as well. 
This practice is appreciated by the discussants in experts’ focus group discussion in all 
case woredas as a good start to promote transparency. However, the feedback they 
received from the people as a result of such efforts is so limited condemning lack of the 
initiative of citizens to involve or seek information about government financial 
performance. The response of surveyed respondents shows also the practice doesn’t 
seem to bring substantial effect in terms of financial transparency. Table 8.4 reveals that 
respondents have lower level of information (mean=0.2583) about the financial 
performance of their woredas where as they highly suspect (mean=.8817) that the 
financial resource of woreda administration might be abused or utilized for personal 
use.  
Table 8 4: Respondents' response about their level of suspicion for corruption and 
their level of information about woreda financial performance 
 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Variance 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Statistic 
The level of suspect for 
corruption 
300 1.00 .00 1.00 .8817 .01586 .27462 .075 
The level of information 
about woreda financial 
situation 
300 1.00 .00 1.00 .2583 .01851 .32058 .103 
Valid N (listwise) 292        
Source: Field Survey: 2011 
Table 8 5: ANOVA analysis 
 Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean Square F Sig. 
The level of suspect for 
corruption 
Between Groups .265 3 .088 1.173 .320 
Within Groups 22.284 296 .075   
Total 22.549 299    
The level of information 
about financial 
performance 
Between Groups .517 3 .172 1.689 .170 
Within Groups 30.212 296 .102   
Total 30.729 299    
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Source: Field Survey: 2011 
Some of the discussants, particularly in Debremarkos and Shebel Berenta, insist that 
such practice of providing information to the general public cannot be effective way of 
ensuring transparency and accountability given the illiteracy, lack of initiative and the 
complex nature of financial information reported by the woreda administration. They 
suggest, thus the Woreda Council is the only means as representatives elected by the 
people are more educated, informed and dedicated to shoulder such responsibilities. 
Discussant, however, admit also that they are not sure to what extent the financial 
information presented to Woreda Council help the council members to scrutinize and 
oversee the financial performance of woreda administrations on behalf of the people. 
Besides, because the reasons discussed in the earlier chapter Woreda Councils have not 
been effectively playing their role. 
With this in view, the WOFED in Bahirdar Zuria woreda, for instance, very recently has 
set up a FTA (Financial Transparency and Accountability) committee for the purpose of 
promoting the awareness of people in the woreda about government budgeting and 
finance so that they would be interested to seek information and hold woreda officials 
accountable.  The impact of the committee is yet to be seen. But it is so hard to expect 
such initiations from the government office to have a substantial result in providing 
independent support and to genuinely mobilize people to challenge woreda officials. 
However, one thing that all discussants agree on is that the failure of such public 
displays of financial information is due to two reasons. Firstly, citizens had limited 
interest towards publicly displayed financial information as they think that it is difficult 
to comprehend for ordinary people like themselves. They think that the financial 
information displayed is too broad and it is impossible for an ordinary citizen to 
understand and evaluate how effective and efficient the financial practice has been. 
They explained that, no matter how educated and familiar the person is about finance, 
the information displayed on public notice boards is not adequate to know how 
effectively and efficiently the government finance has been utilized. The information 
displayed is crude and does not attract the attention of the people. They indicated that 
such crude information can only cover up the possible corruptions and abuses that might 
take place in the office rather than showing the reality. They said “we don’t expect them 
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to display the amount of money they have loaded to their pocket”. In this situation there 
could be only rumours. Even if citizens are determined to ask officials based on 
rumours, officials would not have difficulty of defending to such rumour based 
accusations. 
Furthermore, discussants said they are not interested to see information about the 
allocation and execution of budget the way it was presented on the notice board, but 
their interest is to know whether the amount they put on the report is really used for the 
development of the woreda. They argue that “how can we know for sure if what is 
reported and posted on notice board is not true”.  
Therefore the second reason is related with the relevance of the information displayed to 
show the people how proper the utilization and allocation of money for the service in 
their surrounding has been. Discussants ask “how could it be possible for an individual 
to know the use of money which is to be distributed for the benefit of the entire woreda 
population. How could people in one village know the utilization of public money 
somewhere else in the woreda”. Thus, they believe that financial transparency can be 
maintained if detailed information about the money allocated and used for each project 
and in each kebele is presented.   
8.2.3 The Prospect of Traditional Community Associations and Formal 
Associations to Harness Financial Transparency and Accountability 
It has been a long-standing experience in all woredas that communities organize 
themselves along neighbourhoods or in traditional associations such as Edirs
17
 and build 
various kinds of small scale infrastructures such as churches, bridges and so forth. 
Discussants in all community FGDs confirmed that the relationship and administration 
of such associations is largely based on social values, trust and consent. The 
participation and contribution of community members in such traditional associations is 
purely on voluntary basis and the return is not only the service they get from what is 
constructed but also the social benefit they get from the community.  
                                                          
17
Edir is a sort of religious burial association organised by local people to share individual households 
burdens when close relative die. Members contribute regularly inorder to cover the expenses of funeral 
ceremonies, food and drinks needed. 
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Community members participate and involve actively in any kind of activity initiated by 
such traditional associations. Discussants were asked to compare the participation of 
people between in the projects or any activities initiated by government body and such 
traditional associations. They described the difference in the level of willingness of 
people to participate in between government body and traditional associations as 
“incomparable”. They explained that people are rarely interested to participate or attend 
the meetings called by government body unless they are forced or they expect some 
private benefit out of it.  
They were also asked why such variation in participation of people has happened. 
Firstly, these associations work in the areas that are most valued by the society. In a 
society that is religious and culture bounded, funeral services are highly valued. There is 
nothing else embarrassing than being alone during funeral services of family member. 
Secondly, they have pointed the nature of relationship among members and with the 
leaders of associations. The regulation and ordinances that determine relationship 
between members are clearly stated and mutually agreed. It is an agreement between 
parties who have balanced power. Thus, the members are confident that those rules and 
regulations will apply similarly to all members. Leaders of such association elected by 
members are often respected and trusted elders by the people. Most leaders in 
traditional associations are known to have the initiative and dedication to promote social 
goods and concerned about the orderly social relationship in their surrounding than their 
private gain. These are people who value being respected and trusted in the society than 
their own private benefit. Therefore, whenever one member fails to attend the events or 
meetings or to pay monthly contributions, the consequences are clear. They are often 
required to pay small fine. Nevertheless, refusing to pay fines would result in not only 
expulsion from the association but also rejection from the community that one cannot 
afford. There is a popular saying that “closer neighbours are always much better than 
distant relatives”. In rural community, security in the rural neighbourhoods is preserved 
often by the neighbours than by police officers. But it has to be noted also that the rules 
and regulations are tolerant as long as the reason for not complying the rules and 
regulations are acceptable. This is with the presumption that no one wants to withdraw 
from such association unless forced by factors that are beyond his/her control. 
Generally, such community based traditional associations work effectively based on 
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trust, cooperation and common understanding as opposed to formal government system 
that constitute strict implementation of rules and regulations.  
One of the issues raised during the discussion is what if the traditional associations such 
as, Edirs, elders (Shimagles)
18
, and religious leaders
19
 involved in the planning, 
budgeting and controlling of government finance allocated for various development 
projects carried out in their surroundings. All the discussants agreed that Edirs leaders 
and elders in particular are respected and trusted by the community that they will 
prioritise and are dedicated to social benefits than their personal interests. Nonetheless, 
they are hesitant to accept the proposition that they should assume a role in government 
finance management and control. The response of the surveyed respondents is also 
consistent with this opinion. As it has been presented earlier in chapter five, table 5.6 
shows that local elders and religious leaders are the least preferred body by the 
respondents to involve in the role of controlling and following up the use finance being 
utilised for various development activities to be carried out in their surroundings. 
Discussants stated that this is mainly for two reasons: lack of capacity and the prospect 
of losing their independence.  
They explained that such traditional arrangements have been used only to address social 
problems and issues as opposed to economic issues. They have little experience in 
running and administering complex projects the likes of projects carried out by 
government that involve huge finance. They perhaps have involved and mobilized their 
community for the construction of few small-scale bridges, church, road and the like. 
Besides, most of the leaders in the traditional association do not have more education 
beyond read and write. It would be difficult for them to follow up and control the 
complex government finance system operated by somehow fulltime employed 
professionals. In light of this situation it is hard to expect they have the capacity to 
challenge the governments officials or officers. And finally, the discussants mentioned 
that traditional associations work only based on trust, mutual respect and cooperation 
                                                          
18
In most part of Ethiopia, elder age is accorded a high socio-political value in the local community. 
Elders (Shimagile)councils are frequently used to settle local disputes (over land or grazing rights, for 
instance), and it is always the elder men who are first heard in community meetings. 
19
Religious leaders, Christians (Priests and Deacons) and Muslims (Sheiks) have power to define 
appropriate social behaviour and conduct, a capacity that, for instance, severely limits the social space of 
women in Ethiopia. 
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but do not have organized structure that can support them to handle such complex and 
huge administrative and controlling responsibilities.  
But they stressed, most importantly, on the tendency that these traditional organizations 
likely to be contaminated by the self-centred, untrusted, party power struggle, 
discriminatory features of government system. All of them would be happy if 
government stays away from such associations. Given the current political structure 
they don’t expect such associations to have the power challenge either kebele or woreda 
officials rather the influence will be the other way around. For them these efforts means 
just an attempt by woreda officials to capture traditional associations so that to make 
sure that they work under their domination. Woreda officials perpetuate their 
dominance over such associations by presenting them small rewards in exchange for 
loyalty. At least, they would pay them per diem whenever they call them for a meeting. 
Discussants mentioned that currently they have seen few indications that the social 
quality that existed for long in the community is degrading due to such government 
interventions. They expect that with increasing intervention from politicians that the 
social qualities such as trust, cooperation and mutual understanding are losing from the 
community leaders. They heard a rumour that some respected elders and Equib leaders 
are becoming de facto members of the ruling party. In this situation it is so hard to 
believe that such institutions can safeguard public finance from corruption and 
embezzlement by government officials. Such leaders would not have the courage to 
challenge whatever wrongdoing they observe. Community members now start to 
frustrate and lose their confidence on such leaders as they become more attached with 
the ruling party seeking personal gains. The response of surveyed respondents also 
shows that there is a tendency that such traditional community association to be 
captured by the ruling party as several of these association members belong to the ruling 
party. As shown in table 8.6 below, there is statistically significant correlation, even if 
not strong, between ruling party membership and the tendency of being a member in 
various informal associations. That means ruling party members are likely to be 
members in more number of informal associations than non-party members do. It goes 
without saying that if party members are also members in informal associations than 
non-party members are, it is highly likely that such associations be captured by the 
ruling political party.  
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Concerning religious leaders, generally, discussants’ stand is against the involvement of 
religion leaders in such financial management. They all agreed that religious leaders 
should stay away from management of government finance. They want them to do only 
their own roles in the society, i.e. religious role. They don’t think these two roles are 
compatible. Rather their concern is the recently increasing involvement of religious 
leaders in government and political activities. They mentioned that there is a rumour 
that some religious leaders become ruling party members. Therefore, instead of 
challenging the government representing the people, they would be dominated and 
manoeuvred by woreda politicians and may leave their spiritual mission behind for their 
personal benefit from the government. 
Participants were asked also to evaluate the participation of people by comparing 
between traditional associations and formally organized associations such as women 
association and youth association. Generally, as all discussants agreed, that people’s 
participation in formal association is far below than required. Some of the leaders of 
such associations who participated in the FGDs admit that they have faced a challenge 
to mobilize people and get their participation. Most people participate in the 
associations only as long as their membership helps them to get job opportunity or else 
they are willing to participate if only they are paid per diem. Discussants indicated that 
when their neighbours see them going for meeting called by youth association or 
women association, they shouted them “don’t you have any work to do? Why are you 
wasting your time to attend such a useless meeting? Please let us know whenever there 
is a meeting that pays per diem.”  Discussants themselves admit that they participate in 
those associations because they believe that someday they will get some benefits from 
woreda government. As most members are high school complete looking for lower 
level office jobs or poor women who hope to get office jobs in the woreda 
administration or credit facilities to start small businesses.  
Discussants have two different views about the reasons for low level of participation of 
people in such associations: lack of awareness about the use of such associations and 
the widespread perception that the associations are not independent bodies. Leaders 
assert that citizens do not have the awareness that they can promote their right by 
organizing themselves in such independent organizations. They believe that there is an 
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overwhelming practice of acting individually than in organized manner such as these 
ones. According to their believe it is a matter of time and effort that in the near future 
people become aware of their right and the benefit of working together in an 
organization to promote their right. 
On the other hand, the primary reason for low level of participation in such associations, 
for majority of the discussants, is the perception widely held by the people that they are 
just an alternative body of government that work under the dominance and control of 
the woreda government. They are organized and supported by the woreda government. 
Despite their formal recognition as separate bodies that work for the right and socio-
economic development of youth and women, they are widely seen by the people as the 
youth and women wing of the ruling party. Of course, it has been observed during the 
discussion that majority of the discussants failed to demarcate the boundary between 
membership in ruling party and in such associations. The leaders of those associations 
who participated in the discussion, while maintaining the belief that the associations 
work independently, admit that they have been organized by the support of woreda 
administration. Given the fact that civil society organizations are non-existent coupled 
with members’ lack of willingness to contribute, they still expect more financial and 
technical support from woreda administration. Thus, unlike the view of the 
associations’ leadership, there is a widespread belief that such associations could never 
serve as independent bodies to challenge the government. The result of survey also 
points to the same proposition. As table 7.6 shows there is statistically significant 
correlation, even stronger than the case of informal sectors, between being member in 
political party and the number of formal associations the respondent to be member. That 
means party members are likely to be members in more numbers of formal associations 
than non-party members. Thus, it is unrealistic to assume, in this situation, that formal 
association work independently.  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT: DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE BEYOND STATE REALM 
  
280 
 
Table 8 6: Correlations between respondents' informal association membership, 
formal association membership and party membership 
 Membership of 
respondent in 
informal 
associations 
Membership of 
respondents in 
formal 
associations 
Membership of 
respondents to 
political party 
Membership of respondent 
in informal associations 
Pearson Correlation 1 .418
**
 .191
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .001 
N 292 292 292 
Membership of 
respondents in formal 
associations 
Pearson Correlation .418
**
 1 .384
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 
N 292 293 293 
Membership of 
respondents to political 
party 
Pearson Correlation .191
**
 .384
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000  
N 292 293 295 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Source: Field Survey: 2011 
8.2.4 Some Limited Social Accountability Practices in Woreda Financial 
Governance 
The practice of social accountability approaches in the financial management processes 
of woreda administrations in the Amhara region is uncommon. But two projects are 
launched where some level of its application has been observed despite their limited 
scope and time span. These are the Ethiopian Social Accountability Program and 
Community Development Fund (CDF). Therefore, the following sections are for 
discussing their practices and challenges they have faced. 
8.2.4.1 The Ethiopian Social Accountability Program 
The Ethiopian Social Accountability Program which is one of the components of the 
Protection of Basic Services (PBS) project
20
 that have been in place in Ethiopia since 
June 2006. The program is designed to enhance the engagement of citizens and civil 
society organizations in the basic service provision process and their financing. The 
                                                          
20
PBS project is commissioned jointly by Ethiopian government and several international development 
organizations for the purpose of supporting government’s endeavor of meeting Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). The project works to ensure that basic services such as primary education, health care, 
water supply and sanitation and agricultural extensions are adequately financed. 
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program is primarily supported by the World Bank with GTZ-International Services 
taking its management responsibility. The program is being implemented in all regions 
of the country but is yet at pilot phase. 
The Amhara Development Association (ADA) assumed the responsibility of 
implementing the program in the Amhara region. ADA taking the leading role also 
partnered with other three organizations, namely Amhara Women’s Association 
(AWA), Green Belt Integrated Community Development and Pact-Ethiopia for its 
implementation. With the involvement of these four organizations, the pilot project of 
the program had been implemented in four woredas (three kebeles in each woreda) for 
eighteen months between February 2008 and June 2009). One of the case study 
woredas, Debremarkos city administration, had been included in the pilot project. The 
pilot project implemented two of the tools of social accountability such as Community 
Report Card (CRC) and Participatory Planning and Budgeting (PPB) focusing on 
primary education and health care services (ADA, 2009). 
Nonetheless the focus here is on the implementation of PPB as it is directly connected 
with involvement of citizens in finance matters. PPB had been implemented in two 
woredas (Debremarkos and Farta) to promote involvement of citizens in budgeting 
decisions: in prioritization, determination of budget needed, implementation of the 
budget and its follow up and evaluation. It involved a multi-step systematic process of 
sensitization workshops to various stakeholders, such as regional officials, woreda 
officials, kebele level officials and communities; capacity building trainings to the 
project staff, officials at various levels and focus group facilitators; baseline survey to 
determine the existing status about budgeting practice and citizens involvement that will 
have used for measurement of the impact of the project; and identification of service 
delivery problems and their prioritization in budget allocation through multi-step focus 
group discussions; preparing budget proposal accordingly; interface meeting between 
community members and service providers based on the budget proposal; and signing 
contracts and forming a committees that will be responsible for implementing and 
following up its sustainability (ADA, 2009).  
The problems that were identified in the FGDs to be prioritized in budget allocation are 
mainly connected with quality and sustainability problems of services which are 
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consistent with what has been already discussed in the last chapter. It has identified 
problems such as shortage of books, qualified teachers, combined desks, poor class 
rooms, poor buildings, absence or poor sanitation of the latrines and lack of library and 
laboratory were facing primary schools. In health care services, shortage of drugs, 
health professionals, shortage of delivery beds, blankets and bed sheets, ambulance, 
absence or poor sanitation of toilets were the main problems identified (ADA, 2009). 
The project, then, attempted to move to address these problems through the involvement 
of the community. 
The evaluation report by an independent organization (Mela Development Training and 
consultancy Service Co.) shows that the project has succeeded in mobilizing both the 
community and government officials at various levels. Through series of sensitization 
and awareness creating workshops and panels, the project had been able somehow to 
gradually change the attitude of people towards direct participation in government 
budget decisions. It is a success for the pilot project that not only government officials 
identified their responsibility but also communities were able to realize that they have 
important roles in the process of overcoming the service delivery problems. 
Nonetheless, there still much more left to be done to improve the existing lack of 
awareness and confidence of both community members and officials (ADA, 2009). 
Thus, one of the lessons that the pilot projects have left for future implementation of 
social accountability projects is not only about the challenges social accountability 
initiatives could face to improve awareness and confidence as well as solve capacity 
problems but also the role that civil society organizations could play in overcoming 
such problems.  
Nonetheless, it can be understood from the report that the tangible results of the PPB are 
limited just in the areas of community mobilization and awareness creation, as its 
implementation is limited in scope. It is even hard to say that because of the PPB that 
the quality and sustainability problems of services came to the attention of officials. As 
discussed in the last chapters, officials at all level are well aware of the existing quality 
and sustainability problems in the services. They are also aware that the people in their 
jurisdiction are discontent about this and believe that it has to be addressed during 
budget allocation. However, it has not been easy to do so as long as the interest in the 
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ruling party is yet to increase access to services. Thus, without undermining the 
importance of citizens’ involvement in priority identification for budget allocation, it 
can be argued that more tangible contribution of such social accountability initiatives 
could have been achieved if the execution of the project had extended up until the 
allocation and implementation of the budget proposed. But here, it is hard to make an 
opinion on the success of the project in changing the budget proposal in to practice. 
Since the project has phased out after preparing budget proposal and making agreement, 
there is no evidence as to whether the priority areas agreed up on were actually 
addressed in the woredas budget allocation. There is no any evidence to witness to what 
extent the contract between government officials and communities had been 
enforceable. In fact, one participant in Debremakos community FGD mentioned that 
one additional health centre and new class rooms for one primary school are constructed 
in their kebele which are according to the priority they agreed up on. However, neither 
the community members nor the FGD facilitator involved in the PPB were aware of the 
progress that the woreda government has made in implementing the agreements. This 
can make the participating community members to lose confidence on the importance of 
civil engagement. 
Even if we assume that problems identified by the people had been addressed in the 
budget and implemented accordingly, the replicability of the pilot project to other 
woredas is also questionable. If we tend to scale up the implementation of the PPB 
project to full scale in all woredas, woredas would need a huge capital budget. Almost 
all of the priority areas proposed by the community to be addressed in the budget 
allocation are related with the existing service delivery quality and sustainability 
problems. Improving the quality and sustainability of service requires huge capital 
investment. This might be possible only for four woredas (only three kebeles in each 
woreda). However, given the existing woredas inflexible budget structure where, as 
already explained in chapter six, about 85% to 90% of the budget is allocated for 
recurrent budget of which salary takes major proportion, the idea of allocating huge 
capital budget to address those priority areas is unrealistic. Currently woredas cannot 
increase their capital budget unless additional grant is obtained from the regional 
government or the donors. Or else woreda administrations need to lay off their large 
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number of employees. Both of these scenarios wouldn’t be both politically and 
administratively possible.  
Another most important concern is connected with the implementing organizations of 
the project. The leading organization chosen for the implementation of the project was 
ADA. However, a close look at the nature of ADA can tell the prospect of the project to 
succeed in mobilizing people to challenge the financial decision of woreda government 
officials. ADA, as already described earlier in chapter three, is the ruling party affiliate 
development organization. It is largely seen as the CSO wing of the ruling party. 
Furthermore, one of the partnering organization, Amhara Women’s Association (AWA) 
to implement the project, though is formally an independent association, as already 
discussed earlier is also largely perceived as the women wing of the ruling party. 
Besides, the association is being financially supported from government at various 
levels. Though there is no evidence about the independence of the other two partnering 
organizations, one can guess that they are not expected to have the desire and power to 
work against the interest of their leading organization. In view of this fact, it is 
unrealistic to expect that these organizations will work independently when government 
budget allocation is made to reflect the interest of the ruling party while becoming in 
conflict with socially desirable budget allocation propositions.    
8.2.4.2 Community Development Fund (CDF) 
CDF is an approach being used by donor funded program that works for provision of 
rural water supply in rural woredas of the Amhara region. One of the case study 
woredas, Bahirdar Zuria Woreda is the beneficiary of this project. It is an approach that 
applies the essence of social accountability in financing and management of the 
construction and operation of water supply points (hand dug wells and spring 
developments), contrary to the direct fund support approach that gives financial 
management responsibility to woreda administrations. Unlike the PPB the involvement 
of people in the financial management process is not limited to initiating and 
preparation of the plan. But here people are involved and responsible in managing both 
the finance and operation of the project throughout its implementation. Community 
water management committee (WATSANCO) consisting of members ‘democratically’ 
elected by the people assumes all financial management responsibilities including 
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preparing the proposal, contracting with contractors or local artisans, making 
procurements and disbursements, collecting initial contribution (at least 15% of the 
project cost) and water fee from the people and financing operational and maintenance 
costs. In doing so, the WATSANCO has its own fund kept in a bank account transferred 
from the woreda account in three to four instalments once the proposal is accepted. The 
woreda water board retains roles such as appraisal and approval of communities project 
proposal; approval of disbursement requests; and supervision and technical guidance 
role. In order all of them to play their role properly, appropriate capacity building 
trainings have been provided not only to the WATSANCOs and woreda body but also 
to local artisans (Rural Water Supply and Environmental Programme in Amhara 
Region, October 2006).  
Despite the need for detail information to assess about the success of the approach, 
some of the performances reported by IRC–International Water and Sanitation Centre 
are clearly indicative of the successes of the CDF approach. The successes is not only in 
terms of mobilizing resources from the people and diversified sources, reducing the 
completion time of projects, reducing the procurement time, securing adequate finance 
for operation and maintenance costs but also in terms of helping people get empowered 
to shoulder the responsibility of managing and raising finance for the project. Just to 
mention some of the tangible results of the approach shown in the report, the average 
number of water points constructed per woreda per year through direct fund support 
approach was between 20 and 30 but now with CDF approach this has increased to 
between 50 and 60 water points. The average time needed for construction of water 
points decreased from 60 days to between 28 and 35 days (Rural Water Supply and 
Environmental Programme in Amhara Region, October 2006). Thus, based on the 
experience of the CDF, it is safe to say that if communities are empowered (devolving 
power to finance as well as capacity building activities), they can use and mobilize 
financial resources for efficient and sustainable provision of public resources.     
As suggested in the report the approach is replicable to several of donor funded projects 
that are going on in the woreda administrations of the region. The approach is 
instrumental in addressing the problems of donor funded projects as majority of them 
are now using direct fund support approach. Those projects, fearing misuse and wastage 
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of the fund by woreda administrations, have resorted to give a patrol role to the regional 
administration which in turn has created a lot of problems in the use of the fund. 
However, the experience of CDF showed how donors can make sure their fund is 
utilised properly and efficiently just by decentralizing financial responsibilities to the 
communities. Nonetheless, the fact that the project has been fully supported by donors 
earmarked only for development of water points, it can be said that the approach deals 
more with problems in the implementation of budgets not with the problems in budget 
allocation. But one of the main challenges woredas has experienced in their financial 
management system is at the budget allocation phase. As mentioned before, even if 
woredas needed more capital investment to solve their current service delivery 
problems, they have not been in a position to shift the current recurrent expenditure 
dominated budget structure given the current inflexible budget structure. And it has to 
be noted that it is at this phase politicians attempt to manoeuvre budget allocation to be 
reflective of political interest that sometimes might be against the preference of people. 
But the experience of CDF doesn’t suggest any mechanism of addressing these 
allocation problems. Thus, the replicability of the approach to government treasury 
funded projects or development activities is quite limited. 
8.3 INTRA-PARTY SYSTEM AND FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE 
This is the second component of the chapter to present how party system and structure 
of the ruling party in the Amhara region influence the financial governance of woreda 
administrations by affecting the self-governing status of woreda administrations; by 
weakening the efficacy of public financial management systems; and by limiting the 
practice of direct voicing of citizens in financial affairs of woreda administrations.  
8.3.1 Political Party and Intergovernmental Relations 
Another important issue in the discussion about intergovernmental fiscal relations 
between woreda administrations and the regional government, besides the design and 
implementation related problems of the district level decentralization discussed in 
chapter five, is the role of political party structure and system either in sustaining 
domination of the regional government over woreda administration or in promoting 
further autonomy of woreda administrations. 
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As discussed in chapter five, the regional government through its structure in the zone 
administrations controls the affairs of woreda administrations. Woreda administrations 
have been forced to accept employees hired by zone administrations without them 
making necessary budget provision as observed in Bahirdar Zuria health office and 
Shebel Berenta education office. The autonomy of woreda administrations to prepare 
and execute their own local socioeconomic development plan has been eroded by zone 
administrations through strict guidelines that dictate woreda administrations for each 
and every target and through successive plan review and approval process. This process 
has sustained top-down planning process as woreda administrations have to follow 
regional government guidelines than the wish of people that comes through kebele 
administrations or grass root level service delivery units (at least theoretically, people 
have been supposed to engage in plan preparation though the participation of people is 
questionable and has to be studied). The intervention is mainly in the plan preparation 
evaluation process but woredas have also been subject to accomplish activities imposed 
from zone administration abandoning activities instinct to their plan approved by their 
Woreda Council. It has been already seen in chapter five also how such practice of 
eroding the autonomy of woreda administration has created difficulties and disruptions 
throughout the woredas’ financial management process.  
Now the question is why are woreda administrations still under the influence of the 
regional government/zonal administration while they are formally empowered to 
undertake those activities autonomously. Is it just because the design of decentralization 
doesn’t clearly and exclusively grant power to woreda administrations that they are still 
subject to regional government overseeing? Is it because woreda administrations 
wouldn’t like to exercise autonomous power over their jurisdiction and they willingly 
submit themselves to the control of regional/zonal administration? Is it because woreda 
officials are forced to accept the order and instruction of regional/zone administration 
through other political means?  
From the discussion in chapter five it can be understood that of course there are a lot of 
gaps in the design of decentralization that could create a chance for such interference of 
regional government. Lack of piece of legislation for assignment of functions, lack of 
exclusivity in the assignment of power, excessive dependence on block grant, lack of 
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adequate revenue raising power and source, lack of clarity in the administrative and 
legislative power could be said to have contributed for woreda administrations loss of 
autonomy. However, the current district level decentralization at least provides woreda 
administrations with political power to exercise self-administration by which to mean 
Woreda Council is the highest political body in woreda administrations to oversee the 
performance of the executive body of woreda administrations (article 86). Accordingly, 
the executive body of woreda administrations is accountable to Woreda Council. That 
means woreda officials have the chance to reject any imposition from the regional/zonal 
government unless it is endorsed by their Woreda Council as long as their action is not 
in violation of federal/regional government policies and laws. However, it has been 
observed in practice that in all cases the changes initiated by the regional/zonal 
administration have been accepted without any endorsement from the Woreda Council 
and without following the formal constitutional procedures. Neither of the interventions 
has been just to ensure compliance of regional policies and laws.  The plans approved 
by the Woreda Council to be implemented in the upcoming year had to be modified in 
the middle of the year just because of the instruction from regional or zonal 
government. Therefore, the design of decentralization cannot be the only factor to be 
blamed for the interventions rather the intra-political party relationship within the ruling 
party between regional/zonal and woredas party leadership that could contribute to instil 
central dominance (power imbalance). Thus, the following section is to see how the 
nature of political party structure and system operate to influence on decentralization 
process and local financial governance. 
8.3.1.1 Political Party structure and System and Fiscal Decentralization 
As already discussed in chapter three, even though Ethiopia has been following multi-
party system, Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front, EPRDF (a 
partnership of four ethnic political parties where all of them have, at least formally, 
equal status) partnering with its affiliated parties have exclusively ruled the country 
since 1991. Therefore, analysing intra-political party relationship and structure of the 
ruling party can help to probe whether this relationship has been inhibiting or promoting 
decentralization process. Paulos (2007) has provided a detail presentation on how the 
intra-political party relationship within the ruling party between central leadership and 
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regional leadership which he refers to clientelistic relationship crippled the regional 
level of fiscal decentralization. It is stated also this relationship could extend to woreda 
and kebele level.  
He cited a number of manifestations of the existence of patron-client relationship 
between central and regional party leadership. Accordingly, the relationship between 
central and regional leaders of the ruling party is reciprocal where the centre (patron) 
needs loyalty and obedience from regional and local party leaders to sustain their power 
and seeking electoral support to secure maximum vote good enough to form 
government and the regional and local party leaders in exchange get posts and 
promotion in the political or administrative career in the regional and woreda 
administrations structure.  
This relationship is based on inequality and power differences. This power imbalance 
between party members at different levels is sustained by the party internal system. The 
party follows a central democracy system by which lower organs of the party are 
obliged to implement, unquestioned, decisions from higher bodies which have the right 
to cancel, amend and change decisions made by lower organs. This arrangement, in fact, 
grants party members the right to discuss the agendas presented freely, to oppose, to 
support and critically comment. However, they have no the right to mobilize others 
against decisions passed by central political party leadership. Furthermore, members 
cannot lobby on issues of interest or attempt to gather support from formal discussions. 
Any attempt to create factions or any other grouping in an open or hidden manner 
would be major discipline breaches.  
Party evaluation system is another arrangement of regularly checking loyalty and 
commitment of lower organs and members to party lines and to instil central 
dominance. It is clearly stated in the party program that it doesn’t entertain any different 
views from party line. Any opposition to party program and policies can result in 
expulsion from party membership. Despite the nominal objectives of party evaluation to 
self-educate, reduce corruption and encourage performance, it is ironical that the system 
has been tolerating anti-democratic acts and undesirable behaviours because of 
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allegiance to the top political leadership. This unbalanced and central dominance 
relationship is extended not only to woreda level party organs but also to kebele level.   
Given this condition in the political arena, it is not hard to imagine how such intra-party 
relation has crippled the self-rule power of woreda administrations. The focus of this 
section is mainly about the structure and working system of the ruling party in Amhara 
region and it’s interaction with the extent of self-administration power of woreda 
administrations. The main reason to focus on the ruling party is, as explained earlier in 
detail, the current ruling party Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) has 
been exclusively in power in the Amhara region since 1991.  
8.3.1.2 Clientelism and the Role of Zone Administrations 
The revised constitution of the Amhara regional government, as mentioned several 
times earlier, denies zone administrations the power to control woreda governments. 
Zone administrations are just agents organized by the regional government which 
assume the responsibility of supporting and coordinating the self-administering efforts 
of woreda administrations. They might also exercise the power granted by the regional 
government by way of de-concentration. That means, aside from their supporting and 
coordinating role, they assume the responsibility to follow up and supervise the 
activities of woreda administrations just for compliance of federal/regional laws, 
policies and standards. However, in practice, the intervention of zone administrations 
has been far beyond these mandates. All of the interventions of the regional government 
in the affairs of woreda administrations discussed in chapter five would not have been 
possible without the involvement of zone administrations.  
Zone administrations have effectively served as agents to hijack the constitutional 
power of woreda governments, though in the eyes of the deputy head of BoFED this 
role is important role in facilitating the relationship between region and woreda 
government. All of the informants in all case study woredas agree invariably that zone 
administrations have been excessively intervening in woreda administrations affairs. 
They feel that their woreda become distant from the regional government because of the 
presence of zone administrations. The chance to present cases which need attention 
from the regional government officials by bypassing the zone administrations has now 
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become minimal. Moreover, during the course of the study, the researcher had the 
chance to observe how the regional government loses touch with woreda governments. 
In an endeavour to find financial information of woreda administrations in the region, it 
was not possible for the researcher to find relevant data about woredas. All financial 
information of woreda governments available at BoFED are organized along zone 
administrations. It is hardly possible to find data about a particular woreda budget. 
Sadly, most of the regional reports are organized along zonal basis not on woreda basis. 
Woreda level data is not readily available and analysis of socio-economic and 
government budget is made at zonal level not at woreda level. The regional government 
has no chance to see woredas that need special attention as the reports are organized 
amassed along zones. There is no woreda level analysis of such data. This creates 
distance between the woredas and their region. Informants state that there is nothing 
changed in the relationship between woreda administrations with zone administrations 
because of district level decentralization except zone’s role of distributing grant to 
woreda administrations has been kept aside to the regional government. Thus, there is 
sufficient evidence to conclude that the relationship between woredas and regional/zone 
administrations has been effectively hierarchical.  
Of course, there has been resistance from woreda administrations though that doesn’t 
reach to a point that causes serious conflict with each other. Nevertheless, the deputy 
head of BoFED doesn’t accept this resistance and still insists that without the 
involvement of zonal administrations it is not practically possible for the regional 
government to handle the burden of coordinating and supporting the existing several 
number of woredas. The informants from the case study woredas, without opposing its 
nominal coordinating and supportive role as well as its responsibility to follow up the 
compliance of regional policies and laws, do not agree with its excessive interventions 
in the woredas. They argue that the current intervention in the form of dictating plan 
preparation and amending plan targets, sometimes hiring employees for woredas, 
ordering woredas to make budget allocation for particular activities, evaluating the 
performance of woredas on services which clearly belong to the mandates of woredas, 
making assignments of various activities arbitrarily that are not instinct to their woreda 
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plan, and so forth is by no means along with the essence of the district level 
decentralization framework of the region.  
Contrary to its nominal role, as discussants in the experts’ FGD believe, the role of zone 
administration to provide technical assistance and supervise the effective compliance of 
regional financial ordinances and policies has declined after the first phase of the 
implementation of financial management reforms. Discussants in Debremarkos, in 
particular, blame zone administration bodies for turning a deaf ear to violation of some 
financial rules and regulations. Zone administrations were basically organised just to 
support and coordinate autonomous woredas without intervention in their mandate 
whereas, in practice, their role has been in the other way around. This happens because 
zone administrations have been overly burdened with dictating, closely controlling and 
evaluating the activities of woreda administration than supporting and providing 
technical guidance to woreda administrations. Besides, the region/zone administration 
authorities have not been interested in strictly following up and regulating the 
compliance of woreda administrations to those policies, regulations and standards for 
the reason that they knew compliance to those rules and regulations and standards 
sometimes negate their political interest. For instance it is the responsibility of the 
regional government or zone administrations education offices to make sure that schools 
and health institutions in woreda administrations meet the required standards and 
facilities. But this is apparently against the expansion policy of the regional 
governments. It is also the responsibility of the regional government/zone 
administrations to ensure the compliance of woreda administrations financial activities 
with financial rules and regulations. But as the regional government or zone 
administrations knew that some of the irregularities in financial management have 
happened due to their interferences, they often tend to be reluctant.   
Therefore, this fact supports the critic that the strengthening of zone administrations 
despite their no constitutional recognition reflects the regional government’s lack of 
political commitment to grant woreda administrations genuine self-administration 
power. It is just because the regional government realized that it couldn’t shoulder the 
burden of closely dictating and controlling several woredas by itself that it has created 
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zone administrations rather not to strengthen the self-administering capacity of woreda 
administrations.     
Then, the question may be why zone administrations have been able to exercise control 
over woreda administrations without having constitutionally recognized political 
power? This question leads us to the discussion about the structure of the ruling party 
and nature and extent of patron-client relationship between zonal and woreda level 
party organs and its impact on decentralization. The structure of the regional ruling 
party (ANDM), as discussed in detail by Paulos (2007), follows a chain of hierarchical 
structure that forms a pyramidal shape from top down to lower level leadership 
stretching from the centre to kebele level. Officials assigned in zone administrations are 
not only members but also constitute ANDM leadership at zone level. The same holds 
true for woreda administrations. In all woredas, not only the members of Woreda 
Council but also all officials in the executive body are from the ruling party appointed 
mainly because of their political loyalty and commitment. These officials are leaders of 
woreda ANDM organ as well. That means woreda administration officials are 
accountable to zone administration informally through their party hierarchical structure. 
This relationship is the result of the centralized system of the party where, as stated 
earlier, the woreda level party organs have the obligation to implement decisions and 
instructions from the centre through zone party organ. To make sure this central 
dominance and their loyalty, the appointment of woreda officials is subjected to 
approval of zone ANDM leaders.  
The periodic party evaluation system is one of the methods to make sure that woreda 
party leaders and the woreda administrations are in compliance with ANDM ideology 
and policy. Their political career highly depends on this evaluation. Lack of 
commitment and loyalty might mean expulsion from the party means that would also 
cost woreda officials their position in the woreda administration. This loyalty might 
sometimes reach the extent of building allegiance to individual party leaders. In this 
situation it is unrealistic to expect woreda officials to withstand the imposition from 
zone administration. They prefer to follow the regional level/zonal targets undermining 
the interest of their community. 
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As it was discussed in the forgoing chapter, even though woreda officials claim to have 
partnership and cooperative relation with high level officials, we saw also that they had 
modest disputes but accept the order of zone authorities just because they are their 
superior in the party structure. But discussants in experts FGD in all case study woredas 
expressed that the dispute between experts at woreda level and zone level is, unlike that 
of between politician officials, a bit fierce. For instance, financial rules, regulations and 
standards are one area of conflict. This arises when financial experts at zone level on 
behalf of the regional bureau try to enforce compliance to financial ordinances. But 
participants in Bahirdar Zuria indicated that they would not accept any imposition from 
zone experts unless it is convincing enough. They expresses that even if they knew that 
experts from the zone administration have expert authority over woreda 
administrations’ experts, they would not accept their instruction. 
One of the issues that auditors in the Amhara Region Auditor-General authority 
(ARAG) often complained about is woreda administrations’ reluctance to take the 
required actions in response to the problems auditors found out during audit 
investigation. Auditors at the ARAG Authority are tasked to examine the financial 
activities of woreda administrations if they are in line with financial procedures and 
standards. But there are often disputes between woreda administration officials as well 
as experts and auditors over the audit findings and opinions. During informal 
conversation with public relations officer of ARAG Authority, he stated that even if the 
regional audit body has formal authority it has been so hard for it to enforce audit 
suggestions in woreda administrations. He stated that woreda administrations, in many 
cases, do not take auditor recommendations seriously and the regional audit body has 
not been able to enforce such suggestions. It becomes more difficult especially if the 
findings are against woreda politicians. Therefore, it can be said that relationship 
between woredas and zone administration is determined not by formal government 
authority but by the relative position in the ruling party structure. 
However, the question is how far can all these kinds of disputes continue? One 
participant mentioned that a brief telephone conversation by zone sector office authority 
with woreda sector office head would be enough for any ordered changes from zone 
administration experts to get accepted by woreda administration experts. Take for 
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instance the case of disputes over plan targets for primary education (enrolment rate), 
the head of education office at Bahirdar Zuria noted that they eventually accepted it 
“after a brief discussion with zone authorities”. He stated that zone authorities told them 
“let you put the targets in your plan and do your best to attain it, it doesn’t matter if not 
achieved”. It is very clear that there is no choice for experts than to accept it if it comes 
through the head of their office. Thus, it can be said that such disputes between experts 
have been settled through the relationship between politicians at woreda level and zone 
level. This is because the relationship between officials at woreda and zone, unlike 
between experts, is based on dominance that is determined by their relative position in 
the party structure.  
The same would apply to other kinds of disputes between experts. However, this 
process of influence by zone administration depends on the level political interest zone 
authorities have on the issue. They tend to dictate woreda administration only in the 
areas of their political interest. In many instances, as discussed earlier, they don’t have 
interest to influence woredas over other issues such as financial rules and regulation or 
service standards as they know that compliance to financial rules, regulations and 
standards may sometimes be at the expense of their party interests. That is why the 
ARAG authority, as discussed earlier, struggled to force woreda officials to make 
necessary measures in response to audit opinions. Such short of power of zone experts 
or ARAG auditors to influence woreda administration experts or officials has made 
them reluctant in their assistance and follow up role. In fact, the complaint of 
participants’ at Debremarkos experts’ FGD, unlike the earlier case, is over the low level 
of interest of experts from regional and zonal level to support and follow up local 
governments financial practice to ensure if they are in line with financial rules, 
regulations and standards. This case clearly illustrate how the ruling party system and 
structure influenced the involvement of the zone administration to shift from its 
supporting, coordinating and regulating role to interfering in the affairs of woreda 
administrations.   
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8.3.2 Political Party and Local Government Relation and its Impact on Woreda 
Administrations Financial Governance 
In the previous section an attempt has been made to uncover how political party 
structure and system has determined the level of autonomy of woreda administrations. 
Nevertheless, the pressure that the ruling party system exerts is extended also to touch 
woreda administrations’ financial management system. This doesn’t mean only the 
financial management difficulties that it causes to happen indirectly by inhibiting the 
self-administering power of woreda administrations. It is rather the direct influence it 
triggers in the financial management system of woreda administrations. Thus, in order 
to analyse this it is imperative first to begin with describing the interaction of the ruling 
party structure and system with woreda administrations system.  
Generally, the relationship between the ruling party and the woreda administrations said 
to be intermingled where the informal ruling party system dominates while formally 
established government system remains to have only a nominal role. It is to be noted 
from chapter five that all of the officials of the executive body at woreda 
administrations are political appointees who have dual responsibility (political 
responsibility and managerial responsibility). The primary considerations for their 
assignment are related with their political commitment and loyalty and even sometimes 
their allegiance to individual party leaders. Their political responsibility is to implement 
unquestionably the decisions that come from the centre as the party follows central 
democratic system. In order to make sure loyalty and commitment to the party lines and 
policies, woreda officials’ appointment is subject to zone level party leadership 
approval and their performance is subject to regular and irregular party evaluations 
(gemgema). These evaluations are not necessary meant for accountability rather to make 
sure that officials are still working for the party. Furthermore, reportedly there have 
been attempts to lure staff members in the woreda administrations to join the party with 
the intention of ensuring total control of the state function by the ruling party. 
Promotions and assignment of staff members to various positions have been reportedly 
based on loyalty and commitment to the ruling party. There are reports that indicate 
party evaluations have been systematically combined with formal administrative 
evaluations to be used even for evaluation of staff members that is purposely designed 
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to instil loyalty to the ruling party. Besides, there are reports that indicate the successive 
reshufflings and staff turnover thereof in the woreda administrations have happened by 
design for the reason of instilling loyalty and commitment to the ruling party as the 
popular saying goes “being in a position of EPRDF (the ruling party) government is just 
like sleeping on a tree branch”. As many agree the reassignment of staff members to 
various positions during the reshufflings have been made based on their result in the 
evaluation that is made to reflect party interests.  
Given these facts, it is very difficult to fully blame the design of financial management 
reform implemented in the woreda administrations for all the flaws in the financial 
management discussed in chapter six and seven. There are number of cases in the 
financial management which cannot be necessarily attached with weakness in the design 
of financial management reform. Rather, some of the difficulties are related with 
problems in the implementation of the reform caused by the intervention of the ruling 
party system and structure in the woreda administration systems. Thus, it is imperative 
to pinpoint implementation problems that are caused by the attempt to use formal 
administration system for political benefits taking advantage of the blurred relation 
between state and party. From the previous sections, the consequences of the 
interference of the ruling party system and structure in the case study woredas formal 
financial administrative systems can be seen in four categories. 
The first is the financial management difficulty caused by decisions in the planning and 
budgeting process made just to the interest of their political party but might be at the 
expense of managerial targets. One best case example here is, as pointed out in chapter 
six, officials tend to allocate budget for expansion of services at the expense of quality 
and sustainability of services just to show their loyalty and commitment to their ruling 
party. Woreda officials have been well aware and convinced of peoples’ concern over 
quality and sustainable of the available service delivery facilities. However, they didn’t 
dare to make responsive budget allocation as they had to comply with centrally 
established party policies and goals.   
The second problem is the compromise of desirable financial management practices, 
standards procedures and rules just for political party interests. As discussed in chapter 
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six and seven, one of the problems in the financial management systems of the case 
woreda administrations is the reluctance of woreda officials in the plan and budget 
preparation process that triggered several cascading undesirable consequences in the 
implementation. The deviation between strategic plan and annual plan, between 
strategic plan expenditure estimate and actual, between cash flow plan and actual cash 
flow, excessive budget transfers, unplanned procurements among others are partially 
caused by the reluctance of officials in the planning and budgeting process. It goes 
without saying that there is no possibility to meet managerial targets with such 
undisciplined management of resources. Nevertheless, officials have been less 
concerned about managerial standards and techniques in the preparation of plans and 
budgets as they knew that the important factors for them to stay in their position 
eventually are connected with their loyalty to their party by meeting political targets 
than compliance to formal managerial targets. Furthermore, the fact that officials have 
been overburdened with political duties meant their main managerial duty of preparing, 
following up and evaluating plans and budgets relegated to secondary level.      
Reluctance of officials, of course, might not be the only factor responsible for the flaws 
in planning and budgeting but it was also officials and staff members lack of skill and 
experience as well as turnover that have exacerbated the problem. Nevertheless, these 
capacity limitations in one way or another are connected with the influence of the ruling 
party system and structure. As discussed earlier, successive reshuffling and turnover of 
officials and staff members made in the name of reforms have been politically 
motivated to make sure that they remained loyal and committed to party lines. But this 
frequent turnover of employees has another repercussion. As discussants at 
Debremarkos experts’ FGD noted, most of the accountants and budget officers are 
novice to their job and are not familiar with financial rules, procedures and standards. 
As a result, they don’t have the confidence to refuse illegal disbursement requests from 
officials. They do not internalize the ethics and values of accounting and budgeting 
standards. Thus, they don’t care for the violation of these values and ethics 
(professionalism) as long as that doesn’t cause discontent of their officials (boss). Thus, 
these discussants blame the current reshuffling for causing illicit and undisciplined 
financial activities.   
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It has been discussed also that officials have never got any training related with 
planning and budgeting. All of the trainings they got so far are intended to strengthen 
their political leadership capacity. It is clear that the main purpose of these kinds of 
trainings is to instil compliance to centrally established party policies and strategies but 
at the expense of skills required to undertake their main managerial duty. Therefore, 
there is enough evidence to believe that capacity building efforts have been targeted to 
instil party loyalty and commitment but at the expense of the capacity needed to handle 
financial management responsibilities.  
Most of the desirable financial management practices (standards, rules, procedures) that 
were designed for economic use of resources have been compromised due to party 
interests as well as the imbalance power relationship among officials and experts 
instigated by the ruling party system. Experts in the financial management system, such 
as accountants, budget officers, purchasers and auditors who are supposed to oversee 
the financial activities of woreda administration and to safeguard the compliance of 
established financial standards, rules and procedures have remained silent to non-
conforming financial activities. This has happened due to the infiltration of party system 
in woreda administration. It has been observed that these experts have lost their 
administrative power to stop financial activities that did not comply with established 
standards, rules and procedures such as disbursement or refund requests without 
adequate supporting documents or procedures, disbursement requests without 
submitting cash flow plan, budget transfers requests without fulfilling necessary 
prerequisites, excessive budge transfers, unplanned procurement requests and so forth. 
They understood that evaluation of their performance have not been in terms of the 
accomplishment of those responsibilities but by the evaluation system that are designed 
to instil party loyalty. They understood that their career depends not on the level of 
accomplishing such expertise responsibilities but their allegiance to the party and its 
leaders. For this reason, most of these experts are not concerned about the non-
conformance of financial activities to established ordinances but they just follow 
whatever instruction and order that comes from officials and act accordingly. The only 
concern experts have, as understood from the experts’ FGD discussions, is the lack of 
clarity in accountability between the officials and themselves in case such abuse of 
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ordinances are identified by regional auditors. However, the demand for clarity in the 
role and power in financial process might not be necessarily emanated from their need 
to exercise independent autonomy to oversee the financial activities of officials. But it 
may be because they are afraid of being eventually fully responsible for it as they think 
officials get protection from higher level party leaders.       
Administrative accountability arrangements within woreda administrative offices are 
predominated by politically motivated evaluation systems characterised by lack of 
clarity about administrative or legal consequences on experts or officials for breaching 
regionally established financial management ordinances. Furthermore, the 
accountability relationships between staff members within the offices are determined by 
the degree of loyalty and closeness of the individual to the party or party leaders rather 
than the formal expertise or administrative structure.  
On paper, officials are accountable to the Woreda Council. Nevertheless, in practice, 
such check and balance system has not been fruitful to hold officials accountable. This 
is mainly due to the imbalance of power between the executives and council members. 
As opposed to commonly held view, the evidences in this study shows that such 
imbalance of power is created not necessarily by lack of Woreda Council’s 
independence or the capacity problem of council members as well as that of the Woreda 
Council institutions but more importantly it is the influence of the ruling party system 
that has resulted in the legislative body to be dominated by the executive.  
In order to analyse the power relationship between the Woreda Council and Woreda 
Executive, it is important first to understand the relative position and role of Woreda 
Council members and cabinet members in the formal government and party structure. 
Council members are just par time politicians and ordinary party members who are in 
most cases at lower level in the party structure. They are leading their life engaged in 
different walks of life. They are peasants, civil servants or small scale traders. Being a 
council member does not get them any benefit except the per diem they get paid 
whenever they participate in the regular council meeting. They take part in the party and 
in the council just hoping future career promotions or other forms of small benefits. In 
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order this future dream come true, they have to show their loyalty and commitment to 
their party leaders.  
On the other hand, cabinet members are full time position holders in the woreda 
administration who enjoy both economic and career benefits. They hold these positions 
because of their higher rank in the party structure. That means cabinet members are 
either in the leadership or closer to the leadership in woreda party organ. Thus, even 
though, cabinet members are formally accountable to the Woreda Council, the 
accountability works the other way around due to the party structure. Council members 
who are ordinary members in the party structure are accountable for cabinet members 
who form the woreda party leadership. In this situation, it is unrealistic to imagine that 
Woreda Council members would challenge cabinet members whenever improper 
financial performance they noticed in the woreda administration.  Ironically, there is 
reverse accountability relationship. Council members have to attend and participate 
actively in the regular meetings to show their loyalty to the party. Otherwise they have 
to face the danger of expulsion from party membership. Thus, the discussions in the 
Woreda Council take the form of feedback gathering or cabinet members use it to 
enhance council members’ awareness about the party directions and policies.  
Therefore, from this discussion, it can be assumed that the formal administrative and 
political accountability arrangements of the woreda financial management system are 
twisted to the interest of the ruling party by the imbalance of power generated due to the 
overwhelming overlap of the ruling party system with formal woreda administrations 
system.  
8.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter was set up based on the findings of the preceding chapters that financial 
governance of woreda administrations is determined not only by formally arranged 
intergovernmental relations and financial management tools but also other informal 
arrangements such as social accountability mechanisms and contextual factors such as 
political systems and structure of the ruling party. The chapter attempted to reveal 
several gaps in financial governance where the formal arrangement of financial 
management in woreda administrations failed to address. While some of the gaps 
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indicate the need for an alternative approach that allows direct involvement of people is 
the appropriate arrangement others indicate political context that determines the 
intergovernmental relation and under which woreda administrations operate hinders 
woreda financial governance. 
 
To begin with the assessment the practice of social accountability arrangements in the 
financial management process, the findings in the case woredas show that social 
accountability arrangements has been the most neglected aspect of the reform. The 
opportunities for citizens to participate have been either rare or unorganized or not 
empowering citizens. Citizens also found to be having little interest to participate for the 
reason that such public meetings organized by government body either have not been in 
the areas of people interest nor with meaningful participation of people and tangible 
result. On the other hand, it is observed that citizens in the woreda administrations have 
been willing to participate when they were invited to get involved in solving tangible 
service delivery problems in their surroundings. For instance, urban residents in 
particular have been willing when they were asked to contribute for development of 
infrastructures and expansions of services in their surroundings. In this case 
decentralization might take the credit for enhancing participation of people as it was 
observed that residents have been more enthusiastic to contribute voluntarily when they 
knew that it was for their own surrounding development. 
 
The finding on the assessment of peoples’ tendency to expose and challenge corruption 
shows that people do not dare to account officials when they are frustrated with weak 
administrative, legal and political arrangements of accountability. But at the same time, 
they more tend to expose and challenge local officials for corruption when its impact 
directly and visibly affects them and impacts the service delivery in their surroundings. 
That is the more contribution people make in the fund the more they tend to be 
concerned and hold officials accountable. On the other hand it is observed that public 
investment dominated intergovernmental transfer financing undermine downward 
accountability that people do not tend to account officials.  
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Assessment was also made on the possibility of using civic organizations for facilitating 
direct engagement of people for accountability. Traditional associations such as Edirs 
found to be effective in mobilizing mass people albeit they have capacity limitation and 
potential danger of being captured by political party to operate independently in the 
process of direct voicing. Formal associations, in general, have had minimal role in 
mobilizing people due to their alleged lack of independence caused by blurred boundary 
between the associations and woreda administrations. 
 
Despite the limited practice of social accountability, an attempt has been made to assess 
three initiatives of social accountability arrangement that have been put in place in the 
woreda administrations. The experience of displaying information about budget 
appropriation among sector offices along with sources of funds and regular budget 
execution on public places shows that the practice has been futile to facilitate financial 
transparency at least for two reasons. The first reason has to do with capacity of 
ordinary people to comprehend such information. The second is related with the 
crudeness of the information which doesn’t really show the manner of spending. The 
third is its inability to attract the attention of citizens. Local people are more interested 
in disaggregated information particularly about the fund utilized in their surrounding 
than such woreda wide budget information.  
 
The pilot project of Participatory Planning and Budgeting (PPB) has proved that 
citizens can have meaningful role in woredas financial management process. People 
taking part in the PPB were able not only to articulate their priorities but also to 
formulate the budget needed for it. But it was observed also that there are daunting 
challenges especially in creating adequate awareness and building capacity of local 
people to make sure they participate in an empowered manner. This indicated that civil 
society organizations have a crucial role to play in facilitating direct involvement of 
citizens. But this is without forgetting to mention that lack of the independence of civil 
society organizations is the concerning issue. The CDF approach that is being in use by 
donor funded projects that are working to improve rural water supply in woreda 
administrations has also used social accountability approach where citizens have been 
involved throughout the implementation of the project and management of finance. This 
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approach has provided an important lesson that direct engagement of citizens in the 
administration and control of finance will result in economic use of resources, timely 
completion of projects, and sustainability of the services despite the fact that its 
replicability is limited only to donors’ fund.   
 
The assessment of the influence of the ruling party system and structure indicates that 
the interference of the regional government through its structure in the zone 
administrations that constraint the spending autonomy of woreda administrations is not 
necessarily caused by shortcomings in the design of decentralization or the 
implementation limitations mentioned earlier. But it is the ruling party system and 
structure that facilitated for regional government/zone administration authorities to 
directly intervene in the affairs of woreda administration. This chapter argues that the 
centralized system and dominance relationship between members at different position in 
the structure of the ruling party have forced woreda officials to be subordinated to 
unconstitutional tier of governments. Even though zone administrations are meant for 
following up and regulating woredas activities just for compliance of federal/regional 
laws, policies and standards as well as for supporting woreda administrations to 
strengthen their self-administering capacity, they are actually controlling and dictating 
woreda administrations without having any constitutional power but informally through 
party hierarchical structure. However, zone administrations have been neither capable as 
they are overburdened with the duty of dictating and controlling woreda administrations 
activities nor interested to follow up the compliance of financial rules, regulations and 
standards as they sometimes negate their political interest of the ruling party. 
The assessment in this chapter addresses also how the ruling party system and structure 
interacts with formal public administration systems to determine woreda financial 
governance. It is indicated that the boundary between the ruling party system and 
woreda administration systems is blurred. This led to the dominance of the informal 
party system over the formal administration system. This is guaranteed by the 
appointment of party loyal cadres in woreda executives’ positions who are subject to 
periodic party evaluation and reshuffling. They have neither the training nor the 
experience to discharge their managerial role. This also extended to staff members in 
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the woreda administration. It is indicated, therefore that there have been chances for 
party system to override the formal administrative system.  
Due to this fact woreda officials have been making budget allocation decisions that 
reflect party interest but at the expense of administrative standards. Woreda officials 
couldn’t properly undertake their managerial duty like planning, budgeting and 
evaluation because of their overburden with political duties. They didn’t give attention 
to planning and budgeting preparation and their implementation as they knew that their 
evaluation is based party loyalty and commitment than these managerial duties. 
WOFED staff members failed to force officials to comply with financial management 
standards, procedures and rules. Even though, formally the duty and responsibility of 
safeguarding the violation of these administrative ordinances is given to WOFED and 
its staff, the accountability relation is inversed to be in the other way around due to the 
dominance of party system. It is discussed also that the existing manpower deficiency in 
woreda administrations is associated with party system dominance as the successive 
reshuffling and assignment of officials and employees to new positions is party driven 
for the purpose of instilling party loyalty of staff members. The reason for officials’ lack 
of skill in planning and budgeting is caused by the current management development 
program that is designed just to teach party ideology and maintain party loyalty. Party 
system is also the factor for limiting the overseeing role of Woreda Council. It is 
observed that there has been reverse accountability relationship between Woreda 
Council and executives where Woreda Council members are accountable to executives 
through party structure despite their formal power to hold executives accountable. 
The chapter also attempted to portray the influence of the regional ruling party system 
and structure in determining the contribution of social accountability arrangements in 
promoting woredas’ financial governance. It was observed that the ruling party chain of 
control that extends from the region to community level and from government level to 
civil society and community associations level undermines not only the chance of the 
people to challenge the financial allocation and utilization of decision of woreda 
officials but also the independence of civil society organizations and community 
associations to challenge woreda officials representing the community.   
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All in all, the chapter confirmed that the effort to improve woreda financial governance 
can succeed if only the reforms to overhaul the intergovernmental relations and 
financial management systems are supplemented by social accountability initiatives but 
also depends on the political context. 
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CHAPTER NINE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this final chapter, a brief review of the thesis and synthesis of its different chapters is 
to be presented in order to clearly address the research objectives and answer the 
research questions. The thesis sought to examine the link between fiscal 
decentralization and local financial governance and intervening factors in woreda 
administrations of the Amhara region in Ethiopia. The district level decentralization 
program pioneered by the Amhara regional government, along with three other regions, 
to reorganize woreda administrations into self-administering local governments has 
devolved not only political and administrative powers but also the power to collect and 
spend government finance for financing local public services. The expressed aim of 
devolving fiscal power to woreda administrations is to enable woreda administrations to 
deliver local public services through the efficient, effective, transparent and accountable 
raising and spending of public finance, as well as through the active participation of 
local people. However, as in other developing countries that have followed the path to 
devolved forms of decentralization, the evidence from this study reveals that it is 
doubtful if the decentralization program in the Amhara region in Ethiopia will be to 
deliver its financial governance promises, given that the program has faced a variety of 
important challenges, including the unclear and inadequate devolution of power, 
problems in the system of intergovernmental relations, incomplete financial 
management reforms, dysfunctional democratic arrangements, weak citizen and civil 
society involvement, and the dominance of a centralized ruling party system.  
 
The theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 (based on the four different 
perspectives), as well as the comparative experience of fiscally decentralized countries, 
suggest that the endeavour to achieve local financial governance benefits through fiscal 
decentralization is not only a matter of devolving fiscal power and making necessary  
reforms in financial management systems, but also requires a range of carefully 
designed multifaceted efforts such as social accountability arrangements and the 
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provision of an enabling environment. The theoretical perspectives suggest that having 
clear and adequate assignment of powers and functions helps to ensure accountability 
and effective forms of financial management at the local level. The inadequate and 
unclear assignment of functions, finance and powers provides insufficient motivation 
for local officials to act responsibly, makes it difficult for local people to know who is 
accountable for what, and can easily result in the unpredictable and inadequate 
availability of resources. Furthermore, complete and appropriate reforms in the public 
arrangement of decentralization can help to ensure effective, efficient and financial 
management, to facilitate financial transparency by providing complete, reliable and 
relevant information, and to ensure that officials and civil servants are administratively 
accountable and executives are politically accountable to local legislators and the 
people. Moreover, it is suggested that no matter how well they are designed and 
practiced, such public arrangements might not ipso facto adequately lead to effective 
and strong accountability. Instead, new forms of social accountability mechanisms, 
which enable the direct engagement of citizens in government, should complement 
public accountability mechanisms. In addition, it is important to recognize that the 
political environment in which fiscal decentralization, public arrangements and social 
accounting reforms are implemented can play an important role in influencing how 
effective decentralizing reforms work in practice. In democratic countries that have a 
single dominant party, it is suggested that the intra-party relationship of the ruling party 
at the different levels of government can play a particularly important role. In short, the 
theoretical and comparative practical experience suggests that local financial 
governance is best served when these various elements are used in combination in an 
enabling political environment. 
 
In view of this argument, the overarching question that this thesis attempts to address is 
how the incomplete and mixed initiatives of the Amhara region’s district level 
decentralization program in a centralized single party dominant system have combined 
to influence district level (woreda) financial governance. Before answering this question 
it is imperative first to address three other specific questions. The first is how adequate 
and appropriate have been the decentralization and public financial management 
reforms undertaken under the decentralization framework. The second is to identify 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER NINE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
  
309 
 
those areas of decentralized financial management and governance that could not be 
adequately addressed by the decentralization reforms, and which therefore need to be 
supplemented by other alternatives such as social accountability mechanisms, as well as 
to assess the opportunities for the effective introduction of such mechanisms. The third 
is the extent to which the political environment, and specifically the intra-political party 
relations of the ruling party, has served to promote or inhibit the genuine devolution of 
power and the introduction of effective and accountable forms of financial governance 
at the district level. 
 
In an attempt to answer these questions primary and secondary data was gathered from 
four different woredas in the Amhara region. It was believed that answering these 
questions would help to identify the gaps in the design and implementation of district 
level fiscal decentralization and to determine what additional interventions are needed 
to reap its promised financial governance benefits. However, before attempting to 
answer the questions, it is necessary to present a summary of the study’s key findings in 
relation to an assessment of the effectiveness of the intergovernmental relations system, 
the adequacy and appropriateness of the efforts to empower woreda administrations, the 
reforms in the public arrangements for fiscal decentralization and financial 
management, the existing mechanisms for citizen involvement and the influence of 
political party system and structure.  
 
9.2 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
9.2.1 Intergovernmental Relations 
The assessment of the district level decentralization framework was designed to 
determine the level of autonomy afforded to woreda administrations, as well as the 
supportive and regulatory role to be played by the regional government. According to 
the revised constitution of the Amhara regional government, woreda administrations are 
autonomous political units mandated to undertake a range of functions for which they 
can also raise and spend funds. These include the formulation and implementation of 
socio-economic plans, and annual plans and budgets. Nonetheless, neither the 
constitution nor other legal instruments clearly specify all the functional competencies 
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devolved, resulting in a lack of clarity on the precise and exclusive roles of the woreda 
administrations. 
 
In particular, the woreda administrations have not been devolved with significant power 
to raise their own revenue, for example through borrowing. Although the urban 
administrations are better empowered to raise their own revenue from municipality 
services, most of the rural based woredas (which are the vast majority) have a very low 
tax base. Currently, therefore most woreda governments are highly dependent on 
transfers from the regional government for both their recurrent and capital expenditure, 
as well to a more limited extent on donor funding for capital development projects. As 
most of the regional transfers are delivered on an unconditional basis, this in theory 
would suggest that the woreda governments still have a significant level of discretion in 
deciding on their spending plans. However, in reality the discretionary power created by 
the unconditional block grant has been cancelled out by the unit cost approach that is 
used to determine the volume and distribution of the grant. This effectively compels the 
budget allocation by the woreda governments to reflect regional government interests 
and priorities. 
 
More fundamentally, however, the constitutionally recognized spending autonomy of 
woreda governments in the Amhara region has been severely compromised by the   
interference of the regional government through its zone administration structures. As 
noted in the study, the various sector offices in the zone administrations interfere on a 
regular basis in the planning and budgetary preparation of woreda sector offices by 
dictating what goals and targets to include. They do this through the provision of 
planning guidelines and the evaluation of the performance of the woreda sector offices, 
as well as in some cases in dictating what employees to hire, and ordering woreda 
officials to engage in and allocate budgets for unplanned activities. As will be seen later 
in this section, the zone administrations are able to exercise such levers of control on 
behalf of the regional government primarily because of the political dominance 
exercised through the intra-party operations of the ruling party.   
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Although the woreda administrations have been able to achieve some success, 
particularly in terms expanding access to services, reducing red tape, and mobilizing 
local resources, far less progress has been made in areas such as involving of people in 
local financial allocation and utilization decisions, availing financial information to 
citizens, engaging people in holding local officials accountable. In many ways, 
therefore, the findings of the study indicate that actual practice of decentralization in the 
Amhara region therefore has exhibited many of the features of decentralization by de-
concentration than decentralization by devolution. 
9.2.2 Public Arrangement of Reforms in Woreda Financial Management 
Generally, the study finds that almost all of the public arrangements in the financial 
management systems of woreda administrations have been overhauled, as part of the 
decentralization process, in line with the ‘getting basics right first’ approach. In the first 
place, and with respect planning, woredas have been required to link their annual plans 
and budgets with the required policy outputs through strategic planning. They are 
required to link their annual plans and resource allocation not only with such medium 
term policy outputs but also with the preferences of people at the grass root level 
through bottom-up rather than top-down planning. Moreover, they have been provided 
with new budget codes that have been helpful in analysing the budget from different 
dimensions, as well as in allocating budgets to programs. A new budget calendar has 
also been introduced to provide the woredas with sufficient time to analyse and allocate 
their budgets properly and prudently. Procedures that should be followed and the 
various actors who are involved in the process of allocation, appropriation and approval 
have been clearly established. In order to ensure an orderly and disciplined 
implementation of plans and budget, sector offices have been required to prepare and 
follow action plans and cash flow plans. The old single entry recording system has been 
changed to a double entry system, which has helped all the case woredas to improve the 
accuracy of recording, easing reconciliation and closing accounts. The old cash based 
accounting system has been also replaced by the new modified cash accounting system 
that recognizes short term advances and takes commitment expenditures into account. A 
single treasury system has also been introduced to replace the old fragmented cash 
management system. This pulls all funds together into a single bank account introduced 
in the place of the old fragmented cash management system. 
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Procurement also has gone through reform. The previous unplanned and fragmented 
system has been changed to a planned and centralized procurement system. Direct/pro 
forma centred procurement practices have been replaced by open bid procurement with 
the aim of reaping ‘value for money’ benefits. Reporting in the woreda administrations 
has been also overhauled to facilitate greater transparency and accountability. Woreda 
administrations and their sector offices are now required to prepare their reports by 
integrating their financial performance with physical performance, as well as by 
comparing their planned and actual performance. Auditing has also been reformed to 
strengthen its role of facilitating transparency and accountability. The previous 
verification centred pre-auditing practice has been changed to sample based post-
auditing. 
 
Decentralization has also resulted in new political systems at the district level. Multi-
party elections have been introduced for the Woreda Council, with a separation of 
powers been the elected representatives and appointed officials. The Woreda Council is 
composed of democratically elected representatives who collectively have the power (at 
least in theory) to appoint the woreda administration executives and hold them to 
account. 
 
Nevertheless, the findings of the study demonstrate that such reforms have not been a 
complete success. In the first place, the evidence suggests that the practices of strategic 
planning and bottom-up planning have not delivered any meaningful results. Strategic 
plans in the case woredas are often unrealistic and have little or no connection with 
annual plans and budgets. Similarly, the ‘bottom-up’ plans prepared by kebele 
administrations and service delivery institutions are often rejected or only included in 
the woreda plans following major modification, largely because they include targets 
that are unrealistic. This means that the intention to base planning on a bottom-up 
approach has not been realised in practice. In practice, the annual plans and budgets of 
the woredas have tended to be based much more on the achievement of regional 
government priorities than on the needs of communities and the declared preferences of 
the people.  
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Budgets have not only not been linked to strategic plan policy outputs. They also have 
not been systematically tied to annual performance targets and outputs. Allocations 
rather have been made to inputs and estimations made based on the availability of 
funds. This, in turn, has resulted in budget appropriations among the sector offices often 
being subject to manipulation and misappropriation. In short, budgets have failed to 
reflect both policy outputs and citizen preferences. These problems in planning and 
budgeting have also had a domino effect on other financial management activities. 
Budget implementation has often significantly deviated from the plan, resulting in the   
excessive use of budget transfers.  
 
In addition, due to such disruptions in the plans and budgets, woredas have been unable 
to put into action and realise the benefits of planned procurement. This also helps to 
explain why the auditing practices of woreda administrations have been limited to 
compliance auditing. Budget reporting and evaluation has been forced to rely on budget 
execution information that does not clearly reveal the efficiency and manner of their 
spending. In fact due to the intensity of disruptions in the plan and budget, sector offices 
have experienced difficulty of preparing a report that compares actual and planned 
performance.  
 
With regard more specifically to procurement, the introduction of an open-bid system 
has not in most cases realised the envisaged benefits in terms of competitive pricing and 
quality. This has especially been the case in the rural-based woredas that make up a 
majority of the woredas in the region. Many of these have not been able to capitalize on 
the competitive price benefits of the new procurement system as they have only a small 
number of suppliers or contractors to compete in the bid. This situation has permitted 
suppliers to collude with each other and rig the prices. Due to the shortage of suppliers 
and contractors, tenders often have to be issued several times before they attract any 
response, thus leading to delays in the commencement of infrastructure projects. Where 
no responses are achieved at all, woredas have often been forced to resort to more 
traditional methods of direct procurement, with the attendant dangers of nepotism and 
price rigging. The lack of experienced and capable suppliers and contractors has also 
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had an adverse effect on the quality of construction projects and their timely 
completion. 
 
Moreover, though the double entry system has brought improvement in accuracy and 
facilitated recording and closing processes, the modified cash accounting system’s 
failure to recognize in-kind donations and contributions, as well as its treatment of asset 
acquisitions as expenditures, has meant that financial managers do not full control over 
all their assets, also resulting in incomplete financial statement. Despite its generally 
positive effect on financial management, the single treasury system has sometimes 
resulted in cash management difficulties through the incorporation of unreliable and 
irregular funds.  
 
Auditing practices have tended to be limited to disbursements, collections and 
accounting statements, and auditing in general has suffered from the lack of coverage of 
all aspects of woreda finances. The main activities of financial management: planning, 
budgeting and implementation have generally been excluded from both internal and 
external auditing. In addition, the limited number of woreda that are covered by the 
external auditors, due to capacity constraints in the regional auditor general’s office 
(ARAG). The lack of effective controls through the internal and external auditing 
systems, together with the limited types of discipline or punishment dispensed to 
identified offenders, has provided an atmosphere in which corruption and fraud can 
thrive. 
 
At the same time, two important changes that would have undoubtedly contributed to 
the financial reform processes, namely performance/program budgeting and zero based 
budgeting, have not as yet been embraced. 
 
Another problem is that the political arrangement of elections and check and balance 
systems have not in general served to ensure financial accountability. Opposition parties 
have shown little interest in participating in Woreda Council elections, with the result 
that in all the case woredas the ruling party occupies all the seats in the Councils. 
Citizens have also shown little active interest in participating in the elections. In 
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addition, the Woreda Councils have generally failed to effectively oversee plans, 
budgets and performance, and to woreda officials to account, largely due to their lack of 
capacity and interest. Typically the plans, budgets, and reports prepared by the woreda 
officials have not been sufficiently understandable, relevant and complete to facilitate a 
critical analysis. External audit reports are also not usually presented for Woreda 
Council scrutiny. In a nut shell, the role of the Woreda Councils has in many ways been 
little more than rubber stamping the activities of the woreda executive. Again, as will be 
seen later, this tendency has been reinforced by the operation of the party system at the 
woreda level. 
 
Another important problem has been the considerable variation in the actual 
implementation of the decentralized financial reforms between different woredas, as 
well as between different sector offices in the same woreda. This has been due in the 
main to variations in the levels of manpower, as well as to variations in the quality, 
skills and commitment of the officials employed. Although there has been a shortage of 
manpower in most of the rural woredas (the situation is somewhat better in the urban 
areas), some woredas have been more successful than others in filling the posts 
available.  
 
In general, however, human resource capacity problems have continued to plague most 
of the woredas, particularly in terms of planning and finance staff in the sector offices 
and WOFED. There is a general shortage of qualified and experienced staff, as well as 
the lack of training opportunities to build capacity. In addition, many financial officials 
have only been in their jobs for a very short period of time. One of the main reasons for 
this is the constant reshuffling of staff that has taken place, resulting in high levels of 
turnover.  
 
At the same time, the findings of this study reveal that skill deficits have frequently 
been accompanied by a lack of commitment on the part of officials to carrying out their 
work efficiently and with integrity. Officials and staff members in many cases do not 
seem to have been seriously concerned with the effective implementation of budgets 
and plans. The situation has often been more serious with respect to procurement. Those 
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officials who are supposed to supervise compliance with rules, regulations and 
ordinances have often been found to have breached them themselves. 
 
One of the main reasons for such negligence by officials and staff members is related to 
the failure of WOFED to effectively enforce compliance with financial management 
procedures, standards and rules. There is little clarity on the extent of power afforded to 
WOFED to enforce such ordinances. At the same time, the consequence of breaching 
such ordinances is not well known or understood. There is therefore no adequate 
administrative accountability relationship between WOFED and other woreda sector 
offices, or between senior officials and their staff members. Therefore, it can be 
generalized that administrative accountability has been one of the major missing 
elements in the financial reform processes. This has adversely affected the 
implementation and sustainability of the reform processes, and led to an increasing 
trend towards negligence, mismanagement and corrupt breaches of the financial rules 
and standards. 
 
In general, therefore, despite some successes, it can be concluded that the administrative 
and financial reforms introduced as part of the decentralization reforms have failed to 
lead effectively to responsive planning and budget allocation, the sustainable delivery 
and quality of services, efficient procurement with competitive prices, the timely 
completion of projects, improved forms of revenue assessment and collection, and the 
introduction of effective forms of administrative accountability. 
 
9.2.3 Social Accountability 
Given the weaknesses and gaps in the formal administrative arrangements for 
decentralized financial governance, the study examined the role that social 
accountability arrangements have played in improving this situation. The findings 
reveal that the practice of social accountability has been one of the most neglected 
aspects in the reform of the planning and financial management systems of the woreda 
administrations. In general civil service organizations and media have been too weak to 
play a major role in holding the woreda administrations to account. Citizens have 
generally shown little interest in participating in the formal meetings organized by the 
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woreda and kebele administrations to solicit the views of the people. One of the main 
reasons for this has been that most of the meetings have focused on issues, such as 
election campaigns, that are of little direct concern to citizens. If meetings and forums 
were called to discuss the provision of local public services, the community 
representatives surveyed in the study indicated that they would be genuinely interested 
in participating, especially if they were convinced that their issues and concerns would 
be positively taken into account.  
 
One form of public participation that has taken place is that of community contributions 
to development projects. Woreda administrations and urban administrations in 
particular, have been able to mobilise resources, in money or in kind, from citizens for 
the development and construction of various types of small-scale infrastructure projects. 
This is an indication that decentralization can indeed enhance the participation of people 
if such participation is meaningful and helps to solve problems in their immediate 
surroundings.    
 
With respect to the issue of popular oversight and accountability, the findings of the 
study reveal that there has been little or no opportunity for citizens to hold their officials 
effectively to account. The have been two main reasons for this. In the first place, there 
are no simple and convenient mechanisms for expressing their grievances and 
complains, or exposing wrongdoings. The local administrative, political and legal 
arrangements for doing so are complex and inconvenient for ordinary citizens and in 
many ways serve to protect woreda officials from public scrutiny. In the second place, 
the unsatisfactory ways in which official information about district level finances are 
currently disseminated has meant that the public have little or no access to information 
about how government finances are being used. 
 
Despite such difficulties, citizens have been courageous in challenging illicit spending 
on some occasions, especially where the funds misappropriated have been raised from 
their own contribution, and where the mis-utilization has been visible and has directly 
impacted on service delivery in their surroundings. However, the impact of such actions 
on the overall accountability of woreda administrations has been very limited, largely 
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because community contributions form a relatively small proportion of the total funds 
used by the woreda administrations for development activities and projects. 
 
The study also included an assessment of the possibilities of using traditional and 
formal associations as a channel for people to voice their opinions and concerns in ways 
that hold their woreda administrations to account. In general it was observed that 
traditional associations such as Edirs, local elders and religious organizations have a 
greater capacity to mobilize people than the formal associations. However, most of the 
activities of traditional associations are targeted at the social benefit of people, based on 
trust, cooperation and mutual understanding. Little focus has been placed on 
administrative, financial or economic issues associated with the work of the woreda 
administrations. This has been due partly to the traditional associations’ lack of skills 
and capacity in the area of government planning and finance, and partly due to the fear 
of being captured by local politicians if they started to enter into the political and 
administrative arena. In general, therefore, it is clear that such associations have played 
a very minimal role at best in holding local officials to account. The role played by 
formal associations, such as women’s associations and youth associations, was also 
found to have been limited in this respect, largely because they have been captured and 
co-opted by the regional party structures. 
 
Despite the limited practice of social accountability, an attempt was made by the 
researcher to assess a number of initiatives in the area of social accountability that have 
been put in place in the woreda administrations. These included the government’s 
Financial Transparency and Accountability (FTA) program that displays budget 
information in public places; the Participatory Planning and Budgeting (PPB) program 
(which is a component of the national Social Accountability Program); and the 
Community Development Fund (CDF) program.  The experience of displaying financial 
and budgetary information on public notice boards, it was found, had not played a 
significant role in creating public interest and awareness, or in promoting greater 
financial transparency, for a number of reasons. The first has to do with capacity of 
ordinary people to comprehend such information. The second was related to the 
crudeness of the information which, because it provided little or no information on the 
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effectiveness of the spending. The third was its inability to attract the attention of 
citizens. Local people are more interested in disaggregated information particularly 
about the funds utilized in their immediate surroundings, rather than woreda wide 
budget information. 
 
The PPB program was one component of the Ethiopian Social Accountability Program 
(ESAP) which has been in place in Ethiopia since June 2006. The ESAP program is 
designed to enhance the engagement of citizens and civil society organizations in the 
provision and financing of basic services.  The program is primarily supported by the 
World Bank and the GtZ (now GiZ). The pilot project of the program was implemented 
in four woredas between February 2008 and June 2009, and included the Debremarkos 
city administration as one of the pilots. Focusing on primary education and health care 
services, the PPB program was designed to promote the involvement of citizens in 
budgeting decision making (prioritization and the determination of the budget needed), 
in budget implementation, and in budget follow-up and evaluation.  
 
The experience of PPB pilot project shows that people can have a meaningful 
participation in forcing woreda administration officials to be responsive to their 
interests if they are empowered and their capacity is built. The citizens taking part in the 
PPB were able not only to articulate their priorities but also to help formulate the budget 
needed for them. However, given that this was a pilot project that has now come to an 
end, there was no opportunity to evaluate whether the actual outcomes of the project 
conformed to the planned priorities, or whether the budgets were executed as planned. 
As the program was funded by outside donors, there also seem to be limited 
opportunities for scaling it up to all woredas, especially with the limited government 
funds available for capital development projects. 
 
A third initiative covered in the study was the Community Development Fund (CDF) 
program. The CDF approach is being used in selected woredas by donor funded 
projects that are working to improve rural water supply. The CDF used a social 
accountability approach whereby citizens were involved throughout the implementation 
of the project and in the management of finance in particular. This approach has 
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provided an important lesson that the direct engagement of citizens in the administration 
and control of finances can result in the more economic use of resources and the more 
timely completion of projects. However, its wider replicability is limited by the reliance 
on donors’ funds.   
 
9.2.4 The Role and Influence of the Ruling Party and Intra-Party Relations 
Although Ethiopia embraced a multi-party system of democracy following the downfall 
of the Derg regime in 1991, the country has been exclusively ruled since then by the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF is an 
umbrella organization of four ethnically based parties that rule their respective ethnic 
regional states. Accordingly, the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), 
being one of the founding members of EPRDF, has ruled the Amhara regional state 
since 1994, and has come to monopolise all of the seats in most of the elected Woreda 
Councils, including the four case woredas surveyed in this study. The internal structure 
and operations of the ANDM is based on an extremely hierarchical form of democratic 
centralism, extending from the regional government to the zone, woreda and kebele 
administrations, as well as to the community level. 
 
The findings of the study demonstrate that the overwhelming dominance of the ruling 
party in the Amhara region, together with its centrally dominated hierarchical structure, 
has in a number of important ways served to seriously undermine the self-governing 
autonomy of the woreda administrations granted to them in the regional constitution.  In 
the first place, the regional government has used the influence of the party hierarchy to 
significantly expand the role of the zone administrations and their power to interfere in 
areas that are strictly within the mandate of the woreda administrations. Such 
interference has in many ways served to weaken the ability of the woreda 
administrations to devise and implement their own plans and budgets in accordance 
with the needs and priorities of their own constituents. At the same time, the legitimate 
role of the zone administrations in providing support and oversight has tended to decline 
in importance. 
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In the second place, and more generally, the blurring of the relations between party and 
state has led to the dominance of the informal party system over the formal 
administration system in the woredas.  This has been guaranteed in particular by the 
appointment of loyal party cadres to posts at all levels within the woreda and kebele 
administrations, particularly at the senior and executive levels, whose loyalty and 
positions are subject to periodic party evaluation and reshuffling. Many of these senior 
officials have neither the training nor the experience to discharge their managerial roles 
effectively.  
The result has been that woreda administrations have tended to align their development 
plans and budgets to the politically determined priorities of the regional government, 
rather than to the expressed interests and needs of the communities they serve. Another 
and associated outcome has been that woreda officials have not been effectively held 
accountable by the regional and zonal authorities for their compliance with the financial 
regulations, rules and standards laid down by the regional government, providing they 
continue to display the appropriate level of political loyalty. 
In the third place, the operation of the hierarchical party system has also been a factor in 
limiting the oversight role constitutionally allocated to the elected members of the 
Woreda Council. The fact that executive leaders of the woreda administrations usually 
occupy more senior positions within the ruling party than most of their elected 
counterparts has served to foster an inverse accountability relationship between Woreda 
Council and the Executive Cabinet, whereby the elected Council members are 
essentially accountable to the appointed officials through the party structure. 
In the fourth place, the ruling party chain of control, which extends from the region to 
the community level and from the government level to civil society, has in many ways 
served to undermine the independence of civil society organizations and the ability of 
the people to hold their woreda administrations to account. The Amhara Development 
Association, for example, is controlled by the ruling party, and most of the civil society 
associations, such as youth and women’s organizations are dominated by ruling party 
activists. 
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9.3 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Despite the many challenges mentioned in the chapters and sections above, most of the 
case study woredas have nevertheless been able to make some limited progress, 
particularly in areas such as the expansion of access to services, the more economic use 
of resources, increases in administrative efficiency by streamlining bureaucratic 
processes, and the mobilization of local resources for development purposes. However, 
none of the case study woredas have showed signs of achieving the most important 
claimed benefits of decentralization, in particular the establishment of an efficient, 
effective, responsive, accountable and participatory system of local governance and 
administration, in which plans and budgets for service delivery and infrastructural 
development are designed, implemented and monitored in a participatory manner, in 
line with the expressed needs of local communities. As the findings of this study show, 
there has been little involvement of citizens in local financial allocation and utilization 
decisions, and few opportunities for citizens to hold their elected and appointed leaders 
and officials to account.  
With respect more specifically to the administrative and financial management reforms 
introduced as part of the decentralization process, the evidence suggests that, despite 
some successes, they have largely failed to lead effectively to responsive planning and 
budget allocation, the sustainable delivery and quality of services, efficient procurement 
with competitive prices, the timely completion of projects, improved forms of revenue 
assessment and collection, and the introduction of effective forms of administrative and 
financial accountability. 
 
This study has identified a range of factors that have been responsible for the 
weaknesses and shortcomings that have characterised the decentralization process in the 
Amhara region, and in particular the operation of the financial governance and 
administration systems that have been put in place as a key part of the process. These 
include the lack of clarity in the constitutional and legislation framework for 
decentralization, the serious human resource capacity constraints that face the vast 
majority of woredas, and the low tax base that comprises their revenue raising capacity.  
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However, in many ways the most important constraint in the decentralization reform 
process has been the role played by the ruling party hierarchy in maintaining and 
consolidating its influence and control over all the levels of governance in the region. 
Through its control of the elected Woreda Councils and its ability, in particular through 
the activities of the zone administrations, to ensure that party loyalists are appointed to 
the senior positions in the woreda administrations, the ruling party has ensured the 
development of a client-patron relationship at the district level that has seriously 
constrained the self-governing autonomy of the woreda administrations. At the same 
time, the lack of demarcation between the party system and woreda administrative 
system has served to undermine the formal accountability relationships within the 
woreda administrations; and the political capture of citizens and civil society 
organizations has lessened the independence of civil society organizations and the 
active involvement of citizenry. 
The result has been a system of decentralized district government that is essentially top-
down rather than bottom-up in its approach, and characterized in many ways by the 
features of decentralization by de-concentration rather than genuine devolution. 
According to the more cynical observers, this illustrates that the original decision by the 
federal and regional authorities to embark upon a process of district level 
decentralization was motivated more by a desire to consolidate the control and reach of 
the ruling party than a genuine desire to promote autonomous forms of self-government 
at the local level.  
Whether or not the decision to decentralize was prompted by such cynical motives, 
what does seem clear is that, unless the ruling party at the regional level is prepared to 
loosen its tight control over the governance and administration of the woredas, the 
prospects for the realization of genuine forms of autonomous and participatory financial 
governance at the district level will continue to be remote. 
The study further highlights a symbiotic relationship among the determining factors of 
local financial governance. The relationship between the degree of devolution of fiscal 
power and the public financial management arrangements suggest that devolution of 
power without proper public financial management arrangements and vice versa could 
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not bring any tangible result in the woreda administrations financial governance. 
Therefore, it is possible to suggest that the symbiotic relation between the 
intergovernmental relations caused by the decentralization process and the public 
financial management arrangements in woreda administrations of the Amhara region 
led to the partial reform to have no tangible impact on woreda administrations’ financial 
governance. This relationship is further complicated by the cascading relationship 
between financial management processes.  
 
This symbiotic relationship is also extended to social accountability arrangements. 
Findings reveal that arrangements of direct engagement of people could strengthen 
fiscal decentralization to community level and supplement the formal financial 
management system to fill some of its gaps. But in order to have genuine and 
productive direct involvement of people, it is suggested that adequate devolution of 
power and proper public financial management arrangement are very important. The 
evidence also reveals that the effect of these factors on local financial governance is 
determined by the structure and system of the ruling party. 
 
9.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The evidence compiled in this study clearly shows that the link between the devolution 
of powers and resources to local governments and the establishment of effective forms 
of local financial governance is not automatic. There are a range of intervening 
variables that influence the ability of fiscal decentralization to deliver on its financial 
governance promises. In essence, fiscal decentralization not only has to be accompanied 
by effective and accountable governance and financial management mechanisms but 
also by an enabling political environment. The empirical evidence from the experiences 
of the case study woredas reveals a range of weaknesses and shortcomings in these 
respects.  
 
Given the capacity and other constraints that most developing countries have typically 
experienced in their attempts to decentralize functions and powers to sub-national levels 
of government, it might be argued that the shortcomings and challenges identified in 
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this study are essentially problems that will be resolved over time. Decentralization, 
after all, is a gradual and iterative process, not an event. This argument might hold 
water if the district level decentralization process in the Amhara region was on 
continuum towards the further devolution of power and full-fledged financial 
management reform. However, the reality is that in many ways the district level 
decentralization of the Amhara region has not been a process. Rather it was a one-time 
measure that took place in 2001. Few positive changes have taken place in the period 
since then. Therefore, the overarching recommendation of this study is that, for 
decentralization to achieve its intended benefits, the reform measures of 2001 will need 
to be accompanied by a much more concerted, proactive and continuous process of 
refinement and improvement, designed to address the many problems and challenges 
that have limited the ability of woreda administrations to exercise their self-governing 
powers of financial governance in ways that are efficient, effective, accountable and 
responsive to the needs of the communities they serve.  
 
The ultimate objective will be to work towards a framework that complies with the 
accepted principles of subsidiarity, namely that basic government services should be 
delivered, wherever possible, by the level of government closest to the people; that such 
levels of government should be assigned clear and exclusive powers and functions to 
carry out their work effectively; and that they should be equipped with the necessary 
revenue raising powers to do so. Administrative shortcomings and capacity problems at 
the local level should not provide an excuse for the retention or reclamation of powers 
by higher regional or central levels of government. Where local level administrations 
lack capacity, this can be more effectively addressed through forms of 
intergovernmental collaboration in which the higher levels of government provide 
support not only in the process of delivering services but also in building the self-
administering capacity of woreda administrations.  
 
In moving towards a more effective system of decentralized financial governance in the 
Amhara region, a number of important initiatives will need to be undertaken. In the first 
place, the regional legislative framework for decentralized district level governance will 
need to be reviewed and revised to address the serious weaknesses and gaps revealed by 
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this study in the original design process. Particular attention should be placed on clearly 
specifying the respective powers and functions of the regional and district organs of 
government, including their ‘own’ powers, over which they have exclusive jurisdiction, 
as well as concurrent powers and responsibilities. These need to be set out in specific 
legislation, together with the procedures for further revision or amendment, as well as 
mechanisms for the fair and objective resolution of disputes surrounding the powers and 
functions. The need to encapsulate the respective powers and functions clearly in 
legislation is important to put an end to the current practice of making changes in the 
operation of intergovernmental relations through executive decrees of the regional 
government. Particular attention will need to be paid in the legislation to the role and 
responsibilities of zone administrations. These should be confined, as originally 
intended, to support and oversight rather than the kinds of direct interference in the day-
to-day affairs of the woreda administrations that have been all too prevalent in the past. 
 
In the second place, serious attention will need to be given to improvements and 
reforms in the recruitment, promotion, retention and remuneration of staff, as well as in 
the quality, relevance and accessibility of staff training. This is to ensure that woreda 
officials and staff have the necessary knowledge, skills, experience and attitude (i.e. 
competence) to carry out their work efficiently, honestly and accountably. 
Appointments and promotions must be based on merit rather than political loyalty. The 
constant reshuffling of staff at the behest of the regional and zonal administrations 
should be curtailed to ensure greater stability and a reduction in the current high levels 
of staff turnover. And incentives should be introduced to encourage qualified staff to 
work and stay in the more remote woredas. At the same time, the opportunities for 
officials and staff to improve and update their qualifications and skills, through training, 
mentorship and other forms of human resource development, should be vastly expanded 
by the regional government, particularly in areas of great skill shortage such as financial 
management. In general, improvements in staff training and development should also 
focus on officials and staff in the regional and zonal offices of government, as well as 
those in the woredas. These should be designed to strengthen the capacity of the 
regional government and its zone administrations to more effectively support and 
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monitor the work of the woreda administrations, as well as to increase their self-
administration capacity. 
 
In the third place, with respect to financial management reforms, measures should be 
taken to move forward towards fully-fledged NPFM reform. These would include 
replacing line item budgeting and incremental budgeting by program/performance 
budgeting and zero base budgeting;  modified cash accounting by modified accrual 
accounting; execution reporting by performance reporting; and compliance auditing by 
performance auditing.  
 
In the fourth place, the current limited revenue raising powers of the woreda 
administrations will need to be addressed and improved. Devolution of adequate power 
to woreda administrations to raise their own revenue would not only enhance woredas’ 
own revenue generating capacity and effort but also results in more responsive and 
proper utilization of finance as many of the respondents surveyed during the course of 
this study indicated that local citizens would be more likely to be interested in 
challenging undesirable allocation and utilization by local officials if they were paying 
taxes or contributing to the financing of public services. Another approach of increasing 
revenue raising power could be to relax the current restriction on borrowing, providing 
this is accompanied by clear and enforceable guidelines covering the circumstances 
under which borrowing could take place. Amongst other things, this would enable the 
woreda administrations to cover shortfalls in capital expenditure that were delaying the 
implementation and completion of development projects, resulting from delays in the 
transfer of regional or donor funds. At the same time, efforts should be made to reduce 
such delays in the transfer of funds, as they have had a serious adverse effect, as this 
study shows, on the ability of the woreda administrations to plan and implement their 
developmental and infrastructural projects in an effective way.  
 
Equally if not more importantly, the woreda administrations need to take measures to 
increase their local tax base, improve the collection methods, and close the current 
loopholes that give rise to quite high levels of tax avoidance and evasion (especially by 
informal or illegal traders). An important quid pro quo in this respect will be to device 
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mechanism of genuine and empowered community involvement in the tax assessment 
process and in the process to fighting tax evasion by informal and illegal traders.  
 
In the fifth place, efforts will need to be made to promote much more effective forms of 
top-down and bottom-up accountability in the woreda administrations. At the top-down 
level, this will involve, amongst other things, improvements and reform in the 
monitoring and reporting carried out by the zone administrations on behalf of the 
regional government, as well as by the Woreda Council and by WOFED. As revealed in 
this study, the zone administrations have tended to neglect their legitimate oversight role 
in favour of more direct forms of interference in the day-to-day activities of the woreda 
administrations. This situation needs to be reversed. At the same time, the capacity and 
commitment of the Woreda Councils needs to be enhanced, so that they can play a more 
effective role in holding their appointed officials to account. Likewise, the 
accountability relationships between WOFED and the other sector offices, as well as 
between officials and staff members within such offices, needs to be clarified and 
strengthened. 
 
With regard to bottom-up or social accountability, this leads naturally to the sixth main 
type of reform initiatives required. These relate to the need to promote more genuine 
and effective forms of direct citizen involvement in the governance of the woredas, and 
particularly in the financial affairs of woreda administrations. This should take the form 
of participation in the design of development plans and the allocation of budgets, to 
ensure that they are aligned to community needs and priorities, as well as in social 
accountability mechanisms to ensure that plans and budgets are implemented effectively 
in line with the agreed priorities. Direct citizen involvements also must take the form of 
community participation in tax assessment and in bringing illegal and informal traders 
into formal system. Traditional and formal associations should be encouraged and 
supported to actively engage in mobilizing people to become involved in the execution 
and monitoring of participatory financial decision making processes. This could be 
along the promising lines demonstrated by the Participatory Planning and Budgeting 
(PPB); and Community Development Fund (CDF) programs, outlined in earlier sections 
of this study. Such programs have so far been funded as pilots by donor partners. Given 
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their success in the pilot areas, consideration needs to be given to expanding such 
programs on a more sustainable basis (i.e. with regional government support) 
throughout the region. 
 
Finally, and most importantly, for these recommended reform initiatives to succeed, 
there will have to be the political will on the part of the federal and regional authorities 
to reorient the political landscape that currently governs the operation of the 
decentralization process in Ethiopia. A key finding of this study has been that the 
overwhelming dominance of the ruling party in the Amhara region, together with its 
centrally dominated hierarchical structure, has served in a number of important ways to 
seriously undermine the self-governing autonomy of the woreda administrations granted 
to them in the regional constitution. The ruling party’s concern with maintaining its 
tight control over the affairs of the woreda administrations has in many ways resulted in 
practice, if not in theory, with decentralization through de-concentration rather than 
through genuine forms of devolution. Unless this situation changes, it is likely that little   
serious consideration will be given to the reform efforts detailed above, and that the 
establishment of genuinely autonomous, responsive, accountable and participatory 
forms of financial governance at the district level will continue to be an unfulfilled 
promise. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1:Budget calender for woreda administrations in ANRS 
Budget cycle  Date in ethiopian calendar  
 
Preparation of formula for woreda grant February 18 
 Budget call and notification of        
temporary budget ceiling to woreda 
February 18 
 
Notification of the actual budget ceiling May 17 
Approval of the woreda grant by 
regional council  
May 22 
Preparation of budget request by the 
offices  
July 8 
 
Approval of the recommended woreda 
budget by the woreda council  
July 8 
 
Proclaiming of the budget  July 18 
Notification of the proclaimed budget 
to the offices 
July 25 
 
Implementation of the budget  July 25-june 30 of next year 
Closing of annual account closing  July 1 
          Source: Budget preparation and management training manual (2003) 
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Appendix 2: Perception of respondents if allocation of budget fits preference of 
people 
Perception of respondents if allocation of budget fits preference of people 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
No 98 31.7 32.3 32.3 
I don't know 165 53.4 54.5 86.8 
Yes 40 12.9 13.2 100.0 
Total 303 98.1 100.0  
Missing 
99.00 5 1.6   
System 1 .3   
Total 6 1.9   
Total 309 100.0   
ANOVA 
Perception of respondents if allocation of budget fits preference of people 
 Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.270 3 .423 4.158 .007 
Within Groups 30.454 299 .102   
Total 31.724 302    
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Appendix 3a: Perception of people about the existing constraints in service 
delivery institutions 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Poor construction 
quality 
Between Groups .881 3 .294 2.893 .036 
Within Groups 30.557 301 .102   
Total 31.438 304    
Limited service 
capacity 
Between Groups 1.495 3 .498 2.501 .060 
Within Groups 59.781 300 .199   
Total 61.276 303    
Lack of skilled 
personnel 
Between Groups .178 3 .059 .458 .712 
Within Groups 38.939 300 .130   
Total 39.118 303    
Lack of timely 
maintenance 
Between Groups .283 3 .094 1.075 .360 
Within Groups 26.427 301 .088   
Total 26.710 304    
Lack of facilities, 
equipment and 
furniture 
Between Groups .173 3 .058 .781 .505 
Within Groups 22.177 301 .074   
Total 22.349 304    
 *the mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level 
 
Appendix 3b: Perception of civil servants about the existing constraints in service 
delivery institutions 
ANOVA 
 Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Poor construction 
quality 
Between 
Groups 
531.652 3 177.217 1.887 .137 
Within Groups 9013.696 96 93.893   
Total 9545.347 99    
Limited service 
capacity 
Between 
Groups 
540.695 3 180.232 1.902 .134 
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Within Groups 9095.632 96 94.746   
Total 9636.328 99    
Lack of skilled 
personnel 
Between 
Groups 
526.557 3 175.519 1.863 .141 
Within Groups 9042.683 96 94.195   
Total 9569.240 99    
Lack of timely 
maintenance  
Between 
Groups 
504.496 3 168.165 1.786 .155 
Within Groups 9037.652 96 94.142   
Total 9542.147 99    
Lack of facilities, 
equipment and 
furniture 
Between 
Groups 
518.735 3 172.912 1.839 .145 
Within Groups 9026.112 96 94.022   
Total 9544.848 99    
 
Appendix 4: People’s interest to get the financial performance of woreda 
administrations investigated by independent party 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   Are you happy if the finance performance activity investigated by third party   
 (I) Woreda 
the 
respondent 
resides 
(J) Woreda the 
respondent 
resides 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
LSD 
BDZ 
Mekiet -.00642 .07410 .931 -.1523 .1395 
Shebel .22250* .08025 .006 .0645 .3805 
Markos -.03152 .07601 .679 -.1812 .1181 
Mekiet 
BDZ .00642 .07410 .931 -.1395 .1523 
Shebel .22891* .07255 .002 .0861 .3718 
Markos -.02510 .06783 .712 -.1586 .1084 
Shebel 
BDZ -.22250* .08025 .006 -.3805 -.0645 
Mekiet -.22891* .07255 .002 -.3718 -.0861 
Markos -.25401* .07451 .001 -.4007 -.1073 
Markos 
BDZ .03152 .07601 .679 -.1181 .1812 
Mekiet .02510 .06783 .712 -.1084 .1586 
Shebel .25401* .07451 .001 .1073 .4007 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Appendix 5: Willingness of the people to participate in meetings organized by 
woreda administrations 
ANOVA 
Willingness of people to participate in the meeting called by woreda government   
 Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .418 3 .139 1.704 .166 
Within Groups 24.561 300 .082   
Total 24.979 303    
         *the mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level 
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Appendix 6: Summary of Audit Findings in the Three Case Study woredas 
Finding Area of 
operation 
Reason Number 
of Cases 
Amount Severity Possible Outcomes 
Bahirdar Zuria Woreda (2005/06) 
1.Inappropriate 
Recording 
Cash Lack of skill or negligence 3  Medium Inadequate information for controlling and 
accountability/ not auditable 
2.Unsafe Cash keeping cash Negligence 1  Medium Exposed to robbery 
3.Timely unsettled 
advance pay 
Accounting Negligence 8 8,475.00 Medium Cash mismanagement, open for wastage (creates cash 
shortage) 
4.Inadequate Recording Accounting Negligence/lack of experience 2 27,646.6 Medium Financial statement doesn’t reflect the accurate 
finance and inappropriate use or cash management in 
bank 
5.Unsafe cash keeping  Cash Negligence 6 10,536.43 Medium Exposed to robbery and inefficient cash management 
7.Inadequate recording cash Negligence/intentional 1  Sever Frauds and abuse of public finance cannot be identified 
8.Inadequate recording cash Negligence/capacity problem   Severe Inadequate information for follow up 
9.Incomplete supporting 
documents 
cash and 
Acct. 
Negligence/intentional 1 56.90 Severe Unable to identify fraud and abuse of public finance 
10.Incomplete supporting 
documents 
Cash and 
acct. 
Negligence/intentional 1/344 23,875 Sever Unable to identify fraud and abuse of public finance 
11.Inappropriate 
recording 
Revenue 
collection and 
acct. 
Negligence/lack of training 5 16,479.9 Sever Financial statement doesn’t reflect the correct asset 
12.Incomplete supporting Revenue 
collection and 
Negligence/intentional 1  Sever Unable identify frauds, wastages and abuses and 
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documents acct exposed to abuse of public finance 
13.Inadequate recording 
of advance payments 
Accounting Negligence/lack human resource 6 4,195270.33 Medium Unable to follow up and enforce timely reimbursement 
(creates cash shortage) 
14.Payment made 
without adequate 
supporting documents 
Accounting 
and sectors 
Negligence/intentional 1 3,178.00 Sever May be abused by individuals 
15.Disbursement 
recorded without 
adequate supporting 
document 
Accounting Negligence 2 173948.81 Medium Exposed to  corruption 
16.Payment made 
without adequate 
supporting documents 
Accounting/p
rocurement 
Negligence/intentional 1 104088.6 Medium Exposed to fraud of public finance 
17.Disbursement 
recorded without 
supporting document 
Accounting Negligence/lack of skill 1 33919.20 Medium Exposed to fraud and financial statement not reliable 
18.Procedures for 
disbursement not 
followed (lack of formats 
to be filled, signatures, 
etc 
Accounting  Negligence/intentional 6  Medium Controlling is difficult and exposed to fraud 
19.Excessive budget 
transfer 
Budget Negligence 1  Medium Misuse and no link between planned budget and 
execution 
20.Inadequate recording 
of payables 
Accounting Negligence/lack of skill 1 1762208.38 Medium Inadequate information for managing payables 
21.Lack of budget 
discipline 
Accounting/b
udget 
Negligence 2 25392.52 Low Misuse and no link between planned budget and 
execution 
22.weak budget 
execution 
Budget/Secto
r office 
Negligence/practical reasons such as 
failure of the bureau to procure and 
provide the material on time 
2 499,270.57 Medium Ineffective utilization of capital budget 
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23.Discrepancy 
(shortages/excesses) 
Property 
management 
Negligence/lack of control or follow up 1 212.00/40.00 Sever Wastage of public resource. 
24.Discrepancy of 
receipts (excess) 
Disbursement 
and 
accounting 
Lack of appropriate transfer from 
outgoing to incoming/follow up, 
negligence 
1 250 
pages/serial 
numbers 
Medium Expose to fraud 
25.Inappropriate 
handling (vehicles) 
Property 
management 
Negligence and lack of follow up 1  Sever Can cause wastage management  
26.Property management 
procedures not followed 
Property 
management 
Negligence 3  Medium Difficult for follow up and management 
27.Lack of control (fuel) Property 
management 
Negligence/intentional 1  Sever Cannot identify if any fraud or abuse 
28.Inadequate control of 
vehicles (no use of 
formats) 
Property 
management 
Negligence/intentional 1  Medium Can cause misuse of public vehicles 
29.No surety/guarantor 
for cashiers 
HRM Negligence 5  Medium Accountability is not guaranteed 
Mekiet Woreda (2008/09) 
30.Lack of periodical 
balancing 
Cash Negligence 1  Medium Difficult to control cash wastages 
31.Lack of bank 
reconciliation 
Cash Negligence 4 NGO 
accts 
 Medium Difficult for cash management (cash balance is 
unknown) 
32.Unrecorded settled 
advance payments 
Cash/account
ing 
Negligence 1  Medium Unable to follow up unsettled advance payments 
33.Cash shortage not 
recorded properly and 
not yet returned 
Cash/account
ing 
Negligence 1  Sever Public finance remained wasted/fraud 
34.Revenue collected not 
supported by adequate 
Cash/account
ing 
Negligence ?  Sever Public resource abused/fraud 
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documents 
35.Inadequate recording 
of receivables 
Accounting Negligence 10 5697999.4 Medium Inadequate information to follow up and enforce 
payment 
36.Procurement not 
follow the procedures 
Procurment/a
ccounting 
Negligence 2 17,830.12 Medium Exposed to corruption 
37.Uneconomical 
construction 
procurement negligence/intentional 1 30,622.2 Too sever Enough evidence for corruption 
38.Payment without 
following the procedure 
Procurement/
accounting 
Negligence/intentional 8 123,014.72 Sever Payment could have been made without satisfactory 
completion of construction 
39.VAT payment without 
adequate supporting 
document 
Accounting Negligence/lack of skill 2 19,121.26 Sever Causes government tax to be collected may be used by 
individuals 
40.Excess payment than 
the amount of work 
completed 
Procurement/
accounting 
Negligence/intentional 3 47, 469.24 Sever Exposed to wastage 
41.Disbursement without 
adequate document 
 Negligence/intentional 3 153,101.54 Sever Exposed to fraud and abuse 
42.Perdium paid illegally Accounting/s
ectors 
Intentional 11 36,832.50 Too sever Adequate evidence for abuse of public finance 
43.Lack of procedures 
(signature, seal, formats, 
indications of payment, 
records 
Accounting/c
ash 
Negligence 4  Medium Exposed for fraud, abuse and double payment 
44.Inadequate recording 
of payables 
Accounting Negligence/lack of skill 19 accts 4391470.32 Medium Lack of information for follow up and management, 
report unreliable 
45.Inappropriate 
recording of receivables 
accounting Negligence/lack of skill 5 386,161.87 Medium Unreliable report, difficult for follow up, open for 
abuse. 
46.Inappropriate 
reporting (including 
accounting Negligence/lack of skill 2 353176.08 sever Unreliable financial report 
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regional) 
47.Inappropriate 
recording 
accounting Negligence/lack of skill 1 1131698.25 Sever Unreliable financial report 
48.Inadequate recording 
and lack of trial error  
accounting Negligence/lack of skill 1  Medium Difficult to control disbursement or if correct recording 
49.Low budget execution budget Negligence/lack of capacity/late release of 
the fund 
2 1430684.50 
(35.77%) 
Sever Ineffective budget execution 
50.Property management 
Procedures not followed 
(no recording, checking, 
inventory) 
Property 
management 
Negligence 1  Sever Highly exposed to corruption, abuse 
51.Lack of proper 
handling 
Property 
administratio
n 
Negligence 11 
vehicles 
 Sever Public resource wastage 
52.Property management 
procedures not 
followed(libre) 
Property 
administratio
n 
Negligence 36 
vehicles 
 Medium Difficult for follow up and management 
53.Property management 
not followed (recording, 
appropriate transfer, 
serial number  
Property 
administratio
n 
Negligence and lack of capacity 3  Medium Difficult to identify lost property and open for fraud 
54.Guarantor not 
provided or incomplete 
HRM Negligence 47  Medium Unsafe situation 
Measures taken   12 not satisfactory and 11 satisfactory  
Mekiet Woreda (2006/07) 
55.No balancing and no 
measures taken timely 
Cash/account
ing 
Negligence/intentional 2 10,323.72 Too sever Wastage, abuse and fraud of public finance not 
identified; weak follow up and controlling 
56.Lack of appropriate 
transfer of responsibility 
Cash/internal Negligence/capacity problem 1  Sever Unable to clearly identify the person responsible for 
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for cash auditing discrepancy  
57.Unable to identify how 
much excess or 
shortage/the existing 
balance unreliable  
Cash/auditing Negligence/capacity/weak controlling 1  Sever Unable to know the real cash balance 
58.Cash discrepancy b/n 
auditors record and 
ledger and left not 
reconciled 
Cash/auditing Negligence/capacity 1  Sever Unable to identify and hold accountable the 
responsible person 
59.Cash never audited for 
2 years 
Auditing Negligence/capacity 1  Medium Unable to check the cash against records/open for 
abuse or fraud 
60.No cash control ledger Cash/auditing Negligence 1  Medium Not easy for follow up and controlling 
61.Dubious accountability Cash/account
ing 
Negligence 1  Medium Chance for losing accountability 
62.Unsafe cash keeping cash Negligence 1 408,074.45 Medium Chance for fraud, robbery 
63.Unsafe cash keeping Cash/procure
ment 
Negligence 2 70, 965 Medium Chance for robbery and fraud 
64.Timely unsettled 
advance payments and 
never recorded as 
receivables 
Cash/account
ing 
Negligence ??? 1,821,929.85 Medium Cash mismanagement/unreliable reporting 
65.Advance payment 
discrepancy 
Cash/ 
accounting 
Negligence 1 10,308.55 Sever Suspect for fraud, loss  
66.Fail to  record of 
already paid payables 
properly and timely 
accounting Negligence/capacity ??? 1501157.35 Medium Unreliable reporting 
67.Revenue collection 
and disbursement 
without appropriate 
Cash/account
ing 
Negligence/late budget 
appropriation/release of the block grant 
the region 
1 500 medium Open for fraud  
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recording 
68.No bank reconciliation accounting Negligence/capacity 1  Sever Unreliable reports, difficult to know cash balance 
69.Wrongly recorded 
cash balance 
Accounting/c
ash 
Negligence/capacity 1 498317 Medium Difficulty of cash management 
70.Expenditures 
supported by enough 
document but not 
recorded properly 
Accounting Negligence/capacity 1 369,133.58 Medium Unreliable reporting 
71.Revenue without 
adequate supporting 
document 
Accounting Negligence 1 11,692.50 Medium Open for abuse 
72.Unsafe cash keeping 
(2%tax) 
Cash Negligence/intentional 1  Sever Open for abuse/ cash mismanagement 
73.Discrepancy between 
ledger and report 
Cash/account
ing 
Negligence 1 1399.56 Sever Unreliable reporting/unable to identify losses if any 
74.One form signed by 
one purchaser used 
though the money is paid 
two purchaser 
Cash/procure
ment 
Negligence 1  Medium Dubious accountability/unable to identify who is 
accountable 
75.Lack of proper transfer 
of responsibility for cash 
Cash/auditing Negligence/audit capacity 1  Sever Unable to identify who is accountable 
76.Transposition of 
record(debit vs. credit) 
accounting Negligence/capacity 1  Sever Unreliable reporting and difficulty of controlling 
77.Unsafe situation for 
ash keeping 
cash Negligence 1  Medium Chance for robbery 
78.Inadequate 
information on cheque 
Cash/account
ing 
Negligence 1  Medium Difficult for controlling; Open for fraud 
79.Revenue collected 
without adequate 
Cash/account Negligence 1 8,920 medium Open for fraud/ controlling and follow up become 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
352 
 
supporting document ing difficult 
80.Timely uncollected cash Negligence 1 3074 Sever Cash mismanagement 
81.Misplaced and 
unfound of unused 
receipts 
cash Negligence/intentional 38 
bundle 
 Sever Open for fraud or abuse 
82.Block grant recorded 
wrongly  
Accounting Negligence/capacity 2 12,035,227.99 Sever Unreliable reporting/controlling difficulty 
83.Revenue collected 
without adequate 
document 
Cash/account
ing 
Negligence/intentional 1  Sever Open for suspect of fraud or misuse 
84.Inadequate recording 
of receivables 
Accounting Negligence/Human resource deficiency 6 796,181.65 Sever No adequate information for management 
85.Disbursement not 
supported by enough 
document 
accounting Negligence/intentional 8 35259.65 Too sever Enough reason to suspect for fraud or abuse  
86.Inappropriate 
recording of receivables 
accounting Negligence/capacity problem 1 130,294.48 Medium Difficult for follow up and management 
87.Expenditures recorded 
to wrong account 
Accounting Negligence/capacity 1 16,816.50 Sever Unreliable reporting 
88.Discrepancy b/n 
ledger and report 
Accounting Negligence/capacity 1 88815.00 Sever Unreliable reporting and suspect for fraud 
89.Inadequate supporting 
document per diem paid 
Accounting Negligence 1  Medium Difficulty of controlling 
90.Expenditure payment 
decided only by two 
management committee 
members 
Management 
committee/ac
counting 
Negligence/Intentional 1  Sever Suspect for fraud or corruption 
91.Procurement by chief Cash/procure Negligent/intentional 1  medium Opens chance for fraud or abuse 
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cashier ment 
92.Voucher used not 
sequentially 
accounting Negligent/intentional 1  Medium Open chance for fraud or abuse 
93.Uneconomical 
procurement 
procurement Intentional 1  Too sever Enough evidence to suspect for corruption/wastage of 
public resource 
94.The same supporting 
document is provided for 
two different 
expenditures 
Accounting Intentional 1  Too sever Enough evidence to suspect for corruption 
95.Checks not 
registered… 
Accounting/c
ash 
Negligence 1  Medium Difficult to follow up or control 
96.Inadequate recording 
of payables 
Accounting Negligence/human resource deficiency 10 736,796.93 Medium No detail information for its management 
97.Budget indiscipline 
Excess paid than 
approved 
Budget/accou
nting 
Negligent 1 3,393.57 Too sever Misuse of budget 
98.Lower capital budget 
execution 
Budget/accou
nting 
Negligent/capacity/late release of the 
fund from foreign assistance 
1 912,083.80 Too sever Ineffective utilization of budget to bring the required 
socioeconomic changes 
99.Incomplete reporting 
(off budget) 
Budget/accou
nting 
Negligence/lack of awareness 1  Sever Net asset not known 
100.No property auditing Auditing/prop
erty admin 
Negligence/capacity auditing 1  Sever No guarantee for not loss of property 
101.Lack of procedures 
(no recording, 
identification number is 
not given) 
Property 
administratio
n 
Negligence/capacity 3  Sever Open for abuse, fraud, loss of public resources (difficult 
to control) 
102.Lack proper transfer 
of responsibility for 
property 
Audit/propert
y admin 
Negligence/capacity 1  Sever Dubious accountability 
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103.Mishandling of 
Vehicle 
Property 
admin 
Negligence 1  Sever Wastage of public resource 
104.No Guarantor is 
provided 
HRM Negligence ??  Medium No guarantee if there is loss or abuse, fraud 
Shebel Berenta Woreda (2009/10) 
106.No bank 
reconciliation 
Cash/account
ing 
Negligence/capacity problem 4  Medium Difficult to for cash management, unreliable report 
107.Revenue without 
adequate supporting 
document 
Accounting Negligence 1 754.5 Medium Open for fraud, inadequate info for controlling 
108.Revenue not 
collected 
Accounting/p
rocurement 
Negligence/lack of skill 1 177.14 Sever Government revenue not collected 
109.Procedures not 
followed (signature, seal, 
balancing) 
Accounting Negligence 2  Medium Difficult for controlling and follow up, open for fraud 
110.Receivables recorded 
without adequate 
supporting document 
Accounting Negligence/ lack of follow up 2 231025.39 Medium Difficult to follow up and unreliable report 
111.Advance payments 
not settled timely 
Accounting/c
ash 
Negligence/lack of control 3 719647.45 Medium Inefficient cash management, difficult to control 
112.Unreliable 
receivables recorded 
Accounting Negligence 2 6835.22 Medium Controlling becomes difficult and unreliable report 
113.Unreliable and 
unsettled receivable 
Accounting/p
rocurement 
Negligence/lack of follow up 1 16802.05 Sever Could be sever abuse/fraud, difficult to follow up,  
114.Inadequate recording 
of receivables 
Accounting Negligence/lack of capacity   Medium Difficult to follow up and enforce its return 
115.Uneconomical 
procurement 
Procurement/
accounting 
Negligence/intentional 1 2900.00 Sever Inefficient utilization, wastage and probably abuse or 
corruption 
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116.Disbursement 
recorded without 
adequate supporting  
document 
Accounting/c
ash 
Negligence 1 1501989.00 Medium Open for abuse, week internal controlling 
117.Illegally paid per 
diem 
Sector/accou
nting 
Intentional 2 1416.30 Too sever Enough evidence for corruption 
118.Government fund 
use for private purpose 
Accounting/s
ector 
Intentional 3 260.00 Too sever Enough evidence for corruption 
119.Excess paid Accounting Negligence 1 109.49 Sever Enough evidence for wasting public finance 
120.Disbursement 
approved beyond 
authority 
procurement Negligence 1 38375.91 Medium Chance for abuse and weaken controlling 
121.Various controlling 
procedures not followed 
(signature and seal 
missing) 
Accounting/p
rocurement 
Negligence/lack of skill 5  Medium Open chance for abuse/fraud 
122.Inadequate recording 
of payables 
Accounting Negligence/lack of skill 10 654132.65 Medium Difficult for management 
123.Disbursement are 
accumulated at closing 
time 
Accounting Negligence/intentional 1  Sever Uneconomical transactions or wastages, unplanned 
activities,  
124.Inappropriate 
reporting 
Accounting Negligence/lack of capacity 3  Sever Unreliable report/statement 
125.Some unreported 
accounts (off-budget) 
Accounting Negligence/lack of capacity 2  Medium Incomplete information for report users 
126.Lack of budget 
discipline 
Budget/accou
nting 
Negligence 1 3418.78 Sever Can cause misuse 
127.Excess budget 
recorded wrongly 
Budget Negligence 3 3,106 Medium Can cause inefficient utilization, weaken budget control 
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128.Lack of proper 
handling 
Property 
administratio
n 
Negligence 21 
vehicles 
 Sever Wastage of public resource 
129.Not following the 
property admin 
procedures (libre, license) 
Property 
admin 
Negligence 15 
vehicles 
 Medium Difficult for management and follow up 
130.Not presented for 
auditing 
Property 
admin/sector
s 
Negligence/intentional 9 
vehicles 
 Sever There is a suspect that they might not be in good 
condition, difficult to ensure they are there 
131.Improper handling 
and management of 
property in the store 
Property 
administratio
n 
Negligence/capacity problem/no 
recording, inventory, follow up, timely 
distribution for use, no appropriate 
transfer of responsibility through audit 
  Too sever Enough evidence for wastage of public property or 
damage, and loss of property, fraud are unidentified. 
132.No or incomplete 
guarantor 
HRM Negligence 12  Medium Accountability weakened  
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Appendix 7: Questionnaire to Local Residents 
Dear respondent! 
This questionnaire is meant for the constituents who reside in the selected rural and 
urban woreda administrations of the Amhara region. The primary purpose of this 
questionnaire is to gather data which will be used to write a research on “Linking Fiscal 
Decentralization and Local Financial Governance: the case of District Level Fiscal 
Decentralization in the Amhara Region, Ethiopia”. The success of this study depends on 
your genuine responses. The researcher would like to assure you that the entire data 
gathered will be used only for academic purpose and is strictly confidential. Hence, you 
are cordially requested to respond objectively and frankly to those questions.  
 
Thanks in advance for your cooperation! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note 
- Writing your name is not required 
- Please write or choose your answers to questions by putting    on the blank 
space or box in front of your preferred answer 
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1. Personal Information 
 1.1 Sex              1.7 Education level 
 1.2 Age             1.8 Marital status 
 1.3 Religion 
 1.4 Occupation  
 1.5 Woreda 
     1.6 Kebele 
2. Awareness about woreda administrations finance and budgeting 
  
2.2 Do you have interest to know the woreda administration finance and budget 
situation?   
      Yes                                                      No 
 
3. Attitude about government tax 
 
 
4. Accountability 
2.1   How do you evaluate the importance of the following 
woreda government roles or activities? 
Important Undecided Not 
important 
Collecting and using tax for provision of various local public 
services 
   
Solving the economic problem of the people       
Ensuring peace and security in the surrounding    
Ensuring justice among the people    
Helping people who are suffering from various natural 
disaster 
   
2.3 What do you expect if the woreda administration finance is 
allocated and utilized properly? 
Agree Undecided Disagree 
Services like schools, clinics, clean water, fertilizer and 
chemicals would be provided properly and adequately 
   
My own and my families living standard would be improved    
I would not be asked to pay tax    
Public services would be provided free of charges    
Government would give me money    
3.1 How do you think various development activities and 
public services in your surroundings should be financed? 
Agree Undecided Disagree 
It has to be covered from regional or federal grant    
It has to be covered from foreign assistant and loan     
Citizens have to pay tax properly to cover it     
I am not concerned about it    
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5. The role of Woreda Council 
 
6. Community Participation 
6.1 How is your willingness to attend meetings called by your woreda 
administration?  
Always                   Sometimes                              Never 
 Yes Undecided No 
4.1 Do you suspect that public finance in the woreda 
government get corrupted, misused or wasted? 
   
4.2 Which body do you think should be given the power to 
oversee the proper use of the budget allocated for development 
projects to be constructed in your surroundings? 
Agree Undecided disagree 
Elders in the community      
Woreda chief administrator    
EPRDF (the ruling party)    
Regional or Federal government body    
Woreda council members    
4.3 Which of the following activities do you think are 
exposed to corruption?  
Agree Undecided Disagree 
Procurement           
Construction    
Tax assessment    
Service delivery    
5.1 Effectiveness of woreda council to channel the voice of 
people? 
 
Yes Somehow No 
Have you ever met your kebele representative in the woreda 
council?    
   
Do representatives have information about the peoples’ 
demand? 
   
Do you think your kebele representative have the capacity to 
convince the woreda administration to prioritize peoples’ 
demand 
   
Do you know clearly the power and role of the representatives 
in the council 
   
6.2 If you are invited to participate in a meeting to discuss 
about the allocation and utilization of public finance, 
Agree Undecided Disagree 
willing to participate if it involves personal gain    
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7. Intergovernmental relations 
 
 
Willing to participate if it can lead to public service 
improvement 
   
Willing to participate if I will be heard in the meeting    
Willing to participate if I know I can influence budget 
decision 
   
Willing to participate whether I am heard and can influence 
budget decision or not 
   
Not willing to participate because of busy with personal 
engagements 
   
Not willing to participate as this is the duty of government 
officials and employees           
   
Not willing as I am not aware of any thing about this issue     
Not willing as it is not my mandate     
6.4 Which of the following would you likely to do If you were participating 
in a meeting to evaluate the utilization of government finance?  
Agree  
I would criticize openly and expose the corruption and embezzlement, if any   
I would keep quite as I don’t know about the government system and I don’t 
have information 
 
I would keep silent even if I know the government finance system and have 
information about it. 
 
6.5 Which of the following meetings are you willing to 
participate? 
Agree Undecided Disagree 
Local election campaign     
Construction of schools, clinics, roads and so forth    
Woreda administration performance evaluation    
Improving peace and security in the surroundings    
7.1 Which factor do you think is salient for proper allocation 
and utilization of public finance in your surroundings? 
Agree Undecided Disagree 
Strong control from higher level government 
(federal/regional) 
   
Autonomy to woreda administration    
Direct involvement of citizens    
Elders should have role    
Religious leaders should have role    
Capable executives and civil service personnel     
The capacity of Police and court     
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7.3 Can you clearly identify the functional competencies devolved to woreda 
administration and retained to the regional government? 
Yes                         Partially                                        No   
7.4 Do you know the power devolved to your woreda administration and retained to the 
regional government?   
Yes                                    Partially                                                No 
 
8. Service Delivery 
 
 
7.2 Which body would you like to get involved in the duty of 
administering public finance to be used for you surrounding 
development? 
Agree Undecided Disagree 
Higher level government (Federal/Regional)    
Woreda government    
Kebele Administration    
People    
Elders and Religious leaders    
8.1 Can you mention your level of satisfaction on the 
following public services? 
Satisfied Undecided Not 
satisfied 
Primary school 1 – 4     
Primary school 5 – 8    
Clinic    
Health post    
Health center    
Hospital    
Provision of fertilizer    
Provision of improved seeds    
Agricultural expert support     
Other agricultural inputs such as chemicals    
Road    
Electricity supply    
Water supply    
Telephone    
Peace and security    
8.2 How do you describe the importance of the following 
basic service 
Very 
important 
Important Not that 
important 
Primary school 1 – 4     
Primary school 5 – 8    
Clinic    
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9. Availability of Financial Information 
9.1 Do you ever get information about the utilization and performance of government 
finance? 
  Always                Sometimes                 Never   
9.2 What do you feel if the public finance utilized in your surroundings is inspected by 
independent party?   I would be glad                I don’t mind  
 
10. Institutions and their role 
10.1 In which of the following informal associations you have membership? 
i. Edir 
ii. Equib 
iii. Senbetie/Mahiber 
iv. Debo 
Health post    
Health center    
Hospital    
Provision of fertilizer    
Provision of improved seeds    
Agricultural expert support     
Other agricultural inputs such as chemicals    
Road    
Electricity supply    
Water supply    
Telephone    
Peace and security    
8.3 Which of the following limitations do you witness in 
the service delivery institutions in your surroundings?  
Agree Undecided Disagree 
Poor construction quality     
Limited service capacity    
Lack of skilled personnel    
Lack of timely maintenance    
Lack of facilities, equipment and furniture    
Others, if any……    
    
 Yes Undecided No 
8.4 Do you think the budget allocation in the woreda has 
been responsive to the public service problems of the 
people?  
   
8.5 Do you think the allocated budget in the woreda utilized 
properly for the intended purpose?  
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v. Wonfel 
10.2 In which of the following formal associations you have membership? 
i. Cooperative 
ii. Militia 
iii. Mengistawi group 
iv. Saving and credit institutions 
10.3 Political party membership 
11 Your general opinion about the administration and utilization of public finance in 
your woreda 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 8: Questionnaire to Civil servants 
Dear respondent! 
This questionnaire is meant for the civil servants who work in various service delivery 
units of the selected woreda administrations of the Amhara region. The primary purpose 
of this questionnaire is to gather data which will be used to write a research on “Linking 
Fiscal Decentralization and Local Financial Governance: the case of District Level 
Fiscal Decentralization in the Amhara Region, Ethiopia”. The success of this study 
depends on your genuine responses. The researcher would like to assure you that the 
entire data gathered will be used only for academic purpose and is strictly confidential. 
Hence, you are cordially requested to respond objectively and frankly to those 
questions.  
 
Thanks in advance for your cooperation! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note 
- Writing your name is not required 
- Please write or choose your answers to questions by putting    on the blank 
space or box in front of your preferred answer 
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1. Personal Information 
1.1 Sex       
 1.2 Age      
  1.3 Occupation  
1.4 Woreda 
1.5 Kebele 
1.6 Institute 
1.7 Education level 
2. How much do you know about the budgeting activities of the woreda administration? 
A lot                              Few things                                      Nothing   
 
4. In which type of election do you think people are more interested to cast their vote? 
  Woreda council election                         Regional council election   
 
5. Community Participation 
5.1 How is the willingness of the people to attend meetings called by your woreda 
administration?  
Always                   Sometimes                              Never 
 
6. Intergovernmental relations 
3. Which of the following activities in your 
institution and the woreda administration do you 
think are exposed to corruption?  
Agree Undecided Disagree 
Procurement         
Construction    
Tax assessment    
Service delivery    
5.2 Which of the following meetings do you think 
people are willing to participate? 
Agree Undecided Disagree 
Local election campaign     
Construction of schools, clinics, roads and so forth    
Woreda administration performance evaluation    
Improving peace and security in the surroundings    
6.1 Which body do you think the people would you like to 
get involved in the duty of administering public finance to 
be used in their surrounding development? 
Agree Undecided Disagree 
Higher level government (Federal/Regional)    
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6.2 Can you clearly identify the functional competencies devolved to woreda 
administration and retained to the regional government? 
Yes                         Partially                                        No   
6.3 Do you know the power devolved to your woreda administration and retained to the 
regional government?   
   Yes                                      Partially                                                No 
 
8. Your general opinion about the administration and utilization of public finance in 
your service delivery unit and woreda 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Woreda government    
Kebele Administration    
People    
Elders and Religious leaders    
7. Which of the following limitations do you think 
your service delivery unit faces?  
Agree Undecided Disagree 
Poor construction quality     
Limited service capacity    
Lack of skilled personnel    
Lack of timely maintenance    
Lack of facilities, equipment and furniture    
Others, if any……    
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Appendix 9: Checklist of issues to be addressed in the interview with the deputy 
head of ANRS BoFED 
1. Description of the district level fiscal decentralization process in the Amhara 
region 
2. Functional competencies, expenditure and revenue powers devolved to woreda 
administrations  
3. The formulation of regional transfer formula and process 
4. Self-administering capacity building process in the woreda administrations 
including the financial management reforms, organization of woreda offices and 
providing the required personnel. 
5.  Interaction and power relationship between the region, zone administrations and 
woreda administration in the process of planning, budgeting, evaluation and in 
the day to day financial activities. 
6. The absence of legal framework and its impact on their relation 
7. Capacity of woreda administrations to mobilize their own revenue 
8. The current role of the regional office to support and regulate woreda 
administrations 
9. In which situations the regional/zonal office tends to interfere on woreda 
administrations. 
10. Successes and challenges of devolution of power, financial management reform 
and self-administering capacity building. 
11. Your evaluation about the implementation of financial management reforms in 
various woredas and the impact on their financial performance 
12. What the budget allocation structure and budget execution of woreda 
administrations looks like 
13. Why is the budget structure of woreda administrations is dominated by recurrent 
budget 
14. Adequate availability of fund at woreda administrations and the role of aid and 
donors fund to resolve budget shortage problem. 
15. How do you evaluate the role of fiscal decentralization and the financial 
management reform in curbing any possible corruption at woreda 
administrations 
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16. What accountability arrangements are put in place if public fund is abused by 
woreda officials 
17. Do you think the existing accountability mechanism is adequate to handle any 
corruption in woreda administrations?  
18. Does the financial management reform incorporate the role of citizen 
involvement in the financial management process of woreda administrations 
19. Is there any program or project to facilitate participation of people in woreda 
financial management process 
 
Appendix 10: Checklist of issues to be addressed in the interview with the woreda 
chief administrator and heads of woreda sector offices 
1. Description of budget preparation, allocation, appropriation and utilization 
process in your sector office 
2. How clear and understandable is the budgeting process 
3. Do you think the role and responsibility of your office and other bodies such as 
WOFED, woreda cabinet, woreda chief administrator and woreda council is 
clearly known 
4. Which body do you think is influential in the budget appropriation process 
5. How do corresponding offices at the region/zone administration involve in the 
sector office’s planning, budgeting and evaluation process 
6. Do you think there is clear integration between budget allocation and strategic 
plan; and between budget allocation and annual plan, if not why 
7. Do you think planning and budgeting procedures are implemented properly in 
your office, if not why? 
8. Do you think the budget appropriated to your office is fair and adequate 
9. Do you think various planned activities in your office are properly financed? 
10. How often your office drop planned activities due to budget shortage 
11. Do you have procedure to complain if you are dissatisfied with the budget 
appropriated to your office 
12. Do you finish plan and budget preparation process on time, if not why? 
13. Do you implement your budget as planned, if not why? 
14. Has your office ever experienced cash shortage? When, how often, and why? 
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15. Description of the financial reporting nature and process in your office? 
16. Do you think the existing financial procedures, rules and regulation safeguard 
your office budget from wastage and embezzlement 
17. Is there any practice of involving people in the budget preparation, 
implementation and evaluation process in your office 
18. The capacity of supporting staff and officials to properly discharge planning and 
budgeting responsibilities  
19. What improvements do you suggest in the current budgeting system and 
practice? 
 
Appendix 11: Checklist of issues to be addressed in the WOFED experts’ focus 
group discussions  
1. Clarity of the functions and spending and revenue collection power devolved to 
woreda administrations 
2. Clarity of the role, duty and power relationship between regional/zonal office 
and WOFED and between WOFED and various bodies within the woreda 
administration 
3. The nature of changes introduced by the reform in budgeting process, 
accounting process, disbursement and collection process, procurement process,  
financial reporting process, internal controlling and auditing practice. 
4. How is the implementation of reform and the impact thereof 
5. How prudently plans and budgets are prepared and implemented in sector 
offices 
6. The process of plan and budget consolidation at WOFED 
7. The role and power of WOFED to support and regulate woreda sector offices for 
compliance of financial procedures, rules and regulations 
8. Description of procedures in budget controlling and follow up by WOFED 
9. What does the budget performance of sector offices and woreda administration 
in general look like 
10. Account recording and reconciliation practices in WOFED 
11. Disbursement processes and the occurrence of cash shortage in the woreda 
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12. How adequate the current procurement method is to address quality, late 
delivery and high price problems in the procurement process 
13. How donor funds are integrated with treasury funds and accounted and 
controlled? 
14. The capacity of the current financial ordinances, internal controlling 
arrangements and auditing to safeguard public finance from misallocation, 
uneconomic utilization and embezzlement 
15. The nature and adequacy of financial reporting to depict clearly financial and 
physical performances, if not adequate, why? 
16. How often misuse, illegal use, and corruption of public resources occur in the 
woreda 
17. How often is the woreda financial performance audited by ARAG 
18. The challenges WOFED experienced in implementing the reform 
19. What does the political commitment of woreda officials look like to get the 
reforms properly implemented and financial procedures, rules and regulations 
enforced 
20. The gaps in the current financial management reform? 
21. The capacity of manpower (skill, training, experience, number, turnover and 
commitment) involved in the financial management process 
 
Appendix 12: Checklist of issues to be addressed in the community focus group 
discussions 
1. People’s attitude about the government role of collecting and spending public 
finance 
2. People’s awareness about the importance of effective and transparent and 
accountable public finance mobilization and spending by the woreda 
administration 
3. Awareness about the division of responsibilities and powers between the 
region/zone and the woreda 
4. The role and partnership the people should have with the woreda administration 
in service delivery process and financial management process 
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5. Are the people willing to have role in the process of public finance mobilization 
and spending, if not why 
6. The current participation of people 
7. The type of public meetings currently being organized by the woreda 
administration  
8. Are financial performances discussed in such meetings 
9. Is information about the financial performance of the woreda administration 
available, if yes, how and if no, why 
10. Are people interested to get information about the financial performance of the 
woreda administration 
11. People’s level of suspect for corruption by woreda officials 
12. The nature of corruption suspected and areas suspected for corruption 
13. The availability of arrangements for the people to expose such suspects 
14. Are people interested to expose corruption, if not why 
15. What type of community based organizations and civil society organizations 
exist in their surrounding 
16. The capacity, role and credibility of  local formal and informal community based 
organizations to facilitate, mobilize and empower local people to involve in 
budget preparation, implementation, follow up and evaluation process of the 
woreda administration 
17. How the people think different public services and development projects should 
be financed 
18. Are people willing to pay tax, if not why 
19. People’s attitude about the assessment and collection process 
20. The participation of people in the woreda council election 
21. The attitude about the role of woreda council in safeguarding public funds from 
embezzlement by woreda officials 
22. Are public services provided in their surrounding adequately 
23. What kind of problems exist in the public services delivered in their 
surroundings 
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E-Mail:  jbardil l@uwc.ac.za 
 
 
20 January 2011 
 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
 
Meselu Alamnie MULUGETA: Letter of Support 
 
Meselu Mulugeta is a PhD student at the School of Government, University of the Western Cape, Cape 
Town, South Africa.  He commenced his studies in January 2010 and is in receipt of a prestigious 
DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) scholarship.  The School of Government is part of a 
Centre of Excellence established at UWC with funding from DAAD for the education and training of 
leaders and scholars in Africa in the development field. 
 
Meselu has successfully completed his PhD proposal and has attended the School’s partner 
organization in Germany, the Institute for Development Policy and Research at Bochum University, 
where he attended courses and seminars to assist him with his studies. From January 2011 he will be 
undertaking fieldwork in Ethiopia to collect the data he requires to complete his doctoral dissertation on 
District Level Fiscal Decentralization in the Amhara Region of Ethiopia. I am his supervisor for the 
dissertation. 
 
In carrying out his fieldwork and research, Meselu will abide by the strict research ethics principles set 
out in the University’s Research Policy, particularly in relation to voluntary participation, informed 
consent and confidentiality.  The interviews he conducts and the information he collects will be used 
solely for the purpose of his dissertation, and the anonymity of respondents will be guaranteed.   
 
If you are able to assist Meselu in carrying out his fieldwork in Ethiopia, I would be very grateful and 
would like to thank you in advance for the support you provide. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Prof. John E. Bardill 
Director 
School of Government   
 
Appendix 13: Letter of Support from the School of Government 
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Appendix 14: Support Letter (in Amharic Language) to the Case Woreda 
Administration WOFEDs From ANRS Bureau of Finance and Economic 
Development 
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Appendix 15: Support Letter from ANRS Health Bureau 
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Appendix 16: Map of Amhara Region and the Case Study Woreda 
Administrations 
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